Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez harshly criticized the US administration again after the unauthorized passing of the USS George Washington along the coast of the Latin American country. Chavez promised to bury the USA in the 21st century.
“When Americans appear near our shores with their navy, the George Washington aircraft carrier, one should not forget that it happens at the time when we together with Brazil are creating the Defense Council of South America,” Chavez said in a speech that was broadcast by all TV and radio channels of Venezuela.
“In this century we will bury the old empire of the USA and will live with the American nation like with a brotherly nation, because over 40 million of its citizens live below the poverty line,” the Venezuelan leader said.
I'm beginning to get a kick out of that guy...
(Gouge: NC)
-- Christian
Israel Deploys New Mortar
The IDF recently deployed the Keshet 120 mm Autonomous Self Propelled Recoil Mortar System (manufactured by Soltam Systems Limited) that the head of the Army Headquarters Weapons Department, Lieutenant Colonel Eren Garnet, explained would enable a battalion commander to fire artillery autonomously. "The battalion commander should be able to guide the fire in the unit he commands as opposed to requiring outside assistance."
The Keshet can be integrated on any M1064 Tracked Vehicle and is currently in serial delivery to the US Army, the IDF and other customers. The autonomous mortar system is capable of a maximum range of 7KM (with NATO std unassisted bombs) and can fire all types of 120mm smooth bore ammo. Its rate of fire burst is 16 per minute (intense burst, 4 rounds). The total weight is 750kg, elevation (deg) 40-85 and traverse (deg) 360.
According to Valentec Systems Inc., the Keshet offers commanders of infantry and armor unique enhanced operational capabilities. Indeed, improvements in inertial navigation systems and a sophisticated target acquisition system further enhance the accuracy of mortar ammunition delivery.
IDF Lieutenant Colonel Tal Aharon notes that the "Keshet weapons system is, without a doubt, the most advanced weapons system of the Infantry Corps."
Other Mortars Compared:
The XM1204 Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M) is a turreted, self-propelled mortar vehicle with a four man crew. The NLOS-M is currently in development for the U.S. Army and is a component of the Future Combat System.
The Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M) offers unparalleled responsiveness and lethality (http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/ic/fcs/bia/050923_resupply_rfi.pdf) to the Unit of Action (UA) commander. The mortar provides fires in close support of tactical maneuvers that include destructive fires and special purpose fires. While working as part of an NLOS-M battery, the Non-Line-of-Sight mortar-firing Precision Guided Mortar Munitions deliver lethal fires to destroy targets and provide area suppression in support of UA companies and platoons.
The command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network enables the FCS NLOS-M)fire control system to conduct semi- to autonomous computation of technical fire direction, automatic gun lay, preparation of the ammunition for firing and mortar round firing. Vastly improved handling, loading and firing systems will be another centerpiece of the NLOS-M. The mortar platoon will also retain a dismounted 81mm mortar capability for complex terrain.
According to Chinese Defense Today, the YW-381 self-propelled 120mm mortar system is mounted inside the troop compartment of a YW-531 APC and is capable of an indirect fire range of 7,700m. The 13.2t mortar is mounted (or fixed) on the APC floor, and cannot move in traverse. As such, the mortar tube elevation range is limited to 45-80 degrees. Auxiliary weapon include a Type 59 12.7 anti-aircraft machine gun mounted on the APC's roof.
The Russian Tulpan is based on the GMZ tracked minelaying vehicle carrying an externally mounted M-240 240 mm breech-loading mortar on the hull rear. The M-1975 mortar (130kg per projectile) is capable of a 9,650m range, but an extended range munition could possibly raise the range to 20,000 m. The Tulpan is limited to a firing frequency of one round per minute. However, the Tulpan can also fire laser-guided, armor-piercing, chemical and nuclear rounds.
Enemy Forces notes that the 240-mm mortar is lowered into the firing position under remote-control and when in position can be elevated from +45 to +80° with a traverse of 8° left and right. The sighting system is located on the right side of the mortar.
Inside the Pentagon has an interesting story on America's assistance to Lebanese special forces. Seems like a good idea to me, though I'm sure each side would have rather kept the deal quiet. No one in the Middle East wants to appear like a US stooge, but Lebanon's army is really the glue that holds together a fractured society.
Could Lebanon's army be a model for Iraq's? They're dealing with a similar set of paradoxes in terms of religiosity and sectarianism. Anyway...
The other things that's cool about this Lebanon deal is that my boy Dave Woroner was pretty close to inking a deal to supply the Lebanese army with his popular TacRail system. The deal didn't go through, but it's kinda cool to see a DT friend playing in this big deal.
Amid U.S. concerns that Iran and Syria are destabilizing Lebanon by supporting Hezbollah, the Pentagon is poised to bolster Beirut’s military with new shipments of weapons, trucks and other gear.
The Pentagon will spend $7.2 million to equip Lebanon’s special forces with small arms, vehicles, night-vision sights for guns, Global Positioning System devices and clothing, Inside the Pentagon has learned.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman informed Congress of the details last month, noting the gear will enable Lebanon’s elite troops to conduct counterterrorism missions in both daylight and limited-visibility conditions.
Let's just hope those NVGs and small arms don't wind up in the hands of Hezbollah militiamen. But, yeah, that's right, they get their weapons straight from Iran.
-- Christian
"Merchant of Death" Nabbed by Feds
In the "truth is stranger than fiction" category there's this one.
Viktor Bout, legendary arms dealer and global scoundrel, was arrested yesterday in a DEA-sponsored sting operation in Thailand.
It is Bout whom Nicolas Cage modeled his "Yuri Orlov" character after in the (I thought pretty entertaining) "Lord of War" flick released in 2005.
There's an excellent story on the arrest in the Washington Post today, and I've got to tell you, there's something in my Cold War bones that sort of admires the idea of a guy like Bout taking advantage of all the conflict around the world to make a profit. I mean, he supplied both sides of most of these third-world conflicts...
The list of Bout's alleged customers since the early 1990s stretches across at least four continents, with a focus on Africa, Western law enforcement officials and human rights groups say. The Treasury Department accused him of supplying armaments to both the Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies in Afghanistan before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, while also providing weapons to the opposing Northern Alliance.
In Zaire, now known as Congo, Bout allegedly supplied arms to rebels fighting then-dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, turned around and helped Seko flee the country, then flew humanitarian cargo into the devastated nation.
"One of the most fascinating things is his ability not only to supply different sides of a conflict, but to live and tell about it with no one killing him," said Douglas Farah, a former Washington Post reporter and co-author of a 2007 book about Bout, "Merchant of Death."
Other alleged customers over the years have included then-Liberian despot Charles Taylor, Unita rebels in Angola and the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. Cargo companies connected to Bout were also linked to hundreds of supply flights into Iraq for private contractors and the U.S. military early in the Iraq war. The complaint even states that, in the 1990s, Bout sought to drop "crates and boxes over Chechnya," the site of a bitter secessionist rebellion inside Russia.
The straight-up business panache and rank amorality of the whole thing is downright intriguing. In a voyeuristic way, how many of you secretly wish you could be Bout for just a day?
He promised an immediate delivery of 100 Russian Igla missiles -- a standard item in the Russian army -- plus thousands of assault rifles. For $5 million extra, he agreed to drop the items into the Colombian jungle using several hundred combat parachutes, according to the complaint. Bout also promised, through Smulian, to provide helicopters "that could wipe out" other helicopters, flight training, and armor-piercing rockets, the complaint says.
I mean, agreeing to airdrop rifles and anti-aircraft missiles with hundreds of parachutes to FARC rebels as part of the deal? Brilliant -- and ballsy!
-- Christian
Could Israel Deploy C-RAM for Border?
Our Defense Tech contributor who keeps a close eye on the Middle East, Aharon Etengoff of Weaponsurvey, reports:
The Israeli Defense Ministry holds high-level talks with the Pentagon on purchasing the Phalanx B, or C-RAM, a rapid-fire cannon to protect strategic installations against Palestinian projectiles. It should be noted that the C-RAM (manufactured by Raytheon) is fully operational and available for immediate deployment.
The C-RAM is a radar-controlled gun adapted from a US Navy original, which can fire 4,500 rounds a minute and destroy incoming mortar bombs before impact. According to Jane's Defense Weekly, the Land-based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS) "is a reconfigured variant of the widely sold Phalanx 20 mm shipborne close-in weapon system [that] combines a 20 mm M61A1 Gatling gun with a Ku-band search-and-track radar featuring closed loop spotting."
Sean Osborne, Associate Director of NEIN Military Affairs & NEIN Blog:
"The C-RAM is deployed at US FOBs (Forward Operating Bases) all over Iraq - not just in the so-called Green Zone. C-RAMs success rate in shooting mortar rounds and other incoming indirect ordnance out of the sky is better than 85% according to data I've received from those who've installed these systems in Iraq. C-RAM counter-fires which miss the incoming target do not simply fall to ground - each 20mm round is fused to self-destruct if contact is not made with the target.
The IDF Research & Development Directorate's (MAFAT) refusal to acquire and deploy the C-RAM system in defense of Sderot or other Israeli towns is several echelons below unfortunate, and appears to be couched in political considerations which have nothing to do with the suffering of the citizens of Sderot. The non-acquisition is sending a message of abandonment to the women and children of Sderot who are under severe traumatic stress and psychological pressures not unlike that of soldiers in combat."
Uzi Rubin:
"This is a very effective system for protecting strategic installations...It covers a radius of up to a kilometer and would be ideal for protecting key installations like power plants and IDF bases."
"This [Palestinian rockets] is a close-to-home threat that has an impact on the home front as well as the national morale...Our ability to deal with this threat is difficult until being almost impossible in certain places."
It seems a long time ago that Muammar Gadaffi was the root of all evil, doesn't it? Those were the good old days of "Freedom of Navigation" ops (remember the "Line of Death"?) and VF-32 Tomcats picking on kids coming off the short bus.
Of course, Gadaffi has done an "Abominable Snowman after the dental work" and made nice with the world, right? Well, Joe at DID has an interesting report about Libya's recent outreach to . . . wait for it . . . FRANCE.
Here's a bit:
Libya's military has traditionally been Soviet supplied, alongside some equipment from France. The demise of the Soviet Union, the 1990s drop in oil prices, and Libya's pariah status all combined to choke military modernization – but Libya's new political direction, and the rise in oil prices, are changing that. Unsurprisingly, there have been widespread reports in recent days that France and Libya have signed a Memorandum of Understanding covering arms deals worth up to EUR 4.5 billion, including the first foreign sale of the Rafale fighter. Has France learned the lessons of Morocco and Saudi Arabia? Can the Rafale find an export home at last? Will the deals come to fruition?
Meanwhile, Christian and I are flying back from corporate headquarters on the west coast, so we'll be post-light for the rest of today. See you for the Sunday Paper.
...I mean, I want to be pithy and all with this one...but it speaks for itself.
In the old days naval recruiters used to get young men drunk in bars, make them scrawl their signature on a bit of paper and next thing the young men knew they woke up not only with a hangover but aboard a ship.
Young men (and women) today spend less time in bars drinking and a lot of time in internet cafes and 11 million of them are pretending to be somebody else on Second Life. So, that's where the French Navy recruitment drive decided to go and get them, well, a few anyway. It's the first time a French armed force has used this kind of method to recruit: some say it's a world first but I couldn't guarantee that.
From 29 November to 4 December a virtual frigate (which looks remarkably like the yet-to-be-built Franco-Italian FREMM) called in on Second Life which could be visited 24 hours a day and where youngsters could meet virtual sailors who would answer questions about the jobs and careers they might have if they joined the Navy. A competition was also held, first prize being a day aboard a frigate, a real one this time!
Aboard the virtual frigate visitors were given virtual red pompoms (traditionally worn on the hat, the pompom, I learnt the other day, was designed to provide additional protection for the head which, as everyone whose been aboard a ship knows, frequently gets knocked) , could see films, visit an exhibition, hold daily chats with naval pilots, submariners, combat divers but also go up to the command deck for more serious discussions.
OK, so my whole impression of France in the national security realm has changed with the election of Sarkozy. But after this little story, I think I'm going back to calling them "freedom fries."
British army Apache attack helicopters in Afghanistan are the only Apaches in the country that fly with the mast-mounted Longbow radar installed -- and that is giving them a distinctive edge in the NATO-led operations against Taliban and other opposing militant forces, the commander of the unit says.
Lt.Col. Jon Bryant, commanding officer of the Apache-equipped No. 3 Regiment (Army Air Corps) at Wattisham, Suffolk, says that the Longbow radar is "extremely useful in airspace deconfliction terms."
"When on patrol, we are sharing the airspace with other Apaches, Chinooks, Lynxes, fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles," says Col. Bryant, who recently returned from a tour as commanding officer of Britain's Joint Helicopter Force (Afghanistan) at Kandahar Air Field, southern Afghanistan.
Especially at night, the radar helps pilots to build up situational awareness and to prevent getting dangerously close to other aircraft during tactical maneuvers.
See the rest of this article from our Aviation Week partners at Military.com.
-- Christian
Israel's Cyber Shot at Syria
Our friends at Av Week have this story so wired, I couldn’t wait to post this update. And, as you well know, I’m a bit obsessed with it.
It now seems that one of Israel’s first shots in its raid into Syria in September was a fusillade of 1s and 0s.
From Aviation Week:
The U.S. was monitoring the electronic emissions coming from Syria during Israel’s September attack; and—although there was no direct American help in destroying a nuclear reactor—there was some advice provided beforehand, military and aerospace industry officials tell Aviation Week & Space Technology.
That surveillance is providing clues about how Israeli aircraft managed to slip past Syrian air defenses to bomb the site at Dayr az-Zawr. The main attack was preceded by an engagement with a single Syrian radar site at Tall al-Abuad near the Turkish border. It was assaulted with what appears to be a combination of electronic attack and precision bombs to enable the Israeli force to enter and exit Syrian airspace. Almost immediately, the entire Syrian radar system went off the air for a period of time that included the raid, say U.S. intelligence analysts.
There was “no U.S. active engagement other than consulting on potential target vulnerabilities,” says a U.S. electronic warfare specialist.
Elements of the attack included some brute-force jamming, which is still an important element of attacking air defenses, U.S. analysts say. Also, Syrian air defenses are still centralized and dependent on dedicated HF and VHF communications, which made them vulnerable. The analysts don’t believe any part of Syria’s electrical grid was shut down. They do contend that network penetration involved both remote air-to-ground electronic attack and penetration through computer-to-computer links.
“There also were some higher-level, nontactical penetrations, either direct or as diversions and spoofs, of the Syrian command-and-control capability, done through network attack,” says an intelligence specialist.
These observations provide evidence that a sophisticated network attack and electronic hacking capability is an operational part of the Israel Defense Forces’ arsenal of digital weapons.
Despite being hobbled by the restrictions of secrecy and diplomacy, Israeli military and government officials confirm that network invasion, information warfare and electronic attack are part of Israel’s defense capabilities.
And the cool thing was that it seems that Israel was able to do this cyber attack from the air.
That ability of nonstealthy Israeli aircraft to penetrate without interference rests in part on technology, carried on board modified aircraft, that allowed specialists to hack into Syria’s networked air defense system, said U.S. military and industry officials in the attack’s aftermath.
Network raiders can conduct their invasion from an aircraft into a network and then jump from network to network until they are into the target’s communications loop. “Whether the network is wireless or wired doesn’t matter anymore,” says a U.S. industry specialist.
And it seems the Syrian government’s self-imposed secrecy was partly to blame for the shut-down.
“The raid on Syria was a strategic signal, not a threat,” says a retired senior military official who flew combat in the region for decades. “This [raid] was about what we perceived are their capabilities [for developing weapons of mass destruction] and about deterrence more than creating damage.”
He contends that Syrian procedures even contributed to the successful bombing raid.
“Part of the vulnerability of the Syrian facility was that they kept it so secret that there weren’t enough air defenses assigned to it,” the official contends.
Be sure to read the rest of this fascinating story and really kick ass reporting HERE.
An update on the India/Russia 5th gen fighter development from the Dubai air show.
Via RIA Novosti:
...Unfortunately, Russia has so far failed to master production of the purely experimental Su-37, built by Sukhoi at its own expense. Nevertheless, the plane's lay-out makes it possible to streamline various engineering solutions under the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (PAK FA) program.
The United States and Europe spent over $20 billion on the F-35 JSF program. Therefore, experts believe that Russia should team up with a foreign partner in order to develop a fifth-generation fighter. It will take $600-800 million to design the engine, the most expensive element, and another $1.5 billion to launch serial production.
Moscow considered China and India to be the best partners. However, Beijing prefers to develop its own aircraft engines, and India is more interested in state-of-the-art designing methods and does not want to manufacture "ready-made" planes.
Russia and India started negotiating on the joint fifth-generation fighter program in 2003. New Delhi insisted that the new plane be developed from scratch. Moscow was not very happy about this because it implied another highly expensive project.
Apart from outstanding achievements, bilateral military-technical co-operation has been marked by major setbacks and even conflicts. And this explains why it took India so long to get involved in the new fighter program.
Both countries have faced serious problems such as upgrading the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier. Under a bilateral contract, the Indian Navy was to have received the warship in 2008. However, the Admiral Gorshkov will only conduct its trial run from 2010 to 2012.
Moreover, Russian bureaucrats have failed to approve the preparatory documents of the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MTA) project during last two years and have nearly stopped it. New Delhi has already said that it could withdraw from the project and develop the MTA together with Brazil or the EU.
Tatyana Shaumyan, head of the Centre of Indian Research at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies, said Russian red tape, the inadequate fulfillment of contracts and delayed shipments had impaired many aspects of bilateral relations. This is why India is trying to protect itself from such negative developments.
For instance, the national air force floated a global tender for 126 combat jets worth $10 billion. Eighteen of the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) will be purchased in flyaway condition and the remaining 108 manufactured in the country under a transfer of technology (TOT) agreement with the chosen supplier.
The 211-page request for proposal (RFP) has been sent to the manufacturers of six aircraft: the U.S. F-16 and F-18 Super Hornet, the Swedish Gripen, the French Rafale, the Russian MiG-35 and a European consortium's Eurofighter.
Indian engineers and technicians who know all about the Russian aircraft production process will quickly master the relevant technologies.
The Indian leadership seemed inclined to co-operate with the United States and to obtain F-35 JSF know-how. However, Washington, which refuses to share technologies even with its closest allies, offered some rather harsh terms to New Delhi.
This October, Russia and India agreed to jointly develop the fifth-generation fighter and to manufacture it at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Sukhoi Military Aviation Complex plants.
India's Defense Minister A. K. Antony said the agreement heralded a new stage in bilateral co-operation aiming to develop new-generation weapons and military equipment. This will become one of the most ambitious Russian-Indian military programs.
The fifth-generation fighter must retain in-flight stability and control at 90-degree-plus angles of attack. The United States, which faced similar problems, eventually preferred Stealth characteristics and supersonic cruise speeds to super-agility.
The future Russian-Indian warplane would probably out-maneuver any other similar aircraft because the F-22's maneuverability is similar to that of the revamped Su-27 Flanker featuring vectored-thrust engines. This Russian plane features AL-37-FU engines with round rotatable nozzles and can attain supersonic cruise speeds. Its combat efficiency has been enhanced because the Su-27 can bank sharply at high angular speeds and along short trajectories in every plane.
In addition, the fifth-generation fighter will be fitted with advanced avionics, long-range weapons and other radio-electronic equipment for hitting any conceivable target. The Indian electronics industry will provide an invaluable contribution to developing automated electronic counter-measures (ECM) systems, secure data-exchange networks and fire-control systems for long-range tactical missions.
(Gouge: NC)
-- Christian
Bad Days for Pirates
Events like this sort of validate parts of the CNO's new maritime strategy, don't they? This from Military.com
Sailors from the Norfolk-based destroyer James E. Williams boarded a North Korean merchant ship that had been hijacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia, while two other Navy vessels tailed a pirated Japanese ship in the same region.
The Williams, which left Norfolk in July , was about 50 nautical miles from the ship Dai Hong Dan in the Arabian Sea when it received word of the pirate attack, said Lt. John Gay , a spokesman for the Navy's Central Command in Manama, Bahrain.
The Williams dispatched a helicopter and ordered the pirates to give up their weapons via a bridge-to-bridge radio. The North Korean crew, which had retained control of the steering and engineering spaces, then confronted the pirates and gained back control of the bridge, according to a Navy news release.
Initial reports from the North Korean crew said two pirates were killed and five others captured, the release said.
Soon afterward, the North Korean crew permitted a small party from the Williams to come aboard, Gay said.
Three corpsman, accompanied by armed Sailors and a Williams crew member who spoke Korean, boarded the Dai Hong Dan from a rigid hull inflatable boat. The corpsman assisted wounded crew members and attackers.
Three Koreans were transported to the Williams for medical attention before being returned to their ship, Gay said. The pirates were being held on the Dai Hong Dan.
Hundreds of miles away in the same region, two other Navy ships were tracking a Japanese-owned ship seized by pirates over the weekend, Gay said.
The spokesman said that two "coalition" ships from Combined Task Force 150 had responded to the hijacking of the Golden Mori , a Japanese-owned ship registered in Panama.
Combined Task Force 150, which conducts maritime security operations in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden, includes vessels from the Pakistani, British, French, German and U.S. navies.
Navy officials with knowledge of the incident confirmed that the U.S. destroyers Porter and Arleigh Burke, both based in Norfolk, responded to the Golden Mori's distress call.
One of the responding ships fired warning shots in front of the Golden Mori.
It also aimed disabling shots at two skiffs -- the boats the pirates used to approach the ship -- towed behind the Golden Mori. The skiffs caught fire and sank, Gay said.
Gay said coalition crew members have observed men carrying small arms aboard the bridge of the ship, which was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden, a critical body of water between Yemen, Djibouti and Somalia that links the Red and Arabian seas.
After the hijacking, the Golden Mori sailed 380 miles south and remained off Somalia's coast, Gay said.
The article also rolls out the duty critic (it wasn't my turn):
"Essentially, you don't want to use a billion dollar DDG [guided missile destroyer] to suppress pirates," [Robert Work, a retired Marine officer and analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington] said. "That's a mission for a much smaller ship. But we have a lot of ships in that area because of ongoing operations in the Horn of Africa. These are ships designed for high-end war fighting, not chasing pirates."
Hey, not every day's a missile day. Plus, as we say in the fighter business, a kill's a kill, right?
Kudos to our blackshoe brethren here.
(Official U.S. Navy photo showing a pirate ship headed for Davy Jones' locker.)
Here’s another interesting article from our friends at Aviation Week that I thought was worthy of a comment or two. It’s a great example of how internet journalism/blogging can bring some “value added” to readers interested in defense issues and technology.
Bill Sweetman ran across a series of entries at the Secret Projects blog, which yours truly occasionally takes a look at, and found some really cool pictures clicked at a Russian aeronautics lab that shows some intriguing technology being developed there.
Aside from the whiz bang of it all, this sort of post tugs at my “Cold War” heart strings – being a student of Soviet foreign policy and Cold War diplomacy, there’s still a part of me that looks at Russia as this dark, closed place where crazy science experiments are allowed to run amok. Revelations of a variety of weapons development programs that went on behind the iron curtain revealed only as the wall fell have kept those embers smoldering.
This post comes a day after an equally interesting show was broadcast on the History International Channel titled “Secret Superpower Aircraft.” This series was like manna from heaven for someone like me who still yearns for the kind of Cold War rivalry that drove aerospace technology to its limits. The Avro Arrow? The F-103 Thunder Warrior? Hmmmm, yummie.
The invaluable Secret Projects website carries frame grabs from an early-2000s Russian TV documentary, filmed at the vast TsAGI wind-tunnel complex at Zhukovsky. While wind-tunnel models are not equivalent to real hardware, and while known sensitive material wouldn't have been shown, the models are a real indication of Russian industry and government thinking.
First is a flying-wing aircraft, looking (from the inlet and exhaust shape) like a four-engine bomber.
There is also a stealth fighter design that superficially resembles the Lockheed YF-22.
Significant differences from the US fighter include prominent leading-edge root extensions and a different wing and tail planform. This may be the rumored Sukhoi design nicknamed Big Ears, a precursor to the T-50 PAK-FA.
This photo shows some of the fires that burned around Marine Base Camp Pendleton in Southern California last week. Although no buildings were damaged and the Marines were able to contain the fires in about 24 hours, there were some hairy moments, as this shot showing how close the blazes got to aircraft (Hueys in this case) attests.
(Gouge: LR)
-- Ward
Josh Rushing on the AK-47
A colleague sent me this story on a weapon that I’m sure has many fans among DT readers.
It’s a video and text package on the AK-47 done for Al Jazeera network. There’s some good video and the story itself isn’t bad. But what I find particularly interesting is that it’s being run by Al Jazeera in the first place – as if viewers in the Middle East need any education about the AK-47 – and the reporter who filed it.
You may remember that Josh Rushing was a Marine Corps PAO during the invasion of Iraq and was prominently featured in the controversial documentary “Control Room.” He left the service to become a correspondent with Jazeera.
There are some interesting insights into the world of arms smuggling and supplying guerrilla wars throughout Rushing’s Jazeera package. So if you have a few moments to watch, it’s worth a look.
(Read the entire Jazeera post for Part II of the report)
-- Christian
NYT Says Syria Target Was Nuke Plant
So the New York Times had another update on that Syria raid conducted by Israel last month. It doesn’t add a whole lot to what we’ve already reported here, but one thing it does confirm is that the target was a fledgling nuke plant.
The issue raised by the raid seems now to be what is the threshold of preemption when it comes to nuclear facilities? The report says the Syrian plant was basically a few sheds in the desert – years away from producing weapons grade material. Yet the Israelis blew the thing up – and with little regional protest.
If that’s the precedent, why then does Iran continue its nuclear development unabated? Why was Syria’s program some how more a threat than Iran’s much more mature one?
Israel’s air attack on Syria last month was directed against a site that Israeli and American intelligence analysts judged was a partly constructed nuclear reactor, apparently modeled on one North Korea has used to create its stockpile of nuclear weapons fuel, according to American and foreign officials with access to the intelligence reports.
The description of the target addresses one of the central mysteries surrounding the Sept. 6 attack, and suggests that Israel carried out the raid to demonstrate its determination to snuff out even a nascent nuclear project in a neighboring state. The Bush administration was divided at the time about the wisdom of Israel’s strike, American officials said, and some senior policy makers still regard the attack as premature.
The attack on the reactor project has echoes of an Israeli raid more than a quarter century ago, in 1981, when Israel destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq shortly before it was to have begun operating. That attack was officially condemned by the Reagan administration, though Israelis consider it among their military’s finest moments. In the weeks before the Iraq war, Bush administration officials said they believed that the attack set back Iraq’s nuclear ambitions by many years.
By contrast, the facility that the Israelis struck in Syria appears to have been much further from completion, the American and foreign officials said. They said it would have been years before the Syrians could have used the reactor to produce the spent nuclear fuel that could, through a series of additional steps, be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium.
Many details remain unclear, most notably how much progress the Syrians had made in construction before the Israelis struck, the role of any assistance provided by North Korea, and whether the Syrians could make a plausible case that the reactor was intended to produce electricity. In Washington and Israel, information about the raid has been wrapped in extraordinary secrecy and restricted to just a handful of officials, while the Israeli press has been prohibited from publishing information about the attack.
The New York Times reported this week that a debate had begun within the Bush administration about whether the information secretly cited by Israel to justify its attack should be interpreted by the United States as reason to toughen its approach to Syria and North Korea. In later interviews, officials made clear that the disagreements within the administration began this summer, as a debate about whether an Israeli attack on the incomplete reactor was warranted then.
The officials did not say that the administration had ultimately opposed the Israeli strike, but that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates were particularly concerned about the ramifications of a pre-emptive strike in the absence of an urgent threat...
Even though it has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Syria would not have been obligated to declare the existence of a reactor during the early phases of construction. It would have also had the legal right to complete construction of the reactor, as long as its purpose was to generate electricity.
In his only public comment on the raid, Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, acknowledged this month that Israeli jets dropped bombs on a building that he said was “related to the military” but which he insisted was “not used.”
A senior Israeli official, while declining to speak about the specific nature of the target, said the strike was intended to “re-establish the credibility of our deterrent power,” signaling that Israel meant to send a message to the Syrians that even the potential for a nuclear weapons program would not be permitted. But several American officials said the strike may also have been intended by Israel as a signal to Iran and its nuclear aspirations. Neither Iran nor any Arab government except for Syria has criticized the Israeli raid, suggesting that Israel is not the only country that would be disturbed by a nuclear Syria. North Korea did issue a protest…
-- Christian
Security Contractors: A Necessary Evil
An interesting read on the security contractor debate from our friends at Stratfor...
As Stratfor CEO George Friedman discussed Oct. 9, some specific geopolitical forces have prompted changes in the structure of the U.S. armed forces -- to the extent that private contractors have become essential to the execution of a sustained military campaign. Indeed, in addition to providing security for diplomats and other high-value personnel, civilian contractors conduct an array of support functions in Iraq, including vehicle maintenance, laundry services and supply and logistics operations.
Beyond the military bureaucracy and the geopolitical processes acting upon it, another set of dynamics is behind the growing use of civilian contractors to protect diplomats in Iraq. These factors include the type and scope of the U.S. diplomatic miss ion in the country; the nature of the insurgency and the specific targeting of diplomats; and the limited resources available to the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). Because of these factors, unless the diplomatic mission to Iraq is dramatically changed or reduced, or the U.S. Congress takes action to radically enlarge the DSS, the services of civilian security contractors will be required in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Those contractors provide flexibility in tailoring the force that full-time security officers do not.
Although it is not widely recognized, the protection of diplomats in dangerous places is a civilian function and has traditionally been carried out by civilian agents. With rare exceptions, military forces simply do not have the legal mandate or specialized training required to provide daily protection details for diplomats. It is not what soldiers do. A few in the U.S. military do posses s that specialized training, and they could be assigned to the work under the DSS, but with wars going on in Iraq and Afghanistan, they currently are needed for other duties.
For the U.S. government, then, the civilian entity responsible for protecting diplomatic missions and personnel is the DSS. Although the agency's roots go back to 1916, Congress dramatically increased its size and responsibility, and renamed it the DSS, in 1985 in response to a string of security incidents, including the attacks against the U.S. embassies in Lebanon and Kuwait, and the security debacle over a new embassy building in Moscow. The DSS ranks swelled to more than 1,000 special agents by the late 1980s, though they were cut back to little more than 600 by the late 1990s as part of the State Department's historical cycle of security booms and busts. Following 9/11, DSS funding was again increased, and cur rently there are about 1,400 DSS agents assigned to 159 foreign countries and 25 domestic offices.
The DSS protects more dignitaries than any other agency, including the U.S. Secret Service. Its list of protectees includes the secretary of state, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and the approximately 150 foreign dignitaries who visit the United States each year for events such as the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) session. It also provides hundreds of protective details overseas, many of them operating day in and day out in dangerous locations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Colombia, the Gaza Strip, Pakistan and nearly every other global hot spot. The DSS also from time to time has been assigned by presidential directives to provide stopgap protection to vulnerable leaders of foreign countries who are in danger of assassination, such as the presidents of Haiti and Afghanista n.
The DSS is charged by U.S. statute with providing this protection to diplomats and diplomatic facilities overseas, and international conventions such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations permit civilian agents to provide this kind of security. Because of this, there has never been any question regarding the status or function of DSS special agents. They have never been considered "illegal combatants" because they do not wear military uniforms, even in the many instances when they have provided protection to diplomats traveling in war zones.
Practically, the DSS lacks enough of its own agents to staff all these protective details. Although the highest-profile protective details, such as that on the secretary of state, are staffed exclusively by DSS agents, many details must be augmented by outside personnel. Domestically, some protective details at the UNGA are staffed by a core group of DSS agents that is augmented by deputy U.S. marshals and a gents from the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Overseas, local police officers who operate under the supervision of DSS agents often are used.
It is not unusual to see a protective detail comprised of two Americans and eight or 10 Peruvian investigative police officers, or even a detail of 10 Guatemalan national police officers with no DSS agents except on moves to dangerous areas. In some places, including Beirut, the embassy contracts its own local security officers, who then work for the DSS agents. In other places, where it is difficult to find competent and trustworthy local hires, the DSS augments its agents with contractors brought in from the United States. Well before 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the DSS was using contractors in places such as Gaza to help fill the gaps between its personnel and its protective responsibilities.
Additionally, for decades the DSS has used contract security officers to provide exterior guard se rvices for U.S. diplomatic missions. In fact, contract guards are at nearly every U.S. diplomatic mission in the world. Marine Security Guards also are present at many missions, but they are used only to maintain the integrity of the sensitive portions of the buildings -- the exterior perimeter is protected by contract security guards. Of course, there are far more exterior contract guards (called the "local guard force") at critical threat posts such as Baghdad than there are at quiet posts such as Nassau, Bahamas.
Over the many years that the DSS has used contract guards to help protect facilities and dignitaries, it has never received the level of negative feedback as it has during the current controversy over the Blackwater security firm. In fact, security contractors have been overwhelmingly successful in protecting those placed in their charge, and many times have acted heroically. Much of the current controversy has to do with the size and scope of the contrac tor operations in Iraq, the situation on the ground and, not insignificantly, the political environment in Washington.
With this operational history in mind, then, we turn to Iraq. Unlike Desert Storm in 1991, in which the U.S. military destroyed Iraq's military and command infrastructure and then left the country, the decision this time was to destroy the military infrastructure and effect regime change, but stay and rebuild the nation. Setting aside all the underlying geopolitical issues, the result of this decision was that the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has become the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in the world, with some 1,000 Americans working there.
Within a few months of the invasion, however, the insurgents and militants in Iraq made it clear that they would specifically target diplomats serving in the country in order to thwart reconstruction efforts. In August 2003, militants attacked the Jordanian Embassy and the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad with large vehicle bombs. The attack against the U.N building killed Sergio Vieira de Mello, the U.N.'s high commissioner for human rights in Iraq. The U.N. headquarters was hit again in September 2003, and the Turkish Embassy was attacked the following month. The U.S. Embassy and diplomats also have been consistently targeted, including by an October 2004 mortar attack that killed DSS Special Agent Ed Seitz and a November 2004 attack that killed American diplomat James Mollen near Baghdad's Green Zone. DSS Agent Stephen Sullivan was killed, along with three security contractors, in a suicide car bombing against an embassy motorcade in Mosul in September 2005. The people being protected by Sullivan and the contractors survived the attack.
And diplomatic targets continue to be atta cked. The Polish ambassador's motorcade was recently attacked, as was the Polish Embassy. (The embassy was moved into the Green Zone this week because of the continuing threat against it.) The Polish ambassador, by the way, also was protected by a detail that included contract security officers, demonstrating that the U.S. government is not the only one using contractors to protect diplomats in Iraq. There also are thousands of foreign nationals working on reconstruction projects in Iraq, and most are protected by private security contractors. The Iraqi government and U.S. military simply cannot keep them safe from the forces targeting them.
In addition to the insurgents and militants who have set their sights on U.S. and foreign diplomats and businesspeople, there are a number of opportunistic criminal gangs that kidnap foreigners and either hold them for ransom or sell them to militants. If the U.S. government wants its policy of rebuilding Iraq to have any chance of success, it needs to keep diplomats -- who, as part of their mission, oversee the contractors working on reconstruction projects -- safe from the criminals and the forces that want to thwart the reconstruction.
Practical motivations aside, keeping diplomats safe in Iraq also has political and public relations dimensions. The kidnappings and deaths of U.S. diplomats are hailed by militants as successes, and at this juncture also could serve to inflame sentiments among Americans opposed to the Bush administration's Iraq policy. Hence, efforts are being made to avoid such scenarios at all costs.
Due to enormity of the current threat and the sheer size and scope of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the DSS currently employs hundreds of contract security officers in the country. Although the recent controversy has sparked some calls for a withdrawal of all security contractors from Iraq, such drastic action is impossible in practical term s. Not only would it require many more DSS agents in Iraq than there are now, it would mean pulling agents from every other diplomatic post and domestic field office in the world. This would include all the agents assigned to critical and high-terrorism-threat posts in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon; all agents assigned to critical crime-threat posts such as Guatemala and Mexico; and those assigned to critical counterintelligence-threat posts such as Beijing and Moscow. The DSS also would have to abandon its other responsibilities, such as programs that investigate passport and visa fraud, which are a critical part of the U.S government's counterterrorism efforts. The DSS' Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Rewards for Justice programs also are important tools in the war on terrorism that would have to be scrapped under such a scenario.
Although the current controversy will not cause the State Department to stop using private contractors, the department has mandated that one DSS agent be included in every protective motorcade.
Since 2003, contractors working for the DSS in Iraq have conducted many successful missions in a very dangerous environment. Motorcades in Iraq are frequently attacked, and the contractors regularly have to deal with an ambiguous opponent who hides in the midst of a population that is also typically heavily armed. At times, they also must confront those heavily armed citizens who are fed up with being inconvenienced by security motorcades. In an environment in which motorcades are attacked by suicide vehicle bombs, aggressive drivers also pose tactical problems because they clearly cannot be allowed to approach the motorcade out of fear that they could be suicide bombers. The nature of insurgent attacks necessitates aggressive rules of engagement.
Contractors also do not have the same support structure as military convoys, so they cannot call for armor support when their convoys are attacked. Although some private outfits do have light aviation support, they do not have the resources of Army aviation or the U.S. Air Force. Given these factors, the contractors have suffered remarkably few losses in Iraq for the number of missions they have conducted.
It is clear that unless the United States changes its policy in Iraq or Congress provides funding for thousands of new special agents, contract security officers will be required to fill the gap between the DSS' responsibilities and its available personnel for the foreseeable future. Even if thousands of agents were hired now to meet the current need in Iraq, the government could be left in a difficult position should the security situation improve or the United States drama tically reduced its presence in the country. Unlike permanent hires, the use of contractors provides the DSS with the flexibility to tailor its force to meet its needs at a specific point in time.
The use of contractors clearly is not without problems, but it also is not without merits.
...U.S. officials say that close examination of the few details of the mission offers a glimpse of what’s new in the world of sophisticated electronic sleight-of-hand. That said, they fault the Pentagon for not moving more quickly to make cyberwarfare operational and for not integrating the capability into the U.S. military forces faster.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said last week that the Israelis struck a building site at Tall al-Abyad just south of the Turkish border on Sept. 6. Press reports from the region say witnesses saw the Israeli aircraft approach from the Mediterranean Sea while others said they found unmarked drop tanks in Turkey near the border with Syria. Israeli defense officials finally admitted Oct. 2 that the Israeli Air Force made the raid.
U.S. aerospace industry and retired military officials indicated the Israelis utilized a technology like the U.S.-developed “Suter” airborne network attack system developed by BAE Systems and integrated into U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle operations by L-3 Communications. Israel has long been adept at using unmanned systems to provoke and spoof Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, as far back as the Bekka Valley engagements in 1982.
Air Force officials will often talk about jamming, but the term now involves increasingly sophisticated techniques such as network attack and information warfare. How many of their new electronic attack options were mixed and matched to pull off this raid is not known.
The U.S. version of the system has been at the very least tested operationally in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last year, most likely against insurgent communication networks. The technology allows users to invade communications networks, see what enemy sensors see and even take over as systems administrator so sensors can be manipulated into positions where approaching aircraft can’t be seen, they say. The process involves locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages that allow a number of activities including control...
...More interesting is the newspaper’s claim that “Russian experts are studying why the two state-of-the-art Russian-built radar systems in Syria did not detect the Israeli jets entering Syrian territory,” it said. “Iran reportedly has asked the same question, since it is buying the same systems and might have paid for the Syrian acquisitions.”
Syria’s most recent confirmed procurement was of the Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) short-range mobile SAM system. It uses vehicle-mounted target-acquisition and target-tracking radars. It is not known whether any of the Tor systems were deployed in the point-defense role at the target site struck by Israeli aircraft. If, however, the target was as “high-value” as the Israeli raid would suggest, then Tor systems could well have been deployed.
Iran bought 29 of the Tor launchers from Russia for $750 million to guard its nuclear sites, and they were delivered in January, according to Agence France-Presse and ITAR-TASS. According to the Syrian press, they were tested in February. Syria has also upgraded some of its aging S-125s (SA-3 Goa) to the Pechora-2A standard. This upgrade swaps out obsolete analog components for digital.
Syrian air defense infrastructure is based on for the most part aging Soviet SAMs and associated radar. Damascus has been trying to acquire more capable “strategic” air defense systems, with the country repeatedly associated with efforts to purchase the Russian S-300 (SA-10 Grumble/SA-20) long-range SAM. It also still operates the obsolescent S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) long-range system and its associated 5N62 Square Pair target engagement radar. There are also unconfirmed reports of Syrian interest in the 36D6 Tin Shield search radar...
France is expected to soon rejoin NATO's military command after a 40-year absence. The French government withdrew from the NATO military structure in 1966 (although remaining a member of NATO's political-policy structure). France's new president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has placed strong emphasis on France's relationship with the United States. And, he recently declared that he would soon undertake "very strong" initiatives on European defense and give France "its full place" in NATO.
Subsequently, Defense Minister Herve Morin said that he was "convinced that European defense will make no progress unless France changes its political behavior
within NATO."
Then-general Dwight D. Eisenhower established NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) as the principal command of NATO's military forces in Paris in early 1951. The headquarters remained in the Paris area until in February 1966, when French President Charles de Gaulle stated that the changed world order had "stripped NATO of its justification" for military integration and that France was therefore justified in re-asserting its sovereignty over French territory. Consequently, all allied forces within France's borders would have to come under
French control by April 1969.
Soon afterward, France stated that it was withdrawing from the NATO military structure and that the NATO Headquarters, the NATO Defence College, and SHAPE and its subordinate headquarters must leave French territory by April 1967. (NATO Headquarters was based in Paris, in the Palais de l'OTAN, currently occupied by the Université Paris-Dauphine.)
Subsequently, NATO's military headquarters were relocated to Casteau, north of the Belgian city of Mons.
Despite having withdrawn from the NATO military structure, French naval forces conducted bilateral exercises with other NATO navies, including the U.S. Navy. And, certain U.S.-French weapon agreements were undertaken, especially for upgrading American-built tanker aircraft and ship-launched missiles. The French joined other NATO forces in the Bosnia conflict as well as the 1991 assault on Iraq to free Kuwait, which Iraqi forces had taken over the previous summer.
Although the previous French government was not supportive of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the French did send forces to Afghanistan. However, earlier this year France withdrew its 200-strong special forces from Afghanistan; those ground troops were participating in the U.S anti-terror operation code-named Enduring Freedom. The then-Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie said, "There is a general reorganization of our [troops]." However, the 1,100 French troops engaged in the separate, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force remain in Afghanistan.
U.S. forces have also worked with French forces in Djibouti in northeast Africa. (Djibouti is a small, impoverished republic just north of the Horn of Africa on the strait of Bab el-Mandeb. It is bordered by Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea, an area of great political and economic turmoil.)
The United States has used the French military-air base in Djibouti for several combat and support operations in the region. Indeed, the case can be made that—despite its public stance—the French have been most helpful to several U.S. military activities.
Well, the story of the Israeli incursion into Syria is beginning to get some granularity. It now appears that Israeli commandos may have been involved as well. What a totally gutsy move. And, if true, it also shows that Israel took the target seriously enough to send in ground forces.
Our friends at Stratfor passed this along to us synthesizing the latest information threads:
Another leak appeared via the Sunday Times, this time with enough granularity to consider it a genuine leak. According to that report, the operation was carried out by Israeli commandos supported by Israeli aircraft, under the direct management of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak. It had been planned since June, just after Barak took office, and had been approved by the United States after some hesitation. The target was in fact nuclear "material" provided by North Korea, according to that leak.
All of this makes perfect sense, save one thing. Why the secrecy? If the Syrians have nuclear facilities, the Israelis should be delighted to make it public. Frankly, so should the United States, since the Bush administration has always argued that nuclear proliferation to rogue states, including Syria, is one of the key problems in the world. The Syrians should be spinning the story like crazy as well, denying the nuclear program but screaming about unprovoked Israeli-U.S. aggression. The silence from one or two parties makes sense. The silence from all parties makes little sense.
Looked at differently, Israel and the United States both have gone out of their way to draw attention to the fact that a highly significant military operation took place in Northern Syria, and compounded the attention by making no attempt to provide a plausible cover story. They have done everything possible to draw attention to the affair without revealing what the affair was about. Israel and the United States have a lot of ways to minimize the importance of the operation. By the way they have handled it, however, each has chosen to maximize its importance.
Whoever they are keeping the secret from, it is not the Syrians. They know precisely what was attacked and why. The secret is not being kept from the Iranians either. The Syrians talk to them all the time. It is hard to imagine any government of importance and involvement that has not been briefed by someone. And by now, the public perception has been shaped as well. So, why the dramatic secrecy designed to draw everyone's attention to the secret and the leaks that seem to explain it?
Let us assume that the Sunday Times report is correct. According to the Times, Barak focused on the material as soon as he became defense minister in June. That would mean the material had reached Syria prior to that date. Obviously, the material was not a bomb, or Israel would not have waited until September to act. So it was, at most, some precursor nuclear material or equipment.
However, an intervening event occurred this summer that should be factored in here. North Korea publicly shifted its position on its nuclear program, agreeing to abandon it and allow inspections of its facilities. It also was asked to provide information on the countries it sold any nuclear technology to, though North Korea has publicly denied any proliferation. This was, in the context of the six-party negotiations surrounding North Korea, a major breakthrough.
Any agreement with North Korea is, by definition, unstable. North Korea many times has backed off of agreements that seemed cast in stone. In particular, North Korea wants to be seen as a significant power and treated with all due respect. It does not intend to be treated as an outlaw nation subject to interrogation and accusations. Its self-image is an important part of its domestic strategy and, internally, it can position its shift in its nuclear stance as North Korea making a strategic deal with other major powers. If North Korea is pressed publicly, its willingness to implement its agreements can very quickly erode. That is not something the United States and other powers want to see happen.
Whether the Israelis found out about the material through their own intelligence sources or North Korea provided a list of recipients of nuclear technology to the United States is unclear. The Israelis have made every effort to make it appear that they knew about this independently. They also have tried to make it appear that they notified the United States, rather than the other way around. But whether the intelligence came from North Korea or was obtained independently, Washington wants to be very careful in its handling of Pyongyang right now.
-- Christian
The "Father" of All Bombs
The Russkies are at it again.
Back to their “we can do things bigger and better than the United States,” Soviet-style mode, the Russian military has recently tested their version of the U.S. Massive Ordnance Air-blast Bomb, or MOAB.
Here’s Russian news video. I can read a bit of Russian but would be psyched for our international readers to give us more of the gist.
According to a Reuters story we found and what I can read in Cyrillic from the video, the Russian “Father of All Bombs” – we’ll call it the FOAB, for now – weighs 7100 kilograms vs. the MOAB’s 8200KG, has an explosive yield of 44 tons of TNT equivalent compared to the MOAB’s 11 tons and has a destructive radius of 300 meters vice 150 meters.
When you look at the video, you can see the ground where the FOAB went off looks like a lunar landscape...
As all things that go boom, this is pretty darned impressive.
The Reuters story follows the video:
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia has tested the world's most powerful vacuum bomb, which unleashes a destructive shockwave with the power of a nuclear blast, the military said on Tuesday, dubbing it the "father of all bombs".
The bomb is the latest in a series of new Russian weapons and policy moves as President Vladimir Putin tries to reassert Moscow's role on the international stage.
"Test results of the new airborne weapon have shown that its efficiency and power is commensurate with a nuclear weapon," Alexander Rukshin, Russian deputy armed forces chief of staff, told Russia's state ORT First Channel television. The same report was later shown on the state-sponsored Vesti channel.
"You will now see it in action, the bomb which has no match in the world is being tested at a military site."
It showed a Tupolev Tu-160 strategic bomber dropping the bomb over a testing ground. A large explosion followed.
Pictures showed what looked like a flattened multi-storey block of flats surrounded by scorched soil and boulders. "The soil looks like a lunar landscape," the report said.
"The defense ministry stresses this military invention does not contradict a single international treaty. Russia is not unleashing a new arms race."
Such devices generally detonate in two stages. First a small blast disperses a main load of explosive material into a cloud, which then either spontaneously ignites in air or is set off by a second charge.
This explosion generates a pressure wave that reaches much further than that from a conventional explosive. The consumption of gases in the blast also generates a partial vacuum that can compound damage and injuries caused by the explosion itself.
"The main destruction is inflicted by an ultrasonic shockwave and an incredibly high temperature," the reports said. "All that is alive merely evaporates."
Rukshin said: "At the same time, I want to stress that the action of this weapon does not contaminate the environment, in contrast to a nuclear one."
The Tu-160 supersonic bomber that dropped the bomb, widely known under its NATO nickname of "Blackjack", is the heaviest combat aircraft ever built.
Putin, who has overseen the roll-out of new tactical and anti-aircraft missiles and combat aircraft, has ordered "Blackjacks" and the Tu-95 "Bear" bombers to patrol around the world.
The report said the new bomb was much stronger than the U.S.-built Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb -- MOAB, also known under its name "Mother of All Bombs". "So, Russian designers called the new weapon 'Father of All Bombs'," it said.
Showing the orange-painted U.S. prototype, the report said the Russian bomb was four times more powerful -- 44 metric tons of TNT equivalent -- and the temperature at the epicenter of its blast was two times higher.
In 1999 Russian generals threatened to use vacuum bombs to wipe out rebels from the mountains during the "anti-terrorist operation" in its restive Chechnya province.
New York-based Human Rights Watch then appealed to Putin to refrain from using fuel-air explosives. It remains unclear if weapons of this type were used during the Chechen war.
U.S. forces have used a "thermobaric" bomb, which works on similar principles, in their campaign against al Qaeda and Taliban forces in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan.
"It (the bomb) will allow us to safeguard our state's security and fight international terrorism in any circumstances and in any part of the world," Rukshin said.
It kind of reminds me of that embarrassing scene in the Hunt for Red October where the Soviet ambassador to the U.S. asks an American official for help finding another missing sub.
Well, Cold War memories die hard. So I thought you history buffs out there might get a kick out of an article we posted on Military.com this morning about that old K-129 sub that sank back in 1968. American officials handed over log books and video tapes to Russian naval officials related to the search for, and attempted salvage of, the diesel-electric submarine.
From the AP:
MOSCOW - U.S. military officials on Monday gave Russia a videotape and other archival materials on the Soviet K-129 submarine, whose sinking in 1968 is one of the lingering mysteries of the Cold War.
At a ceremony in the Far Eastern port of Vladivostok, Russia's Pacific Fleet archive and museum received copies of formerly classified documents, including two ship logs related to the K-129 incident and to U.S. efforts to salvage the sub from the sea floor in the central Pacific.
Also turned over was a videotape of a secret burial at sea for six Soviet sailors whose bodies were recovered when the United States tried to salvage the sub.
"We have a debt to servicemen. If I were to go missing, I would want someone to work - like what I am doing - to communicate to my mother and father what exactly happened with me," Lt. Col. Michael O'Hara said in comments shown on Russia's NTV television.
O'Hara works with the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, which was created 15 years ago to help account for U.S. military personnel who disappeared during the Cold War.
Roger Schumacher, the Washington-based deputy director supporting the commission, said much of the material donated Monday had been handed over previously to Russian defense, government or intelligence experts.
Other items related to the K-129 sinking that were turned over earlier included the sub's bell and a camera apparently used by a sailor on the vessel, he said. U.S. underwater photographs of the sunken sub have not been given to the Russians, despite repeated requests.
It was unclear whether the ceremony would help assuage the persistent suspicions that Russian naval officials and relatives have had about the fate of the K-129 - a Golf-II class, diesel-electric submarine armed with nuclear missiles that had 98 seamen aboard when it sank in 16,000 feet of water northwest of the Hawaiian island of Oahu on March 11, 1968.
Russian officials long have suspected that the K-129 was struck by an American submarine, the USS Swordfish. But the U.S. Navy says the vessel suffered a catastrophic internal explosion.
Retired Capt. 1st Rank Pavel Dementiev said the sub's captain, Vladimir Kobzar, and his commanding officer, Rear Adm. Viktor A. Dygalo, were both experienced and talented naval officers.
"There is just one version - that (K-129) collided with an American submarine," he said in televised comments.
Russian doubts about the U.S. explanation re-emerged in 2000 with the sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk. Many military officials suspected the Kursk collided with an American or British submarine. U.S. and British officials denied the allegations, but U.S. officials acknowledged that two U.S. submarines were close enough to record the sound of enormous explosions aboard the Kursk.
Russian suspicions about the Swordfish were based on records indicating it underwent nighttime repair of a bent periscope at Yokosuka, Japan, on March 17 - six days after the K-129 sank - and Moscow has requested the Swordfish's deck logs to trace its movements. The Pentagon has explained the repairs in Japan by saying the vessel had collided with an ice pack and was 2,000 miles away from the Soviet sub when it sank.
Russian officials also say he U.S. salvage operations in 1968 and 1974 removed sensitive equipment - possibly including nuclear warheads. In the 1974 efforts, the CIA-financed Glomar Explorer salvage ship tried raising the sub, but it broke apart and only some sections were recovered.
Schumacher said excerpts from the deck logs of the Swordfish and the USS Halibut, a nuclear submarine that was in the area at the time of the sinking, were turned over to Russian officials in 1995.
U.S. officials had earlier provided the burial at sea videotape for the six crew members whose remains were recovered in 1974. The videotape, parts of which were broadcast by Russian TV on Monday, had reportedly been shown to relatives of crew members at an earlier date.
Also turned over to Russian officials Monday was a list of nine U.S. reconnaissance aircraft lost and believed shot down by Soviet forces in and near the Russian Far East between 1951 and 1956, Schumacher said. U.S. officials hope Russia will help provide details as to the whereabouts of the crashes and the fate of the 77 crew members.
-- Christian
FOR SALE: Russian Cargo Jets
The Russian Air Force is preparing to sell off its entire fleet of giant An-124 heavy cargo aircraft. Given the NATO-U.S. code name “Condor,” the Antonov An-124 aircraft is slightly larger than the U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy transports. There are 21 of the An-124s available for commercial sale.
The An-124-100M-150 model is capable of transporting single or multiple items of cargo weighing up to 150 metric tons (330,000 pounds) including such outsize items as construction vehicles and missiles. The An-124, for example, is the only aircraft that can carry the Boeing 777's new GE90 engines.
The civil An-124-100 was certified in 1992, and meets all civil standards including ICAO Stage/Chapter III noise l
