Cyber attacks from individuals, organized crime, extremist groups, terrorists as well as nation states pose a significant threat to the national security of the United States. While many believe that this is a government issue, closer analysis of the problem suggests otherwise. Any computer that is not properly protected can be compromised and used as a weapon against the system owner, businesses and our economy, the nation's infrastructure or in some rare cases our defenses. Personal, business and government systems are constantly under attack and the frequency and sophistication of the attacks is rapidly increasing.
The number of new computer systems threat skyrocketed nearly 570 percent from those identified in 2006. According to one 2007 computer security study, the average annual loss reported by U.S. companies increased by nearly 210 percent to $350,424 (per occurence) in 2007. The top three primary sources of loss were financial fraud, losses due to computer virus and system penetration by outsiders. About 20 percent of the companies reporting security incidents said they have fallen victim to targeted malware attacks. Nearly 1.2 million different pieces of malware have been identified and reside in the malware repository. Malware is software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system without the owner's informed consent. The term is a combination of the words malicious and software. The expression is a general term used by computer professionals to mean a variety of forms of hostile, destructive, intrusive, or annoying software. The bad news is malware is just one of the many threats to computers, systems and networks.
A reader of the blog asked me "Why with all the U.S. technological expertise are we so vulnerable to these threats?" That is a great question. Considering a recent report suggested that around 90 percent of breaches could have been prevented, why are our computer systems so at risk?
After giving this a fair amount of thought I came to the following realization. It is our attitude! For some reason there is an abundance of "I know more than they do" types in information security. If that is not bad enough, the second most prominent attitude is "It can't happen here" followed closely by "I will address it when it happens to me."
Example 1 - A $13 billion publically traded corporation has five full time staff assigned to information security. When I asked the Director how he spent his time he said by far most was in the Human Resources Department and with corporate lawyers.
Example 2 - A systems design and development organization that services part of our nation's infrastructure was briefed on the issues and threats of cyber attack. Numerous examples were provided to that organization that showed their industry had already experienced cyber attacks. In addition, a high level overview of their operational procedures resulted in the identification of two critical vulnerabilities that exposed the systems to compromise. The organization addressed one of those issues and decided to take a wait and see approach to addressing the other.
Example 3 - A security consulting firm contacted me as an advisor. They were brought in to review security and recommend changes of a publically traded company. During their work they discovered the company had been breached. They had found a "bot" attached to an Oracle database. The "bot" collected information about the manufacturing cost of the company's products. They approached the CIO with the facts and the Sarbanes-Oxley issues, he refused to communicate the issue to the senior executives and then cancelled their contract.
Well, we don't know more than all the hackers do. This is a highly dynamic threat environment that even the top security professional say is "challenging." The "it can't happen here" attitude is insane. One veteran US Special Agent in cybercrime investigation publically stated how companies do their best to cover up corporate espionage and insider theft. He went on to say he had seen entire corporate networks of over 100,000 systems completely compromised and hundreds of thousands of files exfiltrated and not disclosed. The fact is, if all system breaches were reported the security metrics would be much worse that the ones reported earlier here. So it not only can happen here, it probably already did and got covered up.
UPDATE: The House Armed Services airland subcommittee will hold a July 10 hearing at 2 p.m. in Rayburn 2118 on the tanker contract at which John Young, undersecetary of Defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, Sue Payton, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, and a representative from the Government Accountability Office will testify. ALSO, see below for information about a closed meeting today with House lawmakers, a GAO rep and one from the Pentagon.
That enormous sucking sound you heard at the Pentagon Thursday was the intake of breath by the senior OSD and acquisition officials who handled the tanker contract when they heard Defense Secretary Robert Gates offer almost no defense of the contracting process that led to the Northrop Grumman contract.
Gates was asked Thursday point blank if he had confidence in Sue Payton, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, who led the team that decided to award the contract. "I have confidence in the team until I find evidence to the contrary," Gates said. Given the recent forced resignations of Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mike Moseley, Payton must be getting ready to move out if asked since Gates also said the Government Accountability Office’s report found that the "Air Force team made significant errors.” At the same time, Gates did say he “needs to get a better feel for the nature of criticisms" made by the congressional watchdog and had not made any decisions about the contract yet, adding that the "first indication" he had of trouble with the contract award was the GAO report.
The Defense Secretary has made clear he will be closely watching the decision whether to rebid the deal or not, signaling that he realizes the political sensitivity of the deal, as well as raising questions about his confidence in the handling of the issue by the office of John Young, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics.
"We clearly need to have an approach that has the confidence of the Congress so we are looking at several options," Gates said. Asked if he would personally get involved in the decision, Gates said he did not think that would be "appropriate, frankly."
UPDATE: In other tanker action today, the House Armed Services airland subcommittee met behind closed doors for more than three hours with a representative from the GAO and a fairly low-ranking Pentagon acquisition official to discuss the tanker deal. No one but lawmakers were allowed to attend. We hear that even Northrop Grumman supporters conceded that the GAO report has devastated their case. For those at the Pentagon who would like to relegate the GAO report to the usual trash can they get put in the building, our source said there was unanimity among lawmakers at the meeting that the GAO had done a fine job in its report and had the ear of members.
Associated Press
WASHINGTON - The Army will deliver some key technologies to ground forces in war zones three years ahead of schedule as part of its $160 billion Future Combat Systems program led by Boeing Co. and SAIC Inc.
Senior Army officials on June 26 said changes to the FCS program will expedite the use of high-tech equipment, including unmanned sensors and robotics, to infantry brigades fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan by 2011.
Portions of FCS were expected to be used by armored units by 2014, but Army officials say the technology being developed is needed for the current war effort.
Lt. Gen. Michael A. Vane, director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, said accelerating FCS and other complementary programs will help "filling the gaps" created by huge demands on the infantry brigades, while increasing the effectiveness and safety of U.S. soldiers.
Army officials maintain that while costs may rise in the short-term from the new schedule, they will balance out in future years and will not raise the program's overall price tag, which has been criticized by lawmakers.
Lead contractors Boeing and SAIC said the Army's decision to accelerate the FCS technologies shows confidence in the program's progress. FCS includes 14 manned and unmanned systems that are linked through a secure communications network.
On Wednesday, Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey briefed Defense Secretary Robert Gates on plans to restructure the program. Gates, who backed the shift, told reporters at a separate briefing Thursday that FCS "deserves support."
Dan Goure, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute, said it appears that the Army "didn't want to repeat the same mistake" as the Air Force in battling Gates publicly over F-22 jets made by Lockheed Martin Corp. Gates also has previously raised doubts about the FCS program.
"Clearly this show that Gates is in command in a way few secretaries have been of the services," said Goure.
A few lawmakers lauded the Army's choice to deploy the latest technology to soldiers in the field. But House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, D-Mo., and Hawaii Democrat Neil Abercrombie, chairman of the air and land subcommittee, expressed concern that the new plan "may not allow for adequate testing of the equipment due to its very tight schedule."
The FCS program has long been criticized for remaining over budget and behind schedule. Earlier this year, the House Armed Services Committee voted to cut about $200 million from the Army's request of $3.6 billion for the FCS program in the fiscal 2009 budget.
"The Army has struggled to justify FCS for years, this is the latest evolution in this saga," said Nick Schwellenbach, an analyst for the Project on Government Oversight. "Yet at least now FCS may now end up helping troops currently deployed overseas."
-- Christian
Major Iraq News...
...but you wouldn't know it from the mainstream media.
Once the most violent place in Iraq, Anbar province will come under Provincial Iraqi Control on Saturday, a senior military official said Monday.
So far, nine Iraqi provinces are under Provincial Iraqi Control, or PIC, in which Iraqi security forces perform day-to-day operations and U.S. troops provide assistance as needed, the military official told reporters.
"When you PIC a province, the coalition force goes into what we call an operational overwatch: They're there, essentially as a security blanket," the official said.
Though the Washington Post ran a story on its Web site today which lead with the heinous attempt by AQI to disrupt the handover by bombing a provincial council meeting and killing an estimated 20 (which hits pretty close to home for me because I met some of these tribal leaders in the very place where the bombing occurred -- see the picture above), the paper edition did not have a story on the handover, nor did the New York Times.
Remember, these were the papers that jumped on the leak of a Marine Corps Intelligence report in September 2006 that Anbar was lost. Wrote the NYTimes:
As the situation has deteriorated, insurgent attacks have increased. The report describes Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia as an “integral part of the social fabric” of Anbar.
Aside from being flat out wrong on that assessment, the stories painted a grim picture of the situation in Anbar and help solidify impressions (with an election coming up just a month later) that Iraq was a lost cause.
But how times have changed. Anbar is flat out boring to go visit anymore. Believe me, I was there for two months in 2005-2006 and I know how violent it was.
And you know I went back in January and now Marines are itching to ditch their protective gear and whining louder and louder about coming home or heading to a real fight in Afghanistan. But why can't the regular media bring themselves to report such a development. Anbar was the headquarters for al Qaeda in Iraq for years -- now it's secure enough to hand over to Iraqi control...before eight other provinces...That's news.
Ok, off my soapbox now.
-- Christian
Parameters of an Iran Strike
A strike against Iranian nuclear-related targets could be carried out before the next US administration enters office.
Israeli military intelligence (AMAN) may estimate that Barack Obama has more than a fair chance of winning in upcoming elections. However, they may wait for the results before deciding to strike.
Ironically, an Obama victory will probably be the tipping point. Israeli MI is no doubt cognizant of the fact that Obama's Middle East policy-makers will favor "diplomacy" and try to avert a strike at all costs.
However, the Israeli government may attempt to utilize the frightening specter of a strike to expedite the sale of advanced military equipment to the Jewish state.
A Likud government led by Benjamin Netanyahu (with support from Shas and other rightist parties) would be more likely to strike Iranian nuclear targets, much like Menachem Begin (against Osirak) in 1981.
There would be intense consultations with the outgoing Bush administration over the timing and scope of the strike, specifically regarding how it would affect the burgeoning price of oil.
Senior Pentagon and Air Force officials who have read the full 67-page report about the tanker bid by the Government Accountability Office think they can still grant a contract before the end of the Bush Administration. John Young, the Pentagon’s acquisition czar, has reportedly drafted a letter for the four congressional committees that oversee defense spending and policy informing them of the Pentagon’s decision to go ahead and award the contract to Northrop Grumman.
There have been reports that the GAO ruling on the tanker contract could add two years or more to the contract award, something that has greatly concerned Air Force leaders eager to start building new tankers after almost a decade of trying.
"Their finding is that the full document is quite different from the summary," issued last Wednesday, said a source familiar with the issue. The source said Air Force leaders believe much of what was challenged is “procedural” and can be resolved without rebidding the deal.
The 69-page report is expected to become public today.
The GAO said in its summary that it found “a number of significant errors that could have affected the outcome of what was a close competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman” and recommended that the bid be reopened. By law, the Air Force has 60 days to inform the GAO of how it will respond to the recommendations.
Any Air Force decision to press ahead with the contract award to Northrop Grumman is likely to spark outrage on Capitol Hill among supporters of Boeing, who include Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), the Nr. 2 member of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee, as well as Washington’s two senators and lawmakers from Kansas.
Read the rest of this story over at Military.com's new online defense and acquisition journal, DoD Buzz.
The U.S. Air Force is initiating a program to develop the Next Generation Unmanned Aerial System (NG-UAS) or unmanned aerial vehicle while Washington is still in an uproar over the last major Air Force contract competition -- the KC-X advanced tanker aircraft. And, the Air Force action takes place while the UAV picture is clouded by a protest filed in May against the Navy's contract award to Northrop Grumman for the Global Hawk-derived RQ-4N aerial vehicle for the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) system.
The notice to industry for the NG-UAV sent out by the Air Force in May seeks a follow-on UAV to the highly successful MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper aircraft, the latter a much improved variant of the Q-1 series. Those UAVs -- with the prefix letter "M" -- indicating multimission -- have proved invaluable in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
The Air Force lists seven potential key missions for the NG-UAV:
Limited interdiction
Close air support/forward air control
Combat search and rescue support
Limited suppression of enemy air defenses
Joint maritime operation support
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Force protection (identifying threats such as IEDs, mortars, and rocket sites)
These missions are to be carried out in all low- and some medium-threat environments.
The NG-UAS platform is planned to have capabilities beyond existing UAVs. Compared to the MQ-1 Predator and the derivative MQ-9 Reaper, the new vehicle would have improved maneuverability and time on station among other features. The planned initial operational capability of the NG-UAS would be 2015. The MQ-1 Predator, developed by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, first flew in July 1994; the improved Predator-B, which was redesignated MQ-9 Reaper, first flew in February 2001. Both have been produced in the hundreds. They have suffered significant losses in the combat area, albeit several losses being due to collisions with smaller, low-flying UAVs. Still, their efficacy cannot be questioned.
General Atomics has already developed a candidate for the NG-UAS role now known as Predator-C. That UAV is believed to have swept-back wings and stealth characteristics. The firm has not "pushed" the Predator-C because of the continuing demand for its Predator and Reaper UAVs.
Other firms, notably Northrop Grumman, which produces the also highly successful RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV and is said to have a scaled down version in the works, as well as several foreign firms are expected to enter the competition for the NG-UAVs. Still, as both U.S. and foreign aerospace firms consider the Air Force's interest in the next generation UAV, the dark cloud of the controversial KC-X program and now the protesting of the Navy's BAMS competition award hang over the NG-UAS landscape.
I didn't really understand it until I noticed the seriousness in the source's eyes. I hadn't given it much thought recently, what with all the other stuff going on around us ... MRAP, Air Force shakeup, body armor, tanker -- you name it.
But when the far-ranging discussion we were having came around to the subject of aircraft carriers, this guy said (and I paraphrase) "you think carriers are irrelevant in a contested environment now, just wait til someone gets an anti-ship ballistic missile capability. That'll be a game-changer."
To me, this seemed implausible. Shooting a ballistic missile at a moving ship?
"Did you see the ASAT test? That was 10-times more difficult," he replied. "And they're a lot closer than anyone thinks."
He wouldn't tell me the country that's so close to getting this capability, but it's not hard to guess which one it is.
China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) as a component of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km and, when incorporated into a sophisticated command and control system, is a key component of China’s anti-access strategy to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers, from great distances.
That's subtle -- not a whole lot there. But my guy tells me this country that he would not mention could plausibly demonstrate that capability "very soon."
Work is believed to be ongoing to provide this missile with a sophisticated terminal guidance system. According to some reports the Mod 2 version of the CSS-5 will be comparable to the US Pershing II IRBM, employ advanced radar guidance to achieve extremely high accuracy.
Now, here's what it means: carriers must stay at least 1000 miles off this enemy's coast. Think how that affects strike planning, surveillance, rescue...any number of factors that go into naval aviation planning. And how do you defend against such a strike? I'm not sure about all the details, but it seems to me there's a pretty short flight time in which to generate a solution for an anti-ballistic missile interceptor. Maybe ABL could handle this one, but how many can it shoot down at any one time? A salvo of even five or 10 of these could be devistating.
Another source tells me there have been tests of the system but they have so far been unsuccessful. But the source also told me the Russians might have recently delivered a key component to the Chinese to make this system more effective.
We'll have more on this as it develops and I'll be interested to see what DT readers might be able to add on this...
-- Christian
Identifying the Cyber Attacker
Computers and networks have blurred the boundaries when you look at cyber warfare, cyber crime, and cyber terrorism. There is no doubt that future conflicts will involve cyber warfare between nations. Distinguishing between military and criminal and civilian attacks is tough and could create a dangerous problem in determining who is behind a cyber attack. It's very difficult to trace cyber attacks back the responsible parties. It is rarely the case that the computer forensic analysis conducted as a result of a cyber attack yields enough hard evidence that would meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard we apply in non-civil court actions.
There are millions of pieces of malicious code available today along with a significant number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited by cyber soldiers, hackers and others who wish to compromise computers and networks. Websites now provide both novice and expert level computer attackers with the latest, up-to-date programs and support needed to plan, design, develop and initiate cyber attacks. In fact, these websites provide services to parties that are interested in hacker computer systems and networks.
When you use the Internet, you leave the equivalent of digital footprints and attacks leave digital fingerprints as well as digital DNA. Every message a computer sends to a different computer travels in a series of hops from one router or server to another leaving behind logs and addresses of the route. Even after the message is received, the record of its path of travel remains behind. There are also a number of ways that attackers use to obscure their location and identity. Intelligence around cyber weapons development and cyber attacks is very limited. In our vast sources of intelligence gathering capabilities only electronic intercepts and human intelligence have the ability to provide the primary sources for our intelligence helping to defend our nation against cyber attacks. The tools and technologies available to law enforcement and the Defense Department are not keeping pace with the rapid advances being made in cyber weapons used by attackers. The current state of the practice and available tools regarding the technical ability to track and trace cyber attacks remains very primitive. The advanced level of sophisticated cyber attacks make it close to impossible to trace to their true source and have the hard evidence that would pass the court of public opinion. In addition, the technical nature of the investigation would make it difficult to effectively communicate to those serving on a jury. Advanced tools for tracing complex attacks are among the research topics that are currently under development by multiple organizations and agencies, but we need them now.
We have seen the harbingers of cyber warfare and the image they present instills fear in our military and technical professionals. Dozens of nation states currently have highly sophisticated cyber attack capabilities and many others are in the process of developing cyber weapons of mass disruption. Advances are needed now to defend our systems against such attacks. Likewise, advances tools, techniques and trained staff are needed now to conduct the investigations into the rash of cyber attacks we are experiencing. Finally, international laws and doctrine must rapidly be developed and implemented as part of our overall cyber defense activities.
I know you all must have been wondering "who is this Colin Clark guy and what's he doing here?"
"Catch the Buzz?" what the heck does that mean. And on and on...
Well, folks, the day has come. Colin is a crack defense business reporter and editor who's been hired on by our parent site Military.com to lead a new online publication we've dubbed "DoD Buzz." The goal of the online defense and acquisition journal is to provide timely, need-to-know business intelligence for defense industry decision makers and experts. Colin's going to be tracking the defense industry, weapons contracts and the shifting sands of procurement policy to a degree seen only in the pricey "Insides" and "Defense News" broadsheet landscape.
But what Colin can bring to the space that the others can't is an editorial independence and enthusiasm lost with print pubs. You've already probably noticed the wry wit he brings to the copy he's posted on Defense Tech and Military.com. Well, now we're unleashing him on DoD Buzz to take it to the next level.
Since many of you are industry players and need the kind of intel Colin can bring to the table to help make better decisions in your world, I hope you'll make DoD Buzz a daily stop alongside Defense Tech. So put it in your favorites and "catch the buzz" of breaking news, cutting edge coverage and a good-hearted chuckle at this crazy world we call Pentagon procurement with Colin Clark and the kick-butt new site, "DoD Buzz."
-- Christian
F-35 Offers Multirole Surprises
This article first appeared in Aerospace Daily and Defense Report.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will "redefine the concept of multirole strike" aircraft, Lockheed Martin officials say, but they offer few details to flesh out that claim.
Still, while the future concept of operations, electronic attack (EA) capability and derivative options remain undefined, at least publicly, some capabilities can be picked out of their purposely vague descriptions.
Starting from the notion that new hardware is the least likely addition to the aircraft and that it has an open architecture for avionics, look for the big multirole capability additions to involve electronic attack.
Because of the ability to penetrate while using low-probability-of-intercept radar and passive sensors, the JSF will not operate in proximity to current, so-called fourth-generation aircraft. It will instead roam well-defended enemy airspace while feeding precision targeting data to nonstealthy aircraft with standoff-range weapons.
Tailored for EA
The F-35 aircraft is being designed to deliver electronic attack (jamming, spoofing and pulses of energy) with the same ease that it can deliver explosive weapons. Moreover, Lockheed officials say the F-35 -- first of all a combat aircraft -- will have full 360-degree awareness of what is going on around it.
That presents an interesting dilemma for EA versus kinetic weaponry. The new AIM-9X air-to-air missile can perform high off-boresight shots without turning the aircraft's nose toward the target. However, delivering electronic effects require specialized antennae pointed toward the target. As far as is known, JSF has only its advanced active, electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar antenna in the nose to pump out its electronic firepower. It would then have the weakness of any AESA array in that it is flat with a field of view of less than 180 degrees, perhaps an effective field of regard for effective attack of 60-90 degrees.
Some radar specialists and Air Force planners already say they anticipate flying the F-35s in line, with the first aircraft being passive and the second emitting and passing target information to the first so that it can remain undetected. Therefore, it appears that without an add-on antenna, the JSF's EA capability will be limited to the forward quarter.
However, within that field the electronic effects generator can be routed through the AESA radar, which allows the F-35 to invade, blind or fool enemy sensors and radars at ranges of up to hundreds of miles.
Sensors
Lockheed officials do admit that the F-35's sensor capabilities include advanced electronic surveillance allowing development of an instantaneous electronic order of battle -- what's emitting and from where.
Probably the longest serving weapon in the U.S. military arsenal is the Browning .50-caliber M2 machine gun. Often referred to as "ma deuce" for its M2 designation, the weapon entered U.S. service at the end of World War I, being scaled up from the Browning .30-caliber M1917 machine gun. The .50-caliber weapon was initially designated M1921.
Using a round designed by Winchester, the .50-caliber machine gun was originally intended for ground troops to use against enemy troops. Subsequently, it was employed as an anti-aircraft weapon and then became the standard armament of U.S. warplanes. In 1932, the design was updated and redesignated M2.
Ground and naval machine guns could be air- or water-cooled, the latter having large "jackets" around the barrel. The weapons had rates of fire from 500 to 650 rounds per minute. Mounts for vehicle and shipboard use soon had twin barrels, while a fixed quad-barrel mount was developed for ground and vehicle use. Its light weight permitted up to eight guns to be carried in fighters and it fit into single-, twin-, and quad-barrel turrets on U.S. bombers. The weapon was used in every theater of World War II by U.S. and allied troops--by 1945 the U.S. Army authorized 237 .50-caliber guns in each infantry division, 385 in each armored division, and 165 in each airborne division.
The "ma deuce" was used in large numbers in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, in other crises and conflicts, and, of course, in the Gulf War of 1991 and the later invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Now, after almost 90 years of service, the U.S. Army has moved to replace Browning's remarkable machine gun. The Army recently ordered three prototypes of a lightweight .50-caliber machine gun. Produced by General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products, the weapon weighs about one-half of the current .50-caliber M2HB (Heavy Barrel) machine gun, fires with less recoil and is equipped with technology to improve accuracy, according to the company.
The Army and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) will test the new guns and then apply the lessons learned to a potential production design. Low-rate initial production could begin as soon as 2011.
It would take several years for the new weapon to replace the "ma deuce" in U.S. service. But even if it does so, the M1921/M2 would have been in service for a century.
Its inventor -- John Moses Browning (1855-1926) -- was one of America's most prolific gun inventors. After making his first gun from scrap metal at age 13, he went on to design pistols, rifles, and machine guns. The U.S. Army began using his machine guns in 1890. Browning's innovative weapons also included the .30-caliber M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), used in U.S. Army and Marine Corps squads from World War I through the Korean War.
Don't expect too many bear hugs, but Defense Secretary Robert Gates plans to attend Friday's retirement ceremony for the man he pushed out the door, Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne.
The Pentagon, at least so far, isn't trumpeting Wynne's departure. It is trumpeting the retirement of Air Force Gen. Michael Hayden - also known as the director of the CIA - who retires at 10 a.m. at Washington's Bolling Air Force Base. The administration had come in for some criticism for nominating a military officer to head the CIA and appears to have been sensitive to this issue. Gates will spend much of the day doing retirements since Wynne's ceremony begins at 1 p.m.
Combine Gates' attending Wynne's ceremony with his recent trips to the Air Force commands and it becomes very, very clear that the secretary knows he has fences to mend and is trying hard to limit the damage done by his firing of Wynne and Air Force Gen. Mike Moseley. Over the next few months we will get to see whether the new secretary (acting or confirmed by the Senate) and the new chief of staff can, as a congressional aide put it after the GAO tanker protest decision came out, be the miracle workers they must be.
As you all well know I've been very passionate about the promise of unmanned aerial vehicles -- especially combat drones that can execute long-range strike missions and even dogfight.
My good friends Tom Ehrhard and Bob Work at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments put together an exhaustive report making the case for naval UCAVs. Tom, a former Air Force colonel and one of those guys that was almost too smart for the service's own good, has done a lot of work and research on the promise of UAVs in a service that views them with suspicion. Bob Work, a former Marine officer, has been wading through the weeds of US naval power and strategy for years and understands the art of the possible in a service steeped with tradition and resistant -- sometimes -- to change.
The long and the short of it is that both analysts believe that the Navy must invest in naval UCAV as a growing part of its long-range strike capability.
The logic supporting accelerated development of a longer-range, carrier-based UCAS is straight-forward. Using manned aircraft, current carrier air wings are best suited for striking targets at ranges between 200 and 450 nautical miles (nm) from their carriers. At the same time, due primarily to the limits of aircrew endurance, these aircraft lack persistence. That is to say, they are generally limited to missions no more than ten hours long, and they more typically fly missions that last only a few hours. Therefore, US carrier air wings can maintain a persistent 24-hour-a-day presence over the battlefield only by massing several carriers. However, emerging national security challenges— including defending the homeland in depth, defeating global terrorist networks, operating in a world with more nuclear-armed regional powers, and hedging against the appearance of new anti-access/area-denial networks—will likely require future carrier task forces to stand off and fight from far greater distances than in the past, and to maintain a far more persistent presence over future battlefields. Moreover, when under constant threat of guided weapons attack, carriers will need to operate dispersed and mass their aircraft over targets from widely distributed operating areas. Under these circumstances, a carrier-based UCAS with an unrefueled combat radius of 1,500 nm or more and unconstrained by pilot physiology offers a significant boost in carrier combat capability.
Indeed, with aerial refueling, a UCAS would be able to stay airborne for 50 to 100 hours—five to ten times longer than a manned aircraft. With multiple aerial refuelings, a UCAS could establish persistent surveillance- strike combat air patrols at ranges well beyond 3,000 nm, and could strike fixed targets at even longer ranges. Such extended reach and persistence would allow a dispersed aircraft carrier force to exert combat power over an enormous area.
Range, stealth, persistance, improved networking...this is what Gates wants and this is what the naval UCAS promises. But there's rumors of strong resistance within the Navy on this program, even though the service has devoted $620 million over the next few years to a demonstration program that would see a combat drone deployed to a carrier for the first time in naval aviation history.
Despite these welcome steps, the current demonstration and technology maturation programs for carrier-based unmanned aircraft are far less ambitious that earlier Navy plans. Indeed, the Navy’s conservative approach toward N-UCAS suggests that the carrier community is reticent to fully embrace the new system. This reticence Distances in the Pacific is perhaps understandable. The carrier flight deck is arguably one of the most dangerous workplaces in the world, and the job of spotting, fueling, arming, launching, and recovering aircraft is a complex process requiring close teamwork and timing. As a result, many carrier aviators remain highly skeptical that unmanned air systems can be safely integrated into carrier operations, and insist that they “earn their way” aboard the ship. To many Navy carrier aviators, a simple naval UCAS demonstration focused on carrier flight deck and flight operations, followed by a slower, more deliberate development of unmanned air combat systems, is the prudent, safe way to go.
And as Tom and Bob point out, there's a strange historical inconsistancy here:
This rather timid, less-than-certain development approach stands in stark contrast to the period between the two World Wars, when the Navy aggressively worked to integrate aircraft into naval operations. At that time, the prevailing attitude seemed to be to prove why aircraft should not be taken to sea and incorporated into fleet operations. There was never any doubt in the minds of naval officers that aircraft would improve fleet operations in important ways.
But, for some reason, the Navy is tepid on this situation...and while the CSBA guys can't say it, the Navy may be kicking the can down the road even further in the future budget planning.
The program fared much better in the FY 2008 budget cycle, with both the Senate and House endorsing full funding of the Navy’s UCASD request. However, given the other competing requirements facing Navy planners, how hard will carrier aviators fight for the UCAS-D program in the future if DoN aviation budgets are less than expected, or if they are faced with a choice of funding either the UCAS-D or another competing priority? If history is any guide, given the inattention to and lack of interest in unmanned systems within the carrier aviation community, the answer to this question is not likely to be encouraging. This seems especially true given that the newly published Naval Aviation Plan 2030 folds the N-UCAS program into a sixth-generation strikefighter (F/A-XX) program, and slips this new program even further into the future (around 2025). Moreover, with “manned/unmanned decision points” built into the new F/A-XX program, it is not even certain that an unmanned air combat system will survive. This may make it easier to shift funds from the UCAS-D program in the face of sharp budget pressures over the next several years.
-- Christian
Tanker Ruling Shows Air Force in Disarray
The decision to uphold the Boeing protest of the airborne tanker award to Northrop Grumman Corp. raises fundamental questions about the ability of the Air Force -- and the Pentagon in general -- to buy weapons effectively, according to lawmakers, congressional aides and defense analysts.
"The GAO's decision in the tanker protest reveals serious errors in the Air Force's handling of this critically important competition. We now need not only a new full, fair and open competition in compliance with the GAO recommendations, but also a thorough review of -- and accountability for -- the process that produced such a flawed result," said the Senate's senior defense lawmaker, Carl Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, in a June 18 statement.
The congressional Government Accountability Office upheld Boeing's protest of a $35 billion Air Force tanker contract awarded to Northrop Grumman and Airbus parent European Aeronautic Defence and Space, and it recommended that the service hold a new competition. The GAO said it found "a number of significant errors" that could have affected the outcome of "what was a close competition."
The contract for 179 aerial refueling tankers is the first of three deals worth up to $100 billion to replace the Air Force's entire tanker fleet over the next 30 years.
The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee was more understated in his criticism.
"The GAO did its work, and the Air Force is going to have to go back and do its work more thoroughly," Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) said in a statement.
Democratic Sen. Maria Cantwell of Washington state, a vociferous Boeing supporter, said the GAO criticisms "were a scathing indictment of the Air Force's process.
A congressional aide said the Air Force may be on the brink of collapse from the accumulated weight of bad acquisition, personnel and strategic decisions.
"You have to ask how much more can the Air Force take. Are they really that broken? Not just on acquisition but across the board. Are they more broken than any other services or is it just their time in the glass house?" the senior congressional aide said.
This aide, who has been sharply critical of Air Force acquisition practices in the past, said that the ruling by the Government Accountability Office makes the appointment of the next Air Force Chief of Staff "more than a critical appointment. They need a miracle worker."
A defense analyst said the Air Force -- and the military in general -- now faces a crippled system for buying anything.
"At this point the procurement system is so broken … that I believe that we are at a structural disarmament point, and we certainly will not fund a strike Air Force," the analyst said. This source noted that the Air Force lost its bid to buy more F-22s and pointed to the Navy and Coast Guard's broken acquisition efforts as further sign of the crippled state of Pentagon acquisition.
The head of Boeing's tanker programs, Mark McGraw, said the company welcomed the ruling, "fully supporting the grounds of our protest. We appreciate the professionalism and diligence the GAO showed in its review of the KC-X acquisition process. We look forward to working with the Air Force on next steps in this critical procurement for our warfighters."
While the GAO decision is not binding, it puts tremendous pressure on the Air Force to reopen the contract and could help Boeing capture part or all of the award. It also gives ammunition to Boeing supporters in Congress who have been seeking to block funding for the deal or force a new competition.
-- Colin Clark
Boeing Wins!
From a pro-Boeing source:
The Boeing Company protested the award of a contract to Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation under solicitation No. FA8625-07-R-6470, issued by the Department of the Air Force, for KC-X aerial refueling tankers to begin replacing its aging tanker fleet. Boeing challenged the Air Force’s technical and cost evaluations, conduct of discussions, and source selection decision.
Our Office sustained Boeing’s protest on June 18, 2008. The 69-page decision was issued under a protective order, because the decision contains proprietary and source selection sensitive information. We have directed counsel for the parties to promptly identify information that cannot be publicly released so that we can expeditiously prepare and release, as soon as possible, a public version of the decision.
Although the Air Force intends to ultimately procure up to 179 KC-X aircraft, the solicitation provided for an initial contract for system development and demonstration of the KC-X aircraft and procurement of up to 80 aircraft. The solicitation provided that award of the contract would be on a “best value” basis, and stated a detailed evaluation scheme that identified technical and cost factors and their relative weights. With respect to the cost factor, the solicitation provided that the Air Force would calculate a “most probable life cycle cost” estimate for each offeror, including military construction costs. In addition, the solicitation provided a detailed system requirements document that identified minimum requirements (called key performance parameter thresholds) that offerors must satisfy to receive award. The solicitation also identified desired features and performance characteristics of the aircraft (which the solicitation identified as “requirements,” or in certain cases, as objectives) that offerors were encouraged, but were not required, to provide.
The agency received proposals and conducted numerous rounds of negotiations with Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The Air Force selected Northrop Grumman’s proposal for award on February 29, 2008, and Boeing filed its protest with our Office on March 11, supplementing it numerous times thereafter. In accordance with our Bid Protest Regulations, we obtained a report from the agency and comments on that report from Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The documentary record produced by the Air Force in this protest is voluminous and complex. Our Office also conducted a hearing, at which testimony was received from a number of Air Force witnesses to complete and explain the record. Following the hearing, we received further comments from the parties, addressing the hearing testimony as well as other aspects of the record.
Our decision should not be read to reflect a view as to the merits of the firms’ respective aircraft. Judgments about which offeror will most successfully meet governmental needs are largely reserved for the procuring agencies, subject only to such statutory and regulatory requirements as full and open competition and fairness to potential offerors. Our bid protest process examines whether procuring agencies have complied with those requirements.
Our review of the record led us to conclude that the Air Force had made a number of significant errors that could have affected the outcome of what was a close competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. We therefore sustained Boeing’s protest. We also denied a number of Boeing’s challenges to the award to Northrop Grumman, because we found that the record did not provide us with a basis to conclude that the agency had violated the legal requirements with respect to those challenges.
Specifically, we sustained the protest for the following reasons:
1. The Air Force, in making the award decision, did not assess the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation criteria identified in the solicitation, which provided for a relative order of importance for the various technical requirements. The agency also did not take into account the fact that Boeing offered to satisfy more non-mandatory technical “requirements” than Northrop Grumman, even though the solicitation expressly requested offerors to satisfy as many of these technical “requirements” as possible.
2. The Air Force’s use as a key discriminator that Northrop Grumman proposed to exceed a key performance parameter objective relating to aerial refueling to a greater degree than Boeing violated the solicitation’s evaluation provision that “no consideration will be provided for exceeding [key performance parameter] objectives.”
3. The protest record did not demonstrate the reasonableness of the Air Force’s determination that Northrop Grumman’s proposed aerial refueling tanker could refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing tanker-compatible receiver aircraft in accordance with current Air Force procedures, as required by the solicitation.
4. The Air Force conducted misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing, by informing Boeing that it had fully satisfied a key performance parameter objective relating to operational utility, but later determined that Boeing had only partially met this objective, without advising Boeing of this change in the agency’s assessment and while continuing to conduct discussions with Northrop Grumman relating to its satisfaction of the same key performance parameter objective.
5. The Air Force unreasonably determined that Northrop Grumman’s refusal to agree to a specific solicitation requirement that it plan and support the agency to achieve initial organic depot-level maintenance within 2 years after delivery of the first full-rate production aircraft was an “administrative oversight,” and improperly made award, despite this clear exception to a material solicitation requirement.
6. The Air Force’s evaluation of military construction costs in calculating the offerors’ most probable life cycle costs for their proposed aircraft was unreasonable, where the agency during the protest conceded that it made a number of errors in evaluation that, when corrected, result in Boeing displacing Northrop Grumman as the offeror with the lowest most probable life cycle cost; where the evaluation did not account for the offerors’ specific proposals; and where the calculation of military construction costs based on a notional (hypothetical) plan was not reasonably supported.
7. The Air Force improperly increased Boeing’s estimated non-recurring engineering costs in calculating that firm’s most probable life cycle costs to account for risk associated with Boeing’s failure to satisfactorily explain the basis for how it priced this cost element, where the agency had not found that the proposed costs for that element were unrealistically low. In addition, the Air Force’s use of a simulation model to determine Boeing’s probable non-recurring engineering costs was unreasonable, because the Air Force used as data inputs in the model the percentage of cost growth associated with weapons systems at an overall program level and there was no indication that these inputs would be a reliable predictor of anticipated growth in Boeing’s non-recurring engineering costs.
We recommended that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a new source selection decision, consistent with our decision. We further recommended that, if the Air Force believed that the solicitation, as reasonably interpreted, does not adequately state its needs, the agency should amend the solicitation prior to conducting further discussions with the offerors. We also recommended that if Boeing’s proposal is ultimately selected for award, the Air Force should terminate the contract awarded to Northrop Grumman. We also recommended that the Air Force reimburse Boeing the costs of filing and pursuing the protest, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.
By statute, the Air Force is given 60 days to inform our Office of the Air Force’s actions in response to our recommendations.
-- Christian
What Constitutes an Act of Cyber War?
Throughout history wars have been triggered by events. Being at war is a state or condition. To be legal, a war must be declared by a branch of the government entrusted by the Constitution with this power. In the Constitution of the United States, Article I provides Congress the power to declare war. War is defined as a contention by force; or the art of paralyzing the forces of an enemy. An act of war is typically defined as an aggressive act that constitutes a serious challenge or threat to national security, armed conflict, whether or not war has been declared, between two or more nations; or armed conflict between military forces of any origin. This frames the discussions around traditional war. In the physical sense it is easy to define such infractions; enemy troops crossing another countries border, military strikes by missiles or bombs, basically you know it when you see it. What constitutes a serious challenge and a threat to our national security in cyber space? That is much more difficult to define.
In the U.S. Army's Cyber Operations and Cyber Terrorism Handbook 1.02 I found the following reference to the definition of Cyber Warfare & Terrorism: "the premeditated use of disruptive activities, or the threat thereof, against computers and/or networks, with the intention to cause harm or to further social, ideological, religious, political or similar objectives or to intimidate any person in furtherance of such objectives." This was an excerpt from an article I wrote back in 2003 when the issue of cyber war was in its infancy. While this frames acts of cyber war, in retrospect it does not address a measure of the disruptive acts or provide guidance assess if individual acts, or a collection of acts rise to the level to be considered an act of cyber war.
If a foreign government hacks a sensitive system of another government and accesses security and defense information, is that an act of cyber war? If so, that has already occurred. If a foreign government hacks a sensitive system of another government and places software on the system that collects data and sends it back, is that an act of war? If military personal from a foreign government infiltrates another nation's networks or systems through the use of counterfeit hardware and monitors communications, is that an act of cyber war? Both are certainly acts of espionage and have already taken place. The factor that will determine if an act or acts of cyber attack rise to the level of an act of war rests in the magnitude of disruption that accompany the acts. Adding to the complexity is the fact that much of our critical infrastructure that are prime targets for cyber attacks are owned or operated by the private sector not the government. This infrastructure in some cases carries military communications, supports civilian emergency services as well business and consumer services. An attack on the infrastructure impacts multiple segments. The question of what constitutes an act of cyber war remains unanswered.
Given that we are in relatively new territory, each individual attack must be examined and the forensic evidence weighed to determine the source of attack. Little physical evidence will ever exist that you can hold up and point to or take a picture of and say "they did this." Much debate is currently taking place over the legality of cyber warfare tactics and their use. Is a cyber attack on our networks and systems an act of war? Are acts of cyber espionage a violation of international law? It is better we investigate and answer these questions now rather than reacting to cyber events in the heat of the moment when they occur.
-- Kevin Coleman
Huge Win For T-Sat Builders
One of the most important program decisions of this administration was made on Tuesday last week. After years of dithering, the Pentagon’s Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (known affectionately as the DAWG) approved Tier 2 -- the next stage of the Transformational Satellite Communications system.
For a program that had just been whacked by $4 billion over the fiscal 2009 Program Objective memorandum’s five years this is a remarkable achievement and is testament to the enduring need for enormous amounts of protected communication bandwidth. Lockheed Martin and Boeing executives, who just four months ago feared the program was headed for the trash heap of history, were elated. Lockheed partners with Northrop Grumman and Juniper Networks on the program. Boeing partners with Cisco and Hughes.
T-Sat, aside from providing the vaunted comms on the move capability, will provide something even more important – enough bandwidth for the Army’s future Combat System and other key joint systems to function. There are two separate T-Sat programs -- the ground segment and the satellite segment. The DAWG meeting approved going ahead with the satellites and the plan is to build five of them and one spare.
The June 10 decision came as quite a surprise to several industry players. One told us Thursday that their company “could not believe” that the Pentagon leaders had approved the program unanimously.
The DAWG’s action spells an end to several years of questions about whether to go with what many people have called T-Sat light, which would have been basically a fifth version of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite. Congressional staff had been leaning increasingly to such a solution to cover what they feared might be an 18-month gap in protected comms coverage as the old MILSTAR satellites began to fail.
The gap is no longer a concern, according to a senior Pentagon source, adding that launch is now set for 2018. This source says that the DAWG locked in the T-Sat requirements. Doing that basically means that this program – barring major technical or schedule screwups – is likely set for a long life.
-- Colin Clark
Back and Forth...
And this from Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell...some interesting tidbits (edited for brevity):
There has been absolutely no change in this building's position on that contract. As the secretary has said time and time again, this is the number-one acquisition priority of the Air Force. It has to be. It is 10 years overdue.
The average age of this fleet is 47 years old. These plans desperately need to be replaced, not yesterday, not the year before, but 10 years ago. Any further delay would be a real problem.
And we believe that the acquisition and the contracting process that eventually produced Northrop Grumman and EADS as the winner of this deal was a fair and transparent one. It was very deliberate.
And we believe it provided the American taxpayer with -- we believe it provided our warfighters with the most capable aircraft and the taxpayer the most cost-effective solution to this very real need of replacing the tanker fleet.
Nothing really new here. Of course the Pentagon is going to back their service's decision. But what I think is interesting in Morrell's comment is the idea that the decision was the "most capable" aircraft and the "most cost effective" one. That's more than just a stock endorsement. It's a value decision.
Then it got really interesting...
I think our people felt very secure about the contracting process. Obviously, the eyes of the world were upon the Air Force, as they were pursuing this contract, and in light of what had happened with the previous attempt to award this contract.
Precisely. It's hard to argue any underhandedness here and that somehow the wool was pulled over Boeing's eyes for this very reason.
More:
You know, I know there's been a lot of concern in Congress about this and the impact that this contract may have on the loss of jobs in particular states. And the secretary has told Congress time and again that the only factors that they are allowed to consider when letting these contracts is cost and capability.
And that if they wish to change the contracting criteria to include the impact on jobs, they should be aware of the potential impact that would have on U.S. military companies, because they do an awful lot of business overseas. And you run the risk of opening the door to retaliatory trade restrictions that would ultimately have a far greater impact on domestic jobs than perhaps this one contract will.
Kudos to Colin for recognizing this aspect in yesterday's post. And clearly the Pentagon is worried about the health of the defense sector and its ability to sell systems worldwide.
-- Christian
The Coming Clash
GAO Tanker Decision Could Come Tomorrow
A pro-Boeing source sent me the following this AM...
The best indication we have at this point is that the GAO decision on the Boeing protest of the Air Force tanker contract is likely to be announced late Wednesday. The initial announcement in these cases (e.g. the CSAR-X protest) will be somewhat limited, simply stating the GAO’s conclusion, for example, that the Air Force made serious mistakes in conducting the competition. In the CSAR-X case, the announcement said: “GAO sustained the protest on the basis that the Air Force’s actual evaluation of the MPLCC (most probable life-cycle cost) was inconsistent with the required approach as set forth in the solicitation.” GAO recommended that the solicitation should be “amended,” but later recommended that the CSAR-X competition be re-opened.
So it looks like GAO might make an initial call on the tanker deal tomorrow -- a day earlier than planned.
And here's another interesting way of phrasing the controversy from the anti-EADS folks as well:
The Air Force was pressured into altering the program requirements and the decisionmaking models, leading to its subsequent misjudgment of the factors of 1] Mission Capability, 2] Risk, 3] Past Performance and 4] Cost.
The Air Force was pressured? By whom? McCain...who spent little time on this issue once it was recompeted?
The arguments are getting weirder and weirder as this goes forward. We're all sort of holding our breath to see how this shakes out. Colin's piece yesterday was interesting too in noting the cold reception U.S. reps could get at Farnborough if the KC-45 is pulled.
-- Christian
Raytheon Missile Deployed On Predator
This article first appeared at Aerospace Daily & Defense Report.
A small air-to-surface missile developed as a private venture by Raytheon is being deployed on the Predator unmanned aircraft by an unidentified customer.
The Griffin is a 42-inch-long, tube-launched missile with a semi-active laser seeker, and is intended to give the Predator and smaller UAVs an organic, self-guided direct attack capability, Raytheon says.
The short-range missile including its launcher weigh around 45 pounds, and the Predator will be able to carry up to three rounds for each Hellfire missile now carried. Although longer than Hellfire, the Griffin has a narrower diameter at 5.5 inches and a smaller warhead, reducing collateral damage.
Raytheon says the low-cost weapon is modular, using technology from several of the company’s existing weapons including Javelin, AIM-9X and guided projectiles. Other seekers and warheads could be installed, the company says.
We don’t have any inside track on the Government Accountability Office’s decision this week about the Boeing protest of the airborne tanker contract award to Northrop Grumman, but here are some of the possible pitfalls no matter which way the GAO rules. (If you know something about the protest and want to tell us before it's officially released, email me at colin.clark@military-inc.com. No one will know where it came from.)
If the protest is denied, Boeing’s supporters in Congress are clearly prepared to try and make life as miserable for the Pentagon as possible. Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), a senior member on the House Appropriations defense subcommittee and one of Boeing’s biggest boosters on the Hill, made it clear after Thursday’s meeting of the House Aerospace Caucus that he was working hand in glove with Rep. John Murtha (D-Penn.), dean of the defense subcommittee, to come up with creative ways to stymie Northrop. Although single members such as these can cause heartache and heartburn, I think the relative quiet of most senators (aside from the two Washington state lawmakers) on the issue indicates that – barring some pretty spectacular goof by the Air Force contracting folks – Northrop will probably get the contract through the appropriations and authorization processes
In addition to the congressional angle, there are enormous allied industrial cooperation issues at stake. The award of the contract to Northrop was seen as a bold and welcome move by the Air Force to include allied companies on truly major contracts.
Taking it away now – either through congressional action or by reopening the bid as a result of the protest decision – would be read as a slap in the face of NATO allies and raise questions about the viability of the United States as a defense industrial partner. As one defense analyst, who has been in the thick of the contract award process, told me this afternoon, any American attending the Farnborough Air Show in mid-July will need an armed guard should the Northrop-EADS team be denied the contract.
-- Colin Clark
A Big Pot of Money
Recently much attention is being given to the topic of cyber warfare and rightfully so. Our computers and networks are under continuous attack from all over the world. The level of sophistication of these attacks and the quality of the code written to perform these attacks both have raised significantly in the past year. Experts agree we have entered a new era of warfare and are transitioning from bombs and bullets to bits and bytes.
In January two classified presidential directives were signed related to defending the country against cyber attacks. At that time the price tag was estimated at $6 billion. In mid May the price tag was revised and believed to be $17 billion. Now, the price has risen again to be $30 billion. That is a big pot of money by anyone's standards. So the question is, where will this money be spent? Increasing cyber defense will require investment in Research and Development as well as in existing technology and services. The first and most critical activity will be to fortify current systems against known cyber threats.
Spending Allocation:
Hardware 18% $5.4 Billion USD
Software 25% $7.5 Billion USD
Consulting 29% $8.7 Billion USD
Services 24% $7.2 Billion USD
R&D 4% $1.2 Billion USD
The R&D efforts will focus on near term delivery of advanced defensive capabilities (like behavioral modeling) of software processes and transaction to evaluate if they pose a threat to the system. Additionally, advanced modeling capabilities are required for evolving defenses and investigative activities. Advanced modeling will be used to certify and authenticate chips, hardware and software to be authentic and free of malicious code. One of the most promising capabilities centers on the development of a "Digital DNA" database repository. The ultimate goal of this work is the same as with current DNA forensics - to identify the perpetrators of the assault. Most cyber attacks leave behind forensic evidence that can be used to assess the capabilities of the attacker, understand the implications of the attack and to create defensive measure to guard against this type attack in the future. With all the attacks that have taken place, there is significant intelligence out there about techniques, cyber weapons, and strategies that have been used in these cyber assaults. Analysis of this evidence can create Digital DNA which could also help to identify the source o
This article first appeared in Aerospace Daily and Defense Report.
