Farah Hit Shows Need for COIN Plane

I know it's been out for a while, but I thought I'd give the recently released investigation report on the air strikes in Farah province Afghanistan a chop and post the entire report here.

You might remember this was the latest high-profile close air support strike on a village that allegedly killed as many as 140 civilians -- but probably killed more like 60 (still a WAY too high number) during a day-long battle in Farah province in May.

I'm not going to get into the whole idea of using CAS in villages against an enemy that may (or may not) be deliberately hiding amongst civilians, the perception versus reality arguments and any doctrinal issues. We can cover that at DoD Buzz and Military.com, but I have a purely defense tech-related issue I'd like to bring forward for you to consider as an outgrowth of the investigation's findings.

The report states that there were essentially two rounds of air strikes called in by a Marine Corps Special Operations team which was acting as a QRF for Afghan forces and their "coalition" trainers (it doesn't say where these trainers were from but they could have been other Marines or Brits) who came into contact with enemy forces around 3pm on May 4 during a patrol intended to secure a small village rumored to have been hassled by foreign Taliban.

The MarSoc bubbas took control of the CAS when they arrived on scene and talked in an escalation of force strike with four F/A-18Fs which popped flares, did a couple gun runs and eventually dropped some bombs on confirmed Taliban positions that the MarSoc commander observed and confirmed for each strike.

While the direct fire stopped for a while, the enemy was never completely suppressed. But the Hornets were running out of juice, so they had to RTB. In came our Soviet nuclear strike bomber to save the day.

Four hours later, as the Marines and Afghan forces were waiting for a medivac chopper and coming under intermittent fire from a nearby village, a B-1B Lancer called in on station. It dark by then and the B-1 spotted a group of military looking men walking toward the village to reinforce the enemy firing on the Marines and ANA. Of course, this was almost a mile away from the ground force commander, so he had to trust the B-1's thermals and used "a variety of real-time intelligence resources" which probably means he was listening to a radio scanner and having the jibberish translated to confirm that the group was coming in for the kill.

Farah Province Investigation
Of course they hid in two buildings.

Boom! Three 500 pounders on air burst fuses destroy a mosque and a shrine. No one in the air or on the ground has any idea who's taking shelter in the mosque and shrine aside from the Talibs.

Then the B-1 sees another group like the first one, tracks it for 20 minutes on the thermals moving toward the Marines' front line and rallying near another building outside the village. Threat=strike. Boom: two 500 pounders and two 2,000 pounders (which must have looked like a nuclear strike).

More than two hours after the B-1 came on station, and spotting a third group of tactically-moving personnel take shelter and another building, the Lancer drops its last 2,000 pounder, destroying the building and killing everyone inside.

Again, we can debate the policy and tactics of CAS and target ID in another forum, but what this incident tells me is that we absolutely need a counterinsurgency aircraft. The F-18s could ID the targets themselves and get low enough to do strafing runs, etc. But they couldn't stay very long and had to relinquish control to a strategic bomber sheep-dipped as a tactical support aircraft.

An A-10, or some other COIN aircraft would have done a much better job eliminating the enemy with graduated force and IDing the targets -- and staying on station. They can be cheap, easy to field at FOBs and convenient to maintain (especially prop-driven planes). And I got no problem with the armaments either. Give me some Hellfires and a couple chain guns, and I'll put your Talibs on the ground.

I hope that this incident arms those in the Air Force and Army to advocate for a "back to the future" focus on simpler, long-endurance, stick and rudder with a pair of binos CAS that is critical to keeping the population on our side in a conflict with an economy of force that demands a the careful use of precision airpower.

-- Christian

Yon on Rohde Escape

The excellent reporter David Rohde has escaped his kidnappers. My latest word on Mr. Rohde came on about June 1 during a trip with Secretary Gates, when a very well placed source told me in Singapore that the Pentagon had no word on the whereabouts or condition of David Rohde. I first heard about the escape this morning subsequent an interview request to me from The Washington Post.

I first heard about the kidnapping in late 2008. The initial information came to me in Afghanistan from a source close to Rohde. During a subsequent trip in December with Secretary Gates, I asked a well placed source about the whereabouts and condition of Mr. Rohde. I was told that the information suggested he had been moved from Afghanistan to Pakistan. News about the kidnapping continued to leak, though mainstream outlets kept it quiet. I published a small paragraph several months later, in March 2009, but then archived the paragraph based on a request from concerned parties. Through the months, interesting information about Mr. Rohde has come my way but was always followed by a request to keep it quiet.

Welcome home David Rohde.

-- Michael Yon

General McChrystal's New Way of War

Max Boot, in yesterday's Wall Street Journal--

Gen. Stanley McChrystal was appointed commander in Afghanistan to shake up a troubled war effort. But one of his first initiatives could wind up changing how the entire military does business.

Gen. McChrystal's decision to set up a Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell means creating a corps of roughly 400 officers who will spend years focused on Afghanistan, shuttling in and out of the country and working on those issues even while they are stateside.

Today, units typically spend six to 12 months in a war zone, and officers typically spend only a couple years in command before getting a new assignment. This undermines the continuity needed to prevail in complex environments like Afghanistan or Iraq. Too often, just when soldiers figure out what's going on they are shipped back home and neophytes arrive to take their place. Units suffer a disproportionate share of casualties when they first arrive because they don't have a grip on local conditions.

I've also heard rumblings of Army units using new media like Facebook, Flickr, et al to keep their stateside counterparts in touch with the news from local villages and chiefs (the Army just recently unblocked social networking sites).

When McChrystal was appointed, the conventional wisdom was that Secretary Gates intended to shake up the Big Army's cumbersome warfighting methodology (Gates did the same with the Air Force, appointing a special forces pilot to the CSAF slot). That decision seems to be working well for the Air Force, just as it's working well for the Army. I'm with Boot, this new strategy shows incredible promise and could ultimately do for Afghanistan what Petraeus' surge did for Iraq.

More on Gen. McChrystal here.

Willy Pete in the 'Stan

Did anyone see this?

From US CENTCOM:

In response to claims that insurgents in Afghanistan are not using, nor have access to, white phosphorus (WP) munitions, ISAF RC-East conducted a summary database query, by which a total of 44 instances of reported enemy WP incidents were uncovered and declassified on 11 MAY 09. Thirty-eight of those occurred in RC-East and are released in this document. Our research also revealed six WP events that occurred in other ISAF regions; this list is available upon request from ISAF PAO press office at pressoffice@hq.isaf.nato.int.

Discussion: Three means of white phosphorus use and access by insurgents can be identified: 1) improvised explosive devices, 2) indirect fire attacks, and 3) ordnance caches or UXO. It is notable that the enemy has stockpiled and used white phosphorus in attacks since 2003 and as recently as the week prior to this release. It should also be noted that these instances have occurred in nearly every province in RC-East, which demonstrates the wide availability of white phosphorus to insurgents. Finally, it is important to note that insurgent stockpiles do not necessarily derive from old Soviet-era left-behind stocks; the white phosphorus munitions found in these 38 events have their origins in a wide range of countries. Also, the vast majority of white phosphorus rounds found in listed caches were determined to be in serviceable condition.

That's weird, don't you think? Why would insurgents use WP rounds? Aren't they for very specific anti-personnel uses? You'd think the bad guys would use the highest explosive power for IEDs, particularly, rather than a quasi-chemical round like this. Or maybe it is a sort of "poor man's" chemical weapon insofaras the effects. Not sure, any ideas?

Here's more below the break:

1. Improvised Explosive Devices using White Phosphorus:

(U) 1.1 On 5 FEB 2009, an ISAF unit observed a white phosphorus detonation, determined to be a 107mm WP rocket IED, near a civilian district center in Sabari District, Khost province.

(U) 1.2 On 15 SEP 2008, an ISAF patrol conducting road clearance discovered an IED rigged with one 120mm white phosphorus round, in the Sabari District of Khost province.

(U) 1.3 In MAR 2008, an ISAF convoy in Mandozai District, Khost province, was struck by a vehicular suicide IED, wounding one service member and one local national. Investigators later determined that the IED charge contained both white phosphorus and high explosives.

(U) 1.4 On 9 FEB 2008, a white phosphorus round exploded in the vicinity of an ISAF forward operating base, in Behsood District, Nangarhar province.

(U) 1.5 On 10 JAN 2008, an ISAF EOD team destroyed a Russian 122mm white phosphorus round placed in the vicinity of an ISAF forward operating base in Nader Shah Kwot District, Khost province.

(U) 1.6 On 1 DEC 2007, Coalition forces on patrol discovered an 81mm white phosphorus mortar round set in the vicinity of a convoy in Waza Khwa District, Paktika province.

(U) 1.7 On 23 MAR 07, an ISAF EOD team discovered and defused a 122mm white phosphorus mortar round emplaced on the side of a road in Gardez District, Paktya province.

2. Indirect Fire Attacks using White Phosphorus:

(U) 2.1 On 7 MAY 2009, an ISAF outpost reported receiving two rounds of indirect white phosphorus fire, in Charkh District, Logar province.

(U) 2.2 On 11 AUG 2008, ISAF forces on patrol located a 107mm white phosphorus rocket tube that insurgents had prepositioned to fire in the direction of a nearby ISAF forward operating base in Goshta District, Nangarhar province.

(U) 2.3 On 28 JUN 2008, insurgents fired a white phosphorus rocket at an ISAF outpost in Bermel District, Paktika province.

(U) 2.4 On 4 JAN 2008, insurgents fired nine white phosphorus rounds at an ISAF forward operating base in Darreh-ye Pich District, Kunar province.

(U) 2.5 On 21 NOV 2007, insurgents fired at least one white phosphorus rocket at an ISAF forward operating base in Zadran District, Paktya province.

(U) 2.6 On 2 OCT 2007, insurgents fired two 107mm white phosphorus rockets at an ISAF forward operating base in Gelan District, Ghazni province.

(U) 2.7 On 4 AUG 2007, insurgents launched an indirect fire attack on an ISAF outpost, using HE and white phosphorus rounds in Dara Pech District, Kunar province.

(U) 2.8 On 25 MAY 2007, an insurgent mortar team fired two white phosphorus rounds at an ISAF bridge construction site in the Darreh-ye Pich District, Konar province.

(U) 2.9 On 25 MAY 2007, insurgents bombarded an ISAF outpost with 10 rounds of white phosphorus, in Darreh-ye Pich District, Kunar province.

(U) 2.10 On 13 MAY 2007, insurgents fired five white phosphorus mortar rounds at an ISAF outpost in Chawki District, Kunar province.

(U) 2.11 On 11 APR 2007, insurgents fired five white phosphorus mortar rounds at an Afghan National Army compound in Watah Pur District, Konar province.

(U) 2.12 On 26 MAR 2004, Afghan locals intercepted and drove off an insurgent mortar team setting up a group of rockets in the vicinity of an ISAF forward operating base. Coalition responders later destroyed the rockets, including one white phosphorus round, in Khost District of Khost province.

3. Insurgent Caches and UXO Finds of White Phosphorus:

(U) 3.1 On 20 JAN 2009, ISAF troops discovered a diverse weapons and ammunition cache that included three 82mm white phosphorus mortar rounds, in Chowreh District, Oruzgan province.

(U) 3.2 On 24 NOV 2008, an ISAF EOD team located and collected a weapons cache including two 107mm white phosphorus rockets, in Pol-e ‘alam District, Logar province.

(U) 3.3 On 06 JAN 07, an ISAF patrol detected and destroyed an unexploded ordnance find that included one 122mm white phosphorus round in Terezai District, Khost province.

(U) 3.4 On 27 OCT 2006, an ISAF EOD team found a major ordnance cache that included six 122mm white phosphorus rounds in Bagram District, Parwan province.

(U) 3.5 On 23 DEC 2005, a Coalition unit discovered a sizable cache of ammunition and ordnance, including six 82mm white phosphorus mortar rounds, in Kohe Safi District, Parwan province.

(U) 3.6 On 12 DEC 2005, Afghan National Police found a cached mortar assembly, including one white phosphorus round, in Jaguri District, Ghazni province.

(U) 3.7 On 9 JUL 2005, an ISAF unit discovered hundreds of rounds of cached ordnance, including 27 rounds of 82mm white phosphorus mortar ammunition, in Qalandar District, Khost province.

(U) 3.8 On 26 MAR 2005, an Afghan National Police patrol reported a cache of various munitions, which ISAF responders identified and removed, including one 82mm white phosphorus mortar round, in Jalrez District, Wardak province.

(U) 3.9 On 19 MAR 2005, an ISAF unit found a cache of ordnance and IED-making materials including five 82mm white phosphorus mortar rounds, in Sharana District, Paktika province.

(U) 3.10 On 13 MAR 2005, Coalition troops discovered a cache of various ordnance including one 82mm white phosphorus round in Shahid E-Hassas District, Oruzgan province.

(U) 3.11 On 12 MAR 2005, local nationals led an ISAF unit to a cache of ordnance, including eight 107mm white phosphorus rockets, in Mosa Khail District, Khost province.

(U) 3.12 On 19 FEB 2005, an ISAF unit received a tip of a weapons cache in Khogyani District, Nangarhar province. The search revealed IED-making materials as well as two 82mm white phosphorus rounds.

(U) 3.13 On 1 OCT 2004, an ISAF unit discovered an ordnance cache containing an 82mm white phosphorus mortar round and other munitions of Chinese, Russian, Iranian, British origin, in Waza Khwa District, Paktika province.

(U) 3.14 On 13 SEP 2004, an ISAF unit located a cache of ordnance and weapons of various origin, including one round of Russian white phosphorus mortar ammunition, in Orgun District, Paktika province.

(U) 3.15 On 24 MAY 2004, an ISAF unit discovered an ordnance cache that included one 81mm and two 122mm white phosphorus rounds, in Zarghunshahr District, Paktika province.

(U) 3.16 On 5 APR 2004, an ISAF EOD team destroyed multiple weapons caches that included four white phosphorus rounds of various national origin, in Sarowbi District, Kabul province.

(U) 3.17 On 15 MAR 2004, Afghan security forces led ISAF troops to a large cache containing several hundred rounds of ordnance, including six 107mm white phosphorus rounds, in Qareh Bagh District, Ghazni province.

(U) 3.18 On 22 APR 2003, Coalition personnel located an ordnance cache that included four 82mm white phosphorus mortar rounds in Khar Konar District, Konar province.

(U) 3.19 On 6 FEB 2003, ISAF units, following a local tip, destroyed a 107mm white phosphorus rocket found in Bermel District, Paktika province.

-- Christian

Combat Advising (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Counterinsurgency)

Damn good column here from Small Wars Journal (pdf). A taste:

Combat advising is central to successful counterinsurgency operations in existing U.S. conflicts around the world. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed, “The most important component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.”1 Similarly, in 2006 the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, identified the most critical task required to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations as, “…developing an effective host-nation security force.”2 The importance of combat advising is not a new realization. In fact, major U.S. efforts in this area began in the early 1950s when U.S. forces provided training and assistance to Greece, the Philippines, China (Taiwan), Iran, and Japan. Since that time, protracted combat advising operations have occurred in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.

The traditional arm of America's combat advising force, Special Forces A-Teams, are way overtasked at the moment. To compensate, we've been sticking officers in a combat advisor role that -honestly- have no business being there in the first place. The solution, to create a combat advisor command, pains me due to my severe bureaucracy aversion, but does make some sense from a training and sustainment point of view.

Still, it seems as if combat advising is something that could be rolled into our Joint Special Operations Command. The initiative-fostering culture of our boys in black, as well as their equal aversion to chickenshit regulation and bloated command infrastructure, is precisely the right environment for this style of soft operations (think Lawerence of Arabia for the 21st century).

--John Noonan

Obama's War

I'm gratified to hear the leaking coverage of President Obama's upcoming speech today on his new Afghanistan policy.

As you know, we at DT and DoD Buzz read the tea leaves and saw a strong pull toward a "minimalist" approach to the Afghan war, dumbing down the goals to "containment" and pushing responsibility on Pakistan for any failure.

But today's coverage of the upcoming speech seems to indicate that Obama sided with the Petraeus' of the world (and credit where credit is due, the Clinton approach) and decided that he'd throw all his chips on the table to win in Afghanistan.

I strongly believe that those of us who were pushing for the so-called "all-in" approach were buttressed by a little known Army officer who's done some extraordinary work in the White House -- one Lt. Gen. Doug Lute.

He's the so-called "war czar" at the White House, shepherding the competing interests of State, intel, the DoD and White House into a cohesive strategy that makes military strategic sense. I guarantee it was his wise counsel that helped tip the balance toward a more robust approach and a rejection of the idea that we abandon the Afghans. (And I also bet he was the source of the pre-speech stories -- and oh by the way, he's a Bush holdover)

I'm glad to hear that more troops, more money, and, more importantly, more influence on making Afghanistan "work" is going to be Obama's approach. We'll keep a close eye on how this unfolds -- both from Washington and the field -- to make sure we don't let the strategy get hijacked when things get tough.

-- Christian

Giving Up on Afghanistan (It Begins)

Well, apparently the Obama administration is going to release its new strategy for "victory" in Afghanistan -- though I doubt they'll use that word -- next week, but the AP put out a story on it today that says the new plan will rely on Pakistan to fight the havens and dumb down U.S. expectations:

The Obama administration is close to announcing a redrawn strategy for a war in Afghanistan that the president says the United States is not winning, focusing on enlisting Pakistan in the fight against extremism and trimming U.S. expectations for military victory, administration, defense and intelligence officials said.

Well, this is the beginning of the end folks. "Trimming expectations" and "enlisting Pakistan in the fight" are code words for "exit strategy." We've been hearing the rumblings of this for weeks from Obama's allies on the left, but make no mistake, they have no stomach for this war -- or any other Bush-initiated conflict, for that matter -- and will look for excuses to reduce our commitment to a country we owe much.

We're seeing the demonization of Karzai by this administration along the same lines as the under cutting of Nori al Maliki in Iraq during the dark days of 2006. And the defeatist language has become the narrative for all coverage of the conflict:

The White House expects to announce new objectives for the flagging war as soon as next week that place an onus on next-door Pakistan to contain extremism, defense and administration officials said Thursday.

The New York Times had two opposing Op/Eds this morning, one from Leslie Gelb and another from Fred and Kim Kagan and Max Boot, who've been in Afghanistan for the last week on a battlefield tour.

Gelb is giving Obama an out:

Mr. Obama needs to consider another path. Our strategy in Afghanistan should emphasize what we do best (containing and deterring, and forging coalitions) and downgrade what we do worst (nation-building in open-ended wars). It should cut our growing costs and secure our interests by employing our power more creatively and practically. It must also permit us — and this is critical — to focus more American resources and influence on the far more dire situation in Pakistan.

Why is it that war opponents care only about "stability" and care nothing for the Afghans themselves?

The Taliban are no exception. While most of them want to drive America out, they have no inherent interest in exporting terrorism. As nasty as the Taliban are, America’s vital interests do not require their exclusion from power in Afghanistan, so long as they don’t support international terrorists.

I can't believe I'm hearing this. Oh, the Taliban aren't so bad as long as they're not giving haven to al Qaeda..? Tell that to the Afghans who lived in terror for more than a decade under Taliban's Hobbesian rule and who will again be subject to their Wahabbist dogma if they're given a substantial stake in Afghan government.

And I love this:

President Obama has to ring Afghanistan with a coalition of neighbors to show the Taliban they have no place to seek succor, even after an American departure. The group would include China, India, Russia, NATO allies, and yes, Iran. They all share a considerable interest in stemming the spread of Afghan drugs and Islamic extremism.

This is like Biden's straw man "rapid reaction force" to be stationed in Kuwait if (when) all goes to Hell in a hand basket after a putative U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Yeah, right. We'll ask Iran to jump in and keep Taliban jack-booters from shooting burkha-shedding women in the soccer stadium.

Kagan, on the other hand, who's actually over there and talks to military leaders, Soldiers/Marines and Afghans themselves, wonders what all the defeatism is all about:

It is odd that the Afghans felt it necessary to reassure American visitors that all was far from lost. It reflected the fact that even in a country where electricity and running water are scarce, word of the defeatist hysteria now gripping some in the American political elite has spread.

And the Kagan2/Boot also says the idea that we can plink bad guys from Predators after a withdrawal is bunk:

There are many who claim that a large-scale commitment isn’t necessary. Some say we have no interest in making Afghanistan a functioning state -- all that matters is preventing Al Qaeda from re-establishing safe havens, and we can do that by killing terrorist leaders with precision air strikes or covert raids.

The key question for those who advocate pulling back is this: Where will we get the intelligence to direct the raids? If we have few troops on the ground, we will have to rely on intercepted communications. But seven years into the fight, the terrorists have learned a thing or two about keeping their communications secret. The only way to get the intelligence we need is from the residents, and they won’t provide it unless our troops stay in their villages to provide protection from Taliban retribution.

I've been saying recently that the best way to counter extremism in the tribal areas in Pakistan is a robust Afghan army and police -- including intelligence forces. They speak the language, the share cultural and ethnic ties but they do not share sympathies. Leaving them would weaken us. As the Kagan2/Boot piece states, it's time to gird our loins and fight to the finish -- there are no half measures.

If we abandon them, we will become blind to one of the most dangerous threats to our security, and also hand our most determined enemies an enormous propaganda victory — their biggest since 9/11.

Make no mistake: there is hard, costly fighting ahead in Afghanistan. But the fight is worth pursuing, and the odds of success are much better than they were in Iraq when we launched the forlorn hope known as the surge.

And make no mistake, the Obama administration (with the help of a Pentagon that wants to get back in the business of combined arms training for Fulda Gap battles) is looking for an expedient way out, and they'll take the Euro line of "there's nothing more we can do here" and blame Karzai and Pakistan as we pull the plug.

[BREAK - BREAK: We have an exciting live podcast interview today with a close friend and colleague Morgan Till. He's a producer for the PBS News Hour program and is on assignment in Afghanistan. We'll talk to him live at 1200 EDT today about his reporting in the Korengal Valley, patrols outside Bagram, time with PRTs and hanging with Leathernecks near Kandahar. Please join us.]

-- Christian

Give Peace a Chance -- n't

Our boy Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal has a breaking piece on a new alliance between insurgent groups and al Qaeda in Pakistan.

This occurs of course as the US begins it's mini-"surge" of forces into Afghanistan (which I guarantee you won't last more than a year) and the recent "treaty" between Pak government at the militants allowing some areas to be governed by Sharia law (yeah, that'll work).

So in the spirit of friendship, the Pak militants say "all hail al Qaeda"...Let's just give diplomacy a chance. Mr. Holbrook, you want some more frequent flier miles?

The three senior most Taliban leaders in North and South Waziristan joined forces to wage jihad against Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the US at the behest of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The new Taliban alliance said it openly supports Omar and bin Laden in its war against the US, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

North Waziristan Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadar and South Waziristan leaders Mullah Nazir and Baitullah Mehsud put aside differences last week and created the Council of United Mujahideen. Nazir and Bahadar had feuded with Baitullah due to tribal disputes as well as Baitullah’s rising power at the senior leader of the Pakistani Taliban.

The three leaders had pamphlets distributed throughout North and South Waziristan to announce the formation of the Council of United Mujahideen. The Taliban leader “united according to the wishes of Mujahideen leaders like Mullah Muhammad Omar and Sheikh Osama bin Laden,” The Nation reported.

The Taliban alliance “supported Mullah Muhammad Omar and Osama bin Laden’s struggle” against US President Barack Obama, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai's administrations.

The new alliance said it was waging war “in an organized manner’” to “stop the infidels from carrying out acts of barbarism against innocent people” just as Omar and bin Laden were waging war against Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the US.

The creation of the Council of United Mujahideen and their open support of al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban finally put to rest the Pakistani government’s claim that Bahadar and Nazir are “pro-government” Taliban. While Bahadar and Nazir opposed fighting the government for tactical reason they had openly supported al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.

The establishment of the alliance also helps to consolidate the expanding network of Taliban, al Qaeda and Central Asian terror groups operating on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Analysts have claimed the Pakistani Taliban were a localized phenomena de-linked from the global jihad, despite Nazir’s open support for al Qaeda and the Taliban, the interconnections between the North Waziristan-based Haqqani Network and al Qaeda, and the establishment of Taliban-run suicide camps whose attendees conduct attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West. The Lashkar al Zil, or the Shadow Army, al Qaeda's joint paramilitary force that includes some Taliban forces, operates on both sides of the border.

The Pakistani government ceded North and South Waziristan to the Taliban after a series of peace agreements that began in 2004. The government attempted to restore its writ in 2007 and in early 2008 after the Taliban openly violated the agreements, but the military was defeated and agreed not to conduct operations in the region. Al Qaeda and a host of jihadi terror groups maintain training camps and safe houses in Waziristan.

-- Christian

Kabul Attack Analysis

Have a listen to our quick fire "Boots on the Ground" episode with The Long War Journal's Bill Roggio analyzing the attacks by Taliban/al Qaeda militants on government buildings in Kabul yesterday.

-- Christian

TUNE IN: Boots on the Ground -- Kabul Terror Episode

I've got to tell you, that attack by terrorists in Kabul yesterday freaked me out.

I think there's more to it than the media is reporting. This was total Mumbai style and as Ward said during a conversation we had this afternoon, it has Tet-like connotations.

So I decided to bring Bill Roggio from the Long War Journal back for another breaking news edition of "Boots on the Ground" to discuss his analysis of the brazen and well coordinated attack in Kabul that killed 19 people and wounded 50.

So tune in here at 1500 EST today to hear Bill and I speak, and this time I'll let others chime in with questions.

From The Long War Journal:

The assault consisted of three teams of suicide bombers and gunmen who fanned out in the early morning to attack the Justice and Education ministries in the heart of the city, as well as at an office of the Prisons Department on the edge of the city.

The opening salvo took place at the Justice Ministry, where the heaviest fighting occurred. A suicide bomber detonated at the main gate, allowing three other attackers armed with AK-47s and hand grenades to enter the compound and the ministry building. Gunfights broke out as the attackers battled security guards in the hallways.

The Justice minister was trapped in the building as the battle raged, while other employees scrambled to leave. By the afternoon, the gunmen were killed and their suicide vests were disabled.

The next attack took place at the Education Ministry, however this attack failed. Security forces gunned down the suicide bomber outside the ministry compound.

The third attack took place at the offices of the Prisons Directorate, which is part of the Justice Ministry. Three suicide bombers attacked the office, two managed to detonate their vests, while a third is said to have escaped.

Just eight days ago, the Afghan National Directorate of Security broke up a cell operating inside of Kabul. The seventeen men detained in the operation belonged to the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network and the Harkat ul-Mujahideen.

This cell is believed to be behind the assault on the Serena Hotel in January 2008, the assassination attempt on President Karzai at a ceremony in April 2008, the deadly suicide attack on the Indian embassy in July 2008, and a number of other attacks. The suicide attack on the Indian embassy has been traced back to Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence agency, which has supported the Taliban and various Kashmiri terror groups such as the Harkat ul-Mujahideen.

[The] assault in Kabul is similar to the assault on the Serena Hotel. In that attack gunmen wearing suicide vests breached the front gate with a suicide attack and then entered the hotel and began shooting civilians.

Be sure to tune in later to analysis of this still developing story.

-- Christian

JCS Lobbying for Defeat in A-Stan

Oh I'm all fired up again. And you guessed it, it's about Afghanistan.

We're running a story on Military.com about a leaked strategy report on Afghanistan compiled by the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They're arguing that the national goals for Afghanistan should be dialed down, the objectives scaled back and the quest for democracy abandoned.

A report prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises focusing more on squeezing Taliban and al-Qaida sanctuaries inside neighboring Pakistan while de-emphasizing longer-term goals for bolstering democracy.

So, is Pakistan all of the sudden going to let us send troops into the SWAT? Oooh, I get it, we're going to do war from a distance, launching hellfires at wedding ceremonies in Miran Shah from an air conditioned trailer in Nevada.

The Joint Chiefs' plan reflects growing worries that the U.S. military was taking on more than it could handle in Afghanistan by pursuing the Bush administration's broad goal of nurturing a thriving democratic government.

The plan calls for a more narrowly focused counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan and operations to root out militant strongholds along the Pakistani border and inside the neighboring country, according to officials who confirmed the essence of the classified report. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the plan publicly.

And you think it was the Democrats who wanted to get out of Iraq? That it was Rumsfeld's fault for trying to get troops out of Iraq before "victory" was achieved? He was doing EXACTLY what the uniformed chiefs wanted. Get in, maneuver warfare, kick the government out and leave. Bing, bang, boom. And now they have an administration that cares so little about defense policy that they keep most of the same people from the Bush administration in place. They see an easy target to just roll over.

They want to get back to maneuver warfare training, big, set-piece tank and infantry battles against Soviet troops flowing across the Fulda gap. Artillery barrages, heliborne cavalry charges, massive parachute landings.

Just read what my colleague over at DoD Buzz found out about an Army captain who just completed his career course:

That the Army’s big-battle mindset hasn’t gone far, despite eight years spent fighting two counterinsurgency wars, can be seen in this article on the Small Wars Journal web site by an Army captain who recently completed the captain’s career course and had this to say: "With rare exception, the exercises which hone officers’ skills in these areas are focused on the conventional Fulda gap-style battle… Despite all that has been written about third-generation warfare (Blitzkrieg) and fourth-generation warfare (state vs. non-state), we operated largely in the second generation of warfare."

Don't think for one second that this view isn't widespread within the Army. We all wondered how we could have given up all of that subject matter expertise in counterinsurgency warfare gained through all the blood and toil of Vietnam. Now you see why.

And here's the most laughable contention of the JCS...

Part of the recommended approach is to search for ways to work more intensively and effectively with the Pakistanis to root out extremist elements in the border area, the senior defense official said...

...The Joint Chiefs' report advises a greater emphasis on U.S. military training of Pakistani forces for counter-terror work. The training efforts also would expand and develop the Afghan army and police force, while at the same time work to improve Afghan governance.

First of all, we ARE training the Afghan army, and despite MSM reports, doing a pretty good, steady job of it. I commend the forces working closely with the Afghan troops and I know from first hand knowledge that they have a close, solid rapport with their Afghan brethren. But the most idiotic contention is that the Paks will root out the Taliban and, oh, that they'll take US training...Right...

The Paks have shown little interest in defeating the Taliban because they're far more focused on the external threat (real or imagined) by an ever more powerful India. And let's not forget, most of the Talibs and AQ folks are Pakistani...you think for one second the Pak army is going to enthusiastically fight their own -- many of whom have sympathy for that brand of Islam? Not a chance.

Just check out this amazing news report to see what I'm talking about...(notice the Pak tanks literally running away from battle...and did the morale sound good to you?)

So, what's the answer? I'm not sure. But it seems to me we need to keep the democratization and counterinsurgency effort going in Afghanistan. The way it's reported, the JCS plan is an excuse to abandon that country. People like Dave Petraeus, who were red headed step children in the institutional Army before Bush doubled down in Iraq, will (I pray) not allow this abandonment to happen. We owe it to the Afghans (with whom I have great personal affection and admiration) not to ever allow that country to descend into the Hobbesian miasma that it was from 1990 to 2001.

The Afghans will help us defeat the Taliban, contain militants in Pakistan and crush al Qaeda. We just need to stick with them and if some Pentagon brass think it's too much work, well tough noogies. Tell Gunny you can't hump that pack anymore because it's just too much of a burden and see what he says...that's what I say.

(Gouge: Weekly Standard for the video and DoD Buzz for the Hybrid stuff)

-- Christian

"Hell's Angels: Lithuanian Style"

Speaking of Afghanistan -- here's a phenomenal report from my friend Michael Yon. Seems that the Lithuanians are instituting their own unique form of Eastern European badassery out in the Zabul Province...

Zabul Province give high marks to the Lithuanian Special Forces, who like to ride these captured Taliban motorbikes to sneak up on, and chase Taliban fighters. The “LithSof” are on their way to becoming living legends: Both Afghans and Americans report that the Taliban are afraid of the Lithuanians. Stories about them are filled with dangerous escapades and humor.

Americans say that the Lithuanians are sort of a weaponized version of Borat, who think nothing of sauntering around a base in nothing but flip-flops and underwear. “They look like mountain men. They never shave, sometimes don’t bathe, and often roll out the gate wearing nothing but body armor and weapons. Not even a t-shirt,” an American soldier told me. The Lithuanians may be a little bit nuts, but the Americans love to have them around because Lithuanians love to fight, and when you need backup, you can count on them. That contrasts starkly with many of the NATO “partners.” Maybe when your country spends almost a half-century with the Soviet boot on its neck, its first generation of free soldiers know what freedom is worth — and that you sometimes have to fight for it.

--John Noonan

The Rest of the Marine Story...

"We're kind of the leading edge of the U.S. plus-up of forces in this area," said Col. Duffy White, commander of the Marine task force that recently deployed to southern Afghanistan. "I'd love to win hearts and minds, but I would really prefer at this point to win trust and confidence of the people; that we're here to help them, we're here to stay and we're here to help the Afghans find a solution to an Afghan issue."

For months, Marines from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines labored to hold a huge operational area that stretched across three provinces. Relying on NATO allies for logistics, air and other functions, 2/7's commander, Lt. Col. Rick Hall, pleaded for more equipment and support - the kind of things Marines are used to having when they deploy as an expeditionary unit or a MAGTF.

Now, with White and his infantry battalion from the Camp Lejeune, N.C.-based 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines and his logistics arm from the Hawaii-based 3rd Marines, coupled with Cobras from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 and CH-53E Super Stallions from Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466, there's a lot the Marines can do to not only clear the enemy out, but also to hold onto coalition gains.

"We are picking up from the success [2/7] had and now it goes a little bit beyond that because now we have a little bit more capability," White said during an exclusive interview with Military.com on Dec. 15.

As the war on Iraq winds down and security gains take hold, international focus is shifting towards the festering battle for Afghanistan where attacks on coalition troops are increasing at an exponential rate and casualties are beginning to outpace those in Iraq.

Though White believes the situation in his operational area isn't teetering on the brink of failure, the interview with Military.com was interrupted by a rocket attack on his headquarters in Kandahar.

"We're going to be able to succeed where we are," White said after resuming the interview about one hour later. "If we can get the unity of effort right and everyone pulling in the right direction, I don't think it's as dire as most people think it is."

One of the major factors that contributed to 2/7's heavy casualty rate of was the lack of armored vehicles to protect its troops from roadside bombs planted in the unimproved roads of Afghanistan's southern deserts. White comes armed with mine resistant, ambush protected vehicle variants that carry both troops and route clearance gear. His logistics teams include explosive ordnance disposal technicians and ground roving robots that can probe for increasingly sophisticated IEDs, he said.

He's also looking forward to the potential development of an all-terrain MRAP the Army's pushing for use in areas today's massive, top-heavy MRAPs can't reach.

"That would be something that I would say we need the most," White said. "Being able to make your own roads when you need to, to go off road and be able to surprise some enemy is the key."

With the increase in forces, new, more robust equipment and aviation elements at his back, White hopes he'll be able to expand on the slim gains made by his predecessors. And a new NATO commander for coalition forces in southern Afghanistan, Dutch Maj. Gen. Mart de Kruif, who trained at the Army War College and is "very bright, very energetic and very focused on the enemy and how to defeat him in a holistic manner" will help.

Add to that a group of hard-charging British Royal Marines guarding his flank in Helmand province, and the MAGTF commander sees a tough force for militants to reckon with.

"Marines are Marines and they're fighters and they're going after it," White said of the Brits. "So, what I've seen is what I'd expect to see if I had a U.S. higher commander and U.S. forces on my flank."

-- Christian

Headline Preview: Marines Lead Afghan Surge

[Here's a short preview of tomorrow's lead story on Military.com]

It's a tough neighborhood for coalition forces in southern Afghanistan. The historical home of the Taliban and its putative leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, American and NATO troops have been increasingly bruised by fighters from the resurgent movement who attack, run and lay ambushes nearly at will.

The last substantial group of American troops who patrolled the area at the juncture of Farah and Helmand provinces was battered and bruised by militant attacks, hitting when they could, but absorbing casualties at a rate their small numbers could not adequately prevent.

Now, as part of an upcoming surge of as many as 10,000 U.S. troops into Afghanistan, the new U.S. commander in the area says lessons learned from his predecessor's experience is putting him in a better position to knock the enemy down -- and keep him out.

"We're kind of the leading edge of the U.S. plus-up of forces in this area," said Col. Duffy White, commander of the Marine task force that recently deployed to southern Afghanistan. "I'd love to win hearts and minds, but I would really prefer at this point to win trust and confidence of the people; that we're here to help them, we're here to stay and we're here to help the Afghans find a solution to an Afghan issue."

For months, Marines from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines labored to hold a huge operational area the stretched across three provinces. Dependant on their NATO allies for logistics, air and other functions, 2/7's commander, Lt. Col. Rick Hall, pleaded for more equipment and support - the kind of things Marines are used to having when they deploy as an expeditionary unit or a MAGTF.

Now, with White and his infantry battalion from the Camp Lejeune, N.C.-based 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines and his logistics arm from the Hawaii-based 3rd Marines, coupled with Cobras from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 and CH-53E Super Stallions from Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466, there's a lot more he can do to not only clear the enemy out, but also to hold onto coalition gains.

"We are picking up from the success [2/7] had and now it goes a little bit beyond that because now we have a little bit more capability," White said during an exclusive interview with Military.com Dec. 15.

-- Christian

'That Thing is a Freaking Monster'

I interviewed the new commander of the Marine Special Purpose MAGTF in Afghanistan this morning and thought I'd fill folks in on some interesting gear news he made while we talked. And just for your information, I'm working on a more comprehensive story on his new command for Military.com to post either tomorrow or the next day.

But a few things first:

The new commander is Col. Duffy White. He's the 3rd Marine Regiment Commander based in Hawaii and attached to his SPMAGTF is an aviation element consisting of helos from HMLA 269 and HMH 466 He's also got some KC-130s that can help him out from VMGR-252.

You'll remember we've spoken in the past with Lt. Col. Rick Hall, the commander of 2/7, who got a bit beat up out there with a large AO and little support.

This time, White's equipped with the gear he needs to keep his troops safe and do a better job of pushing the mission. First of all, he's got a bunch of MRAP vehicles that he can use for route clearance and other convoy needs. He's also got EOD personnel and a ton of other heavy vehicles that come along with the logistics group that's attached to his MAGTF.

"I also have some revised mine rollers that have a hydraulic down-pressure mechanism that enables the rollers to get down into the undulating terrain and into the former shot holes and things to get in there to the pressure plates," White told me, noting the evolution from command-detonated IEDs to pressure plate triggers. "The unsung hero ... is the MTVR. That thing is a freaking monster out here. And you know, when you strap a mine roller onto the front of an MTVR you're doing good. So right now, for my force I have enough vehicles."

But White mentioned the new MRAPs being developed for all-terrain use.

The SecDef "was saying that they were pushing some research toward developing MRAPs that would be more conducive to off-country mobility. So that would be something that I would say we need the most. ... Being able to make your own roads when you need to, to go off road and be able to surprise some enemy is the key."

White said drone surveillance is also important in his AO, which stretches across the southern hilt of Afghanistan into Helmand and Farah provinces. So he's trying to tie imagery from his Scan Eagle drones directly to displays in his vehicle convoys.

"It doesn't do me very much good to see the Scan Eagle feed in my CP. It would be a lot better if the convoy commander can see that on the convoy," White said. "So we're looking to retrofit and put that stuff together."

I also asked him about the MV-22, which has yet to be deployed to Afghanistan...whether he had any in his aviation combat element, had any coming or thought he would need any for the mission. Here's what he told me:

"With the Osprey ... I think the fast forward flight mode of the Osprey -- man, you could put forces on the battlefield where they need to be in a big hurry," White said...But read carefully what he says next...

"I think the enemy has it templated out where ... they know how long it takes for [fixed wing] air to check on station and start working. So, man, I think those Ospreys you could set some blocking forces behind some enemy and I think you could really be able to out maneuver them and gain the upper hand pretty quickly. So I would look forward to the opportunity to work with the Osprey..."

Keep looking for more on my exclusive interview with Col. White here and at Military.com.

-- Christian

Despite Odds, Marines Crush Insurgent Assault

It started out just like any other patrol in a war-ravaged Afghan province.

Hardened by months of combat, sneak attacks and roadside ambushes, the Marines were ready for a fight. Rolling through the hardscrabble village of Shewan in Afghanistan's Farah province on August 8, the leathernecks of the Twentynine Palms, Calif.-based 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment knew enemy eyes were upon them.

It was a village they'd had on their radar for months. Taliban insurgents and their al Qaeda helpers were constantly harassing the Marines charged with holding back the anti-coalition flood in their 37,000 square mile operational area -- and insurgents were using Shewan as an occasional base for attacks.

They knew the rows of mud compounds held bad guys. But on the tail end of the 10-mile patrol, they never could have expected the hornets nest they were destined to stir up.

"I was prepared for contact but I wasn't expecting any," a Marine unit leader told Military.com. "It turned out later that there was a big meeting of enemy leaders in the town that we had interrupted, and we inadvertently trapped them inside of their compound."

It all started with a rocket propelled grenade shot at around 1:00 pm, and it ended nearly eight hours later with more than 50 enemy killed and only one injured Marine. For months, 2/7 had absorbed ambush after ambush from their hit-and-run opponents, suffering one of the highest casualty rates of any Marine unit deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The unit would be a symbol of the festering conflict in Afghanistan, where few NATO allies are willing to pitch in when the fight turns nasty and the full-force of American might distracted by the high-profile conflict in Iraq.

But on August 8, in what would be known as "the battle of Shewan," it was payback time.

In an exclusive email exchange with Military.com, the platoon commander who led the Marines on that ill-fated patrol described the pitched battle in vivid detail. His Marines preferred that their story be recounted anonymously, so Marine officials declined several requests to name the specific platoon and company involved in the hours-long battle.

Notes from a 2/7 platoon commander on the Battle of Shewan

What the story shows is a typically aggressive response to an enemy that for once decided to emerge from the shadows. And it also serves as an illuminating look at how, no matter the adversity and casualty count, U.S. forces continue to fight with the will and determination to win, no matter the odds.

"We didn't win the fight because of our superior firepower. We were severely outnumbered, and outgunned," the platoon commander told Military.com. "From that first counter ambush assault we gained the momentum and maintained it until the enemy finally fled from the battlefield eight hours later."

Less than two hours into the patrol one of the Marine Humvees took fire from an enemy RPG team about 150 yards away. The grenade sailed harmlessly by, but the platoon sergeant swung his rifle, fired and killed the shooter while another Marine dropped a second man, the platoon commander said. The unit continued to receive sporadic small arms fire for the next hour, but pressed on with their patrol.

Then all hell broke loose.

About 10 insurgents ambushed the Marines' vehicles from an irrigation ditch and more fired on the patrol from a nearby trench line. Though a group of Marines tried to push through the enemy position, they were rebuffed by heavy fire and another Humvee was rocked by a volley of RPG rounds.

As the Humvee burned with its vehicle commander still inside, the Marines pounded the insurgent positions with M249 fire while AK bullets ricocheted off their vehicles. The platoon commander rushed to the downed vehicle to pull the stricken Marine to safety.

"All of a sudden we took an intense amount of machine gun fire from the tree line and at this point numerous machine guns opened up on my vehicle and the dismounted crew trapped in the kill zone," the platoon commander wrote. "This began 20 minutes of intense fighting as the platoon battled to recover the Marines from the kill zone."

All this was too much for one of the platoon's designated marksmen, who crawled to the top of a berm -- exposing himself to enemy fire -- and began to plink off the insurgent gunners firing at the burning Humvee.

"The enemy fired over 40 RPGs from the tree line but were unable to effectively engage the Marines trapped in the kill zone because of the high amount of accurate fire being directed at them," the platoon commander said. "The enemy was reinforcing the tree line and replacing fighters as quickly as we were killing them."

So the designated marksman kept his cool and continued to fire.

"The designated marksman merely adjusted [his sights] and sighted in on targets as they revealed their positions by engaging him," the platoon commander added. "He rapidly acquired and prosecuted these targets again and again, firing his rifle with exceptional accuracy ... until all of the Marines were recovered from the kill zone."

In all, the designated marksmen fired 20 shots, racking up 20 dead fighters.

Finally the Marines were able to roll in an MRAP vehicle to recover the wounded Marines, and the platoon pulled back out of the enemy's range to "redistribute ammunition and [come] up with a quick game plan," the platoon commander said.

The fighters never expected the Marines to return and were surprised to see leathernecks swarming through their trenches and targeting two strongholds with close air support.

"We took another 60 or so RPGs, some rockets and mortars ... but as we attempted to assault we started taking more fire from another compound," the platoon commander wrote. "The enemy had established a defense with mutually supporting positions."

Unable to continue the assault because of the intensity of fire, and with enemy trucks pulling into the compounds and disgorging insurgent fighters, two Marines crawled through a hail of machine gun fire to get more precise coordinates for an aerial bombing run. From only 75 meters away -- well within "danger close" restrictions -- the two Marines called in air strikes until the enemy eventually withdrew from the area.

In all, what started as an ambush by 30 insurgent fighters swelled to a full-fledged assault by an estimated 250 enemy militants. The 30 or so Marines of 2/7's platoon killed more than 50 insurgents in the eight-hour battle, the Corps says.

"It turned out later that there was a big meeting of enemy leaders in the town that we had interrupted and we inadvertently trapped them inside of their compound," the platoon commander wrote. "They must have thought that if they ambushed us we would cut and run. This was not the case."

-- Christian

Marines Being Marines (Better than Last Time)

This is a picture from a gallery by John Moore, a kick butt shooter (photo) who's been in Afghanistan for a while during the last month.

I posted it because I want to see how quickly our well-informed DT readers can spot ... well, WHY I thought it was a cool picture.

Moore's caption reads simply: "U.S. Marines scan for Taliban insurgents as Afghan forces search a house for weapons October 25, 2008 in the Korengal Valley of Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan."

Make sure to check out the entire gallery. It really brings back memories...

-- Christian

Paks Rumbling with Afghan Rebels?

Here's a little tid bit on the cutting room floor from last week's interview with the Pentagon's policy chief, Eric Edelman.

The other day I got an email from a source of mine who claimed some of his buddies working in the private security industry in Pakistan and Afghanistan told him Pakistani intelligence officers have been found in "non life-supporting postures" after skirmishes or air strikes on insurgents in Afghanistan.

In other words, elements within Pakistan's ISI are directly aiding anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan -- sometimes engaging in combat operations with them.

I asked Edelman what the deal was...here's a brief transcript of how that conversation went:

Defense Tech: In Afghanistan, have you seen any evidence of Pakistani agencies' involvement in assisting the Taliban and other parties within Afghanistan against US troops and also within the [federally administered tribal areas]?

Edelman: I think that, you know, there's a long history here. The Pakistan government for a very long time has regarded Afghanistan as its 'strategic depth' and clearly there have been relationships that go back to the Mujahaddin era that have persisted. We've had some concerns about it, we've expressed those concerns. We had a meeting with the head of ISI, general Pasha ... my view is we ought to give him a chance to see how he can handle his new responsibilities and go from there.

Defense Tech: So is that a 'yes?'

Edelman: You'll have to make a judgment on whether that was a yes or not.

Defense Tech: So you have seen involvement...?

Edelman: As I said there have been persistent ties that have withstood over a long period of time and we've expressed concerns over those ties.

Sounds to me like a yes...What do you all think?

-- Christian

An Afghan 'Surge' no sure Winner

One of the Pentagon’s top policymakers warned Thursday that a “surge” of U.S. troops to Afghanistan like the one executed in Iraq 18 months ago doesn’t recognize the complexities of the Taliban and al Qaeda-sponsored violence there and could backfire.

Eric Edelman, the Pentagon’s top civilian policy advisor to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, said the situation in Afghanistan is far different than the one faced by U.S. troops in Iraq during the darkest days of sectarian violence in 2006,

“We shouldn’t just focus on the numbers of forces,” Edelman told defense reporters at a Nov. 13 breakfast meeting in Washington. “The success of the surge in Iraq, in my view, was less a function of the increased numbers … it was what they were doing that mattered.”

“The single-minded focus on what’s the level of force is wrong headed because there are a lot of elements that go into it and there’s no magic number,” he added.

Edelman said the Pentagon had executed what he called a “silent surge” of about 30,000 U.S. and NATO troops into Afghanistan in 2006, “but the scale of the insurgency began to outpace even the steps that we had taken.”

While Iraq has a well educated population, an oil-based economy and is mainly urban, Afghanistan is one of the poorest nations in the world, with illiteracy reaching close to 80 percent for males and per capita wages close to 50 percent of those in Haiti.

“There are very large differences between the circumstances in Afghanistan and the circumstances in Iraq,” Edelman said. “It’s very complicated and I don’t think it’s a ‘one size fits all’ there.”

Edelman blamed Pakistan’s previous regime, led by Pervez Musharraf, for negotiating a series of cease fires that allowed the Taliban and al Qaeda sympathizers to regroup and pour militants into the anti-coalition fight across the Afghan border.

The counsel against launching a large troop buildup in Afghanistan to tame the violence comes as President-elect Barack Obama continues to call for a two brigade increase in forces to counter growing Taliban and al Qaeda-sponsored violence.

Advisors to Obama have emphasized the need for “soft power” to tame the anti-coalition insurgency in Afghanistan, including increases in military trainers, added diplomatic initiatives and more economic outreach.

“There are opportunities to use capabilities besides military power in Afghanistan that have been underdeveloped in administration policy up until now,” top Obama advisor and former Navy Secretary Richard Danzig told reporters last month. “It is very important to engage the Afghans as much as possible themselves.”

But Obama advisors also continue to insist that the nearly 6,000 additional U.S. troops are necessary to push militants out once and for all.

Edelman stressed that some elements of the counterinsurgency doctrine that worked in Iraq could be applied to Afghanistan, particularly the notion of separating the insurgents from the population and to “clear, hold and build” on territory won back from the militants’ grip. But the ethnic complexities, degrees of anti-American sentiment among what he called “big ‘T’ and little ‘T’ Taliban” and deep cultural biases against occupation make Afghanistan a longer term commitment.

“It’s not going to be an easy cookie-cutter transfer of one to the other,” Edelman said.

Obama advisors argue the additional brigades for Afghanistan will come directly from reductions in Iraq. But commanders in Iraq, Edelman added, worry that a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces along the lines of the 16-month plan advocated by Obama could erase the surge’s gains during a crucial period of provincial and national elections.

For that reason, Edelman said he expects an Obama administration to move conservatively in reducing troop levels in Iraq.

The new administration, he said, will "try and make sure the U.S. plays a role as the guarantor of free and fair elections, and that the notion of politics as a zero sum game in Iraq doesn’t get loose again, which could lead to some unraveling of the security gains.”

-- Christian

Truth, Lies and Videotape: The Azizabad Raid

All right, I just wrote out a long entry but it got erased when I tried to post it...frustrating.

But the deal is, I'm wondering what in the Sam Hell is going on with this Azizabad raid story.

Saw a story last night on Fox about it. Ollie North (who I do not respect as a journalist, but isn't a bad guy personally -- I've bumped into him on two trips to Iraq) and a pretty damned good cameraman with no Fox agenda were embeded with the MARINE special operations force on the raid.

They saw the engagement. They saw the casualties. They did not see what "witnesses," the UN, the Afghan government or the New York Times (nice try with that BS iPhone video) saw.

Watch the report:

Now, what I want to know if there's anyone else out there who can tell us the straight gouge. Why? Here's what I'm worried about. There's a high level delegation going over there to conduct another "investigation." They HAVE to find something wrong. Who are they going to hang out to dry? MarSoc...once AGAIN. Remember all the "civilians" they killed in March 2007 after that roadside ambush? They got kicked out of theater, the commander in Afghanistan prostrated himself before the Afghans, the media and the Pentagon for forgiveness. The Corps holds a public inquiry on the incident and what do they find? The MarSoc operators did NOTHING wrong.

How much do you want to bet this will be replayed once more? Help us keep this from happening again, folks.

-- Christian

Afghanistan Sold Short -- Allied Troops Die

The situation in Afghanistan has gotten me pretty pissed off these days. I got off the phone a little while ago with the commander of a battalion of Marines -- 2nd battalion, 7th Marine Regiment -- who's trying to hold back the waters of "Taliban" violence manning the ramparts of a 28,000 square kilometer area of operations ... a swath the size of Vermont, he said.

Because of this lack of forces, Lt. Col. Richard Hall, the battalion CO, has lost by my count 13 Marines in the short time he's been in Afghanistan. That's getting close to the total number of Marines killed in Iraq this year. Hall's been extended once already -- and he's praying for relief by November if Gates will free up some Marines from Anbar (Iraq) as the commandant reiterated his desire to do today at the Pentagon.

My fundamental question is how could we have let it get this bad? Hall said he's got no coalition forces buffering his provinces (Helmand and Farah) to the north, so the enemy slips back and forth with impunity. He says the "Taliban" that are killing his men aren't religious fanatics -- they're criminals who are pissed about the disruption of their smuggling routes.

A couple weeks ago, we talked to the deputy director for operations at Centcom, Brig. Gen. Robert Holmes. He said the enemy in Afghanistan has gotten "more organized" and in some cases stronger. Stronger!?

"Well, we've seen, fighting season after fighting season, the Taliban have become more organized. And their fighting, in terms of being in units, has become more organized, and in some cases stronger."

How can that have been allowed to happen after more than six years in-country?

There's no excuse. Other than the obvious, I guess. the USG put Afghanistan on the back burner to get Iraq squared away and now it's turning back to the fight. Hall said his Marines are getting attacked in the "spaces in between the districts" -- the no man's land of rock and sand roads that connect the arid villages of his AO to one another. Hall said he doesn't have enough men to "hold" the villages and that his original mandate was to train and mentor the Afghan army and police there.

"There are not enough forces here to completely control those districts, so there is going to be risks. And consequently, the casualties do come. ... The way I'm task-organized right now, I as a infantry battalion don't have the numbers of Marines that can effectively operate within all these different districts as well as influence the area in between those districts. And that is where we normally get hit by the enemy, is in between those districts that we don't control."

Ummm, didn't we figure out that more troops were needed to "hold" Iraqi towns after the insurgents and AQ guys were kicked out? And somehow we didn't know we need to do that in Afghanistan...?

And most of Hall's casualties are from IEDs. Why? Because he can't patrol enough to keep bad guys from building and emplacing them. The commandant said there's about 40 MRAPs with Marines in Afghanistan. MRAPs aren't going to defeat IEDs; counterinsurgency tactics will. And the risk of rollover and getting stuck on some dirt road in one of those "bank safes on wheels" makes it a heck of a juicy ambush target.

It's not about tech, it's about tactics and manpower. Let's hope now that Petraeus is taking over Centcom he can have some influence over pushing more troops to Afghanistan to get this thing back in the bottle.

-- Christian

NATO's Helo Woes

NATO is desperately short of attack and transport helicopters that can support its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, senior sources in NATO Headquarters say. In recent weeks, the alliance has been examining multiple options to correct the shortfall.

Proposals on the table range from improved training and logistic support for deployed helicopters, to a commonly funded modernization of 20-odd Russian-built, Czech-owned Mil Mi-8 Hip transport helos that could then be used to form a multinational transport pool for Afghanistan-type operations.

Representatives from several NATO nations will be discussing these options at a seminar in Brussels, a senior European diplomat in NATO Headquarters tells Aviation Week & Space Technology.

"I believe the U.S. will also shortly come forward with specific proposals to help solve this problem," he adds.

The helicopter shortage is the "single biggest operational problem" that is hampering the day-to-day operations of ISAF, a 41,000-strong multinational mission led by NATO and comprising troops from 38 nations, including 14 that are not members of the alliance.

"We’re beseeching, begging, doing everything we can to convince nations to contribute more rotary-wing aviation assets, both transport helicopters and attack helicopters," a Canadian NATO official says.

"It’s not that NATO nations don’t have helicopters. The problem is that they’re very expensive to ship to Afghanistan and to operate and maintain them there. I think there are several nations that prefer to keep their helicopters at home for this reason."

At the Shephard Heli-Power conference in The Hague, operational commanders stressed that ISAF is struggling with a "constant imbalance of demand versus availability of both attack and transport helicopters."

"Without helicopters, operations in southern Afghanistan are not possible. There’s a lack of road infrastructure and a high threat of improvised explosive devices and ambushes by Taliban and other opposing militant forces," says Maj. Gen. Ton van Loon of the Royal Netherlands Army. He returned from Kandahar earlier this year after having commanded ISAF’s Regional Command (RC) South.

Read more about NATO's helo woes from our Aviation Week partners at Military.com.

-- Christian

Getting Afghans Into the Air

About two months ago, the American military went into high gear to create an air corps for Afghanistan’s military. Of course, that seems like a long time in coming, but commanders there wanted to set their priorities on building a robust ground force before switching to the more complicated task of forming an aviation force.

According to the general in charge of establishing the new Afghan air corps – which will be the aviation wing of the Afghan National Army – the coalition is building the fledgling fleet at a fever pace. In an interview with military bloggers Wednesday, Air Force Brig. Gen. Jay Lindell said his 130 member team got started in earnest to build an air corps for the Afghan military on a pretty tight schedule. Luckily, it’s not as if the team is building the Afghan air corps from the ground up. Currently, the Afghan air corps has seven Mi-17 Hip transport helicopters; six Mi-35 Hind attack helos; two An-32 Cline and two An-26 Curl fixed-wing transport aircraft and two Czech-made L-39 Albatross training aircraft - used primarily for flight demonstration shows.

But the coalition isn’t stopping there. The air corps is in the process of receiving several Russian-made troop-carrying helicopters from allies. The list includes: six Mi-17s and six Mi-35s from the Czech Republic; one Mi-17 from Slovakia; 10 Mi-17s from the United Arab Emirates and four An-32s from the Ukraine. “All of these aircraft should be here in Kabul in the next six months,” Lindell said.

The coalition trainers are also checking out what’s available to boost the Afghan’s medium lift transport inventory. That procurement will be handled through the U.S. foreign military sales accounts, but Lindell said he likes the looks of the C-27A Spartan, though Lindell is looking at refurbished versions of this Italian-made transport.

So who exactly is going to fly these birds, you ask? Well, Lindell said there are 165 Afghan pilots currently in the Afghan air corps. They’re Soviet trained, run about 2,500 flight hours each, but they’re on average about 43 years old. “They’re actually very capable pilots. They’re not too current. That’s why we need to get them the aircraft to fly in,” Lindell said.

The air corps has its own crew of instructors and they have a Soviet-era flight training syllabus they’re already familiar with, so getting them up to speed won’t be too difficult. It’s the night and foul-weather operations that are going to be the toughest to train. The plan is to establish mobile training teams manned by Eastern European NATO pilots who fly the same types of aircraft to mentor the Afghan pilots on all-weather, day-night tactical flying.

Lindell hopes to set up a training program for new pilots to ascend through the ranks from the Afghan National Military Training Academy in Kabul, so a fresh generation of Afghan air corps pilots can take over for the vets.

Of course, logistics is what makes a functioning air corps and Lindell is bullish on the Afghans’ capabilities there. He’s seen a knack for keeping aircraft aloft with even the most rudimentary resources (just ask the spooks who flew into Afghanistan in 2001), but a good inventory of spare parts and modern maintenance equipment will also be needed.

“The Afghan air corps has ability and desire. They need resources to give them capability,” Lindell said.

-- Christian