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'From the Clouds to the Sidewalk'
The Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, released the new U.S. Counterintelligence Strategy for 2007 this week.
It’s pretty predictable what the main goals are:
Secure the Nation Against Foreign Espionage and Electronic Penetration
Protect the Integrity of the US Intelligence System
Support National Policy and Decisions
Protect US Economic Advantage, Trade Secrets and Know How
Support US Armed Forces
Manage the Counterintelligence Community to Achieve Efficient Coordination
Improve Training and Education of the Counterintelligence Community
Expand National Awareness of Counterintelligence Risk in the Private as well as Public Sector
What’s interesting, however, is the intelligence community’s emphasis on enlisting civilians in the counter-intel process…
By engaging the private sector and academia in meaningful dialogue, there is much we can learn, and in turn we can provide a mechanism to coordinate the public dissemination of information on intelligence threats to the nation.
It’ll be interesting to see if the private sector cooperates. But as the national counterintelligence chief, Dr. Joel Brenner, said in a release: "The President and the Director of National Intelligence expect us to make measurable progress on all of these goals soon. Our job now is to drive this strategy from the clouds down to the sidewalk."
-- Christian
New Eyes for Gators
As someone who’s spent a lot of time in the hull of an amtrac, I absolutely love this one.
Defense Industry Daily reports the Corps has signed a contract with L3 Communications to install thermal sights on their amtrac fleet. The article touts the thermal sight’s capability over the current light intensification scope.
And if you’ve ever looked through an amtrac sight, you’d agree it’s about as first-gen as it gets.
The Marine Corps has taken some serious hits in its pursuit of a replacement for the old-school AAV7 Amphibious Assault Vehicle fleet. All you need to see is a row of these medieval behemoths lumbering through the desert – hundreds of miles from the sea – and you can’t help but agree that the Corps needs to find an alternative.
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is close, but its cost and complexity have hampered development and put its future in doubt. So the Marines have resorted to continuously upgrading today's amtrac, slapping on new suspensions and applique armor.
The funny thing about this development is that the thermal sight will probably do little good for the amtrackers other than help them see better at night. Though the EFV admittedly has a high-tech thermal sight, the vehicle also has a 30 mm Bushmaster cannon tethered to a computerized weapons system. On the flip side, the amtrac sports a .50 cal machine gun and a Mark 19 grenade launcher. Great weapons, but a little outclassed by such a sophisticated thermal capability.
I don’t know too many gator drivers who speak very highly of its weapon systems, and putting an expensive - and potentially glitch-prone - thermal sight on it seems a little over the top.
-- Christian
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
On Monday, DT posted a detailed after action report from the influential – and thoughtful – former Army general and SouthCom commander Barry McCaffrey on his mid-February visit to Afghanistan.
We now have the report he complied on his mid-March visit to Iraq. Media reports have focused on the comments portending disaster in Iraq – and justifiably so. But there’s also some hopeful signs, particularly as counterinsurgency guru Gen. David Petraeus moves forward with his strategy to give the Iraqi government breathing room to forge compromises.
McCaffrey also makes some interesting points on certain U.S. capabilities that are worth a second look…
(Download entire report)
From the report…
Iraq is ripped by a low grade civil war which has worsened to catastrophic levels with as many as 3000 citizens murdered per month. The population is in despair. Life in many of the urban areas is now desperate.
There is no function of government that operates effectively across the nation--- not health care, not justice, not education, not transportation, not labor and commerce, not electricity, not oil production. There is no province in the country in which the government has dominance.
US domestic support for the war in Iraq has evaporated and will not return. The great majority of the country thinks the war was a mistake. The US Congress now has a central focus on constraining the Administration use of military power in Iraq ---and potentially Iran.
In summary, the US Armed Forces are in a position of strategic peril. A disaster in Iraq will in all likelihood result in a widened regional struggle which will endanger America’s strategic interests (oil) in the Mid-east for a generation. We will also produce another generation of soldiers who lack confidence in their American politicians, the media, and their own senior military leadership.
But…
Since the arrival of General David Petraeus in command of Multi-National Force Iraq--- the situation on the ground has clearly and measurably improved.
There is a real and growing ground swell of Sunni tribal opposition to the Al Qaeda-in-Iraq terror formations. (90% Iraqi.) This counter-Al Qaeda movement in Anbar Province was fostered by brilliant US Marine leadership. There is now unmistakable evidence that the western Sunni tribes are increasingly convinced that they blundered badly by sitting out the political process.
Reconciliation of the internal warring elements in Iraq will be how we eventually win the war in Iraq---if it happens. There is a very sophisticated and carefully integrated approach by the Iraqi government and Coalition actors to defuse the armed violence from internal enemies and bring people into the political process. There are encouraging signs that the peace and participation message does resonate with many of the more moderate Sunni and Shia warring factions.
The command and control technology, training, contractor support, and flexibility of Marine and Army combat formations are magnificent.
The US Tier One special operations capability is simply magic. They are deadly in getting their target—with normally zero collateral damage—and with minimal friendly losses or injuries. Some of these assault elements have done 200-300 takedown operations at platoon level. The comprehensive intelligence system is phenomenal. We need to re-think how we view these forces. They are a national strategic system akin to a B1 bomber.
In Sum…
In my judgment, we can still achieve our objective of: a stable Iraq, at peace with its neighbors, not producing weapons of mass destruction, and fully committed to a law-based government. The courage and strength of the US Armed Forces still gives us latitude and time to build the economic and political conditions that might defuse the ongoing civil war. Our central purpose is to allow the nation to re-establish governance based on some loose federal consensus among the three major ethnic-factional actors.
-- Christian
Past as Prologue Dept.
"It appears we have appointed our worst generals to command forces, and our most gifted and brilliant to edit newspapers. In fact, I discovered by reading newspapers that these editor/geniuses plainly saw all my strategic defects from the start, yet failed to inform me until it was too late.
"Accordingly , I'm readily willing to yield my command to these obviously superior intellects, and I'll, in turn, do my best for the Cause by writing editorials - after the fact."
-- Robert E. Lee in 1863
(Gouge: SC)
-- Ward
AQ's Leadership Struggle
Here’s the latest passdown from the intel analysts over at Stratfor on the power plays going on in al Qaeda’s leadership. It’s interesting to note the analysis comes on the heels of our last post describing the stalemate in Iraq and other fronts in the GWOT as “spoiling” attacks.
Could the Shiia/Sunni sectarian struggle erupting in the Middle East be prompting AQ’s re-organization and outreach? Read on...
(Note: Photo is screen grab from latest AQ video posted on IntelCenter)
Iraq: Al Qaeda's Desperate Moves
In a new video posted March 22 on the Internet, al Qaeda leader Abu Yahia al-Libi called for an end to the schisms between Iraqi Sunni Islamist insurgents and jihadists in Iraq, and for Iraq's Sunnis to reject any Saudi involvement in the conflict. The release is a clear effort by the jihadist network to mend fences with the Sunni insurgents. Significantly, it also demonstrates an al Qaeda attempt to raise al-Libi's public profile in preparation for him to assume a greater role among the network's next generation of leaders.
This release, by al Qaeda's As-Sahab media branch, marks the ninth time al-Libi has appeared in an al Qaeda video statement since February 2006. Only al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri has appeared in more new videos, with a total of 12 over the same time period. The charismatic al-Libi, who has strong jihadist credentials, would indeed be a good choice to take on a more prominent role in al Qaeda. As an accomplished preacher, he has eulogized fallen jihadist leaders and called on jihadists to attack such prominent targets as the White House. In addition, he is a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, and was one of four prominent al Qaeda fighters who escaped U.S. custody while imprisoned at Bagram Air Base in July 2005.
In his latest statement, al-Libi specifically called on militant groups Ansar al-Sunnah Army, the Islamic Army in Iraq and the Army of the Mujahideen to put aside their differences with the other Sunni insurgent groups in the country. This call for unity comes amid open conflict between Sunni tribes and al Qaeda in Iraq, as demonstrated by the March 23 attack against the Sunni deputy prime minister in Baghdad and the attacks against civilians involving chlorine gas in predominantly Sunni Anbar province.
Al Qaeda, which is facing a significant threat from Iraq's Sunni nationalist and Islamist militant groups, is trying to achieve three goals: First, to maintain its parallel power structure in the Sunni areas; second, to emerge as the vanguard of the Sunni resistance to the United States and the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government at a time when Sunni political leaders are cutting deals; and finally, to embarrass the Iraqi Islamist militant groups by arguing that they are not following true Islamic teachings.
The latest attack against a moderate Sunni -- likely carried out by the jihadists -- clearly suggests these transnational elements are attempting to discourage Sunni leaders from following a moderate path and cooperating with the Iraqi government, or from accepting help from Saudi Arabia. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zikam Ali al-Zubaie was wounded in the suicide bombing attack, which occurred during Friday prayers at a hall near Baghdad's Foreign Ministry. A week earlier, suspected jihadist insurgents detonated three vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices packed with chlorine west of Baghdad in Anbar province, including one near a prayer hall used by a Sunni cleric who had spoken out against al Qaeda.
These attacks and al-Libi's appeal are signs of desperation on the part of the jihadists in Iraq. Al Qaeda realizes its influence in the country is waning and is appealing to Iraqi and foreign jihadists to concentrate their efforts on the common enemy, rather than on one another. That al-Libi made an appeal that normally would have come from al-Zawahiri or Osama bin Laden suggests he is being groomed to take on a more important role in al Qaeda.
(Gouge: CM)
-- Christian
Native Americans Solve Chinese Space Junk Problem . . .
. . . by building a giant magnet. Observe:
(Gouge: Slashdot)
-- Ward
HTS - The Future of Navy Motors
American Superconductor Corporation recently announced the successful completion of factory acceptance testing for the world's first 36.5 megawatt (49,000 horsepower) high temperature superconductor (HTS) ship propulsion motor at Northrop Grumman's facility at the Philadelphia Naval Business Center. This is the final milestone before the Navy takes possession of the motor.
The motor was designed, developed and manufactured under a contract from the U.S. Navy's Office of Naval Research (ONR) to demonstrate the efficacy of HTS primary- propulsion-motor technology for future Navy all-electric ships and submarines. The power and torque of this HTS motor is comparable to the requirements for the Navy's new Zumwalt class of destroyers, known as DDG 1000. In comparison with the conventional copper motors being used on the first two DDG 1000 hulls, the HTS motor is less than one-half the size and weight, and is more efficient over a much wider range of ship speeds. This results in weight and space advantages, enabling an increase in payload capacity for both naval and commercial vessels.
Why HTS?
High Power Density: The HTS field winding produces magnetic fields higher than those of conventional machines resulting in smaller size and weight.
High Partial Load Efficiency: HTS motors have higher efficiency at part load (down to 5% of full speed), that results in savings in fuel use and operating cost. The advantage in efficiency can be over 10% at low speed.
Low Noise: HTS motors have lower sound emissions than conventional machines.
Low Synchronous Reactance: HTS air-core motors are characterized by a low synchronous reactance which results in operation at very small load angles. Operating at a small load angle provides greater stiffness during the transient and hunting oscillations.
Harmonics: HTS motors generate voltages free of harmonics.
Cyclic load insensitivity: HTS motor field windings operate at nearly constant temperature unlike conventional motors and, therefore, are not subject to thermal fatigue.
Maintenance: HTS motors compared to conventional motors will not require the common rotor overhaul, rewinding or re-insulation.
(Source: American Superconductor)
-- Ward
A New Kind of Vision
For all you operators out there who do a lot of snooping and pooping at night, a Boston-based company has developed a filter for NODs that can make out colors. It won’t look like that 50-inch plasma display hanging in the TOC, but for some, the new enhancements could make a heck of a difference.
Made by Tenebraex Corp., the new night vision goggles use a filter that varies the light intensity of the view through the optic, tricking your brain into seeing objects in different color hues. The Boston Globe reports the new ColorPath scopes will be available this summer, and the company hopes the services will be interested in the new technology for its medical and special operations communities.
With monochrome night vision, "blood is the same color as water," [Tenebraex co-founder Peter] Jones said.
Some medics think a color night-vision goggle will help them treat wounded soldiers faster and better.
"That's what we hope this is going to do," said Jones, "to help people do a better job of assessment and treatment."
If Tenebraex can make the sale to medics, Jones said he hopes that the technology will make its way into other military groups, such as special operations units.
Tenebraex also makes the ARDS system, a honeycomb filter that attaches to the end of optics such as scopes and binoculars. The ARDS protects the viewer from laser dazzlers and light reflection off the scope’s lens, something that can give away a sniper or platoon leader’s position in bright sun.
The ColorPath development is part of a growing trend to update the ANPVS-14 and similar night optics with new bells and whistles that lift the shroud of darkness for U.S. troops – who increasingly use the cover of night for operations. Now companies are in a race to combine image intensification (boosting ambient light) with infrared in a single goggle. Some experimental NVGs overlay the IR image with II picture to cut through dust and foliage.
These new ENVGs have yet to hit the field (at least in the open) but if the manufacturers can fix the weight and image alignment problems, this type of hybrid optic will be the next big thing.
(Gouge: RC)
-- Christian
Surge = Training Op for Iraqis
 Ongoing “surge” operations in Baghdad are doubling as training opportunities for Iraqi soldiers, airmen and government officials. U.S. strategy entails turning over responsibility for security in Iraq to native entities as soon as they’re ready; the demands of the surge have forced Iraqis to be readier, sooner.
Iraqi army battalions “disintegrated last year when we tried to move them around,” says Major General William Caldwell, spokesman for U.S. forces in Iraq, referring to several Iraqi units that refused to deploy to trouble spots from their home bases in the north or south of the country. Many of the Iraqi soldiers involved cited a lack of preparation. “Now we have them ready to move,” Caldwell stresses. “By the middle of March, we should have three Iraqi brigades in Baghdad.”
Iraqi forces in the contested city now number more than 20,000, and Iraqi officers have taken the lead in many Baghdad missions. The tiny Iraqi air force is stepping up operations, as well, flying troop transport missions for deploying units using three U.S.-donated Lockheed Martin C-130E Hercules airlifters in addition to conducting Baghdad surveillance with CH-2000 reconnaissance planes.
“There’s been an increase in Iraqi air force operations in recent weeks,” says Brigadier General Stephen Hoog, chief U.S. trainer for the Iraqi air service. “They did their first medevac mission about seven days ago – they’re setting up channel missions to take wounded northern Iraqi troops back home. And the CH-2000s are going on one or two missions every day checking out checkpoints.” All that’s missing from operations is Iraq’s sizeable force of helicopters, which are awaiting the installation of the defensive gear they need for Baghdad missions. “By the middle of summer, we’ll see much greater participation of their helicopters.”
The surge hinges on significant diplomatic efforts by Iraqi politicians aiming to cut off the flow of weapons and insurgents into Baghdad and to keep the city’s militias peaceful. “The U.S. government got the Iraqi Prime Minister [Nouri Al Maliki] to make it clear to the militias that there’s no room for militias, and that those that ignored that warning were going to be dealt with,” reports Ambassador Daniel Speckhard, deputy chief of the U.S. mission. As a result, many of them dissolved or have ended their activity or moved out of Baghdad.” Speckhard adds that Al Maliki recently took his first official trip to western Iraq to meet with tribal leaders who are key to intercepting weapons coming in from Syria.
--David Axe, cross-posted at War Is Boring
Special Forces Say 'No' to M4 Barrel
If somebody wanted to really help the US Army, they would do something about those God awful M4 carbines that American troops are forced to endure.
This is a recurring theme in this blog, and I'm returning to it again because of yet more new information that sheds light on the problem with the Army's standard-issue weapon for close-in fighting -- which is exactly the kind of combat that is raging in Iraq and Afghanistan today.
In a routine acquisition notice (see this link), a US Special Forces battalion based in Okinawa announced that it is buying 84 barrels for the Heckler & Koch HK416 assault rifle.
The HK barrels will be used to replace the barrels on their own M4s.
Why? Here's what the notice says:
The 416 barrel "allows soldiers to replace the existing M4 upper receiver with an HK proprietary gas system that does not introduce propellant gases and the associated carbon fouling back into the weapon's interior. This reduces operator cleaning time, and increases the reliability of the M4 Carbine, particularly in an environment in which sand and dust are prevalent. The elimination of the gas tube ... means that the M4 will function normally even if the weapon is fired full of water without first being drained. There isn't another company that offers these features in their products. It is a practical, versatile system."
Translation: the M4 barrel is so unreliable that special operations forces units need to swap it out with a barrel from a different gun -- and one that actually works in real combat conditions.
One solution is to simply swap out the barrel.
But here's another good answer: trash the M4s and just buy HK416s!
Christian adds:
For an outstanding investigative report on this issue, check out my former colleague Matt Cox’s article on the bureaucratic engine that is still preventing soldiers from getting what the best soldiers in the world say is the best weapon for the fight.
-- Stephen Trimble
Afghan Sit-Rep
On another front, DT obtained a copy of an after action review of operations in Afghanistan from former 24th Infantry Division commander in Operation Desert Storm and now International Affairs professor at West Point, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who traveled to Afghanistan in mid-February.
During his visit, McCaffrey met with a wide range of military leaders, intelligence officials, diplomats and local Afghans to get a read on how things are going over there. This is something McCaffrey is exceedingly good at. His OIF post-op was outstanding and lacked the politically-charged rhetoric of many other assessments – then and now.
Overall, he’s optimistic that the U.S and NATO can “without question, achieve our US national objective of a functioning law-based state -- with a performing, non-drug economy -- which rejects sanctuary for terrorism. This is the cross-over year. The execution of our plan in the coming 24 months will decide the outcome in the country.”
But “rhetoric and political will cannot achieve our goals. Afghanistan needs strong US inter-agency and Congressional support to provide the dollars, equipment, combat soldiers, ANA and ANP mentors, and vigorous NATO and Afghan leadership to pull this mission from the fire.”
McCaffrey is calling for a $500 billion investment over the next 10 years to build the Afghan army and police force into “capable, dominant” institutions.
The Afghan economy is booming at 12% growth rate a year. $14 billion has been spent on aid since 2001. Six TV channels and a hundred free/uncensored publications are available to the people. Literacy is increasing rapidly. The ring road is now 2/3 complete. The 40,000 soldiers of the ANA are growing rapidly in numbers and capability. There are 45,000 NATO and US troops in-country. There is a functioning democracy with an elected Parliament ---and a serious, dedicated Afghan President in office.
Afghanistan can be a strategic victory in the struggle against terrorism. We are now on the right path.
There’s also good information on Pakistan’s role in the festering conflict, a NATO force hamstrung by constrained rules of engagement, the success of U.S. airpower and an innovative option for creating more “tier one” special operators…
…in my view, the Pakistanis are NOT actively supporting the Taliban -- nor do they have a strategic purpose to de-stabilize Afghanistan…
…the Pakistanis need better US support for COIN operations in South and North Waziristan. We need to sort out a set of strategic tools to help them do better. They immediately require the $395 million they have requested for their Frontier Corps. It will be a disaster for our strategic purpose if we push them to premature military action which destroys them as a unifying and stabilizing force in the region…
…as a general statement, however, the NATO forces are too weak on the ground, lack essential supporting elements (helicopters, engineers, logistics, intelligence), have severely restrictive rules-of-engagement, and may lack the national political will to fight when required. It is possible that the Taliban will try to knock one or more of these NATO nations out of the war. A major blow to the Italians, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Spanish, or the Germans might shatter their weak domestic political support…
…we need to take a revolutionary look at the methods of creating these “Tier One” forces. It will require a separately funded recruiting program similar to WWII OSS programs to identify college graduates, with superb athletic skills, who will volunteer for a 24 month training program (to include total immersion language training in Arabic or Dari) -- followed by a four year employment tour…
(Gouge: NC)
-- Christian
Win Without a Win
It’s the kind of thing that might be more appropriate to post on, say, a Sunday so you can read it with a mug of coffee and some time to think. But I didn’t want this one to grow stale.
Though it’s a subscriber site, DT has a line on a few analytical pieces from the private intelligence firm, Stratfor. They can be a bit in the weeds at times, but this one is a big chunk of food for thought as it attempts to answer the fundamental question of why the United States seems to get itself in conflicts that end in stalemate.
The muddled result of the war in Iraq may not have been such a surprise after all, and, in some twisted way, may serve America’s overall purpose in the global war on terrorism – though unintentionally – Stratfor says.
Excerpts of the intel analysis follow:
…In considering the situation, our attention is drawn to a strange paradox that has been manifest in American foreign policy since World War II. On the one hand, the United States has consistently encountered strategic stalemate or defeat in particular politico-military operations. At those times, the outcomes have appeared to be disappointing if not catastrophic. Yet, over the same period of time, U.S. global power, on the whole, has surged. In spite of stalemate and defeat during the Cold War, the United States was more in 2000 than it had been in 1950…
…Put somewhat differently, there is the liberal view that the Soviet Union was not defeated by the United States in the Cold War, but that it collapsed itself, and the military conflicts of the Cold War were unnecessary. There is the conservative view that the United States won the Cold War in spite of a fundamental flaw in the American character -- an unwillingness to bear the burden of war -- and that this flaw ultimately will prove disastrous for the United States. Finally, there is the non-ideological, non-political view that the United States won the Cold War in spite of defeats and stalemates because these wars were never as important as either the liberals or conservatives made them out to be, however necessary they might have been seen to be at the time…
…If we apply these analyses to Iraq, three schools of thought emerge. The first says that the Iraq war is unnecessary and even harmful in the context of the U.S.-jihadist confrontation -- and that, regardless of outcome, it should not be fought. The second says that the war is essential -- and that, while defeat or stalemate in this conflict perhaps would not be catastrophic to the United States, there is a possibility that it would be catastrophic. And at any rate, this argument continues, the United States' ongoing inability to impose its will in conflicts of this class ultimately will destroy it. Finally, there is the view that Iraq is simply a small piece of a bigger war and that the outcome of this particular conflict will not be decisive, although the war might be necessary. The heated rhetoric surrounding the Iraq conflict stems from the traditional American inability to hold things in perspective…
…Even in cases where the enemy was engaged fully, the United States limited its commitment of resources. In Vietnam, for example, the defeat of North Vietnam and regime change were explicitly ruled out. The United States had as its explicit goal a stalemate, in which both South and North Vietnam survived as independent states. In Korea, the United States shifted to a stalemate strategy after the Chinese intervention. So too in Cuba after the Cuban missile crisis; and in Iran, the United States accepted defeat in an apparently critical arena without attempting a major intervention. In each instance, the mark of U.S. intervention was limited exposure -- even at the cost of stalemate or defeat…
…In other words, the United States consistently has entered into conflicts in which its level of commitment was extremely limited, in which either victory was not the strategic goal or the mission eventually was redefined to accept stalemate, and in which even defeat was deemed preferable to a level of effort that might avert it. Public discussion on all sides was apoplectic both during these conflicts and afterward, yet American global power was not materially affected in the long run...
…This appears to make no sense until we introduce a military concept into the analysis: the spoiling attack. The spoiling attack is an offensive operation; however, its goal is not to defeat the enemy but to disrupt enemy offensives -- to, in effect, prevent a defeat by the enemy. The success of the spoiling attack is not measured in term of enemy capitulation, but the degree to which it has forestalled successful enemy operations…
…The invasion four years ago has led to the Sunnis and Shia turning against each other in direct conflict. Therefore, it could be argued that just as the United States won the Cold War by exploiting the Sino-Soviet split and allying with Mao Zedong, so too the path to defeating the jihadists is not a main attack, but a spoiling attack that turns Sunnis and Shia against each other. This was certainly not the intent of the Bush administration in planning the 2003 invasion; it has become, nevertheless, an unintended and significant outcome…
…Moreover, it is far from clear whether U.S. policymakers through history have been aware of this dimension in their operations. In considering Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and Iran, it is never clear that the Truman, Kennedy, Johnson/Nixon or Carter/Reagan administrations purposely set out to implement a spoiling attack. The fog of political rhetoric and the bureaucratized nature of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus make it difficult to speak of U.S. "strategy" as such. Every deputy assistant secretary of something-or-other confuses his little piece of things with the whole, and the American culture demonizes and deifies without clarifying…
…However, there is a deep structure in U.S. foreign policy that becomes visible. The incongruities of stalemate and defeat on the one side and growing U.S. power on the other must be reconciled. The liberal and conservative arguments explain things only partially. But the idea that the United States rarely fights to win can be explained. It is not because of a lack of moral fiber, as conservatives would argue; nor a random and needless belligerence, as liberals would argue. Rather, it is the application of the principle of spoiling operations -- using limited resources not in order to defeat the enemy but to disrupt and confuse enemy operations…
I know it’s heavy reading for a Monday morning, but it’s worth considering as the Iraq war grinds on without any clear momentum toward “victory” or even “success.”
(Gouge: CM)
-- Christian
The Sunday Paper
Anatomy of an IED Attack
by Sgt. Roy Batty
The chickens are driving me crazy. Bonkers. They won't quit. Surely this counts as 'cruel and unusual punishment.' After eating nothing but MREs for the past two weeks, I am dying for some real food, and the Iraqi vendors in our patrol area are not helping. You see, while Iraq does not have McDonalds, or even a McHommad, or any other kind of fast food for that matter, they do have a plethora of sidewalk cafes and vendors.
In a city that averages three car bombs a day, I'm not convinced of the wisdom of sitting next to a busy road while munching on your falafel. Nevertheless, they are everywhere. Falafel I can resist, but the locals in our neck of the woods are particularly ingenious, and they have somehow pieced together these propane fired rotisseries, stocked full of plumb chickens.
At least I think they're chickens.
Our patrol route today takes us up and down a main business route, checking on the local Iraqi cops to make sure they are actually doing something vaguely definable as law enforcement. Every time we pass one of the rusty cabinets with their greasy avian treasures, my stomach growls like one of the junkyard dogs by the side of the road, and I start bugging my squad leader on the SINCGARS radio again:
"Hey, SSG H., can we stop and get some chicken?"
"No."
"Please? Just one?"
"No."
"C'mon! I'll be the test subject. If I'm still alive 24 hours later, we'll know they are okay....."
"NO!"
"Pllllleeeeeeeeeeez? Pretty please? I'm dyin' back here!"
"SGT Batty, if you come down with freakin' salmonella poisoning, the platoon sergeant would chew my ass. I'd never hear the end of it! Have another MRE, you have plenty in the back of your truck....."
At which point I shut up, my soldiers start making fun of me, and my stomach rumbles away like distant artillery. It fades resentfully, just in time to pass another cafe, and then the whole routine starts up again.
In the midst of licking my ballistic window out of desperation, our top SINCGARS radio, tuned to our company frequency, beeps and crackles urgently. One of the OPS sergeants comes over the net, and reports a IED explosion on another unit, just a few klicks away. He gives the grid coordinates to it, and I grab the wet-erase pen that's hanging off of one of the speakers, and scribble the numbers on the windshield in front of me. It's only a couple blocks north of our current location.
OPS is sending our other squad there, but SSG H. knows they will need all the help they can get, so our column of humvees pulls a U-turn across the dusty median, scattering a group of sheep as it goes, and we gun the lumbering vehicles back down the way we came. Sure enough, we get the directive to head that way a minute later. We're only seconds away.
I prepare myself for what we may be about to see. Burned bodies. Missing limbs. Humvees blown apart and scattered across a scorched street. It wouldn't be the first time. I brief my team as we rock and lean from side to side, the big truck maneuvering around the traffic on our way in.
"Okay, guys, we're heading to the scene of an IED. When we get there, make sure to do a quick '5 and 25' around us. There may be secondaries in the area. N., if we dismount, grab the fire extinguisher. I'll grab the extraction tool and the fire blanket. C., make sure you're looking for a triggerman, and watching the houses for snipers."
The radios are full of chatter, urgent, clipped. Various units are vectoring towards the scene. C., my gunner, yells down to me that he can see Apache helicopters coming up behind us, and a second later I can feel the basal thumping in my chest as two of them roar over us, low and fast. It's a good feeling to have them overhead and leading the way, not to mention having the extra firepower in the skies above us.
We're about half a block away from the scene when the buildings around us change from residential houses to a market place. The roads are choked with cars, trucks, vans, makeshift vendor stalls, and people. At the best of times, these open air markets are an exercise in barely contained chaos, and the addition of high explosives, assault helicopters, and the high speed approach of tan-clad Crusaders only increases the effect. The crowd is mostly women, uniformly clad in their traditional black robes, and a lot of kids, who stand in stiff postures with open mouths, the way that kids do in third world countries. Nobody wants to get out of the way.
Our progress slows to a maddening standstill, made all the worse because we know that our fellow soldiers may be seriously injured just ahead. SSG H. has a siren on his humvee, and Fish, his driver, feverishly works its dial, switching from wail to yelp and back again. The gunners on the trucks gesture wildly, blowing on their whistles, trying to move the people and the vehicles. A couple of IP pick-up trucks fly up behind us, and the blue shirted cops dismount, amid their own sirens and some high pitched Arabic screaming on their PA systems. Add to this the roar and rattle of the gunships circling overhead, and the constant blare of the SINCGARS radios, with their weirdly mechanical voices, and you have an idea of the scene in which I found myself.
The IPs soon found the most effective way of moving the people out of the way, which was to simply shoot at them with their AKs, which IPs like to do. Okay, maybe not at them, but very close to them. This is the normal way of moving traffic in Baghdad, and I have to say that it works pretty well, although it's a little hard on the nerves if you are not expecting it, and you are expecting things by the side of the road to go boom. Still, we got through the crowd.
On the other side of the crowd was a large, triangular field. I guess you could call it a field, although it was really just a large patch of trash-strewn mud and rocks, crisscrossed with holes and ditches and general debris. Pretty standard for the eastside. Pretty standard for any Iraqi city. The term field always brings to mind an Alpine wonderland of greener-than-green grass and a riot of wild flowers, the kind you see in Bavarian postcards, but such things tend to get mugged quickly in Baghdad, and most of them left town years ago. This one looks more like a cross between a lunar crater and the aftermath of Woodstock.
Across the 'field' we can see a column of humvees. We bounce our way across to them, eyeing every tussock of mud and plastic bag with distrusting eyes. The awful truth about IEDs is that they are incredibly easy to conceal, particularly in Baghdad with its decades of accumulated garbage, and this would be a great place to have a secondary one, just waiting for us. The insurgents like to take advantage of Good Samaritans coming to the aid of stricken people, and we want to make sure we don't walk into their trap.
We make it across without any unwelcome detonations, and my squad leader dismounts to check on the stricken convoy. I get out, along with the other team leaders, to pull security on him, and to render aid to any casualties. We walk down the road, rifles up and at the ready, scanning the facades of the houses around us, ready for trouble. I can see the humvee that got hit, the asphalt beneath it scorched black from the blast. The vehicle doesn't look too bad, just some damage to the engine and the right front door, but looks can be deceiving. I've seen trucks that have been absolutely mangled, and everyone inside is untouched, and on the other hand, seen vehicles with a single neat hole in a door, with a dead man behind it.
The 82nd guys are out and pulling security, and quickly tell us that there are no injuries. The truck is disabled, and a wrecker is on the way. They have been very lucky, and I breathe a sigh of relief. I don't know these guys, but in the valley of the shadow, you don't need to. We all have American flags on our shoulders, and that is all the connection we need.
We relay the info back to our TOC on the radio, and then the question turns to finding the SOB that did it. There is a lot of talk of the triggerman, of people in various shirts of various colors seen running from the scene. Eventually the ID coalesces to a young guy in a green shirt with black stripes, running across the field to the east, and so we decide to head that way. More elements of the 82nd are coming in, and they are going to start searching houses in the area.
I'm impressed with the response to this IED strike. We've got multiple squads of infantry and MPs in the area, along with Iraqi Police and EMS, and the Apache gunships overhead. In the past few months, I've been to the scene of a number of IEDs, and often it has just been us and the element that got hit, alone, on some deserted street in the middle of the night. The 82nd is rolling out heavy, as we say, and it feels good to have this amount of back-up around us. I only wish that we could fix the insurgents in the process, and put a ton of lead down on top of them. Too much of my time here, we have felt like the hunted, instead of the hunter we need to be.
Now to find that damn triggerman...
Our squad moves into the mahallah across the field, and sets up blocking positions along a residential road. Apparently this is the street that the infantry saw Mr. Greenshirt run down, after the EFP went off. My truck is at the end of our convoy, and I position the vehicle to block the road, and then dismount to pull security.
As usual in Iraq, normal everyday life goes on in the midst of a guerilla war. Apparently a school is just down one of the sideroads, and a steady stream of schoolgirls walks past our instant checkpoint, uniformly clad in black and white robes. The girls all have the same look on their faces, steadfast, almost fixed, maintaining this aura of disdain while refusing to look at us, as if we were filthy beggars panhandling, instead of just filthy soldiers looking for neighborhood terrorists. I scan the rooftops and balconies for snipers, a habit that is, by now, so ingrained that I found myself doing it subconsciously during RnR, back in Germany. That was less than two weeks ago, and already it seems like a movie I once watched as a kid.
"Hey, SGT B, over here."
One of my counterparts, SGT Y., is calling for me, and I turn to see what he is up to. His weapon is up, and he is sighting down another side road. I jog over to him, and ask him what he has.
"That kid just ran into that house over there!" he says excitedly.
"What kid?"
"The one with the green shirt, with the black stripes! The suspected trigger man...." he replies, dropping his rifle to his side for a second and looking at me.
"Which house? Where?" I ask, peering down the street.
"That one right there, with the old lady outside it." He points a dirty nomex glove towards one on the left, just a few houses away from us.
I look over. There is one of the ubiquitous ninja women standing next to a iron gate and, as I look, a kid of about 12 years joins her from inside. I motion the kid to come over, which he does, apparently without fear.
I ask him in Arabic if a man just went in the house. No, no, he just left, is the reply, which is sort of a confusing answer, but I relay it to Y anyway. SGT Y's reply is short and to the point--bullshit! I ask the kid again if a young man with a green shirt went in the house. Damn, how do you say 'green' in Arabic? I pull out my little phrase book and leaf through trying to find the word. How come you can never find the phrase or word when you really need it? Screw it; I point to an olive drab pouch on Y's body armor, and then to the kid's shirt. The kid figures it out.
Oh yeah, yeah, he went inside! He ran up to the top floor just a minute ago.
I thank the kid, and then tell SGT Y that yes, the guy is inside. "Let's get in there and clear the building!" I'm getting pumped right away. I spent six years on MP Special Reaction Teams, doing SWAT operations, and room clearing is just my thing.
SGT Y is a little more cautious. "Just the two of us? Umm, let's get SSG H up here..."
Just then SSG H. walks up, but before we get to tell him the deal, he chews my ass for leaving my team. I look at my truck, only twenty feet away, and then back at him.
"But, but....."
It's no use. He's right, I guess, but my soldiers are not privates and can handle pulling security by themselves for a few minutes. I stomp back over to them, slightly fuming. It's one of those little disagreement moments that happens when everyone's adrenaline is up. I know that if I just stay cool that SSG H. will be open to listen a little bit later. I tell myself this a couple times while watching them go upstairs, and move across the balcony, rifles at the low ready.
In any case, the dude is not in the house. He probably sprinted upstairs, zipped across the roof, and crossed over to any number of neighbouring houses. That's the other problem with battling insurgents on their turf; they grew up here and know the terrain far more intimately than we ever could. SSG H and SGT Y trudge back outside, and SGT Y looks at me from the gate, shrugging his shoulders.
More elements of the 82nd show up, and they start cordoning off the neighbourhood. It seems that they are preparing to go door-to-door, and they request that we move down this street and block it off at the other end. We move our trucks down the road slowly, the team leaders walking beside the HMMWVs as we go, along with some of the dismounted infantry.
The stroll is another one of those slightly surrealistic Baghdad moments. Bright sunshine, cool breezes, rustling trees. The rumble of our vehicles next to us, .50 caliber machine gun turrets rotating as the gunners change their tactical angles. The feel of rough concrete through my Oakley boots, and the weight of the carrying strap of my 203 across my armored shoulders, bouncing as I walk. Watching rooftops, windows, and balconies for gun barrels, or muzzle flashes, or anything suspicious, and only finding scarfed women hanging up laundry. The rising tone and flashing roar of the Apaches circling overhead, contrasting with the flap of the black martyr flags on the tops of some of the homes. The reaction of the neighborhood people adds to the dreamlike effect. They are not scared, or intimidated, or fazed in any way. They act as if we were tourists out for a stroll, looking for nothing more interesting than a good photo opportunity. One old guy lies supine on the ground, barely moving as we walk past him. I dunno if he is drunk, or just taking a nap, but he seems completely unconcerned at our approach.
We reach the end of the street and set up another roadblock, without the sudden report of a sniper rifle. Some of the infantry squads continue on, striking off down alleyways, while behind us another squad of motorized infantry rolls in behind us, and starts disgorging more troops. A sudden "bang bang bang" makes me jump for a second, but it is only the soldiers kicking against the metal gates to the houses. Apparently it is the kindler, gentler method of conducting a cordon and search, at least for the 82nd.
I'm joined, after a little while, by a short Hispanic paratrooper, Jose, sent down from his squad to make sure no one enters or exits the street during the search. I ask him the usual questions, how ya doin', where ya from, how long ya been in country--the same questions that American soldiers have been asking each other through all of our foreign wars, from Bastogne to Pusan to Nha Trang and now to Baghdad. He answers reluctanctly, almost resentfully, in monosyllables. I guess leg MPs are almost as suspect to him as Iraqi insurgents. About the time that abortive conversation ends, we start getting the usual crowd of locals gathering at our makeshift roadblock--mostly kids, but also some men and a couple of housewives trying to get back to their homes from market, or school, or work.
Jose's social skills need a little work. Maybe it's because he's only been in-country for two months, or maybe it's just because he's Airborne and therefore of a higher order than us mere mortals, but he barks rough commands in English at the waiting people, who stare at him uncomprehendingly. This is usually just after I've done my best to explain the situation to them in Arabic. He finally resigns himself to squatting across the street and glaring at us, the barrel of his rifle pointed in our general direction.
I recently learned the single most useful phrase of Arabic yet. Schloon tgul......im Arabii? 'How do you say.....in Arabic?' If you fill in the blank with either some earnest pointing at the object in question, or some really good Charades acting, you can learn how to say just about anything. It comes in handy over the next two hours, since that's about how long the folks in front of me end up waiting to go back to their houses. Instead of having a small riot on our hands, we end up having a blast. People generally love teaching their language to foreigners, whether it's in a village in Honduras, a city in Korea, a refugee camp in Bosnia, or here in a backalley 'hood on the eastside of Baghdad. It helps if the foreigner is holding a very large assault rifle, and is festooned with a variety of grenades.
Whenever the search teams find a military age male, they send them down to my group, and presently I have about twenty of these guys sitting next to a garden wall. We talk about guns, girls, the United States, George Bush, mobile phones, girls, cars, money, pornography (a relatively new development in Iraq), swear words in multiple languages and, oh yes, girls. I hand out cigarettes and bottled water, and somehow manage to keep the motley crew entertained and not thinking about ways to cause problems for the infidels, at least not right now.
In the midst of our language lesson, the radio crackles with some disturbing news. One of the scouting infantry squads has come across what they think is a car bomb, nestled in an alleyway just behind the houses behind us. It's a old junker with wires and bailing wire protruding from the hood and the trunk. Kind of a weird place to put a car bomb, since a humvee won't even fit in the alleyway, but I suppose it's possible that they stumbled across one being put together. Privately, I suspect it's just another Baghdad hoopty, held together with ingenuity and duct tape.
Still, the infantry lieutenant wants EOD to check it out, which makes the wait even longer. My crowd gets larger, since it is now late afternoon and folks are starting to make their way home. It's only a matter of time until I am faced with the most challenging of Iraqi denizens to control: a very short, very round, Arabic grandmother.
Granny is classic. She's loud, and alternates between being funny, gregarious, tearful and demanding--and the cycle rotates every minute or so, with frantic energy. There is lots of hand gestures and dramatic pleading to the heavens. Her black robes swirl about her like an Old Testament cloud, and the beads and metal necklaces around her thick neck clank and tinkle against each other as she gestures wildly. She's says she's tired and hungry and her house is only right there and there are no terrorists in the neighborhood and even if they are she isn't a terrorist and she doesn't even know any terrorists and her son is coming over later and she has to make dinner for him and she just doesn't understand what the American soldiers are doing here anyway and can't she just go home because she won't cause any problems swear to Allah the most merciful praises be upon him.
After a while, the guys along the wall help me out and try to tell her the deal, too, but even that doesn't work. Granny is on a roll, and surely the damn crusader is about to crack.
It's at that point that the radio crackles to life--EOD has decided to blow up the suspected car bomb, just to be sure, and also because it's fun. EOD loves to blow shit up, and usually without telling anyone, so I should at least be grateful for the heads up. I turn to the crowd and gesture wildly, trying to remember the word for explosion, and finally resort to putting my hands over my ears, and squinting my eyes shut, except for one. Everyone instantly follows suit, and the sight of twenty five people looking like the 'Hear No Evil' monkey is pretty funny, if not for the thought that a big freakin' amount of high explosives is about to detonate half a block away.
There is a reasonable sized BOOOM from behind the houses. Nothing too crazy, about the noise level of your average hand grenade, but enough to make some of the waiting guys jump. The only problem is that the relatively low noise level means that it wasn't a VBIED, and we just demolished somebody's family car.
Ooops.
Jose comes over and announces that all of the guys need to go down the street to be ID'd by some witnesses to the roadside bomb. I do my best to explain what's going on, and we have the lads get in a line and put their hands on the shoulders of the guy in front of them, like some sort of kindergarten field trip, and off they go down the road. Granny tries to join them, and I have to grab her off the end of the line.
Apparently no one fits the picture, as I can see the guys being dismissed just a few minutes later. I wave Granny and the rest of the housewives on, giving them the all clear, and she wafts past me blowing kisses with one hand and waving to Allah with the other, babbling on all the while. She's good people, and I smile at her as she waddles down the dusty street.
We load up shortly afterwards, amid the younger kids begging and pleading for soccer balls, candy and money, none of which I am inclined to give them. We didn't find a single piece of contraband, or any suspects during the search, but I still come away with a feeling of having done some good. Perhaps, at the very least, we've managed to put a human face on the occupying Americans, and my Arabic phrase book is full of scribbled new words and phrases. This is the way that counter-insurgency wars are fought--a quick blast, lots of slow searching and a ton of effort, and nothing material to show for it at the end of the day. If you're lucky, though, perhaps you made a friend or two along the way. Maybe it will make a difference.
As we pull away from the street, I see a kid run out from behind the houses, and disappear down a back alley way, just a flash in the growing dusk of the evening.
And wouldn't you know it. He was wearing a green shirt with black stripes.
Sgt Roy Batty is a pen name for an MP stationed in Baghdad. The picture at the top comes from thetension.blogspot.com.
(Gouge:DD)
Cross-posted at the Military.com Warfighter's Forum.
How Bad is it at Bell Helicopter?
It was Bowl season, a time of celebration. And right there celebrating among 'em was Mike "Red" Redenbaugh, wandering around the Bell-sponsored Armed Forces Bowl like a regular Jerry Jones. His big face beamed into living rooms across the nation as he proclaimed the company's strength and promise.
And then a few weeks later he was running a routine staff meeting when his secretary entered the conference room and told him he was needed in another meeting right away. He walked into his office to find Textron (Bell's parent company) chief Lewis Campbell waiting for him. Red was fired on the spot.
Events over the last few days show things might be getting worse before (and if) they get better under new leadership. Recently, Inside Defense reported that the Army, frustrated by schedule delays and cost increases, directed Bell to stop work on the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. Army acquisition officials have issued a "show cause" letter to the contractor setting a 30-day deadline for the company to rectify the difficulties that have led to significant cost growth and a one-year delay. If Bell cannot sufficiently solve the problems, then they could lose the program altogether.
Inside Defense has also reported that the Pentagon is planning to move VH-71 production overseas completely instead of allocating a significant portion of the work on the next Presidential helo to Bell. The report cited the government's desire to "reduce risk" as the reason behind the plan. Of course, this battle isn't over yet as lawmakers are not going to watch their pork sail across the pond even if the company in their district has proven incapable of making cost and schedule milestones.
Neither of these moves are good signs for Bell, a company that is fighting to regain the stability it enjoyed during the Vietnam era, the heyday of the Huey. A lot was done on Redenbaugh's watch including a reorganization that consolidated its military production effort to Amarillo, but these recent developments have reminded Bell (and Textron) not to confuse activity with outcomes. Whatever the company accomplished in the last few years, it wasn't enough to keep Red onboard or to regain the trust of the Pentagon.
So how slippery is this slope?
(Gouge: SC)
-- Ward
Cold Iron
That is a term we would use when a carrier (or any ship, I suppose) would pull pierside and they would shut down the boilers or turn off the reactors (you can tell I’m not nuke material) or whatever - and everyone would go on leave - with the exception of the duty watch team.
A bit different with KENNEDY today. The decommissioning for the old girl was held this afternoon, and the pomp and circumstance and ceremony of centuries of Navy tradition was played out under a beautiful blue Florida sky. When the crew left the ship this time, there was no watch team left behind - nothing left but a silent ship.
USS JOHN F KENNEDY is indeed cold iron.
 MAYPORT, Fla. (March 23, 2007) - Sailors take their final walk down the brow of USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) during the historical decommissioning ceremony. Kennedy served its country with more than 38 years of service and 18 official deployments. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Susan Cornell (RELEASED)
The below article talks about a KENNEDY reunion held the day before. Read the whole thing - it really captures a lot of what these ships mean to the men who served on them:
It Was A Homecoming for JFK Alumni
FLORIDA TIMES UNION, 23 MAR 07, By Mark Woods
From afar, it might seem like just a ship.
A massive ship. A ship that, as the last conventionally powered aircraft carrier built by the Navy, represents a disappearing piece of U.S. military history. A ship that received so many modifications that it’s basically one of a kind.
But it’s still just a ship, right?
Not to the hundreds of people who stepped back onto the USS John F. Kennedy on Thursday - some of them for the first time since they stepped off it decades ago.
It was Alumni Day, a chance for former crew members to return to the JFK before today’s decommissioning ceremony.
They came from all over the country. They showed spouses and children and grandchildren where they used to live and work. They bumped into old buddies and told old stories, some of which they insisted were true.
They walked up and down familiar steps, grabbing familiar pieces of metal, holding on a little longer than they once did. And not just because they haven’t been on the ship in a while.
Because they knew this was it. They were saying goodbye to something that, to them, is much more than a ship.
More below the fold
--Pinch Paisley, crossposted at the Instapinch
“It’s my second home,” said Mike Friedman, 44, of Toledo, Ohio, recalling his three cruises in three different decades.
“Coming back is like going back to your hometown,” said Laurie Jacobs, 45, of Jacksonville.
“It’s part of my life, that is what it is,” said Norman Hults of Windsor, Va.
Hults, 64, stood on the flight deck with his wife, Ruth. He explained that he met her while on leave, more than 32 years ago. Returning to the ship brought back memories of that time, of working in the engine rooms, of being a sailor on the JFK.
“There were good days and bad days,” Hults said, adding with a smile, “but I’ve forgotten all the bad ones.”
He recently watched as another ship he served on was dismantled and turned into scrap metal. That left the Kennedy as the last ship he has served on that’s still around. So when asked about the decommissioning, he said, “It brings tears to my eyes.”
Moments later - and throughout the morning - there was the sound of a clang, clang, followed by an announcement.
“Plank owner arriving.”
The “plank owners” are the ship’s original crew members, the sailors who were there when the ship was commissioned on Sept. 7, 1968.
Robert Lehman was a machinist mate 2nd class working with air-conditioning and refrigeration. He hadn’t been back on the ship since 1971. Standing in the bright sunlight on the flight deck, he said: “It’s weird. I remember coming up here in the middle of the ocean, pitch black and nothing but the moon and stars. I miss the Navy days.”
Some of the alumni went up to the navigation bridge. Some had their children sit in the captain’s chair for photos. Frank Galietti, one of the plank owners, grabbed some familiar controls and said with a grin, “I feel 40 years younger.”
To the alumni, the ship is much more than tons of metal. It’s sweat and blood. Their sweat and blood.
Jack Devlin, a plank owner now living in Boston, talked about the commissioning and how, on that day, they gave Big John its “heartbeat.”
“It has a life,” said Devlin, who was a radar operator on the ship. “It absolutely has a life.”
If that’s the case, then it was a good, long life. And as is the case with all long lives, it included plenty of ups and downs. Repeated cruises to the Middle East, dating back to the 1970s. A massive homecoming celebration in Virginia after Desert Storm. A collision with the USS Belknap in 1975. Periods of disrepair. Periods of repair.
It’s a tribute to the sailors who served on the Kennedy that it survived this long. Some of them wish it could last longer. Others say it’s time. Maybe even past time.
“It’s kind of like the aging parent that finally passes,” said Jacobs, who was the ship’s first dental hygienist. “It’s bittersweet.”
It’s not just that the ship has had a good life. So have the people who served on it.
That’s what they kept saying as they walked around the Kennedy one last time.
There were times during their cruises when they couldn’t wait to get off the ship. That’s what happens when you serve on an aircraft carrier, when you’re at sea for months at a time. But this day, they didn’t want to leave.
They lingered.
They sounded homesick.
For a ship, they kept saying, is much more than a ship.
The Peoples' Site (Osprey Edition)
The Peoples' Site! is the DT feature where periodically (when we feel like it) we highlight the best comments from our comments forums. And no entry generated more passion recently than "The Commandant Says 'There is Going to be a Crash.'" Resultantly, we're dedicating this edition of The Peoples' Site to Marine Corps Major Tony "Buddy" Bianca.
Buddy has been an Osprey driver for some years, so his two cents merits more than a little attention. Some additional background: I was a Tomcat RIO (like "Goose" in the movie "Topgun") and retired at the rank of commander after 20 years in the Navy. And I wrote a handful of novels about military topics. I was also the PAO for the V-22 program at NAVAIR for three years after I retired (before I assumed the editor job at Military.com). Knowing that, Buddy's ad hominem attacks will make more sense. Anyway, here's his response to my post:
I’m curious to know what question the Commandant was answering when this quote was captured. Or are we led to believe that he called you all to breakfast just to strike up a conversation and tell V22s were going to crash?
Along those lines, why haven’t any other service chiefs invited you to breakfast and announced that there won’t be any crashes of any JSF or H60s or any other aircraft in the other services? Besides, your explanations about why Opsrey’s will crash aren’t well thought out. You do know a little about the program, but your information is old, and you obviously don’t know anything about the aircraft. Any aircraft is going to suffer losses like you described. Anyone with actual operational experience knows that. As for your nugget comment, we’ve been training Lt’s right out of flight school for over a year. There are more than a couple out there in the fleet “doing nugget things” as we blog.
Your description about HROD has a lot of conjecture and a smattering of truth in it. The V22 VRS envelope is significantly smaller than any other rotorcraft out there. To make sure everybody understands that, it means it is harder to get a V22 into VRS than a regular helicopter. Here’s what you don’t talk about in your HROD paragraph: VRS is a function of both forward airspeed and rate of descent. When the guys got the inadvertent entry you describe, they were putt-putting along setting up for the data point – they were slow to begin with, so the idea that it will “surprise” some nugget is a little far-fetched. No nugget goes hunting for datapoints on test plan designed to answer congress and not the operational user. Goodness gracious, we don’t hawk the VSI, neither do our students, and we don’t get the SINK RATE warning. I must say I thoroughly enjoyed your reply where you said to take the aircraft to a 1000 ft hover and then smoothly pull the TCL to idle! Cripes! How about you fly your F14 to 1.1 Vstall in a turn then slowly pull the stick all the way back – that would probably be just as stupid. Oh, that’s right, you didn’t have a stick in the back of an F14. But I digress, you said it would lose 500 ft in the time it takes to move the nacelles? Maybe if you’re currently in a fully developed VRS state and suffering from some kind of time-space continuum warp in the fabric of reality.
I would like to counter your predictions with one of my own: There won’t be a VRS mishap in V22s for many, many years, if ever. We all know what happened in Marana (some of us better than any investigator, if you take my meaning) and we all had a lot of beer and agreed not to do that again.
I’m curious, do you know how many times and how far V22 have flown single engine? Forget about the run-stand down in Ft Worth, I’m talking about actually flying the aircraft with only one engine? Do you know? I’ll bet credits to navy beans you don’t.
And bullets don’t bounce off of composite fuselage? Really? What assault support platform do we have that bullets do bounce off of? I’m also curious to know how the ballistics of composites fair against sheet aluminum on all the current airframes. Just assuming the ground fire is coming from the ground, will not the projectile path travel through the sponson to get into the cabin? Even with the forward velocity of the aircraft taken into account? Or are the shooters just going to aim for headshots on all the Marines in back as the V22 steaks by at 220 kts?
Now this is a little off topic, but I have to bring it up. “yeah, well it has to slow down to land”. You’re absolutely right. And let me assure these readers that no hovering machine in the world can slow down to land or accelerate out of the zone like the V22. Not even a single engine huey with the twist grip rolled off . . . Nothing carrying more than 5 pax anyway. Maybe a little bird could, but I don’t see the Marines turning in 1 V22 and checking out 6 MD500s . . .
Yes, the supply side of V22 is behind. But remember from when you worked in the program office, material support date is October of 2008…that’s what you guys programmed, I guess they just didn’t tell the PAO . . . Wonder why? Might have something to do with the war we’re waging at the moment.
The other “another maintenance issue” you described is going to happen. It’s also going to happen to every aircraft we build until we become omniscient with structures. Yes, the JSF and the EH101 will have structure issues because we can’t predict everything…should we call the service chiefs and invite them to breakfast? Maybe they’ll say something else!? Rest assured we’ll maintain the hydraulics with titanium tubing and 5000 psi. I’ve got some really good airframers who would like to address your challenge if you get the chance to come down to New River.
What the hell do you mean Osprey doesn’t fit on an amphib? Umm . . . then I must have false memories. No . . . I’m certain . . . I took a picture of it. Not just once, not just one ship, over 5 of them. I got lots of pictures. Just the same, my pictures - they’re really cool Polaroids just like Goose took of the Mig in the movie . . . You know, Goose, the non-flying officer’s hero in Top Gun? Anyway, make sure you call those NAVSEA engineers and tell them you vote no confidence in their ability to the deck heating problem. I wonder what we’ve been doing when we go out to train on the ship now, since we don’t "fit" on an amphib like you said. Last question on this subject, how many days you have at sea on an amphib?
Wow, this just drags on and on, doesn’t it?
It sounds like you know all about allocation of forces, too. You know, how the MEF provides forces to the COCOMs . . . Are you sure you weren’t the PAO for HQMC? Bah, now I’m getting too sarcastic . . . You’re [sic} statements of where we put the aircraft don’t have anything to do with our belief it’s a kick ass airplane. For example, "Lets keep it simple"? Are you nuts? How about, lets think about what forces the Marine Corps needs to provide, and what METLs those forces have to be capable of in a joint theatre before we decide where to send our units. Consider that and then tell us how we should deploy the Marines and their equipment to the warfighting COs. Be sure to come back and tell us we don’t believe the Osprey will make it just because we don’t send it to MNW in Iraq.
BTW, Mongo is better than any Turkey driver you know, and didn’t expect to see his name put out there like it was some kind of endorsement for your errant points here. Neither did Jim. And Schnieder is a GySgt now, so you owe him 50 pushups for trying to demote him in your replies.
Last of all, does your current employer know you’re just a mouthpiece as PAO? Does he or she have your resume and know as soon as you get a different job you’re going to change your opinion, champion a different cause, then offer pitiful attempts to make yourself feel better by saying you "respect" all the V22 pilots and maintainers out there by quoting names that resolutely disagree with you? Go back to writing fictional books and being a mouthpiece for someone else. You don’t speak for V22, or those of us who see the long term investment objective to ensure we can out-maneuver any other fighting force in the world. The world is changing, 4th generation warfare is here, and you can decide how much you want to spend to ensure that America wins every time…and not just win while protecting themselves, but win while ensuring minimum loss of life of non-combatants by winning quickly and decisively. . . or you can hang our with Chris and criticize others with conjecture and a background that only impresses the uninformed, all the while referencing POM dollars like they are the lives of those who’s bled out because we couldn’t get to them in time.
In the words of naval aviation, “take it around, you’re [sic] signal is divert."
And finally (whew!) I don’t believe the Commandant brought up, I believe you and your "amigo" did.
Damn. Color me bitch-slapped, absolutely. To be clear, I didn't intend to imply that Mongo agreed with me by complimenting him in the original post. My crime here is I truly respect him as a pilot and a leader. I also wasn't trying to demote Gunny Schneider. I was referring to a time when he was, in fact, a staff sergeant. But whatever. One thing's for sure: Regardless of the airplane's issues, with Marines like Buddy Bianca on the case, the Osprey just might succeed. And if it fails, it won't be without a fight.
-- Ward
Worn Out Welcome?
I just can’t resist a post on this one. According to news reports, Afghan tribal clans have been battling their foreign “brothers” from Uzbekistan in three days of pitched fighting that has so far killed 135.
I spent some time in Afghanistan in 2004 on the Pakistan border near Khost. Intel reports at the time indicated that Uzbek fighters – many of them leftovers from Taliban and al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan before U.S. and Northern Alliance forces pushed them out – were the primary impetus for cross-border raids. Radio transmission intercepts from Prophet trucks perched on the hilltops were peppered with Uzbek-accented chatter.
Though Pakistan officials are trying to pain the clash as a success…
Interior Ministry Aftab Khan Sherpao said Wednesday that the clashes prove that the government's policy of enlisting tribesmen to expel foreign militants was working, and an army spokesman described the local militants as "patriots."
…methinks the tribal elders have gotten sick of their Uzbek guests. So that’s a few less insurgents to launch cross-border raids on U.S. and NATO troops. Wasn’t it Kautilya who said: ‘The enemy of my enemy is my friend?’
-- Christian
Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System
Michael Wales points out part of a Michael Yon report posted last week:
One interesting story of note from what will hopefully be among Michael’s final full days in Camp Victory: Last night, he was awakened by what sounded like cannon fire coming from a chain gun. Even with as much time as Michael has spent around war and battle, he had no idea what it was.
Turns out the army was testing a new anti-mortar system. It’s sort of a giant machine gun that can shoot mortar rounds out of the sky. It tracks the incoming mortars with radar and then shoots them down. Given the size of the rounds, Michael was wondering what would happen if they missed their targets. They were big enough that they could rip a city apart if they missed the target and fell to the ground. Turns out, the rounds explode after a certain time in the air and can’t hit the ground. Smart.
It sounds as if this might be the C-RAM (Counter-Rockets, Artillery, Mortar) Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS) system first shipped to Iraq in 2005. (See R2-D2 vs. Mortar Rounds, also posted at MO). Most details of the program are still classified, but it's basically a Phalanx CIWS Block 1B on a trailer. According to a 2005 article in Air Defense Artillery Magazine:
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