Wow. Big news from the Baker commission:
The bipartisan Iraq Study Group reached a consensus on Wednesday on a final report that will call for a gradual pullback of the 15 American combat brigades now in Iraq but stop short of setting a firm timetable for their withdrawal, according to people familiar with the panel’s deliberations.
The report, unanimously approved by the 10-member panel, led by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, is to be delivered to President Bush next week. It is a compromise between distinct paths that the group has debated since March, avoiding a specific timetable, which has been opposed by Mr. Bush, but making it clear that the American troop commitment should not be open-ended. The recommendations of the group, formed at the request of members of Congress, are nonbinding.
A person who participated in the commission’s debate said that unless the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki believed that Mr. Bush was under pressure to pull back troops in the near future, “there will be zero sense of urgency to reach the political settlement that needs to be reached.”
The report recommends that Mr. Bush make it clear that he intends to start the withdrawal relatively soon, and people familiar with the debate over the final language said the implicit message was that the process should begin sometime next year.
The report leaves unstated whether the 15 combat brigades that are the bulk of American fighting forces in Iraq would be brought home, or simply pulled back to bases in Iraq or in neighboring countries. (A brigade typically consists of 3,000 to 5,000 troops.) From those bases, they would still be responsible for protecting a substantial number of American troops who would remain in Iraq, including 70,000 or more American trainers, logistics experts and members of a rapid reaction force.
So how will the President react?
"I know there's a lot of speculation that these reports in Washington mean there's going to be some kind of graceful exit out of Iraq," the president said during a joint news conference with Mr. Maliki, referring to the panel's reports that are expected next week. "We're going to stay in Iraq to get the job done so long as the government wants us there."
So what's the right move? Speak up!
UPDATE 4:29 PM: Feeling in the slightest bit upbeat? Like there's a shred of hope for good in the world? John Robb should take care of that. His forecast for Iraq:
The US will find itself forced to remain in Iraq indefinitely, despite an inability to achieve any meaningful victory conditions. The reason for this is simple. Iraq is a core producer of oil for global markets. Control of this oil cannot be ceded to either the guerrillas or Iran under any meaningful interpretation of US policy. Further, a full US withdrawal would put Saudi Arabia at risk -- the collapse of both of these oil producers in tandem would plunge the global economy into a depression. As a result, the US will stay. The most likely result is that the US will reconfigure its remaining forces to play the role of the "strongest faction" in Iraq.
This new role is the inevitable result of the US withdrawal from pacification operations (particularly in Anbar), the evaporation of funding for reconstruction (Bechtel's departure from Iraq marked the end of the effort), and the failure of the effort to rebuild the Iraqi military (due to a deficit of loyalty to the government). As the strongest faction in Iraq, the US will adopt the strategy of a spoiler. This means that we will remain in Iraq to prevent (through the decisive application of force) any Iraqi faction (that is antagonistic to the US) or Iran from gaining control of Iraq and its oil. The US presence will also attempt to prevent the spread of the conflict to Saudi Arabia. It will be interesting to see how this role evolves over the next few decades, particularly as the conflict (despite US efforts, or worse, due to the inadvertent consequences of US efforts) spreads to Saudi Arabia. At that point, the entire strategy deck will be reshuffled (almost certainly for the worse, from the US perspective).
UPDATE 5:42 PM: Check out Fred Kaplan's take, too.
It's hard to justify keeping even 50,000 American troops in Iraq—even if they're just sitting there—unless they have a mission. The mission might serve as an adjunct to a broader political initiative.
If Iraq falls apart, the bordering states will be tempted to rush into the vacuum, partly for their own security, partly for aggrandizement. If they do, their forces may brush up against one another (Iraq's internal sectarian borders are far from distinct). The United States could serve as a mediator to keep this from happening. To play this role, it helps to have troops on the ground and planes in the air.
This may be the only real purpose of a U.S. military presence in Iraq at this point—to keep the country and the region from erupting into flames.
The Baker Commission is a joke. A phased withdrawal, that is not original. Anyway, I don't think anyone on the commission is an expert in COTW/counter-insurgency, post conflict and reconstruction, so they are clueless, no value added. They are just a bunch of old Vietnam era Cold War Realists. Should the US leave and never look back or double down? If we stay, and we should, then something radical must be undertaken.
What does the US consider a victory in Iraq? If is a functioning, peaceful democracy, we have to do way more. The current half assed, PC approached has failed. Either we are a heavy handed Empire, meddling all around the world and removing dictators, or we are isolationists.
For the democracy goal to be successful, it must start with law and order. We need at least 1.5 million US troops/police/CA/inter-agency people for this to work; a massive Iraqi public works program and another 10-20+ years of US occupation. Democracies cannot be created from the top down. Certain conditions must be met first. The Iraqis have proven incapable of affectively governing themselves from a centralized government at this time. We should claim a mulligan, and try something radical.
My solution is a bottom up, decentralized, multi-decade approach to nation/institution building and de-Iraqification. No Iraqi central government/CPA. We basically create hundreds of independent functioning mini managed democracies over time; mini "Green Zones" if you will.
We must have enough troops to cordon off every Iraqi city into an air tight grid and I mean hardened 360 degree physical barriers, with 50 thousand or less people per district. Leading to a complete lockdown of the populous, with an extensive weapons search and curfews. It will basically be a mass prison, “Berlin Wall”, because no one can ever enter or leave their assigned district. The Kurds seem to function well. Falluja strategy was the right one, just too big; we did not have enough man power or will power to implement it.
Each district will be run independently by cultural and public/civil affair experts, not necessarily a conventional US combat brigade. Everything will be rebuilt; schools, hospitals, markets, etc., by the locals, all the utilities will function, and food and money will be allocated. It will be safe, clean, and healthy, with basic freedoms and rights, just no one can enter or leave.
After several years, the population will be reconditioned, and governing responsibilities will be increased, until they obtain local autonomy. This will only work in absolute lockdown, with no external physical influences.
This is an Orwellian concept, but this extreme technique is needed to change, I mean “re-educate” a culture, because they have no concept of modernity or civility. Populations are willing to sacrifice freedoms as long as they are safe, and have food, clothing, and shelter. No American is comfortable with this role, it is not who we are as a people, but how bad to we want to succeed in Iraq. We are still in Germany, Japan, Korea, and Kuwait so we may never leave Iraq.
Since no one is willing to put in the extreme effort and allocate substantially more resources to force a democratic Iraq to succeed, the more likely scenario is one like Yugoslavia, or Lebannon. A bloody civil war, with forced mass relocation is highly likely, leading to a tri-partitioning of Iraq. It is of course an artificial state to begin with, so a rebalancing of the region to its natural sectarian boundaries is not a bad thing, but it will be painful. Only downside is all the surrounding countries intervening could lead to a wider regional conflict, but that is a low probability. Maybe the tri-partied will just be absorbed by its neighbors and Iraq will cease to exist forever.
The best case scenario is a peaceful tri-partied, loose federation, sharing oil revenues. If that is successful, Iraq will eventually merge back together. This scenario is unlikely because of external influences and too much sectarian hatred has been fermented.
Winning an offensive conventional military victory on the battlefield solves nothing. We must also win the peace to create the desired outcomes.
Posted by: BT at December 1, 2006 02:36 AM