FCS Can't Get Any Love

In the key areas of defining and developing FCS capabilities, requirements definition is still fluid, critical technologies are immature, software development is in its early stages, the information network is still years from being demonstrated, and complementary programs are at risk for not meeting the FCS schedule.

Ouch...

Read the latest in a series of critical GAO reports on the progress of the Army's FCS program.

Even though the development of FCS will finish late in its schedule, commitments to production will come early. Production funding for the first spinout of FCS technologies and the early version of the FCS cannon begin in fiscal years 2008 and 2009.

Why? Because the Oklahoma congressional delegations insist on it for Ft. Sill's sake.

Production money for the core FCS systems will be requested beginning in February 2010, with the DOD fiscal year 2011 budget request—just months after the go/no-go review and before the stability of the design is determined at the critical design review. In fact, by the time of the FCS production decision in 2013, a total of about $39 billion, which comprises research and development and production costs, will already have been appropriated for the program, with another $8 billion requested.

Doesn't this seem a little backwards? Of course it does. If you're smart, get the money first -- before you've determined if the system really works, right? Can you imagine if we were saying the same thing about missile defense?

Also, the Army plans to contract with its lead system integrator for the initial FCS production, a change from the Army’s original rationale for using an integrator. This increases the burden of oversight faced by the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

No way...make it too confusing for anyone else to make sure you're executing the contract in the most efficient manner? Nobody would ever do that!

Competing demands from within the Army and DOD limits the ability to fund higher FCS costs. Thus, the Army will likely continue to reduce FCS capabilities in order to stay within available funding limits.

Again...ouch...

Can we please just call the FCS program what it really is: a technology incubator program, a giant R&D effort for the ground pounders, please? I worry that the Army could begin slipping into the Air Froce trap by defining its future by a specific program.

-- Christian

A New Look at FCS

Our friends over at the Center for Defense Information have provided DT with an interesting primer on the Army’s Future Combat Systems program.

Contributor Winslow Wheeler explains:

The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program is central to the U.S. Army’s vision of its “transformation” in response to perceived challenges in the post-Cold War world.

Since beginning in 2000, the program has encountered large cost increases, schedule delays and difficulties in developing the systems’ new and complex technologies. Some have challenged the fundamental concept of the FCS as an example of the failed, so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs.”

CDI Research Associate Ana Marte and Research Assistant Elise Szabo provide an overview of the FCS program and links to many additional sources.

(Photo from Boeing)

-- Christian

Getting Greasy with FCS

The Army has opened a $1-million engine test facility for its $200-billion Future Combat Systems program amid Congressional concerns that the ambitious modernization program costs too much and fails to improve upon existing weapons.

The test facility at the Tank-Automotive Research and Development Center (TARDEC) in Warren, Michigan, includes several bays where engineers from the Army and from General Dynamics -- one of several major defense firms associated with FCS -- can install prototype hybrid-electric engines and their associated generators and put them through power loads simulating use in combat. Hybrid engines are slated for installation in the FCS manned vehicles, the first of which would enter service around 2014.

Major Scott Tufts from the FCS mobility program office says an engine currently getting a workout at TARDEC will be fitted to a test model of the BAE Systems Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon, the FCS howitzer, in August. A partial howitzer prototype mounted on an improvised, old-fashioned chassis is already undergoing firing tests at Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona.

Before the 5.5-liter, five-cylinder engine can be installed on the howitzer prototype, engineers at TARDEC must map its performance across a wide range of power loads and in extreme environmental conditions. “We can take the engine anywhere on the power map. We can do starting and backing up,” says John Srodawa, a General Dynamics engineer. Plus TARDEC’s test bays can be heated to 160 degrees Fahrenheit in order to simulate high noon in the world’s hottest deserts.

The first engine to undergo testing has so far logged around 110 hours in the bay, in bursts no longer than three hours, according to Srodawa. But he says that testing will soon ramp up to full power for up to 10 hours at a time. “The goal is to acquire enough data to map the engine’s efficiency.” That, he adds, will help engineers answer the question, “How do we optimize the engine and generator so that they give us the best fuel consumption?”

Despite testing progress, Congress has questioned FCS’ schedule and goals. This month the House Armed Services Committee voted to cut $900 million from the program’s 2008 budget, saying that war expenses and an Army-wide maintenance backlog were more urgent -- and that FCS duplicates some existing Army capabilities. The proposed cut comes on the heels of the Army’s decision last year to defer four of the 18 vehicles and robots planned for FCS in order to save money.

But even if the House cut sticks, FCS would still get nearly $3 billion next year. And Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-Hawaii) from the House committee says that’s plenty for FCS to meet its 2008 goals, including full installation of the first hybrid engine.

-- David Axe

FCS Budget Woes Continue

Despite a full-bore public relations campaign to press lawmakers into supporting the Army’s Future Combat System program, it looks like Congress wasn’t buying the service’s pitch.

According to a report by Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg News, House authorizers slashed the FCS budget 23 percent, cutting nearly $870 million from the Army’s fiscal 2008 request. According to service budget documents, the Army asked for $3.7 billion in 2008 to pay for the following:

Continuing development, testing and delivery of unmanned aerial vehicles, unattended ground sensors and unmanned ground vehicle prototypes.

Completing preliminary platform design reviews and initiating critical design reviews.

Continuing development of the FCS network, including delivery of the battle command network and software to support key testing events and Spin Out 1.

Completing technical field testing (TFT), force development testing and evaluation (FDT&E) and limited user testing (LUT) for Spin Out 1.

Delivering early prototypes of the Non-Line-Of-Sight-Cannon (NLOS-C) Manned Ground Vehicle.

Continuing development of the short-range countermeasure active protection system.

See an exerpt of Capaccio’s story below:

The $867 million cut is the largest since the program was proposed in 2003. Cuts in the past two years have averaged about 10 percent.

This latest cut could be overturned by the Senate Armed Services Committee when it completes its version of the fiscal 2008 spending measure later this month.

At $161 billion, the Future Combat Systems is the Pentagon's second-most-costly program, behind the $276 billion Joint Strike Fighter.

Since fiscal 2003, the program's research-and-development phase has slipped five years and the final fielding date by seven years.

And the House Armed Services Committee’s red pen didn’t stop there…

In a separate action, the committee voted to kill the Textron Inc. Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, a $3.6 billion program.

The committee recommended that the program be reopened to competition. In voting to kill Textron's stewardship, the committee cited a long list of problems.

The program's development phase has grown to more than $300 million from $210 million, and the per-aircraft price has nearly doubled -- to almost $10 million from $5.2 million, according to Army officials.

Like the story says, the money for FCS – and the ARH, for that matter - could be restored by the Senate Armed Services Committee and put back into the final bill during the conference markup. But at a time when the world’s attention is focused on current operations and counterinsurgencies, it’s hard to see how the Army’s sales pitch is going to take hold.

-- Christian

JTRS on the Skids

The cornerstone of the Army Future Combat System has come under more scrutiny this month with a scathing article in National Defense magazine that shows a key communications program is underperforming and taking too long to bear fruit.

The Joint Tactical Radio System has been touted by Army planners as a key ingredient in the FCS “system of systems,” allowing soldiers to communicate across the networks on a common radio architecture. The plan makes sense, and builds on revelations from the attacks on 9/11 that showed various government and civilian agencies couldn’t communicate with each other because they used distinct radio systems and networks.

(From the Army’s FCS program document)

The FCS (BCT) Family-of-Systems (FoS) are connected to the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network by a multilayered transport layer with unprecedented range, capacity and dependability. The primarily mobile transport layer provides secure, reliable access to information sources over extended distances and complex terrain. The network will support advanced functionalities such as integrated network management, information assurance and information dissemination management to ensure dissemination of critical information among sensors, processors and warfighters both within, and external to the FCS (BCT)-equipped organization.

The FCS (BCT) transport layer does not rely on a large and separate infrastructure because it is primarily embedded in the mobile platforms and moves with the combat formations. This enables the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network to provide superior Battle Command (BC) on the move to achieve offensive-oriented, high-tempo operations.

The FCS (BCT) transport layer is comprised of several heterogeneous communication systems including the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T). FCS (BCT) leverages all available resources to provide a robust, survivable, scalable and reliable heterogeneous communications network that seamlessly integrates ground, near ground, airborne and space-borne assets for constant connectivity and layered redundancy.

The FCS (BCT) Network Management System will be utilized to manage the entire FCS (BCT) network including radios with different waveforms, platform routers, and local area networks (LANs), information assurance elements, and hosts. It provides a full spectrum of management capabilities required during all mission phases, including pre-mission planning, rapid network configuration upon deployment in the area of operations, monitoring the network during mission execution and dynamic adaptation of network policies in response to network performance and failure conditions.

The military has been trying for years to standardize its radio communications but has run up against some serious technical and hardware barriers that still keeps common radios out of the troops’ hands. Remember stories about field commanders using Thuraya satellite phones and Aol Instant Messaging to pass information across the battlefield during the ground invasion of Iraq in 2003?

From National Defense…

During the past four years, the services (mostly the Army) have spent nearly $4 billion on new radios. By comparison, between 1998 and 2001, their radio purchases amounted to less than $1 billion, according to Defense Department estimates. More than 60 percent of all radios procured are either individual handheld or squad-level manpack.

Before the war, the services were not allowed to purchase radios unless they obtained a “JTRS waiver” from the office of the assistant secretary of defense for networks and information integration. The policy aimed to discourage purchases of non-JTRS radios.

But Army officials complained that the waiver was a bureaucratic burden that hindered their ability to rapidly deliver radios to troops in Iraq. The Pentagon subsequently agreed to suspend the waiver, although it recently approved a limited policy that only applies to single-channel handheld radios.

Radio manufacturers, who had envisaged a financial boon from JTRS contracts, gradually realized that they could make better profits by ramping up production of existing radios in response to the military’s surging demand. Some contractors privately admit they have soured on JTRS, especially once they saw that their customers in the armed services had begun to lose confidence in the program.

(Read the entire National Defense article HERE)

So, National Defense shows Pentagon officials are starting to back off their forceful endorsement of JTRS, allowing the services to purchase more modern versions of the radios they have now.

As the program continues to lose support across the military services, Defense Department officials are engineering a last-ditch effort to save what is increasingly a shaky procurement plan. They also are backing away from earlier demands that the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps stop buying their own service-unique radios in favor of a “joint” family of radios.

They’re better, for sure, but they still lock the services on their own communications track keeping the disjointed comms problem alive and raising yet more questions about the viability of the FCS program.

(Gouge: NC)

-- Christian

Standing Up for Future Combat Systems

"I’d say we’ve done a reasonable job of managing the balance between risk and reward – reward being the ultimate performance of the system," said Dr. Thomas Killion, the Army's chief scientist, of Future Combat Systems during a January interview in his Pentagon office. "And we’re very cognizant of the risk associated with the various systems."

In recent months, the sprawling, ambitious FCS program -- meant to equip a third of the Army's 70 combat brigades with a family of new networked vehicles at a cost of around $300 billion -- has taken a couple big hits. Several of the program's airborne and ground robots have been deferred and more cuts are looming as the defense budget gets squeezed by war costs. FCS, with its delicate "system of systems" approach, remains a big technological risk in many lawmakers' minds, making it vulnerable to gradual paring. Still, Dr. Killion remains optimistic:

Yes, we’ve gone forward with some risk, but I think we’re managing that risk in a reasonable fashion. Every time we’ve gone through an independent review where I’ve put people together from outside to review the technology for FCS, they’ve come back saying you’re doing a reasonable job managing risk and we believe you’ll ultimately be successful. I know there are a lot of questions out there about [technology readiness levels] and FCS, but we’re doing a reasonable job when you go in and look at the details. ...What a lot of people would like us to do is manage it as piece-parts, essentially like traditional acquisition programs: platform X, platform Y and so on, each one managed as a separate program. Personally, I think that that would add new risk and complication to fielding the next generation of systems to the Army.

Look at what FCS was intended to do – that is, to achieve as much commonality as possible across platforms so that we have a common logistics tail, common sets of components which reduces production costs, and also (and I think the biggest thing) to ensure interoperability in software and subsystems cutting across those various platforms. What we’ve had in the past are things like the Abrams [tank] and the Bradley [fighting vehicle], where we spent a lot of time and effort in the “digitization” period in late ‘90s figuring out how to kluge together capabilities to make those platforms talk to one another. FCS, it’s designed in from the beginning that these systems will talk to one another and collaborate, because they share a common operating environment, common communications environments and common interfaces. We ensure from the beginning that all these platforms share the capabilities we want them to and can work together as a team, both manned and unmanned systems.

Read the whole interview in the new issue of Defense Technology International.

--David Axe, cross-posted at War Is Boring

Undead "Warrior" (Updated)

As expected, the Army has eliminated funding for its high tech soldier ensemble, Land Warrior, in its budget for 2008. The gear -- a collection of radios, electronic maps, and next-gen rifle scopes -- was finally supposed to connect the average infantryman into the growing network for combat. But the Army never could figure out the seemingly-endless weight and usability issues.

Robot Economist is almost delirious over the program's demise:

DOD planners dream up expensive systems... while ignoring the obvious success of modern digital device formats, such as cellphones, PDAs and even iPods. You may not be able to tap out a text message on a cellphone during a firefight as easily as with the Land Warrior, but what are you doing text messaging anyways? That's what the radio is for!

But Land Warrior isn't quite dead, yet. The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry will still be taking more than 200 Land Warrior uniforms to Iraq, later on this year. The systems were already bought and paid for, in earlier budgets. And the hope is that Land Warrior performs so well under fire that the Army's chiefs have no choice but to turn the program's cash spigot back on. "It's kind of a Hail Mary pass," one Pentagon insider tells me.

The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II, a new rocket for Apache and Cobra copters, and the Army Tactical Missile System have been wiped out, too.

Also, as expected, the Army will trim its mongo modernization project, Future Combat Systems, by cutting "two classes of unmanned aerial systems, one unmanned ground system and remov[ing] the Intelligent Munition System [a sort of smart landmine] from the program," Inside Defense reports. Army budget director Lt. Gen. Dave Melcher says the changes will save $3.3 billion over five years. FCS will still cost taxpayers $10.6 billion in fiscal year 2008 alone, if the Pentagon's budget goes through. Plus, there will be another $222 million for the Warfighter Information Network - Tactical, which is designed to help troops on the battlefield plug into info networks through satellite, airborne and terrestrial links. That's a nearly 100% increase over the previous year.

Defense News lists some of the other items that the Army is buying this year with its $27.8 billion procurement budget:

• $473 million to buy Patriot PAC-3 missiles.
• $596 million to buy 7,000 Humvees.
• $828 million to buy 2,862 trucks in the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles.
• $483 million to buy trucks in the Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles.
• $172 million to buy mortars rounds.
• $222 million to buy artillery rounds.
• $167 million to buy rockets.
• $132 million to buy combat service support equipment.
• $712 million to modernize AH-64 Apache helicopters.
• $705 million to buy UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.
• $191 million to buy Chinook CH-47 cargo helicopters.
• $468 million to buy Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters to replace OH-58D Kiowa Warriors.
• $230 million to buy Light Utility Helicopters.
• $98 million to buy 5,900 M4 carbines.

“We are trying to procure M4s for all soldiers in theater; the shorter weapon gives a lot more potential,” the service’s budget director, Lt. Gen. Dave Melcher said.

UPDATE 7:44 PM: "The 4th Brigade was also scheduled to test Land Warrior at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., but now that has also been canceled," Federal Computer Week notes. "NTC is a common final stop for realistic training before Iraq deployments."

The unit will be fully supported throughout its Iraq deployment, Atherton said. The Army has funding for unit support and repair parts through 2007 and is confident they will find procurement or operating money to keep the unit alive in 2008.

Meanwhile, the program office for Land Warrior here at home will be shut down. The Army will buy replacement parts and materials to last during the duration of the deployment...

The Army is looking for alternatives to give dismounted soldiers a point of presence on the network, Melcher said. One possibility is something called the Single Infantry Transport System, which has similar capabilities, he said.

The research from Land Warrior will be folded into the Future Force Warrior program, a component of the Future Combat System, Melcher said.

T.M.I., Robo-Dude

That's "too much information," for those of you over the age of fourteen. These days, information superiority is supposed to make U.S. military forces faster, smarter and more lethal and able to defeat more numerous foes on their own turf. But how much information can one soldier process, and how fast can he make decisions?

Unmanned vehicles sporting sophisticated sensors are key suppliers of new and more voluminous streams of info to grunts on the ground. But in addition to potentially overwhelming customers with too much information, robots require regular input from their human masters.

That's a key problem facing the engineers responsible for developing the Army's human-robot interfaces. At the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center in suburban Detroit, Gregory Hudas and his colleagues are trying to figure out what robots should be allowed to do on their own, and what they should ask permission for. The key factors are what human operators are comfortable with, and what they're capable of. "We must be aware of when they [soldiers] get overloaded."

To work out this problem, the folks at TARDEC have linked up two consoles representing the controls of a Future Combat Systems fighting vehicle. Each console boasts three tall touch-screen displays. At the center in front of a padded seat, there is a control stick similar to what you might see on an arcade game. The consoles include a simulation function, akin to a video game, that the TARDEC engineers use for tests.

On one screen, a TARDEC engineer representing an FCS crewman brings up an overhead map of the battlefield dotted with icons representing his vehicle and four robots that he's controlling. One is a Fire Scout aerial drone. The others are ground drones equipped with cameras and guns. On his other screens, the crewman can see what his robots are seeing in addition to what's outside his own vehicle. It's a massive amount of data for one man to process, and things are sure to get worse when he decides to send his drones on a reconnaissance mission, potentially forcing him to also coordinate the movements of five vehicles simultaneously while facing an elusive enemy on unfamiliar terrain.

Which is why the Army decided that each FCS vehicle would include two identical consoles. Side-by-side crewmen would share responsibility for all the functions described above. The Army believed that by coordinating their efforts, one two-man crew should be able to control 10 drones and keep up with all their data feeds.

But that's too many robots, Hudas says. Four drones is the realistic max. And a third crewman at an additional console is ideal. And that's assuming a minimal level of human intervention in the drones activities. Basically, you tell a drone what to do, confirm the command, then let it go. Now, if the drone wants to kill something, it's going to need a soldier's permission. But for surveillance and reconnaissance, it can make its own decisions. "With those applications," Hudas says, "we don't even want a soldier."

Thanks to TARDEC and other research organizations, the Army is making enormous strides in combining thinking men and thinking machines into one cohesive fighting force. That's the subject of a feature slated for our March issue. Stay tuned.

--David Axe, cross-posted at Ares and War Is Boring

Army "Future": Fewer Drones

The other day, Inside Defense broke the news that the Army was shaving billions off of its massive modernization program, Future Combat Systems. Now, we're starting to get some details. Turns out the drones are the ones getting the axe.

FCS originally envisioned four types and sizes of unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, buzzing over soldiers' heads. The littlest ones would join platoons. Slightly bigger drones would be assigned to companies. Batallion commanders would supervise an even larger UAV. And the biggest of 'em all -- an armed, robotic helicopter -- would work for the brigade.

Those four classes of UAVs are now being trimmed down to two; just the tiniest and the most gargantuan drones will remain. There will still be other robotic planes in the Army's arsenal -- the hand-held Ravens, the Shadows, and the big, high-flying, bad-ass Warriors.

But the move is the latest in a series of efforts to scale down the once-grandiose FCS vision. First to go were the all-electric, laser-firing, next-gen fighting vehicles. Then, the requirement that those vehicles fit into a C-130 transport plane. And after that, the high-tech uniforms that were supposed to electronically tie the grunts to the larger Army. With the vehicles' designs still very much in flux -- and with the network connecting all of those drones and vehicles together still facing major roadblocks -- who knows what will be left, when FCS finally deploys?

UPDATE 3:55 AM: Speaking of those little Raven drones, it looks like the Marines will start using 'em, too. Inside Defense says that the Corps has given up on its own mini-UAV, the Dragon Eye. During the Iraq invasion, Marines found the drone "too flimsy," and didn't stay in the air nearly long enough. Some fixes were made. But the things still had a nasty habit of "break[ing] apart upon repeated landings." So it's out with the Dragon Eyes. In with the sturdier Ravens.

Behind the Army's Cash Crunch

Our Army gets $168 billion a year to train and fight. So why do its chiefs keep complaining about a cash crunch? The Wall Street Journal's Greg Jaffe explains, in maybe the best article on the subject to date.

From 1990 to 2005, the military lavished money on billion-dollar destroyers, fighter jets and missile-defense systems. Defenders of such programs say the U.S. faces a broad array of threats and must be prepared for all of them. High-tech weaponry contributed to the swift toppling of the regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, but has been of little help in the more difficult task of stabilizing the two countries.

Of the $1.9 trillion the U.S. spent on weaponry in that period, adjusted for inflation, the Air Force received 36% and the Navy got 33%. The Army took in 16%, it says. Despite the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, both dominated by ground forces, the ratio hasn't changed significantly...

It may seem hard to believe that a country which allocated $168 billion to the Army this year -- more than twice the 2000 budget -- can't cover the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the two pillars of the Army, personnel and equipment -- both built to wage high-tech, firepower-intensive wars -- are under enormous stress:

The cost of basic equipment that soldiers carry into battle -- helmets, rifles, body armor -- has more than tripled to $25,000 from $7,000 in 1999.

The cost of a Humvee, with all the added armor, guns, electronic jammers and satellite-navigational systems, has grown seven-fold to about $225,000 a vehicle from $32,000 in 2001.

The cost of paying and training troops has grown 60% to about $120,000 per soldier, up from $75,000 in 2001. On the reserve side, such costs have doubled since 2001, to about $34,000 per soldier.

At Fort Knox, Ky., the cash crunch got so bad this summer that the Army ran out of money to pay janitors who clean the classrooms where captains are taught to be commanders. So the officers, who will soon be leading 100-soldier units, clean the office toilets themselves.

"The cost of the Army is being driven up by [Iraq and Afghanistan]. That's the fundamental story here," says Brig. Gen. Andrew Twomey, a senior official on the Army staff in the Pentagon. The increased costs are "not from some wild weapons system that is off in the future. These are costs associated with current demands."

Senior Army officials concede they mistakenly assumed prior to the Iraq war that if they built a force capable of winning big conventional battles, everything else -- from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping -- would be relatively easy. "We argued in those days that if we could do the top-end skills, we could do all of the other ones," says Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz, the deputy commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. Iraq has proven that guerrilla fights demand different equipment and skills. "I have had to eat a little crow," says Gen. Metz...

The Humvee stands as a metaphor for the problems the Army faces. First fielded in the early 1980s, it was designed to ferry soldiers around behind the front lines of a conventional war. In recent years, the vehicle, which troops drive on the streets of Iraq, has been modified countless times. The Army has bolted layers of armor onto it to protect troops from roadside bombs. It has added sophisticated electronic jammers, rotating turrets, bigger machine guns, satellite navigational systems and better radios.

The result is a Humvee that is much better than the version the Army took to Iraq in 2003. But the add-ons have driven up its cost. The modified vehicle is top heavy and tends to tip over at high speeds. Army officials say they can't add more weight without overwhelming the engine or breaking the axle.

"The Army recognizes that the Humvee has reached a limit of our ability to improve it for the current fight," Gen. Speakes says.

What the Army says it really needs is an all-new vehicle, designed to better withstand roadside bombs that have become part of life in Iraq. But such a vehicle likely won't be ready until 2010 or 2012, Army officials say. In the interim, the Army wants to buy something on the commercial market -- South Africa, Turkey and Australia all make alternatives. Yet it's not clear whether the Army, which is struggling to equip the current force, has the money.

Army Axing High-Tech Uniforms, "Future"

The Army made a big decision, back in October. After 15 years and a half-billion dollars in development, the service would finally take Land Warrior, its ensemble of high-tech soldier gear, to war for the first time. The collection of radios, GPS-locators, and next-generation rifle scopes wasn't perfect -- far from it. But, for infantrymen who typically don't even have a walkie-talkie, it was an important first step towards plugging the average soldier into battlefield network.

But, just six weeks later, the Army appears to have reversed itself. According to Inside Defense, service financiers have decided to kill off Land Warrior in its 2008 budget. It's one of a number of high-tech programs slated for big cuts by the Army.

The service got $17 billion less than what it wanted for its 2008 budget from the Pentagon and the White House. "Earlier in October... Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker said if the service got less than what it needed in FY-08 it would be forced to slow the modernization of the force," Inside Defense's Dan Dupont notes. "In submitting its budget plan to Pentagon leaders last week, the Army contended that budget constraints have forced the service to take what it believes are imprudent risks in the readiness of today’s forces, as well as in its future plans."

Future Combat Systems -- the Army's plan to connect all its next-generation tanks, robots, and fighting vehicles to that battlefield network -- is also slated to take a good-sized hit.

By delaying key milestones, shifting some pieces of the program out of FCS plans and killing others, the Army believes it can save more than $3.3 billion over the next six budget years (fiscal years 2008 to 2013).

The moves would reduce the cost to field each FCS brigade combat team, but it would also push back procurement plans for BCT equipment, delaying by five years the schedule for fielding the teams, according to sources familiar with the plan.

The FCS cuts also entail the removal of some unmanned aerial vehicles from the program and the deferral of some vehicles, as well as some ammunition. The upshot of the moves would be an FCS program consisting of 14 platforms plus the network, down from the 18 envisioned today, with FCS systems to be fielded at a rate of one brigade combat team per year for fifteen years, beginning in 2015. Prior plans called for those 15 BCTs to be fielded at a rate of 1.5 per year over 10 years.

Now, just because the Army has proposed these cuts doesn't necessarily mean they are going to happen. As you may have heard, there's a new party taking over Congress. And, at least in the run-up to the elections, these guys made a lot of noise about giving the Army a boost. Then there's the new Secretary of Defense. He may be more favorably inclined to funding the Army than his predecessor was. Certainly, he seems to look kindly on the larger goal of retooling the military. Check of this exchange with Sen. Elizabeth Dole:

SEN. DOLE: Dr. Gates, the transformation efforts undertaken by Secretary Rumsfeld are critical to meeting the challenges of the 21st century. While Secretary Rumsfeld made transformation of the military a priority, obviously much remains to be done. In your view, which transformation programs are the most important and effective in fighting this war on terror?...

MR. GATES: Senator Dole, one of the things that has impressed me the most in the briefings -- the very short briefings that I've received preparatory to this hearing, is the extent of the transformation that actually has taken place in recent years, compared to when I was in government.

I can't tell you how many crisis meetings I sat through in the Situation Room over a 20-year period, and we would look at military contingencies, and we would be looking at 60 to 90 days to generate a brigade, to get a military force on the move and in place.

So the expeditionary nature of the Army, the mobility, the change in mind-set -- sometimes perhaps those of you who have been really close to it may not fully appreciate just how dramatically the situation already has changed, compared to when I was in government last.

I think that the transformation needs to continue... The two things that I think make a lot of sense has been this shift of the Army from being basically a static force to a more mobile expeditionary force. I think that's very important.

I think that the -- based on very superficial information at this point, this -- the shift from divisions to the brigade structure does make a lot of sense, and I think it provides a lot more flexibility.

I would say that one of the things that I think is very important in the transformation is continuing to strengthen our capacity to fight irregular wars. I think that's where the action is going -- is most likely to be for the foreseeable future. And so I think it's very important that it go forward.

Cash-Poor Army Pays Big to Pimp Pricey 'Future'

The Army is quickly going broke, its leaders insist. Worn-out gear can't be replaced; units can't properly prep for combat; some bases can't even afford to mow the lawn.

But there's one Army account that the generals are still managing to keep packed to the brim: marketing. The annual Association of the United States Army convention is going down this week, in Washington. And the Army is pulling out all the stops, to show just how groovy its $300 billion high-tech upgrade, Future Combat Systems, is going to be.

High above conferees' heads, a movie theater-sized screen shows Hollywood-grade videos of how awesomely FCS will work in action. Beneath the display, an Army major and a Boeing executive -- each equipped with wireless mics -- lecture a crowd, seated in stadium seats, about FCS' virtues. Beside them, to the right, is a mock operations center, manned by a trio of soldiers, pantomiming battle commands.

To the left, an defense contractor is demonstrating the new Future Combat video game. "Kaboom!" he shouts, as he directs some simulated next-gen cannon to waste a pixilated foe. Ostensibly, the game is supposed to start getting officers familiar with "the FCS wireless network-centric operating system that seamlessly links advanced communications and networking systems with soldiers, platforms, weapons, and sensors." But when I ask the contractor whether the game is really just a marketing tool for the mega-expensive project, he sighs, "Yeah."

Now, the FCS folks are hardly the only Army team with a booth at the conference. Everyone from Airborne to Special Forces to ROTC has a little set-up -- to market themselves within the Department, to show off to the higher-ups, and to prove their worth to Congress. And that makes some sense, in an organization as big and complex as the Army. But still, you've got to wonder whether it's the right thing to do -- with multiple wars raging and with budgets apparently so tight. "A real 'fleecing of America' story," says one conference-goer. "It's like 'we're going broke, and here's a super-slick presentation to show you why.'"

"Future Combat" Needs Info Chief

Talk about a thankless job. The Army is planning to spend $300 billion or more on a massive effort to make its forces quicker, lighter, and much better networked. The program, Future Combat Systems, has come under intense scrutiny -- and not just for its bloated budgets and constantly-shifting expectations. FCS is also an information technology undertaking for the ages, trying to link together countless thousands of next-gen tanks, flying drones, fighting vehicles, and robotic ground sensors all into a single "System of Systems Common Operating Environment."

If you've got a head hard enough to think you can pull this off, give the folks at defense contractor SAIC a ping. They're looking for deputy CIO for Future Combat Systems -- "minimum of 15 years experience in both classified and unclassified enterprise information management" required.

"Proficiency with Microsoft products and common office software applications" is a must, SAIC tells job-seekers. "Candidates must possess excellent oral and written communication skills with the ability to communicate difficult concepts to various audiences; and, have the ability to accomplish tasks under limited supervision."

Hmmm... $300 billion. Limited supervision. Maybe that job doesn't sound so bad, after all.

(Big ups: Sailfast)

Futures

Man, I wish Noah were around to comment on this one, from Inside the Army:

The Future Combat System successfully cleared its initial preliminary design review, marking the end of the program's "PowerPoint" phase and the beginning of more tangible progress, program officials said last week.

"We are done with PowerPoint charts," said Maj. Gen. Charles Cartwright, the Army's FCS program manager during an Aug. 15 conference call with reporters. "It's about building real stuff for not only the current force but to build the equipment for the future modular brigades."

And then there's this, from a congressional staff member:

Another area of concern is the program's long-term costs, but the discussion during the initial preliminary design review put aside the issue of cost entirely, the staffer said.

Noah may not be around, but you can get a pretty good idea of what he'd say by browsing here.

-- Dan Dupont

UPDATE, 5:06 EST (from Axe): Since Noah's not around, I'll say it: FCS is too expensive, too ambitious, technologically and operationally unsound and destined for the kinds of cuts and stretches that turn even useful programs into multi-billion-dollar embarassments. Only here we're talking a trillion dollars, if the Army FCS-izes the entire force.

The CBO is all over this one (PDF!), as I reported earlier:

In 2011, planned FCS costs would account for about 6 percent of the Army's $21 billion procurement budget, CBO estimates; by 2015, that share could rise to almost half and remain at or above 40 percent through 2025. (For purposes of comparison, in the mid-1980s, at the height of the Reagan defense buildup, the Army dedicated at most 20 percent of its procurement funds to buy combat vehicles.)

Kill FCS now!

--David Axe

Should FCS Sink ...

The latest Congressional Budget Office report (PDF!) on the Army's $250-billion Future Combat Systems family of vehicles paints a pretty bleak picture:

In 2011, planned FCS costs would account for about 6 percent of the Army's $21 billion procurement budget, CBO estimates; by 2015, that share could rise to almost half and remain at or above 40 percent through 2025. (For purposes of comparison, in the mid-1980s, at the height of the Reagan defense buildup, the Army dedicated at most 20 percent of its procurement funds to buy combat vehicles.

So CBO has come up with alternatives, as described by Defense News:

CBO’s first alternative, focused on the Army’s ability to collect and disseminate information, includes the purchase of unattended ground sensors, all four proposed classes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and a computer network to link them all together ...

A second alternative, with an emphasis on long-range strikes, calls for the procurement of the network and ground sensors, but only the longer-range UAVs (Classes III and IV) to detect targets and an FCS vehicle-based mortar system to attack them ...

Under a third alternative, the Army would focus on maneuver warfare by developing several of the proposed FCS vehicles, particularly those that would replace aged M113 armored personnel carriers and M109 self-propelled howitzers. The FCS computer network would be retained ...

Under the fourth and least expensive alternative CBO proposed, the Army would develop only the computer network and forgo acquisition of any other FCS components. The service would maintain the same fleet of armored vehicles that it has had for more than 20 years ...

One aspect common to all four proposals is the elimination of the unmanned ground vehicles and “intelligent munitions” system now part of the FCS plan. All four alternatives would, however, see the Army upgrading its armored vehicles to the most recent standard, while incorporating various FCS attributes as they are developed.

The Army has already moved forward on such upgrades, as the CBO explains:

The more than 2,500 upgrades that the Army plans to procure from 2007 through 2016 would improve the capabilities of its tanks, fighting vehicles and personnel carriers and slightly lessen the increase in the average age of the armored vehicle fleet ... When combined with the additional upgrades funded in the supplemental appropriations enacted this past June, the planned upgrades would further the Army's efforts toward meeting its goal of having enough of the latest models of its Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles to equip all of its heavy brigades and prepositioned stocks.

But the Army says that upgraded legacy vehicles, while capable, would mean heavier brigades that are 25 percent slower to deploy using existing sealift and airlift assets.

Here's a thought: stick to proven, affordable armored vehicles that work (and might even be better suited to future fights than FCS) while investing some of the savings in more ships and C-17s, speeding up deployments at a fraction of the cost.

--David Axe

Army's Out-of-Control "Future"

As gut-wrenching as today's Times story on runaway Pentagon spending is, the article doesn't touch on what's quickly becoming the biggest defense contracting boondoggle of them all.

Reporter Leslie Wayne pulls out some great factoids in her piece today.

For instance, contractors on the Joint Strike Fighter, a next-generation fighter jet, received their full bonus award of $494 million from 1999 to 2003, even though the program was $10 billion over budget and 11 months behind schedule.

Contractors in the F-22A fighter jet program, over the same time period, received 91 percent of their performance bonus, or $849 million, even though the current phase of the program was $10 billion over budget and two years late.

And a handy chart shows that the per-unit cost of the F-22 was 189 percent higher than originally expected.

But that same chart shows the Army's massive Future Combat Systems modernization program costing a mere $127 billion -- up a paltry 54 percent since it was introduced.

Which was true a couple of days ago.

Now, however, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has a new estimate: $300 billion, to revamp about a third of the Army's gear.

And remember, these costs are soaring in the earliest days of the program, before Future Combat's major hardware purchases are set. The new-fangled tanks, the family of ground robots, the fighting vehicle replacements -- in other words, the collective heart of the program -- are still enormous question marks. How much do you figure the price of FCS will go up, once those projects are set?

That's one of the reasons why Sen. John McCain -- one of Congress' few truly good guys on this issue -- has been pushing the Pentagon to adopt "fixed price" contracts for weapons R&D, instead of the insane "cost-plus" agreements, which give defense firms huge bonuses, even when their projects spin out of control.

But, of course, spinning projects out of control has become a contractor business strategy. Just look at what's happening with the F-22 and JSF. So the Lockheeds and Boeings of the world are fighting McCain's provisions, hard. If they win, how much do you think Future Combat will cost next year?

The Army still needs tanks

The transformation of the Army continues. It's just that part of the transformation involves keeping the M-1 Abrams main battle tank production lines open for an extra eight years. Operations in Iraq have affirmed heavy armor's worth, according to Army Times. (subscription only)

Fort KNOX, Ky. — The armor community is alive and well and the 70-ton Abrams tank has a bright future on the urban battlefield, even in a force moving increasingly toward lighter, more mobile fighting platforms, Army leaders said.

“Without tanks, we don’t have combined arms,” said Gen. B.B. Bell, commanding general of Eighth U.S. Army Korea, who spoke to a packed auditorium May 18 during this year’s Armor Warfighting Symposium about tank successes on the Iraq battlefield.

Bell emphasized the tank’s important role in a complicated fight, pointing to its decades-old lethality, ability to adapt to open terrain and urban settings, the survivability factor for crews, and the fact that a heavy-armor task force can be deployed in as little as 96 hours.

Bell points out that urban operations are nothing new for the Army, and that tanks are major part of our ability to be successful in the cities. Tanks led the way during the initial invasion and have been prominent weapons in nearly every major operation as well as important in the day-to-day mission.

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Richard Cody pointed out that the Army was not really prepared for modern warfare before the 9/11 attacks in 2001. It was under-trained, under-equipped, and in a generally-poor state of maintenance. But war has changed that to a great extent, and the place of the tank in the new and improved US Army has been re-thought.

“The opportunity to invest came to fruition when we went to war,” [Col. Larry Hollingsworth, Heavy Brigade Combat Team project manager] said. “It became apparent to people that the risks you could assume with your force during a peacetime environment were very different from the risks you could assume during wartime.”

“If you’re not going to fight with tanks and Bradleys, you may not want to invest in them the same way as if you were going to have to roll them into Baghdad. I think that’s what our entire Army has seen,” Hollingsworth said.

Note the machine gun shield with ballistic glass in the pictured M1A1 (pic from DoD). This is a recent addition to the old warhorse which increases protection while maintaining vital sight lines for the man on the gun. Other improvements for the M1, collectively known as the TUSK program ("Tank Urban Survival Kit"), are in the pipeline to transform our tanks into even more lethal monsters on today's battlefields, also known quaintly as "cities". Many times "transformation" isn't revolutionary but instead incremental.

It's not been just tanks, either, that have had their worth re-evaluated lately. It's also been the B-52 bomber, the A-10 attack plane, the 7.62x51mm rifle round, the M79 "blooper" grenade launcher, and many other systems, most of which are considered "old school" and had been slated for retirement. Some had already been put out to pasture but rushed back into service when the need arose. Sometimes it is because new gee-whiz gadgets don't work as expected, and we could have worse problems than to learn that the systems we already have are the ones we need.

--cross-posted by Murdoc

P.R. Push for "Future" Army

Last year, when Pentagon chiefs threatened to cut funds for the F-22 Raptor, the Air Force unleashed a massive PR campaign for the jet -- even flying the thing over the Super Bowl.

This year, it's the Army's Future Combat Systems modernization effort that could be on the chopping block. And, according to Inside Defense, "FCS supporters are taking it to the streets to make sure its program is defended... across the country, plying the time-honored trade of ensuring as many congressman in as many districts as possible are on board."

FCS contractors haven't made any playoff plans, yet. But they are holding a dozen conferences around the country to talk up the guargantuan, multi-faceted project.

The size of the program gives backers the opportunity to tap a large number of lawmakers for support: The FCS industry base spans 159 congressional districts over 35 states, with 363 companies on board, according to materials released by the program’s industry team.

And, apparently, those contractors are using some rather odd arguments to support the program. FCS centers, in large part, around replacing the Army's current fleet of tanks and fighting vehicles with lighter, quicker, better-networked substitutes. Which is all well and good, for fighting Iran or North Korea. Hurricane relief? That's a bit more questionable, at least to me. But not to FCS' industry team, which "has been advertising how well FCS could work in a 'Katrina-like' event," Catherine MacRae Hockmuth reports for Inside Defense.

Recon on Radio Project

Over the last year, we've spent a whole lot of time chronicling the woes of the Joint Tactical Radio System. That's the Pentagon's star-crossed $6.8 billion effort to replace their with just a few digital ones. It's the backbone of the military's effort to modernize itself. And it is not going well.

But "Jitters," as the program is Pentagonese, hasn't gotten much mainstream press attention -- largely, I think, because its sprawling and confusing, even for a Defense Department project. (Jitters has four "clusters" of radios, for example -- the last of which is "Cluster 5.")

The current issue of Defense Technology International (pgs 30-34) does the best job I've seen so far at picking through the Jitters tangle, detailing what's working, and what's holding the radio project back. Check it out.

"Future Combat": Cuts, or More Cash?

It's only taken $50 billion in extra cash, a heap of missed deadlines and redrawn requirements, and a war that's lasted about two years too long. But the Pentagon may finally be ready to start putting the axe to the Army's leviathan modernization program, Future Combat Systems.

Inside Defense reports that FCS is on a "short list of...weapon system programs that could be terminated or significantly pared back."

“They are looking to slip it to the right or kill it,” said a source familiar with FCS options advanced by the Pentagon's office of program analysis and evaluation.

Army officials are working to convince Pentagon leaders, including England, to reconsider cutting or even terminating FCS, the service's only major new-start development program.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker is scheduled to meet Friday with England and again make the case for the program, a briefing that is expected to discuss FCS' relevance to today's challenges.

Whoops! Make that $70 billion in cost overruns. The Defense Department quietly released a "selected acquisition report" this week saying that FCS would now run $161 billion -- up from 2003's $92 billion estimate. So we're talking a 75% increase. And remember, folks, that's only down payment. Because $161 billion only pays for modernizing a third of the Army's troops.

Curtains for "Jitters"?

The idea was simple: take the military's tangled mess of radios, any replace 'em all with a single, software-based model.

But executing the idea has been anything but easy. And now, generals are talking about dropping the notion of a universal radio altogether, Defense News' Greg Grant reports -- right when Pentagon chiefs are trying to decide what to do with about the troubled, $6.8 billion Joint Tactical Radio System.

Essentially, the JTRS program [known as "Jitters"] is aiming for something that’s almost physically impossible, or at least extremely expensive, experts say... The desire to use a single antenna for many different wavelengths bumps up against laws of physics, which make it difficult to pull in strong signals across the spectrum. An amplifier that works across the whole spectrum will use much more electrical power than one tuned for a specific frequency band. Waveforms and transmissions that are speedily handled by analog systems, such as the widely used Link-16, are much tougher to achieve with digital computation...

A better solution... is using such software-defined radios only when absolutely needed. More and more communication of data and even voice can be routed via the Pentagon’s burgeoning digital network. Such relays could allow the new radios to coexist with older ones...

Initially, every JTRS box has to host all the waveforms and all the software for the network. To do so requires high-performance computer processors, which translates into more heat and power.

But for the JTRS radio to be carried on missiles to provide guidance and on other platforms such as unattended ground sensors, there is no requirement for all that processing power.

“So maybe one size does not fit all,” [Maj. Gen. Michael Mazzucchi, who commands the Army’s Communications-Electronics Lifecycle Management Command] said. “Maybe we can have it run just one wave form, then you wouldn’t have the same battery, heat and processing speed challenges.”

Mazzucchi said JTRS also ran into the reality of an ongoing war when the Army realized it needed a lot more tactical network radios and so ordered another 100,000 radios. “Those radios are going to last a long time, we’re not going to now go out and replace those radios in three years with JTRS.”

The Army is no longer looking at JTRS as a radio replacement program. Instead, it’s being viewed as a gateway into the network.

The article is "absolutely right," one Air Force radio specialist tells Defense Tech.

Yes, we'd all love a one-size-fits-all radio -- especially one which can tie into larger networks without a lot of mucking around with settings for an hour beforehand. But there are huge technical obstacles to be overcome in the meantime, and the Pentagon is being unrealistic about the timeline for deploying the system. (2 MHz to 2GHz? They're not kidding about laws of physics needing to be overcome.)

In the meantime, they could save a lot of trouble by procuring more of the newer do-it-all radios like the PSC-5D, PRC-117F, or the PRC-148. These radios already have impressive do-it-all capabilities and save a lot of hassle when it comes to interoperability.

Simply, the miltary has finally started using radios that can talk to different services, in different transmission modes, with different encryption, in addition to their normal mission. Our ETACS [Enlisted Terminal Attack Controllers, the guys who help bring in air support] used to need one radio to talk to the Army, a completely different one to talk to the planes, and yet another (different) radio to talk to the next echelon via SATCOM or HF. Each of these needs an encryption device (external, and bulky of course) plus associated power supply, audio cabling, and antennas…

Anyway, since the late 90's companies like Racal and Harris have been making radios which have multi-algorithm encryption built right into the radio, can handle lots of transmission modes (aside from the one or two a given service needs), and cover very broad frequency ranges. As an example, an old PRC-77 (the Army radio operators hauled around on their backs) covered 30-78MHz in FM voice mode only, with no internal encryption. (Mind you, that's just the Army; there's the USMC, USAF, USN, etc. to worry about, plus third parties.) A newer "do-it-all" radio like the PRC-148 MBITR covers 30 to 512 MHZ in AM, FM, SINCGARS (Army frequency hopping), HAVEQUICK II (Air Force frequency hopping) for both voice and data, with internal software that can simulate all sorts of external encryption devices.

AND the damn thing can talk through satellites.

This is typical of what similar radios like the PSC-5D and PRC-117 can do. The only real difference is form factor; the PRC-148 is the size of a largish walkie-talkie (slightly larger if you include the amplifier which makes SATCOM possible), the -5D and -117F are backpack-sized.

So now your ETAC doesn't need a Humvee full of radios and encryption devices; he can carry one radio to talk to anyone he wants. Or maybe two if he needs to talk to two people simultaneously.

...and don't forget that the software-based nature of these new radios means they can learn all sorts of unheard of tricks. For instance, the PSC-5 series of radios can pair up to make a repeater, or retransmit a SATCOM channel over an Army SINCGARS net (for instance) AND vice versa.

Well, to a radio guy, that's pure dynamite.

JTRS wants to take it further, but in my opinion they're trying to turn over two pages at once. There's simply no precedent for tactical radios which self-program to switch nets (the way that cellphones do when changing service areas) and it could take a decade - easily - to get this off the ground.

"Cheap, Ugly" = Good

The Army's Future Combat Systems overhaul is FUBAR, we all know. But it's just the latest in a long line of big-ticket Pentagon programs to burn cash and squander expectations.

So it there any way for the Defense Department to buy next-gen gear without picking taxpayers' pockets and leaving soldiers ass-out? Pentagon insider Dave has a few new rules on his blog, Garfield Ridge.

-- It has to be cheap...

-- Only one, maybe two, leap-ahead technologies allowed per program. The rest of the program has to rely on stuff we've already done before...

-- Congress must not care about it. If it hates it, it will cut it and ruin program stability, particularly in the early years where it's needed most. If it loves it, it'll add unneeded money and unrealistic demands on the program. The best programs are always the ones that Congress keeps their noses out of.

-- The program must be small enough to fail.

That last one is probably the most important one of all.

Most of the Pentagon's acquisition trouble in recent years has occurred on programs that are quite simply too big to fail. Either the requirement is one that can't be ignored, thus forcing the development program into a fixed schedule -- never a good idea to do this stuff on a deadline -- or the program reaches a point where so much money has been spent on it that in the event of failure no one wants to cut their losses and try something new. The moment the contractor smells fear on the part of the Pentagon, once it knows no one in the Building has the guts to cancel the program as it goes south, that's when the Pentagon takes it in the wazoo from industry, often willingly.

FCS, for all its necessary wisdom -- after all, it makes no sense to modernize the Army one little piece at a time -- FCS is precisely one of the complex systems that the Pentagon can't seem to run right anymore, if it ever could.

Welcome to the ugly.

And read the whole thing.

Defense Tech vs. "The World"

You can hear me stammering through another interview on BBC/Public Radio International's "The World" this afternoon. I'll be talking about my favorite $450 billion science project.

THERE'S MORE: It's online now, here.

Slow, Fat "Future" for Army

It's official: After $450 billion, the Army's quick-moving force of the future will be just about as slow as the one that's around right now.

As I noted in June, one of the big ideas behind the Army's massive modernization effort, Future Combat Systems, was to make American troops more mobile – able to get around the world in a matter of days or weeks, instead of the months that are needed now.

The first step: slim down the service's cannon and armored vehicles. Today, it takes a gargantuan C-17 or C-5 transport plane to lug a single, 32-ton Paladin 155 mm howitzer. Army planners wanted the Paladin's next-gen replacement to weigh in at 19 tons or less – so one could fit inside a much smaller C-130 transport plane, instead.

After dancing around the issue for a couple of months, the Army has now delcared that neither the Paladin replacement nor any other FCS vehicle is going to fit into a C-130, according to Defense News' Greg Grant. And that "appears to abandon the fundamental rationale for FCS, which was intended to speed Army brigades to combat zones around the world within 96 hours."

The Army created the