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WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND ORGANIZED CRIME: THE RUSSIAN MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCE

DIMENSION

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

INSS Occasional Paper 10

Proliferation Series

June 1996

USAF Institute for National Security Studies US Air Force Academy, Colorado

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. This report is approved for public release by SAF/PAS; distribution is unlimited.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Dr. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. is a senior analyst with the Foreign Military Studies Office, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army for International Affairs. He is the editor of the international journal Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement and the recently published book Global Dimensions of High Intensity Crime and Low Intensity Conflict. Before joining FMSO, he was Chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Soviet/Warsaw Pact Strategic Operations Branch and served in a variety of other DIA analytical and managerial assignments.

********

This paper is the result of research conducted under the auspices of an INSS grant in the summer of 1995.

********

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to:

Director, Institute for National Security Studies

HQ USAFA/DFE

2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5D33

USAF Academy, CO 80840-6258

Voice: (719)-472-2717

Fax: (719) 472-2716

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii

Executive Summary ix

Introduction 1

The Russian Criminal Environment 4

Military Crime 9

Military Crime and the Conventional Arms Trade 11

Military Crime and Weapons of Mass Destruction 28

Nuclear Arms and Proliferation Issues 29

Chemical Arms and Proliferation Issues 39

Conclusions 45

Endnotes 48

FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this tenth volume in the Occasional Paper series of the USAF Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). This monograph represents the results of research conducted during fiscal year 1995 under the auspices of a grant from INSS.

The proliferation of weapons of all types, especially weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has emerged as a primary international security challenge in the post-Cold War era. This paper examines the critical issue of weapons proliferation in a unique way by focusing on how criminality in the former Soviet Union (FSU) exacerbates this problem. Undoubtedly, this dimension of the weapons proliferation problem does not receive enough attention, is not well understood, and presents extremely difficult policy-making challenges. As the author points out, many very worrisome proliferation ingredients are already present in the FSU, including huge stockpiles of conventional arms and WMD; widespread corruption, turmoil, and uncertainty in military and security establishments; and the potential for huge profits from state and nonstate markets. Adding organized crime to this volatile mix creates an explosive recipe and marks the FSU as the primary source of weapons proliferation for years to come.

About the Institute, the INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Negotiations Division, Plans and Operations Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Its other sponsors are the Assistant Chief of Staff for Air Force Intelligence, OSD Net Assessment, the Defense Special Weapons Agency (formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency), and the Army Environmental Policy Institute. INSS' mission is to promote national security research for the Department of Defense within the military academic community and support the Air Force national security education program. Its primary purpose is to promote research in fields of interest to INSS' sponsors: arms control, proliferation, national security, regional studies, the revolution in military affairs, information warfare, and environmental security. INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for defense policy making. The Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops that facilitate the dissemination of information to a wide range of private and government organizations. INSS is in its fourth year of providing valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of its sponsors.

We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and its research products.

PETER L. HAYS, Lt Col, USAF

Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the changed international security environment of the post-Cold War era, concerns related to weapons proliferation-especially weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-have taken center stage. One dimension of this problem that has not received enough attention is how organized crime facilitates weapons proliferation worldwide. In this context, the former Soviet Union (FSU) has emerged as the world's greatest counterproliferation challenge. This region, after all, contains the best developed links among organized crime, military and security organizations, and weapons proliferation. The dissolution of the Soviet Union provided a fertile seedbed for the development of serious and pernicious criminal activity of all types. Crime in the FSU has increased by orders of magnitude. More ominously, organized crime has emerged as one of the strongest actors in the FSU. According to some official Russian estimates, organized crime may now control some 40,000 state and private organizations and over half of all economic entities within the FSU. The flourishing illegal trade in weapons, both within and outside of the FSU, is one of the most serious reflections of this overall criminal environment. Most importantly, analysts soon reach one inescapable conclusion concerning this trade in weapons: Russian military and security forces are the principle source of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, participants in regional conflict, and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms markets in their various dimensions.

The post-Cold War explosion of criminal activity within Russian military and security organizations resulted from the nearly complete breakdown of Soviet socioeconomic structures as well as the widespread corruption within these organizations during the Soviet era. Criminal elements have taken advantage of the unique resources and expertise of the military and security organizations and, in return, have provided nontraditional means of support for these organizations in the power vacuum that resulted from the Soviet Union's demise. Analysts both within and outside of Russia have increasingly come to recognize an extensive and expanding overlap between Russian "power ministries" and the criminal world.

The flourishing illegal trade in conventional weapons is the clearest and most tangible manifestation of the close links between Russian power ministries and criminal organizations. The sheer magnitude and pervasive nature of this problem underscore its seriousness. Some 81 tons of munitions, for example, had allegedly disappeared by the time Russian forces completed their withdrawal from East Germany. Moreover, attempts to centralize and control sanctioned Russian weapons exports via Rosvooruzheniye, the new consolidated state armaments company, have proven less than successful. Specialized military and security organizations, such as the notorious Security Service of the President, seem to be increasingly operated as private militias to protect the illegal arms trade and various other criminal activities. A final clear indication of the magnitude of the conventional arms proliferation problem within the FSU is the seemingly endless supply of sophisticated weapons available to the Chechen rebels.

The magnitude of the WMD proliferation problem from the FSU is less clear and less tangible, but the potential is certainly very worrisome. There have been many open reports of small-scale fissile material smuggling out of the FSU, and Chechen rebels planted radioactive material in Moscow's Ismailov Park. However, the existence of a much more dangerous, larger-scale, and better-organized Russian "nuclear mafia" remains a topic of debate. The 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (12th GUMO) is charged with the security and transportation of fissile materials within Russia. With the aid of the United States' Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the 12th GUMO is attempting to cope with this enormous challenge. It is unclear, however, whether it will be able to deal with the most serious threats, such as attacks by organized criminals or terrorists.

The situation with regard to the proliferation of chemical weapons (CW) usually receives less attention but may be more serious. With an acknowledged stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, the potential for CW proliferation out of the FSU, especially via organized crime channels, is enormous. This potential was ominously foreshadowed by the March 1995 Tokyo subway nerve gas attack, which revealed numerous personnel and hardware links between the Russian CW establishment and the Aum Shinrikyo cult.

Overall, this study reaches four main conclusions. First, Russian military and security rganizations are the primary sources for the flourishing illegal weapons trade within and outside of the FSU. Second, military criminality is playing an integral role in facilitating the illegal weapons trade. Third, weapons proliferation is fostered by extensive ties between criminal Russian military organizations and criminal elements within the Russian civil sector. Finally, the aforementioned factors raise substantial doubts about the avowed security of the Russian nuclear and CW stockpiles. These conclusions have enormous implications for American and Western policy makers as they attempt to craft mechanisms like the CTR to deal effectively with the threat of weapons proliferation from the FSU.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

Lieutenant General Paul E. Stein Superintendent

Brigadier General Ruben A. Cubero Dean of the Faculty

HEADQUARTERS, US AIR FORCE

PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

Major General Robert E. Linhard Director of Plans

Colonel Todd Bodenhammer Chief, National Security Negotiations Division

USAF INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays Director

Major Alan R. Van Tassel Editor

Ms Marsha Taylor Cover Design

INSS OCCASIONAL PAPERS

1. Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Security Dilemma. Gregory J. Rattray, July 1994

2. The Ukrainian Military: Instrument for Defense or Domestic Challenge? Oleg Strekal, November 1994

3. North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration's Response. William E. Berry, Jr., March 1995

4. Environmental Assistance as National Security Policy: Helping the Former Soviet Union Find Solutions to its Environmental Problems. Robert L. Dunaway, November 1995

5. Economic Power in the Sino-U.S. Relationship. Kevin F. Donovan, December 1995

6. Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat? William H. Kincade, December 1995

7. Nuclear Proliferation: The Diplomatic Role of Non-Weaponized Programs. Rosalind R. Reynolds, January 1996

8. Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials. Guy B. Roberts, February 1996

9. The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare. Richard W. Aldrich, April 1996

Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: The Russian Military and Security Force Dimension

by Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Introduction

As the end of the 20th Century approaches, the widespread availability and distribution of all types of weapons is fueling armed conflicts, organized criminal activity, and random violence in many regions of world. Arms trafficking--whether black market, gray market, or the injudicious legal sale of weapons--has long been a prominent security concern for those areas of the world most affected. While weapons trafficking during most of the postWorld War II era has been assessed in a Cold War context, the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 marked a watershed for this already serious problem. Vast new weapons stockpiles and willing distributors unrestrained by Cold War political and ideological limitations entered local, regional, and international arms markets with considerable fervor.

The end of the Cold War also marked the start of a new era of concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the evolving role of state and nonstate actors in the acquisition, spread, and employment of WMD. The former Soviet Union (FSU)--especially Russia, which inherited the bulk of WMD stockpiles, manufacturing potential, and technologies-became a central focus of regional and world proliferation concerns. While Russian political and military spokesmen officially expressed confidence about the security of WMD systems, they also voiced private concerns about the ability of state institutions to fully protect WMD stockpiles and know-how. At the same time, a combination of wild rumors, frequent seizures of low-grade radioactive materials, and a handful of more serious proliferation cases indicated that the potential for serious WMD leakages from Russia and the FSU was beginning to be realized.

Across the spectrum of arms trafficking from small arms to WMD-associated systems, organized crime has come to play a substantial role. This criminal involvement takes various forms, including traditional civil-sector groups, shadowy commercial ventures, and corrupt government officials. In this regard as well, Russia and the FSU have emerged as central concerns, since crime and corruption in the wake of the Soviet bloc's dissolution quickly began to shape and influence every dimension of public and private life. Military establishments in the region--shrinking, impoverished, and demoralized--were far from immune to these pressures and, in the case of the Russian armed forces in particular, have become major participants in the illegal diversion of weapons.

Overall, the confluence of volatile developments in Russia and its periphery-the presence of large conventional and WMD stockpiles and technologies, high levels of crime and corruption, turmoil in large military and security establishments, and the potential for huge profits from state and nonstate markets--identify the region as a focus of weapons proliferation for years to come. The role of organized crime in arms trafficking is manifested in the form of traditional criminal groups, criminalized government organizations and commercial structures, and corrupt individuals.

This study considers both conventional and WMD arms proliferation and addresses those criminal structures and corrupt state institutions associated with these issues. The focus is on Russia, however, since it is the most important potential source of weapons and technologies and the state most deeply affected by criminal endeavors. More specifically, the study examines the phenomenon of widespread Russian military criminality, the association of military organizations with criminal groups, and the extent to which the Russian military plays a role in black and gray conventional arms markets. After establishing a pattern of systemic Russian military criminality associated with conventional arms trafficking, the study addresses those military organizations most closely involved with nuclear and chemical weapons development, storage, and employment and identifies potential vectors within the Russian armed forces for the diversion of WMD materials and technologies.

The Russian Criminal Environment

Newly established regimes in Russia, other FSU states, and Eastern Europe face serious problems that seem to defy easy solutions. They include daunting economic and resource constraints, complex political and social problems, weakened and demoralized military and security establishments, and a host of transnational security concerns, such as organized crime, narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and environmental issues. Conflicts sparked by national and ethnic tensions have been joined by unprecedented waves of legal and illegal immigration, including refugees from conflict areas. Immigrant populations are often seen as bases where foreign criminal or terrorist elements can hide and operate.

In short, Russia and a number of states in the FSU and Eastern Europe have become fertile seedbeds for the most pernicious forms of random and organized crime. Throughout these regions, the interests of local, regional, and international criminal groups have coincided with the appearance of disrupted economies, requirements for hard currency, and reduced law enforcement effectiveness. Corruption in particular has become a familiar disruption to reform programs ranging from the creation of sound financial institutions to the restructuring of military and police forces.

The Russian criminal environment is a specific example of the corrosive effect that widespread criminality can have on state security institutions throughout the region.1 Overall crime rates have continued to climb despite dramatic increases beginning in the late 1980s. The Ministry of the Interior (MVD) recently indicated that overall crime in the first two months of 1995 had increased by some five percent in comparison with the same period in 1994, with murders up ten percent. Former Russian Interior Minister Viktor Yerin also indicated that the total number of crimes was nearly half again as great as published figures, if one considered those crimes that were unreported. Other figures from midMarch 1995 indicated that juvenile crime had increased by 76 percent over the last six years, a factor that is having a considerable effect on the quality of the military conscript pool among other more obvious issues.2

It is organized crime, however, that poses the greatest threat to Russian national cohesiveness and stability. While estimates vary, a Russian specialist recently indicated that some 4,300 criminal gangs exist in Russia, the most powerful of which have defined spheres of criminal activity to include arms and drug trafficking, gambling, banking, petroleum exports, automobile theft and smuggling, precious metals trading, and a host of other ventures. For gangs in the Moscow area, some 15 percent were thought to have international ties, as do a substantial number outside of Moscow.3

Official 1994 Russian estimates of organized criminal penetration of state institutions indicate that criminal groups controlled some 40,000 state and private organizations, including hundreds of state enterprises, joint-stock companies, cooperatives, banks, and markets.4 The hundreds of Russian banks and financial groups are particularly central to criminal endeavors. According to a 1995 Ministry of Internal Affairs report, "criminal structures in the state now control over 50% of economic entities."5 The organizational disarray, lack of effective legislation and authority, shifting political affiliations, and pervasive criminal penetration present in Russia's financial system have all combined to create rich criminal opportunities.6

The influence of crime in political systems throughout the region is pervasive. In this regard, the possibility that increasing numbers of criminals may win election or appointment to executive, legislative, or judicial positions has been a continuing concern. In the case of the Russian Parliament and regional legislatures, this concern appears wellfounded, given criminal resources and the coercive measures used so effectively in other spheres.7 The potential for criminal penetration of Russian legislative bodies is illustrated by Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov's identification of some 85 criminals running for Parliament in the fall of 1995. Kulikov also announced that some 1,600 linkages between criminals and high government officials were being investigated and estimated that 30-50 percent of criminal profits were used to bribe state officials.8 Nevertheless, determining who is influenced by organized crime is rarely easy, and political agendas run side-by-side with real and alleged criminal activities. In Russia, accusations that "reformist political circles" are heavily influenced by organized criminal agendas mask the actual intentions behind the reformers' "concern for human rights, the constitution, [and] the criminal and procedural code." Such accusations, therefore, require critical examination, as do charges directed at representatives of the military-industrial sector, former Communists, and other political targets.9

Within this overall environment, and fully reflective of it, the trade in weapons is flourishing. While there are various estimates of the number of uncontrolled arms circulating in the region, all of them put the number in the tens of millions. Aside from the number and variety of circulating arms, however, it is the increasingly blurred distinction among black, gray, and legal arms trading that constitutes the greatest danger for the mid to long term. Arms disseminated through black, gray, and legal channels are provided to a variety of recipients and range from custom handguns delivered to mafia kingpins to helicopter and fixed-wing aviation resources delivered to drug cartels abroad to bulk deliveries of weapons and equipment to paramilitary groups and other nation-states. These weapons are provided along routes that often are used jointly by drug and other contraband smugglers. The main providers include government institutions, specially established business ventures and jointstock companies, corrupt bureaucrats and military officers directly and indirectly involved in official arms sales, and organized criminal groups.10 With regard to Russia per se, there is a fundamental conclusion that analysts soon reach when examining the trade in weapons: Russian military and security forces remain the principal source of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, participants in regional conflicts, and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms markets in their various dimensions.

It is instructive, however, to address military criminality more generally before looking at specific linkages among Russian military and security forces, crime, and weapons proliferation.

Military Crime

In some states of the FSU and Eastern Europe, and most dramatically in Russia, the deepening association of military and security establishments with criminal enterprises has been especially alarming. While military crime possesses some special features, it reflects problems in the larger society. It clearly is an understatement, as one representative of the Russian Military Procuracy put it last year, that "the army organism reacts sensitively to the changes in the socioeconomic structure."11

Amid societies and state institutions that are increasingly undermined by crime, military and security establishments in the FSU and Eastern Europe have been faced with a combination of powerful incentives, opportunities, and marketable resources that are facilitating the development of militarycriminal organizations. At the same time, crime is on the rise in other public and private sectors of these fledgling democracies. This is particularly true among active duty military and security forces--as well as retired or discharged military and security personnel--who are faced with diminished prospects and low public regard.

Typically, military and security forces have ready access to valuable state property; the land, air, and sea transport to move that property; and specialized skills that criminal organizations need and can put to good use. Because of severe economic constraints, military units also began working more closely with civilian economic enterprises in many countries and concluding a range of contracts and business ventures on their own. On the one hand, civil economic elements required direct military support to continue functioning, while on the other, military units required new arrangements for food, clothing, and other basic support.12

In this overall environment, military crime has come to incorporate activities ranging from individual crimes of opportunity to sophisticated organized crime, including close interaction with foreign groups and gangs. As one 1995 Russian assessment put it regarding the relationship between the "criminal world" and the "power ministries" (as the Defense, Interior, Federal Security Service, and other Russian security ministries are termed), "At one fine point, two lines--the power ministries and the criminal world-intersected. . . . The criminal world was admitted to secret facilities. The power ministries--to the criminal world."13 These still-evolving relationships have reduced the reliability of many military units (including those deployed in peacekeeping missions), undermined law enforcement efforts at every level, contributed to the "criminal resource base," and generated variations of organized crime as it appears in the region and beyond.

Military Crime and the Conventional Arms Trade

Developments subsequent to the dissolution of the USSR could scarcely have been better designed to sustain and promote military criminality. It should be emphasized, however, that when the Russian armed forces were created in May 1992, criminal enterprises had already been flourishing in its Soviet predecessor.14 This clearly involved "privatized" arms trade activities and a breakdown of centralized control over armaments. The theft of weapons in the Russian military, for example, increased by 50 percent in 1989 and continued to mount in 1990.15 On a larger scale, in January 1991 United Nations personnel enforcing the arms embargo against Iraq found substantial quantities of Russian arms and other military items hidden on a Soviet merchant ship in the Red Sea. Some arms were even concealed in the captain's cabin. While the incident seemed a puzzling contradiction to the USSR's avowed support of UN sanctions, in retrospect it stands as an early indicator of uncontrolled arms trafficking for profit.16

Clearly, the earliest and most visible indication that criminal trends in the Soviet military would continue in the Russian armed forces was the widespread theft, diversion, and unauthorized sale of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Providing effective physical security for Russian military ordnance depots and other facilities became, and remains at the end of 1995, an unsolved problem. The quality of individuals assigned to guard these facilities has been severely criticized, and remedial programs to stem losses from theft or unauthorized sale have floundered in the face of resource shortages, compelling criminal profits, and the near indifference of military personnel who face a spectrum of organizational and personal problems.17

The consequent hemorrhage of military arms from depots, units, and Defense Ministry production facilities has had a number of variants. Weapons, munitions, and other equipment are stolen from storage sites by civilian criminals, often in collusion with military sentries and other service personnel. Facilities are also successfully attacked or breached by criminal groups that neutralize or kill sentries and seize arms. This is a problem that has been particularly serious in areas near Russia's periphery. In addition, weapons are sold outright, individually and in lots of varying sizes, by officers and other military personnel stationed in Russia and abroad.18

In the Western Group of Forces (WGF) in East Germany, other groups of forces in Eastern Europe, and units in the Baltic states, the sale of individual weapons by Soviet/Russian troops became notorious beginning in the late 1980s and continued throughout the troops' phased withdrawal. On a larger scale, an underground trade in heavy equipment ranging from armored vehicles to Mig aircraft has also been widely reported.19 This included the alleged disappearance of some 81 tons of ammunition from WGF depots in early 1994. The charge was compatible with other WGF resource diversions but drew heated denials by the WGF commander-in-chief, Colonel General Matvey Burlakov. General Burlakov was later dismissed from the Army under a cloud of suspicion for a host of alleged criminal activities, including the diversion of huge quantities of arms from his command.20 Analogous military-criminal associations in arms and equipment trafficking by Russian military officers have been evident in the Baltic states, the Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet, Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.21

A similar environment has existed inside Russia. In 1993, for example, four officers ranging in rank from major to colonel were arrested in Moscow for selling weapons. This rather unremarkable incident illustrated how smoothly profit had replaced ideology, since three of these officers were from the Humanitarian Academy of the Armed Forces (formerly the Lenin MilitaryPolitical Academy).22 The commander and deputy commander of the 10th Air Defense Army were charged with weapons thefts and sales as well.23 In 1994, the chief of the Smolensk Federal counterintelligence Service (Federal'naya Sluzhba Kontrrazvedky--FSK) Directorate pointed to the dozens of guns, grenades, and rounds of ammunition confiscated by Chekists (the traditional Soviet name for security service personnel) from the "mafia in uniform."24

A specific illustration of how such weapons are disposed of is provided by the Russian Military Procuracy, which cited the case of a lieutenant colonel in the Rocket and Artillery Armaments Service of a Siberian Military District (MD) formation who sold AK-74 automatic weapons, antitank grenade launchers, and pistols to the Russian Kontinent Company, Ltd.25 Similarly, a major general and fellow officers in the Ural MD acquired military pistols and sold them on the civilian market.26 These kinds of sales continue to flourish around many Russian garrisons and serve as a conduit for arms to criminal and extremist organizations within and outside of Russia. Overall, as 1995 progressed the MVD still considered the Russian military to be "the main and stable source" of weapons supplied to criminal groups and participants in ethnic conflict around Russia's periphery.27

While the selling of weapons and munitions by officers and other military members remains endemic and well-documented, it is the diversion of profits from legal and gray market sales and the outright execution of large-scale black market sales for personal gain that are among the biggest areas of Russian military thievery. It is instructive, therefore, to sketch briefly some of the dimensions, complexities, linkages, and ambiguities of these sales and the principal actors involved. The sanctioned weapons trade in Russia has resided in state-designated "companies," weapons manufacturing enterprises, and elements of the armed forces, all of which are authorized to sell weapons abroad. The use of international joint-stock companies and other commercial firms to set up or facilitate transactions also has been a feature of Russian arms sales. In an ostensible effort to impose order on the free-wheeling, uncoordinated, and multiparticipant "legal" arms market that arose from the ruins of the USSR, Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 18 November 1993 signed an edict that created the state company Rosvooruzheniye (a contraction that means "Russian armaments").28 The edict read in part as follows: In order to provide for a state monopoly on exports and imports of arms and military equipment for the Russian Federation, Oboroneksport, Spetsvneshteknika, and the GUSK [Main Directorate of Special Contacts] shall be withdrawn from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and merged into the Rosvooruzheniye company and placed under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation Government.29

On the surface, this move seemed a wellgrounded attempt to regain control over an important source of state revenue. However, because of the huge hard-currency profits involved, key officials, politicians, bureaucrats, middlemen, lobbyists, and others made intense efforts to associate themselves with the arms import-export business. Military and security force personnel were often at the center of this activity.

Lieutenant General Viktor Samoylov, a supporter of former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and a long-time member of the Defense Ministry's Main Cadres Directorate who had no experience in arms sales, was named Rosvooruzheniye director.30 The Most financial group (its shadowy dealings, security service affiliations, and political rivalries are discussed further below) became one of several authorized banks, despite never having been involved in arms sales. Prominent figures who became associated with Rosvooruzheniye have included former Soviet Defense Minister Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, who was named Yeltsin's presidential representative to the new state company;31 First Deputy Prime Minister O. Soskovets, who became Chairman of the Interdepartmental Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation, the organization that supervises Rosvooruzheniye; and the notorious former chief of the Security Service of the President (Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Presidenta--SBP), Major General Aleksandr Korzhakov, who was granted responsibility for the company's "observance of state interests."32

As with earlier arrangements, a prominent question about Russia's arms sales under the new system soon became, "where is all the money going?" While officials associated with Rosvooruzheniye flourished personally, the return of revenues to the Russian Federation remained limited. Widespread suspicions were raised by the shady business dealing of men like Korzhakov. That is, aside from his dark political and conspiratorial presence in the Kremlin, Korzhakov had interwoven business dealings with his official duties. Aside from his Rosvooruzheniye links, Korzhakov has been tied to the Logovaz financial concern. Logovaz grew out of VAZ, the Soviet state vehicle manufacturer, and among other ventures has attempted to profit from oil export revenues that were to be put back "into hunting lodges and other property."33 An incident at the end of 1994 illustrates how agendas involving arms sales, financial deals, political rivalries, and personal animosities routinely combine.

On 2 December 1994, Korzhakov directed his SBP bodyguard forces to raid the headquarters of Most. Most, while an authorized bank for Rosvooruzheniye and central to many other business ventures involving senior political officials, also was affiliated with Korzhakov's political rivals. The raid was carried out by some 30 armed and masked SBP personnel as well as elements of the Kremlin's Main Protection Directorate (Glavnoye Upravleniye Okhrany-GUO), then headed by a Korzhakov ally, Lieutenant General Mikhail Barsukov. An effort to halt the search of Most offices by the then-designated FSK chief in Moscow, Yevgeniy Savostyanov (an ally of Most director Vladimir Gusinskiy), was rebuffed by SBP/GUO forces and led shortly thereafter to Savostyanov's dismissal by Yeltsin.34 Multiple explanations for the raid have been advanced which, according to concerned members of the Association of Russian Banks, is not unprecedented.35 In any event, the Main Military Procuracy announced in May 1995 that criminal investigations of the incident had been dropped for lack of evidence that any violation of authority had taken place.36 Clearly, however, the pursuit of personal profit and power are imperatives as strong as any of the purely political motivations or machinations suggested.

Such goings-on by state security and law enforcement organizations render a term like "conflict of interest" wholly inadequate and suggest to Russian critics that state companies like Rosvooruzheniye are largely personal preserves; their profits are parceled out to selected members of the leadership and the leadership's financial and business affiliates. Even prominent military figures like Marshal Shaposhnikov, an officer who embodied a tradition of ostensibly honorable military service, have been the targets of sarcastic speculation regarding their evident wealth amid the poverty of those officers and enlisted personnel whose well-being was their personal and institutional responsibility.37

The very nature of foreign weapons sales; the poorly-documented revenues generated and their disposition; the controversial nature of political, financial, and other figures associated with the new state company; and links to commercial and financial ventures and deals (some through predecessor organizations) earned Rosvooruzheniye the nickname "Rosvor," a play on the Russian words meaning "Russian thief." Charges and countercharges involving so-called "demo-thieves" (allegedly criminal democratic reformers) in and out of Yeltsin's administration have made tracing the flow of weapons and profits both a major issue and challenge. Examples include Rosvooruzheniye; uniformed criminals in the military and security forces; predatory arms-manufacturing firms of the military-industrial sector who saw their profits threatened by the creation of Rosvooruzheniye; other unscrupulous state companies, commercial enterprises, and financial firms involved in the arms trade; and investigative reporters. It is evident, however, that irregular arms and equipment sales abroad are carried out with seeming "state authorization" and that much of the hard currency generated is not finding its way into Russian Federation coffers.38

Russia's severe "capital flight" problems appear to have involved the diversion of arms sales or military equipment revenues and associated ventures. Cyprus banks, for example, have been favored Russian choices for large cash deposits since 1992. Arms have been a frequent Russian commodity, generating large sums of money.39 In mid-summer 1994, a self-admitted Russian arms trader who traveled locally in a chauffeured limousine stayed at a Limassol, Cyprus, hotel. At the same time, a Cypriot banker said he believed two Russians who deposited large quantities of cash in his bank were former Russian Army generals. In the view of one Cypriot banker: Russia is bankrupt and can't generate this kind of cash. All money that's coming from Moscow is illegal because of Russia's exchange control regulations. But we're talking of millions and that can only come from illegal arms sales, most probably to Iran and Iraq.40

Rosvooruzheniye did not remain the only official weapons trader for long, despite the rationale behind its creation. In May 1994, just six months after a presidential decree consolidated new arms sales in one state company, the Russian government granted permission for weapons manufacturers to export arms and conclude agreements with foreign partners. Under this apparent contradiction of state policy, Rosvooruzheniye would still set prices but not retain its position as sole deal-maker for new weapon system sales. According to Shaposhnikov, the new regulations would be implemented gradually. He also pointed to the pressing need for Russia to fill an extraordinary gap and "develop a law on arms trade!"41 The effect of this new arrangement on Russian arms sales and the increasingly tainted reputation of Rosvooruzheniye was far from clear, since the state company seemed to operate much as before. Nevertheless, though the current Rosvooruzheniye General Director, Aleksandr Kotyolkin, announced that foreign arms sales of at least $2.5 billion were expected in 1995 (an $800 million increase over the previous years' sales figures), his April 1995 announcement followed on the heels of documents showing Rosvooruzheniye criminality.

More specifically, the published materials dealt with a Rosvooruzheniye audit that "exposed a slump in the volume of arms exports, tax evasion, underpriced sales, the financing of commercial firms from the company's current capital, and fabulous benefits paid to employees."42 The charges largely concerned actions under former director Lieutenant General Viktor Samoylov, whom Kotyolkin replaced in November 1994. Since Kotyolkin and a number of his colleagues were members of Rosvooruzheniye, their culpability remains to be determined. In addition, competition between Grachev's Defense Ministry (MoD) and Rosvooruzheniye over arms sales authority suggests to some Russian observers that leaked audit reports may have been directed at Kotyolkin's supervisor and Grachev's enduring rival, Aleksandr Korzhakov.43 Indeed, Grachev wasted little time after the scandal broke in proposing that the MoD be given "monopoly right to the arms trade."44 While the MoD evidently lost this battle for Russia's huge arms profits, efforts to impose "normal" state controls over arms sales continue.

Among the most recent rounds in this effort was the fall 1995 decision to allow a number of weapon and equipment producers to sell their products abroad, a move that made earlier decisions in this regard more explicit. Seven military-industrial production enterprises were granted this privilege, including the Rostvertol joint-stock company ("Mi" series helicopters), the Izhmash joint-stock company (Kalashnikov assault rifles and other weapons), and the Antey enterprise (air defense systems). As one commentator concluded, "this means in effect that Rosvooruzheniye forfeits completely its monopoly on exporting Russian arms."45 As with past arms sale issues in Russia, this remains to be seen, as do the effects of further decentralizing an already corrupt and poorly managed effort.

The Russian armed forces for some time have been directly involved with the sale of "used" arms and equipment, as well as the provision of security assistance. In this regard, the Voyentekh State Armament and Military Equipment Sales Company was established in the summer of 1992 at the behest of Defense Minister Grachev. The idea was for Voyentekh to "export equipment and armaments at the disposal of the Ministry of Defense" and use the money to build housing for servicemen.46 Rather than selling newly manufactured weaponry like Rosvooruzheniye, Voyentekh's "more modest" role has been to sell surplus materiel from MoD organizations like the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate (Glavnoye RaketnoArtilleriyskoye Upravleniye--GRAU) and the Main Armor-Tank Directorate (Glavnoye Bronetankovoye Upravleniye--GBTU). Other participants in this aspect of arms sales are the General Staff, which determines the kinds of equipment that are excess and available for sale, and various commercial companies and joint ventures which may be used to facilitate transactions. Some 97 percent of the proceeds from this continuing arms sale program were to go to the military housing fund.47 However, these programs have been the target of continuing allegations of corruption. Charges concern the personal enrichment of active and former officers involved in the sales. Questions about the underfunded and substandard military housing effort also abound.48 In addition, it has been equipment already in military inventories that has found its way into the hands of criminals, parties to ethnonational conflict, irregular armed groups, and virtually any other kind of customer with an ability to pay.49

The proposed sale of two ships from the Pacific Fleet--the Minsk and Novorossiysk aircraft carriers--is a case in point. While these vessels were to be sold to the Republic of Korea (ROK), supposedly for salvage, critics have noted that the ROK has no facilities for this purpose. Rather, it was thought these ships would ultimately make their way to the People's Republic of China (PRC) for dismantling, thus improperly transferring various ship-building technologies that the PRC has wanted for some time. Whatever the accuracy of these suspicions, the role of the Kompass-1 joint venture in this transaction is notable. Kompass-1 was designated an intermediary for the sale. It was established by the parent Russian-Korean Kompass Company, whose members include former Chief of the Soviet General Staff Moiseyev, former Commander-inChief of the Soviet Navy Admiral Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin, and former Soviet Navy (and Pacific Fleet) Chief of Rear Services Vice Admiral Makhonin.50 The familiar pattern of former senior officers and their active duty partners profiting from questionable equipment sales elicited the following understated observation from a Russian observer: "Such a distinguished constellation of stars makes it doubtful that the percentage promised by General Grachev for the sale of the ships will be fully used for the Pacific Fleet's social needs."51

The Russian MoD's role in foreign arms aid has also involved the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation (Glavnoye Upravleniye Mezhdunarodnogo Voyennogo Sotrudnichestva--GUMVS), which oversees military-technical cooperation (i.e., security assistance programs that include vetting arms sales and providing training and support to foreign military clients).52 In exercising these responsibilities, the directorate (whose responsibilities formerly resided in the General Staff's 10th Main Directorate) has fallen into criminal activities of various types.53 Perhaps the most notable public example was the dismissal of Major General Vladimir Georgiyevich Ul'yanov, chief of the GUMVS' Hard Currency Economic Service. In an agreement with Oboroneksport, one of Rosvooruzheniye's parent organizations, he illegally received some $80,000 worth of consumer goods.54 The criminal opportunities available to GUMVS personnel may have quite direct or only peripheral relationships to arms and other security assistance transactions, but GUMVS' access, resources, and mandate clearly have been wellexploited.

Among the most recent controversies over the diversion of military resources is the question of how armed groups in Chechnya acquired such large stocks of arms. The sustained intensity of fighting in Chechnya highlights the fact that Chechen weapons stockpiles ware substantial. The existence of such large arms inventories became a sensitive political issue centered on the question of "who armed Chechen President Dzhokar Dudayev?" Some Russian military and government officials have asserted that Dudayev acquired weapons by looting and stealing from Russian military depots in Chechnya during the troubled 1991-1992 period.55 Others point to complex Soviet/Russian political machinations and conspiracies running from Moscow to the Caucasus. According to this latter view, the goals of Russian government factions were somehow furthered by the voluntary transfer (at Shaposhnikov's order) of large arms stocks to Dudayev and by the abandonment of all Russian inventories (with Grachev's acquiescence) upon Russia's humiliating withdrawal from Chechnya in June 1992. Proffered motives for these actions include Russian "democrats" attempting to undermine support for the "Emergency Committee's" August 1991 coup attempt by winning over Dudayev and the Chechen leadership, Russian efforts to maintain clandestine arms routes to Abkhazia, the hope that Chechens would use the weapons against South Ossetians, and payment for the continued use of Groznyy airport as an international drug-smuggling stopover for Russian aircraft.56

More important in the view of some analysts is how the Chechens continued to receive substantial quantities of armaments. The most compelling explanation is that arms were sold to the Chechens by Russian military officials. More specifically, Russian presidential advisors Emil Pain and Arkady Popov assessed in a February 1995 report that Dudayev acquired arms by buying them from "smart traders in military uniforms," and that other criminal actions by officials in Moscow may have taken place as well, to include acquiescence toward drug smuggling.57

In any event, the overt start of hostilities in December 1994 did not slow the sale of arms to Chechens by the Russian military. Individual Chechen fighters continued to buy weapons and ammunition directly from individual Russian soldiers deployed in Chechnya, while wealthy Chechens acquired bulk quantities from more organized Russian military traders.58 As regards other arms supply routes, the MVD reported in April 1995 that it was investigating the attempted delivery of 4,350 pistols to Groznyy from the arms manufacturing plant in Izhevsk, Russia, while in May 1995 104th Guards Airborne Division paratroopers, who had recently returned to their Tula garrison from Chechnya, were arrested when they attempted to sell plastic explosives, grenade launchers, and ammunition to Chechen fighters.59

Overall, the Russian military's criminal involvement in conventional weapons trafficking for personal enrichment ranges from the sale of individual arms for quick profit to sophisticated large-scale weapons transfers for huge revenues. At the end of 1995, weapons diversions at both ends of this spectrum continued unabated.

Military Crime and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Clearly, the unrestrained criminal trade in conventional arms raises justifiable concerns regarding the security of Russian weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, chemical and biological arms--and their associated components and technologies. Given the systemic criminality that exists in the Russian armed forces, there is substantial reason to question whether the personnel responsible for Russia's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are more reliable than the corrupt military officials assigned to responsible positions elsewhere. The large WMD stockpiles in Russia; the slow pace of their destruction or neutralization; questions surrounding the security, control, and oversight of WMD assets; and lagging military reforms are in themselves cause for concern. However, to more fully appreciate the risk of WMD diversion via Russian military vectors, it is instructive to first examine some current issues associated with nuclear materials trafficking generally and then look at the more prominent military organizations concerned with WMD-specifically nuclear and chemical units.

Nuclear Arms and Proliferation Issues Tentative concerns over the security of Soviet nuclear weapons and materials began to surface in the late 1980s and were fully developed by the mid-1990s. While an early concern, the loss of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons based in conflict areas around the USSR's periphery, has receded with the apparently successful withdrawal of these weapons into Russia, the diversion of fissile material and technology has grown as a recognized danger.60 The current profusion of rumored, demonstrably false, and occasionally real and quite serious instances of fissile material diversion and smuggling from Russia continues to fuel proliferation concerns. US and other Western specialists have compiled lengthy lists of real and alleged nuclear smuggling attempts linked to Russia and the FSU.61 Most of the Russian cases are associated with alleged thefts or diversions from facilities of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) or other civil organizations, rather than military sites. The existence of a Russian "nuclear mafia" that is largely dedicated to acquiring and trafficking in fissile material or WMD technologies continues to be debated. As the chief of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service's Directorate for Arms Control and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction judged it: If you want my opinion--in no way is it even possible to talk about a "nuclear mafia" in the same context as the drug trade, where tens of thousands of people are involved and the activity is manipulated by truly well organized professionals. But it is our task, nevertheless, to prevent malefactors from establishing a real mafia.62

Despite this well-reasoned view, it is clear that individual criminals and organized crime groups have sought to profit from selling various radioactive materials. The 1993 case of beryllium diversion, smuggling, and attempted sale by Russian criminals (publicly reported in October 1995) is a notable case in point that suggests some efforts to profit from nuclear materials may be quite organized.63 Certainly, this episode involved the same kind of bizarre personalities, criminal organizations, corrupt commercial ventures, negligent officials, and shadowy foreigners associated with the Russian conventional arms trade and other smuggling activities.

Foreign states and terrorist groups have focused on Russia as a source of nuclear materials and technologies. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service spokesmen have judged that "some countries in the Middle East, Central Asia, south[ern] . . . Africa, and Brazil show interest in Russia's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile technologies" and warn about efforts to acquire Russian WMD secrets.64 Continuing economic stringencies affecting Russian nuclear and missile scientists and workers have resulted in their emigration to countries willing and able to pay them. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been an aggressive consumer of ballistic missile technology. Russian scientists working in North Korea reportedly have been instrumental in the DPRK's program, while in 1992 Russian security forces barely prevented the emigration of 32 nuclear specialists to the DPRK to work on nuclear weapons programs.65 Russia's insistence on selling nuclear reactors to Iran in the face of US and other Western warnings constitutes another danger of technology and material leakage that is potentially multiplied by Russian corruption and negligence.66 The nuclear terrorist dimension, widely discussed in the Russian media for some years, gained new impetus with suggestions that the now-notorious Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect had sought Russian nuclear and chemical technology.67 However, it has been Chechen threats to attack nuclear facilities and, most recently, to contaminate Russian areas with nuclear materials that energized Russian security personnel as 1995 came to a close. Shamil Basayev, the Chechen military leader who led the successful raid on the Russian city of Budyonnovsk in June 1995, warned in midOctober of that year that he was dispatching five containers of radioactive materials to Russia. In a videotaped warning that showed containers about 50-60 centimeters high and 20-30 centimeters wide, Basayev also said that two of the radioactive containers would be wired with explosives.68 Basayev's threat was at least partially fulfilled the following month when a Chechen message led the media to a radioactive package buried near the entrance of Moscow's popular Ismailov Park.

While the material was characterized by Russian authorities as low-grade and relatively harmless, the incident underscored the capital's vulnerability to nuclear terrorism; demonstrated the easy access to some fissile materials by insurgent, terrorist, or criminal groups; and left citizens and security forces alike wondering what might come next.69 While having military implications and associations, the issues discussed above do not involve the Russian military per se. The relationships among the Russian military, crime, and nuclear arms constitute a more specific problem that will now be addressed.

The main military organization in charge of nuclear munitions is the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (Glavnoye Upravleniye Ministerstvo Oborony), more simply known as the 12th GUMO. Unlike most other main and central directorates of the Soviet (and later Russian) Defense Ministry--including GRAU, GBTU, and analogous technical directorates involved with arms and equipment--the secretive 12th GUMO was nearly invisible to public view during the Soviet period. As retrospective Russian assessments have revealed, the directorate had its origins at the very end of World War II, when the so-called First Main Directorate was established under the USSR Council of Ministers to "coordinate work on atomic projects."70 Two years later a "special department" was set up in the Ministry of Defense to study material on the employment and effects of US nuclear weapons. Following the successful explosion of a Soviet nuclear weapon in 1949, the First Main Directorate and the MoD's special department were merged to form a main directorate "to provide centralized direction of testing, stockpiling, and operating nuclear weapons and . . . protection against nuclear weapons." This organization was the direct progenitor of today's 12th GUMO, which is described by its chief, Colonel General Yevgeniy P. Maslin, as follows: Military research and scientific test organizations as well as military units engaged in the immediate operation of nuclear munitions are subordinate to today's Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Directorate. In connection with the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles and the limitation of strategic nuclear arms, the task of eliminating nuclear munitions and increasing the safety of the remaining ones also has been assigned to the Main Directorate in recent years.71

Thus, the 12th GUMO currently maintains large central nuclear munitions depots which have been filled with tactical, operationalstrategic, and strategic nuclear weapons withdrawn from non-Russian areas of the FSU or otherwise taken "off-line" and redeployed.72 In addition to transporting nuclear weapons when necessary, the 12th GUMO runs a variety of research, development, and support facilities. It vigorously asserts exclusive control over these sites, insisting that they are fully secure and should be the province only of MoD inspectors and oversight. But the 12th GUMO is part of the Russian military and Russian society and, as a consequence, is potentially susceptible to the same economic, political, and criminal pressures.

This makes statements like the following one by the 12th GUMO's deputy chief, Lieutenant General Sergey Zelentsov, less than reassuring. He made similar statements as recently as fall 1995. The system for the protection of nuclear munitions is echeloned and extremely reliable. Access to them is multilayered. It is virtually impossible for outsiders to get to the warheads. The transport of nuclear munitions is also properly organized. There are special formations in a high state of readiness to thwart any attempt to seize them. To date there has not been a single loss from the nuclear arsenals.73

General Maslin similarly characterized theft from 12th GUMO facilities as "impossible" but also identified vulnerabilities to criminal or terrorist groups. These vulnerabilities were found principally in the theft of nuclear weapons while in transport, which must be taken "into account in planning our actions on a day-to-day basis." Further, exercises were run regarding the theft of nuclear weapons from 12th GUMO facilities. Maslin candidly summarized the results of these exercises: And I must tell you frankly that as a result of those exercises, I became greatly concerned about a question that we had never even thought about before: What if such acts were to be undertaken by people who have worked with nuclear weapons in the past? For example, by people dismissed from our structures, social malcontents, embittered individuals? This question is so serious that I had to deliver a report on it to an interdepartmental commission of the Russian Security Council.74

In a country filled with embittered and desperate active duty and former military personnel, many long since engaged in criminal activities and some veterans of Soviet/Russian nuclear weapons programs, Maslin's remarks seem well-considered. They also stand in sharp contrast to the typical reassurances issued by him and his fellow officers. Criminality and disaffection in nuclearassociated units is more directly evident at deployed military facilities and operational sites, where living conditions are extremely poor and oversight is lax, than at the centralized and less-visible 12th GUMO facilities.75 For example, in reviewing detected military criminal cases in the late summer of 1994, acting Chief Military Procurator G. N. Nosov identified Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) criminality fostered either by the poverty in which many officers found themselves or as a consequence of opportunity and potential monetary gain. He noted that an SRF officer had set up a currency exchange and shop at his quarters on base where he sold food at inflated prices. He also noted a major general and former chief of the SRF's Financial-Economic Directorate who had illegally transferred 2 billion rubles to several private firms.76

The activities of Major General Vladimir Rodionov, commander of a long-range aviation division in the Russian Far East, and his deputy are good examples of strategic force corruption. Long-range aviation (LRA) is one of Russia's nuclear strike forces, tasked to hit targets deep in enemy territory. The two officers, however, transformed their "top secret" LRA operating base into a transshipment point for moving commercial goods and businessmen between cities in the Commonwealth of Independent States and China. Profits from these illicit operations were shared with bomber pilots and crews who came to see the commercial enterprise as their principal job. A small portion of the profits was put into the division's account.77 These kinds of incidents suggest that conspiring military personnel would be willing to sell nuclear components or even a nuclear weapon, if given the opportunity.

Perhaps the most notable example of this potential involved nuclear materials stolen from a Navy nuclear facility in northern Russia. The circumstances and implications of the theft have gradually become more visible over the last two years. The incident centered specifically on a Northern Fleet nuclear fuel storage facility near Murmansk.

For several years now, the Northern Fleet has stood out as a center of militarycivil crime and generally sloppy administration. Even during the Soviet period, the sudden explosions at the huge Northern Fleet munitions depot in 1984 presaged similar military disasters during the subsequent decade. During the spectacular series of explosions, at least one Soviet submarine in port sealed its hatches while crew members watched through the periscope with alarm as the explosions came disturbingly close to the fleet's nuclear storage facilities. From the late 1980s to date, numerous other examples of declining readiness and rising levels of carelessness have become increasingly evident, while the looting and more systematic theft of fleet resources involved both military and civilian groups. Added to these continuing problems has been the danger posed by 100 or more decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines, some with nuclear fuel unloaded, that one specialist characterized as "floating atomic bombs."78

However, the late 1993 theft of three "live fuel assemblies" (known by the acronym STVS) for obsolete "Victor 1" nuclear submarines from a naval storage facility in the Murmansk area speaks most directly to nuclear security and the potential for criminal penetration. More specifically, the theft involved a total of 4.3 kilograms of nuclear material, of which .85 kilograms were uranium 235. While the theft itself was not as significant as some others, what it revealed about fleet nuclear storage security and criminal opportunity was more significant.79

After months of fruitless investigation, three Russian Navy officers (a captain 2nd rank, a captain 3rd rank, and a senior lieutenant) were finally identified as the thieves. The investigation, concluded in mid-1995, indicated that the three officers had planned to sell the material to an organized crime figure who expressed an interest but never followed through. Military prosecutors were more concerned about security conditions at the nuclear materials storage site than with the theft itself. There was minimal perimeter security, essentially no protective alarm system, poor locks, elderly untrained guards wh

Posted by: Max Anderson at March 20, 2008 01:08 AM

Alas, Nicolas Cage was still a better "merchent of death"...

Posted by: Panda Bear at March 12, 2008 03:21 PM

actually campbell,

I think I will go with Gary Larson's Far Side cartoon. The caption reads, "Gentlemen, what if we had a war and EVERYBODY came?"

that seems to be more the merchant's style

Posted by: Patron Vectras at March 11, 2008 03:08 PM

they lock him up because he compete with them :)

Posted by: dickIn at March 11, 2008 03:49 AM

I have done the research on this one. Practically all of his front companies are in insurgent aqi hot spots. Including s thiland where the planes have been frequently plauged by manpads and extremist geurillas there also. The list goes on and on . He is tied into farc Ms-13 , equadoran terror gangs el-mathachateria, and several other global terrorists. I have another name for you in nigeria christian. Henry Okah also is in custody. Another global geurrilla

Posted by: Max Anderson at March 8, 2008 01:46 AM

More likely than not this will get swept under the rug. For all the hits "Lord of War" took it got one thing right. He has probably done business for people who would otherwise not like getting their hands dirty by doing it themselves. Major arms shipments do not get just handed to you because you have a check or cash. The seller needs a neat document called an End User Certificate. That is a CYA for them. Now, you can fake them and divert the cargo enroute, but in the increasingly digital world we live in this is getting harder to do and it is getting harder to dust the trail behind you. So, it is going to come out that he either did some work for the US or did some work for someone that for political reasons we will not want to expose. So a deal will be cut and he will go on his merry way in at most a couple months and it will be buried in the back pages of any newspaper that even bothers to cover it.

Posted by: Bob at March 7, 2008 12:44 PM

I'm going to go with Grandjesters' comments (minus the anti Bush/Cheney rant). working both sides of the fence to deal arms is an ancient and accepted tradition, across the board, of every people, country, or creed. The only kicker is the TIME...the interval between dealing with entity "A", or dealing with A's apponent, "B". Or gathering up "C" "D", et. al. just to keep the cash flowing back and forth.

Which all brings us to the wonderful 60's query: "what if they gave a war, and nobody came?"

Semper Fidelis

Posted by: campbell at March 7, 2008 11:23 AM

"there's something in my Cold War bones that sort of admires the idea of a guy like Bout taking advantage of all the conflict around the world to make a profit"

No, I'd say he's complete vermin. I don't wish I could be him, I wish everyone like him could also be locked up. The world would be a much better place for it.

What do you think will happen when people like Bout start dealing in nukes? Does it stop being fun when you might feel the effects?

Posted by: Wembley at March 7, 2008 11:15 AM

This might be the first useful thing the DEA has ever done in its entire history.

Posted by: sglover at March 7, 2008 11:00 AM

But when George W Bush goes to the ME, hands $15 Billion in arms to the Israelis, then, the same fucking week, goes and hands $20 Billion more arms to the Saudis, it's peachy keen?

This guy is small potatoes by comparison. Every time I hear a complaint about arms proliferation, I want to scream. Wa-wa Iranian arms found in Iraq, uh-huh and we are supplying how many sides within Iraq ourselves?

The US of A is the largest arms supplier in the world by a great measure, often giveaways at our expense. Utter horseshit, they need to keep the cell next to this guy open for Bush/Cheney.

Posted by: Grandjester at March 7, 2008 10:24 AM

Yah, I gotta agree, it wouldn't hurt to be him...as long as you don't cross the wrong people...
Lets hear it for capitalism!

Posted by: coolhand77 at March 7, 2008 09:33 AM

haha the russians are trying to get him so they can set him free. somethings never change.

Posted by: slntax at March 7, 2008 08:45 AM