You might remember a few months back -- as many lawmakers got themselves into a lather, treating the MRAP as the solution to every problem with the Iraq War -- we raised some questions about the pace at which they were being fielded and how they were going to be employed effectively during a counter-insurgency campaign.
Well, the dust is starting to clear from the stampede of those who were out to prove they love the troops more than the next congressman, and lo and behold, their zeal caused a few unintended consequences.
Here's an excerpt from the story running at Military.com:
The accelerated pace the military has used to buy and deploy thousands of heavily armored mine resistant vehicles for Iraq and Afghanistan could lead to problems with maintenance and cost overruns on the top priority project, according to congressional investigators.
Congress has appropriated $22 billion to acquire more than 15,000 mine resistant ambush protected vehicles, also known as MRAPs, to protect troops from roadside bombs and other insurgent ambushes, according to the Government Accountability Office report. Defense Secretary Robert Gates designated the program as the department's highest priority acquisition last year.
That meant testing of safety and performance occurred while the vehicles were being bought, raising the possibility costly errors would be uncovered after the fact. More than 100 vehicles the military paid for were not fielded because of problems discovered after their purchase, according to the GAO report made public Wednesday.
"While the department's concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the vehicles has provided an urgently needed operational capability, it has also increased performance, sustainability and cost risks," the GAO concluded.
Gizmodo has an item about a new miracle paint that makes whatever it coats invisible to radar:
A German inventor has developed a paint called AR 1 that can hide a vehicle from radar, and most importantly, "all militarily relevant frequencies." How it works is unclear, though one test researcher proposes it's either by reflecting radar waves in a pattern so they cancel one another out, or by utilizing microscopic magnets to absorb radar radiation. And no, it won't get you out of speeding tickets.
The inventor's story is an interesting one, involving thousands of hours of lab trial and error, as well as international military interest in his product ... that far outshined the response from his own country's military.
But apparently the most promising and equitable use for such a paint could be civilian. Airport towers and buildings have a long history of interfering with flight control radars. And to simply make them disappear would be quite useful—as opposed to calling hangar 12 in for a landing or something.
(Gouge: CM)
-- Ward
Humvee Maker Submits JLTV Design
I just received this release from Humvee manufacturer AM General describing its team concept for the development of the next-generation tactical transport: the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.
As you all know, I think the JLTV project is a long time coming and is an exciting opportunity to leverage armor, powerplant, mechanical, vehicle systems and weapons advances since the design and fielding of the Humvee.
Its good to see some many companies jump into the program -- and there's a part of me that's glad to see AM General isn't fighting for the services to cling to its current technology, but is instead getting on the bandwagon with a strong effort on JLTV.
From "General Tactical Vehicles (a conglomerate of AM General and GD Land Systems):
Leveraging over 120 years of combined experience in the design, production and support of more than one million combat and tactical vehicles, General Tactical Vehicles has submitted its proposal for the Technology Development phase of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program.
GTV's offer for the JLTV optimizes survivability while maximizing power and payload. The approach focuses on commonality of systems and components along with modular armor, resulting in an innovative and agile vehicle system that will provide enhanced crew protection, considerable cargo capacity, ready transportability and unprecedented networked mobility.
"Our JLTV will provide America's Soldiers and Marines a vehicle with the strong performance, flexibility, protection and sustainability they need across the full range of missions, locations and operational scenarios," said Don Howe, GTV's JLTV program director. "GTV's JLTV will give our armed forces the rapid deployability, reliability, networking capabilities and survivability they need today and in the decades ahead."
General Tactical Vehicles applies proven technologies along with a modular design that will accommodate continuing advances in armor and vehicle systems. "While it's a significant advancement in design, it's also affordable and practical," said Howe. "Combined with manufacturing readiness that allows an accelerated path to production, our design will make the JLTV program a smart, low-risk investment for America's armed forces and taxpayers."
Innovative features of the GTV design include:
Lightweight hybrid hull structure which provides a low-profile and blast-resistant vehicle designed to survive current and future threats
Parallel arm adjustable height suspension to give the vehicle increased mine blast protection without jeopardizing air and sea transportability;
Semi-active suspension ensuring safety enhanced mobility and crew comfort
Proven propulsion systems with a high horsepower-to-weight ratio to maximize payload, plus a driveline that gives the vehicle tough off road capabilities
Digital cockpit with C4I technologies connecting the crew to other units and systems
A unique modular and scalable trailer that has mobility equal to the JLTV vehicle itself.
General Tactical Vehicles is a joint venture between AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems, a business unit of General Dynamics formed to provide the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps a low-risk, affordable, technically advanced and economically sustainable solution to their Joint Light Tactical Vehicle requirements. In 2006, both AM General and General Dynamics were awarded JLTV "Best Technical Approach" trade studies by the Office of Naval Research.
I've asked AM General for a photo or artist's rendition of the vehicle, but I'm intrigued by this idea of a "modular and scalable trailer." [Sounds like their making the vehicle itself smaller to generate a lower profile and adding a trailer for gear and other stuff. I wonder how well this is going to go over with the Army and Marine Corps. They could read it as just something else to break]...
EDITOR: good call dear readers, indeed a trailer is probably part of the RFP. I understand the need and the compatibility issues Ed, roger all and good input. Thanks!
-- Christian
MRAP Review
Here's a great first-person review of the MRAP from my good friend who posts as "Slab" on OpFor.
In January, my team traded out our well-worn M1114 Up-armored HMMWV for a 4X4 JERRV, one of the models of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles purchased by the Marine Corps. We were pretty excited to have the new vehicle, especially after our first look inside. I mean, the thing looks like the Cadillac Escalade of tactical vehicles. The IED threat in our little slice of Al Anbar had long since dropped to non-existent, but it felt good to have something that was specifically engineered to combat the threat, you know? It didn't take long for the novelty to wear off, however, and by the end of the deployment we had taken to operating mainly from a Humvee again. The MRAP is a superb EOD and convoy security vehicle (the acronym JERRV stands for Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicle), but it is merely a passable utility and/or fighting vehicle. The thing was obviously designed with the EOD mission in mind, and if any operator input was incorporated into the design, it clearly did not come from the infantry community.
On the good side, it is obviously better equipped to resist blast-type mines and IEDs than any other vehicle in the inventory. On top of the increased protection, the MRAP has a fantastic communications system installed, much better than what we had in our Humvee. Most ANGLICO Humvees look like Monster Garage rejects - additional antennas installed in weird places, additional radios installed in all sorts of unauthorized fashion, all trying to maximize the communications capability of our vehicles. Here we had a vehicle that came with brand new multiband radios, all tied in to an intercommunications system. Although many of the comm capabilities are completely unnecessary for most units, it almost seemed like this thing was made for ANGLICO. In addition, the designers were definitely looking to improve crew comfort in these things - the seats are much more comfortable than the ones in a Humvee, the Vehicle Commander's (VC) seat was MUCH roomier than in a Humvee (even my 155 lb ass ends up wedged between the door and the Blue Force Tracker mount in a Humvee), the air conditioning system was top-notch, etc.
For a motorized infantry mission, however, the MRAP's shortcomings are many. It handles atrociously offroad. The suspension is incredibly stiff, with the end result being that you must be tightly strapped in to survive the jostling in the back of the vehicle. Well, my radio operator sits in the back, and those wonderful radios I mentioned before are placed in such a way that the only person who can readily access them is the gunner. Someone that I would prefer keep his attention oriented, you know, outside the vehicle. My radio guy can certainly reach around the gunner's legs and work on the radios, but not if he's tightly strapped in trying to survive the ride.
Because we frequently live and fight from our vehicle, we have to carry an assortment of odds and ends for our radios, weapons, and ourselves. Things like water, MREs, ammunition, spare barrels for the machinegun, and spare items for the radios. The jostling that I just mentioned makes it nearly impossible to store any of these items in the interior of the vehicle without significant modification. We tried removing one of the seats and putting in a wooden box with space for some of these items, but many items were tossed completely out of the box and ended up strewn about the floor of the vehicle. There is a complete lack of weapons stowage for passengers in the rear of the vehicle, and the weapons racks for the driver and VC are designed for M16s, not M4s. One aspect that seems to elude many tactical vehicle designers is that motorized infantry typically store their sustainment load (i.e. rucksacks) externally (see below). This allows the vehicle's internal space to be utilized for items that I mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, which must be readily accessible throughout the day. Sustainment items can typically wait until a long halt of some sort before they are needed. Yet, the MRAP has no provision for strapping a rucksack to the outside of the vehicle.
The MRAP is a vehicle that is well-suited for a particular niche, but due to pressure from people such as our lawmakers in Congress, it has been pressed into service in roles that it is not suited for. For a unit that never leaves a paved surface, and rarely spends more than 24 hours outside of some sort of operating base at a time, the MRAP's protection and communications capabilities make it a superb asset. For units that must remain expeditionary, be able to operate in a wide variety of terrain and pursue the enemy wherever he is found, the MRAP is ultimately a poor choice, and I in retrospect I am very glad that Gen Conway is reducing the number of these vehicles on order. Personally, if given the choice, I would take an M1114 or M1152 HMMWV over the JERRV 4X4, and would seek other means to reduce the IED threat through such things as tribal leader engagement and refining mounted patrol TTPs.
For more reading on the subject, try Defense Tech. As you can see, Christian has been leveling similar criticism since last year. Christian's article is one of the more down-to-earth articles I've seen on the subject. He and I had a good discussion about personal body armor at the Milbloggies last year, it looks like we are of generally the same opinion on the MRAP issue as well.
The number of deliveries by sea now exceeds those airlifted into Iraq by heavy transports, which makes a heck of a lot more sense (and costs less). I remember during my stop over at al Asad airbase seeing those contracted AN-124 Condor (Ukrainian transports) flying in and out all day delivering the IED-resistant vehicles to western Iraq.
It's interesting the see the raging back and forth over the MRAP (partly stoked by yours truly) Peter out as of late. In fact, I hear the Marine Corps is quietly trying to duck out of the "program executive office" role for MRAPs, hoping to hand over the politically radioactive and costly program to the big boys in the Army to deal with.
The Marines have always been more jazzed about the JLTV anyway, so let's give them the breathing room to execute that badly needed program.
You know, I spent some time with Army units over there, but didn't roll in MRAPs with them. Still spent a lot of time in the latest up-armored Humvees. If anyone's got some inside gouge on where these 5,200 MRAPs are operating, I'd like to post it here. Maybe they're mostly around Baghdad.
Well, in the interest of giving each side their due, I’m going post some comments sent to me this weekend from another MGS platoon sergeant who was quoted in the Bloomberg story I cited in my story.
At this time in my opinion am one of the most combat experienced MGS vehicle commanders in the army today. I have fired 58 rounds in a combat situation...none of them were just for fun rounds. I have used the MGS in every manner possible and used it for things it was not tatically supposed to be used for. It pisses me of that only 1 or 2 guys were asked about this vehicle in 4-9 INF, 4/2bde.
And later he wrote me...
I just want the vehicle to get a fair chance and for people who think it a waste of tax dollars to realize that we now control the battlefield both cross country and urban.
The MGS platoon sergeant also pointed me in the direction of some YouTube videos featuring the MSG. Here’s one, and a link to the others.
So, take a look for yourself. All I can say is the crew with whom I talked in Baqubah hated the vehicle and argued it was rushed too soon to combat. Our new source says something completely different, and it’s totally fair to argue that my story was based on the opinions of just a handful of people.
We’ll follow up with any further disclosures on the MGS from all sides.
And, PS: I’m back from the Sandbox. A hearty thanks to my dear leader, Ward Carroll, for hosting the blog in my absence. He did a first rate job and I can see you all enjoyed his aimless blathering...
-- Christian
New Stryker Sucking
BAQUBAH, Iraq - The newest version of the Army’s popular Stryker combat vehicle is garnering poor reviews here from Soldiers assigned to man its tank-like hull.
The General Dynamics Corp.-built Mobile Gun System looks like a typical eight-wheeled Stryker, except for a massive 105mm gun mounted on its roof. The gun fires three different types of projectiles, including explosive rounds, tank-busters and a "canister round" that ejects hundreds of steel pellets similar to a shotgun shell.
But while the system looks good on paper and the Army’s all for it, Soldiers with the 4th Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment -- one of the first units to receive the new vehicle for their deployment to Iraq -- don’t have a lot of good things to say about it.
"I wish [the enemy] would just blow mine up so I could be done with it," said Spec. Kyle Handrahan, 22, of Anaheim, Calif., a tanker assigned to Alpha Company, 4/9’s MGS platoon.
"It’s a piece," another MGS platoon member chimed in. "Nothing works on it."
Hey, folks, greetings from O'Hare airport. My connecting flight to Kansas City is delayed a couple of hours (I discovered after running from one terminal to the other like OJ back in the old Hertz commercials), so I have a little time on my hands here.
Here's an item Military.com reported on a few days back that I thought would be worthy of a discussion among the DT clan. Our man Eric Daniel relays that it's important to note that the Soldier killed was seated in the most vulnerable position in the MRAP and that an IED that size would've taken out everyone in a Humvee. Also, it's unclear if the gunner died from the blast or the MRAP's subsequent roll. But, still, this casualty is a surprise since most considered the MRAP to be IED-proof altogether.
Here's a bit of the report:
A Soldier killed over the weekend south of Baghdad was the first American casualty in a roadside bomb attack on a newly introduced, heavily armored vehicle, a military spokeswoman said Jan. 22.
The V-shaped hull of the huge MRAP - Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected - truck is designed to deflect blasts from roadside bombs, a weapon that has killed more American Soldiers than any other tactic used by Sunni insurgents and militia fighters in Iraq.
The Soldier who died Jan. 19 was the gunner who sits atop the MRAP vehicle. Three crew members tucked inside the cabin were wounded. The vehicle rolled over after the blast and it was not clear how the gunner died - from wounds in the explosion or in the subsequent roll-over.
Maj. Alayne P. Conway, deputy spokeswoman for the 3rd Infantry Division, said the attack and the death were under investigation.
There now are more than 1,500 of the costly vehicles in service in Iraq and the Pentagon is working to get at least 12,000 more, using $21 billion provided by Congress. MRAPs cost between $500,000 and $1 million, depending on their size and how they are equipped.
The cycle of war continues . . .
-- Ward
Secret Service Whoop Ass
Mount a mini-gun on a hard SUV and what do you get? I'm not sure but it sure does have a high rate of fire. Heads up, Code Pink bad people who could be viewed as a threat to state officials . . .
-- Ward
Getting Sideways at the DARPA Derby
The U.S. military's sprawling logistics system has always been its most vulnerable flank. Two years ago Iraqi insurgents figured that out. In 2004 and 2005, attacks on supply trucks killed hundreds of U.S. troops. More escorts and thicker armor eventually trumped insurgent attacks - for now - but the military hasn't forgotten just how hairy it got. In typical American fashion, the military decided one of the best ways to protect logistics troops was to fire them, and make supply convoys autonomous.
It's freezing cold this morning at an abandoned U.S. Air Force base near Victorville, California. In just a few minutes, officials from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency will fire the gun to begin the 60-mile, 6-hour Urban Challenge robot race. The idea: to demonstrate the technology that might one day result in fully robotic supply trucks that can find their way through intersections, maneuver around obstacles, change lanes and stop on a dime when some kid runs across the road. The prize: a $3.5 million check from Uncle Sam.
Two weeks ago, there were 35 teams from universities and industry vying for a spot in the final race. After rigorous testing, during which the robots were required to adhere to California traffic laws, only 11 teams are left. One disqualified robot plowed into a human-driven Darpa car. Others freaked out at intersections, parking lots or left turns.
Read the rest of David Axe's brief from Aviation Week HERE.
MRAP is an unusual program that involves rolling purchases of a wide range of vehicle types, all meeting the same basic mobility and protection requirements.
The requirements do not specify how a vehicle should meet them, so manufacturers take different approaches, with some embracing a monocoque style that combines the hull and chassis in a single piece, and others bolting an armored hull to a separate chassis, perhaps with a "belly plate" to protect the drive train. All hull designs are V-shaped, though some are flatter than others to maximize interior space.
The manufacturers give their vehicles model names like "Cougar" and "Alpha," but the MRAP program office tends to refer to them only by category. The three categories in the program each describe a different weight class and size and are intended for different missions. The roughly 7,800 vehicles ordered as of August are split between the four main military services and Special Operations Command.
The following is a summary of the categories, vehicle types, key performance specifications, design strengths and weaknesses, and mission information for the MRAP vehicles procured by the Pentagon.
Category I: approximately 7-15 tons; at least 4 passengers, plus 2 crew; urban transport.
Category II: approximately 15-25 tons; up to 8 passengers, plus 2 crew; road escort, ambulance and bomb-disposal missions.
Category III: approximately 25 tons; at least 4 passengers, plus 2 crew; bomb disposal.
Category I
Cougar H 4 X 4: Force Protection Industries Inc. (Ladson, S.C.). Weight: 16 tons. Passengers: 4 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 785 + several for testing. Cost: $475,000. Features: Monocoque, flattened V-shaped hull extended to engine compartment; 330-hp. engine; dual air conditioners; rear door.
Reality check: Widely considered the "gold standard" of MRAP designs, the Cougar enjoyed considerable sales success even before MRAP. Force Protection built a small number of Tempest vehicles-basically early Cougars-for British Army engineers in 2002, followed by several hundred Cougars for the U.S. military between 2003 and 2006, mostly for engineer and bomb-disposal units. In April, Force Protection, citing military statistics, claimed that despite some 300 attacks targeting Cougars in Iraq, not one Marine died while riding in one. Force Protection builds Cougars at its main factory in Ladson as well as in a new facility in North Carolina, and has signed co-production agreements with General Dynamics and BAE Systems (for Iraqi army Cougars). The vehicle's major weakness is poor off-road mobility, a consequence of its relatively heavy weight resulting from a high degree of protection. The design minimizes the use of glass to improve survivability, at the cost of passenger visibility.
RG-33 4 X 4: BAE Systems North America (Rockville, Md.). Weight: 14 tons. Passengers: 4 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 201 + several for testing. Cost: approximately $300,000. Features: Monocoque, flattened V-shaped hull that stops short of engine compartment; rear door.
Reality check: The RG-33 is a cousin of the RG-31, which itself is based on the South African Mamba design that incorporates a German-designed Unimog chassis. The RG series of vehicles makes extensive use of armored glass to improve visibility, with a slight penalty in survivability. Perhaps the design's greatest weakness is its vulnerability to a "mobility kill" that destroys the lightly armored engine and leaves the crew stranded. RG-33s are manufactured on two lines in York, Pa., another in Texas and a fourth at a BAE-owned factory in South Africa. BAE's acquisition of Armor Holdings LLC this summer significantly boosted the company's ability to "up-armor" its MRAP designs. BAE representative Doug Coffey says that live-fire testing at Aberdeen, Md., proved the RG-33 to be the overall most survivable MRAP vehicle. He added that stockpiling adequate raw materials, especially armor-grade steel, was the biggest obstacle to fulfilling orders. RG-33 has an extensive combat record. U.S. Army and Marine Corps units use the vehicle in Iraq and Afghanistan for bomb-disposal and route-clearance missions.
MaxxPro 4 X 4: International Military and Government LLC (Warrenville, Ill.). Weight: 16 tons. Passengers: 4 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 1,955 + several for testing. Cost: $548,000. Features: Commercial truck chassis with a bolt-on V-shaped armored hull; 330-hp. engine; rear door.
Reality check: Commercial truck-maker International was a surprise winner in the first round of MRAP purchases; MaxxPro scored more orders than any other type. Assistant General Manager Bob Walsh credits the company's huge factory capacity and support base, as well as MaxxPro's two-piece design. "It does a very good job of redirecting energy [from bomb blasts]." Repairability: "Being cab-on-chassis, you're able to pull off this body and slide a new chassis in." The successful German Dingo vehicle embraces a similar design philosophy, but there's a reason most MRAP types feature single-piece monocoque hulls: On a bolt-on design, a powerful blast might separate the hull from the chassis, resulting in a mobility kill that strands the crew. MaxxPro chassis are manufactured in Garland, Tex.; hulls are made in West Point, Miss.
Caiman 4 X 4: Armor Holdings LLC (Jacksonville, Fla.). Weight: 14 tons. Passengers: 4 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 1,154 + several for testing. Cost: $443,000. Features: Family of medium tactical vehicle (FMTV) chassis with a V-shaped armored hull; rear door.
Reality check: Armor Holdings has released few details about the Caiman design, stressing only that it is lighter than many MRAPs. Caiman has chassis components common to the FMTV utility truck, a feature that should simplify maintenance and support. The design reportedly boasts better off-road performance than the heavier Cougar. Work is performed in Sealy, Tex., and Fairfield, Ohio.
Alpha 4 X 4: Oshkosh Truck (Oshkosh, Wis.). Weight: 13 tons. Passengers: 6 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 100 + several for testing. Cost: $306,000. Features: Monocoque layout with V-shaped armored hull; rear door.
Reality check: Despite being one of the biggest builders of military utility trucks, Oshkosh designs have fared poorly in the MRAP competition. Alpha was intended to be a smaller, lighter MRAP in order to facilitate rapid shipping and improve urban maneuverability. But testing at Aberdeen, as well as limited field testing with combat units, proved Alpha to be more vulnerable than other designs-this despite special armor co-developed by Battelle and Protected Vehicles Inc. The Marine Corps informed Oshkosh that it would not order more than the initial batch of 100.
RG-31 Mk 5 4 X 4: General Dynamics Land Systems Canada (London, Ont.). Weight: 9 tons. Passengers: 10 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 10 + several for testing. Cost: approximately $300,000. Features: Monocoque, flattened V-shaped hull that stops short of engine compartment; rear door.
Reality check: The U.S. Army and Canadian forces used the relatively lightweight RG-31 in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it has proved popular but somewhat less survivable than the Cougar. Canadian RG-31s have been involved in several fatal bombings and have suffered mechanical problems. Mechanical faults also drove the British Army to retire a handful of RG-31s it purchased in the 1990s. GDLS is partnered with BAE in South Africa on RG-31 production. The Army continues to purchase the model for route clearance outside of the MRAP program. RG-31s in Iraq have been fitted with cage armor to protect against rocket-propelled grenades.
M1117 4 X 4: Textron (Providence, R.I.). Weight: 12 tons. Passengers: 8 + 3 crew. MRAP I orders: 4 for testing. Features: Flattened V-shaped hull; side door; 260-hp. engine. Cost: $690,000.
Reality check: Textron pitched this stretched variant of its successful Armored Security Vehicle, more than 1,000 of which have been ordered by the U.S. Army for convoy escort duty in Iraq. The M1117 is lighter and has a flatter hull bottom than the other contenders, and these liabilities apparently doomed the vehicle. The Marine Corps bought only four test examples. The New Orleans factory that makes ASVs was heavily damaged in Hurricane Katrina in 2005; there were doubts that Textron could increase production to meet MRAP demand, even if the vehicle had proved survivable enough. The M1117 also is more expensive than other Category I MRAPs.
Category II
Cougar HE 6 X 6: Force Protection Industries Inc. (Ladson, S.C.). Weight: 24 tons. Passengers: 10 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 920 + several for testing. Cost: $644,000. Features: Monocoque, flattened V-shaped hull extended to engine compartment; dual air conditioners; rear door.
Reality check: The roomier six-wheeled Cougar variant is prized by bomb squads for its ability to carry an ordnance-disposal robot and controls with room to spare; many of the pre-MRAP 6 X 6 orders were placed by the Navy on behalf of the military bomb-disposal community. The British and Iraqi armies were first to embrace the 6 X 6 for other missions. In 2006, Force Protection sold 400 Cougar HE variants to the Iraqi army and 108 to the British Army. The British "Mastiffs," as they are called, reportedly boast superior protection against explosively formed penetrator bombs.
RG-33L 6 X 6: BAE Systems North America (Rockville, Md.). Weight: 22 tons. Passengers: 12 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 330 + several for testing. Cost: approximately $630,000. Features: Monocoque, flattened V-shaped hull that stops short of engine compartment; rear door, exportable power; robotic claw arm.
Reality check: This stretched and widened RG-33 variant is fitted for the same roles as the Cougar HE, with the addition of a robotic arm like that on the larger Buffalo MRAP, used to probe suspected explosive devices. The RG-33's lower height compared to the Buffalo will probably make it an inferior arm platform.
RG-31E 6 X 6: General Dynamics Land Systems Canada (London, Ont.). Weight: approximately 20 tons. Passengers: at least 10 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 610 + several for testing. Cost: $559,000. Features: Monocoque, flattened V-shaped hull that stops short of engine compartment; rear door.
Reality check: A stretched RG-31 variant, the E model has yet to appear in public and the manufacturer has released only basic details, but it should be broadly similar to the RG-33L.
MaxxPro XL 4 X 4: International Military and Government LLC (Warrenville, Ill.). Weight: 18 tons. Passengers: 10 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 16 + several for testing. Cost: $540,000. Features: Commercial truck chassis with a bolt-on V-shaped armored hull; rear door.
Reality check: A heavier, stretched MaxxPro. As with many Category II MRAPs, the MaxxPro XL uses the same engine as its smaller, lighter Category I counterpart, meaning slightly degraded performance.
Golan 4 X 4: Protected Vehicles Inc. (North Charleston, S.C.). Weight: 15 tons. Passengers: 10 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 60 + several for testing. Cost: $623,000. Features: Monocoque, V-shaped armored hull; rear door.
Reality check: PVI was a subcontractor to Oshkosh on that company's failed Alpha MRAP; PVI's own Golan has fared little better. There has been no indication that the Pentagon will order any beyond the initial batch of 60. While awaiting orders, PVI has cut its work force in half, and is currently fighting a lawsuit relating to issues about the departure of PVI founder Garth Barrett from rival Force Protection Inc., where he was president. Force Protection claims Barrett stole a hard drive containing confidential data. Barrett is countersuing. Executive representative Drew Felty says the lack of interest in Golan is not due to survivability. "We have what we call a triad solution: we've got protection against IEDs-including fragmentation, EFP (explosively formed penetrator) and RPG, all in one vehicle." The design features modular armor blocks on the sides and cage armor over the windows. PVI has the advantage of being located near the Navy's SPAWAR Systems Center, which integrates turrets and electronics in MRAPs, and Charleston AFB, where many MRAPs embark for flights to Iraq.
Caiman 6 X 6: Armor Holdings LLC (Jacksonville, Fla.). Weight: 24 tons. Passengers: approximately 10 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 16 + several for testing. Cost: approximately $600,000. Features: FMTV chassis with a V-shaped armored hull; rear door.
Reality check: As with the Category I Caiman, Armor Holdings has released few details about this vehicle, only stressing its FMTV utility truck chassis.
Category III
Buffalo 6 X 6: Force Protection Industries Inc. (Ladson, S.C.). Weight: 25 tons. Passengers: 4 + 2 crew. MRAP I orders: 58 + several for testing. Cost: $856,000. Features: Monocoque, flattened V-shaped hull extended to engine compartment; 400-hp. engine; rear door; robotic claw arm.
Reality check: The Buffalo is the only vehicle qualifying for MRAP Category III, owing to its unique features: greater size, weight and height, which make it cumbersome but extremely survivable, and an excellent platform for the robotic arm used to prod suspected bombs. Buffaloes in Iraq have been seen fitted with cage armor to protect against RPGs. Buffalo is a direct descendant of the South African Casspir design that is in widespread military and civil use for mine-clearance.
Marine commanders in Iraq are asking the Pentagon to slow down deployment of IED-resistant vehicles in order to give them more time to figure out how best to employ the heavily-armored trucks, a top Corps official Wednesday.
Congress and the Pentagon have devoted billions to a crash program to field so-called Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles that are said to protect troops from deadly roadside bombs more effectively than up-armored Humvees. But the vehicles are more than four times heavier than an armored Humvee and may require different tactics for their use.
"I would say 'relax,' we don't know how we're going to use them, nobody does," said Brig. Gen. select Larry Nicholson, deputy commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command based in Quantico, Va. "And anyone who says ... 'this is exactly how many we need and this is exactly how we're going to use them' is not being truthful."
Commanders in Iraq are asking military officials in the U.S. to send "a few more" MRAPs, "then let us figure it out," Nicholson said during a panel discussion on the future of the MRAP, sponsored by the non-partisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a defense think tank with close Pentagon ties.
I found this comment interesting, and I pressed Nicholson on it, remarking that it sounded to me like these vehicles had been imposed upon Iraq commanders rather than requested by them. Nicholson responded that the commanders issued the first tanks didn't necessarily know how they were going to employ them and in what numbers - a point to which Andy Krepinevich, CSBA chief, agreed, remembering that the Wermacht figured 400 tanks would be needed in a Panzer division, but later decided a mix of vehicles with fewer tanks would be needed. I found Nicholson's analogy unconvincing. If commanders were really asking for the vehicles, they'd know damned well how they needed to use them.
The push-back from the field stands in sharp contrast to Pentagon moves to field more than 15,000 MRAPs over the next two years, including 1,500 by the end of 2007. The Marine Corps has an estimated 380 MRAPs in service with II Marine Expeditionary Force in al Anbar province so far, and the service is forecasted to receive a total of 3,700 MRAPs.
Nicholson strongly advocated the deployment of MRAPs for Marine operations in Iraq; despite his caution on the rate they'd be fielded.
The MRAP "is a vehicle that allows us to get to, and circulate amongst, the population better," he said. "The continued introduction of the MRAP as the primary transport vehicle will not change the way we conduct counterinsurgency."
The other thing Nicholson said was to remark on the incredible progress won by the Marines in Anbar. He noted that 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines had just left Ramadi and that during their seven month deployment there had zero KIA. That's incredible. The first night I arrived in Ramadi in December 2005, an IED attack killed three Marines and wounded several more. I was on the QRF that responded to the hit and helped pick boots up off the ground with shredded feet still in them. But I wondered why the MRAP was so urgently needed when the success in Anbar had been realized with those vehicles being used solely as EOD platforms. He didn't have a good argument for that.
But analysts with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, who sponsored the Oct. 16 event on Capitol Hill, said the MRAP has yet to prove its place in future service equipment plans. The gas-guzzling MRAP could impose a strain on logistics, suck funding away from needed vehicle upgrades in the future and could run counter to the intent of counter-insurgency doctrine, which stresses close contact with the population.
"Our concern is there seems to be this rush to judgment on spending a fairly large amount of money on a program that hadn't been planned for and not much discussion about how you actually plan to operationalize this and incorporate it into the force," said Dakota Wood, former Marine transport officer and co-author of the CSBA analysis report "Of MRAPs and IEDs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations."
MRAPs are said to cost as much as $800,000 per vehicle, he added, with up-armored Humvees coming in at about $150,000 each - leading Wood to call the MRAP a "million dollar Kleenex."
The Pentagon plans to spend nearly $25 billion on MRAP buys.
Other experts disagreed with the CSBA report, however, saying MRAP use today hasn't precluded troops from dismounting their vehicles and interacting with the Iraqi people.
"I generally agree with the purchase of MRAPs in large numbers," said retired Army Col. Bob Killebrew, a former Special Forces officer and frequent Pentagon consultant, during the panel discussion. "I find unpersuasive the argument that MRAP will have some kind of doctrinal impact on the conduct of the war in Iraq."
"It will have no effect at all on the current tactics of putting troops out on the beat and on their feet taking on insurgents in Baghdad and elsewhere," Killebrew added.
To be honest, I found both sides of the argument persuasive, though the retirees' rejoinders had a whiff of Old School, Heavy Forces, I told you so rhetorical overtones to them. I have great respect for formers, but sometimes they get a little hidebound in their thinking and more political than practical. The experts' rejection of the notion of an expeditionary revolution was dead wrong, but their contention that MRAPs would not serve as "armored cocoons" I think was spot on when I remembered the success Stryker brigades are having in Iraq.
While the CSBA report cautioned that the heavy MRAP vehicle would overburden an Army and Marine Corps aiming toward a more expeditionary future, others countered that the lust for lightness has been proven empty given the difficulties of counterinsurgency operations.
"This slow building of alliances and the confrontation of growing terrorist threats by other people's armies who have more at stake in it than us is going to be the next military strategy of the United States," Killebrew said. "We should build as many [MRAPs] as we need now to protect our troops in Iraq, and we should be prepared, as we withdraw eventually, to turn over MRAPs to people who are going to live in that area and who are going to have to continue to contend with the war."
You all know I’ve been pretty bummed lately about the overzealous adoption of the MRAP and its inevitable influence on the demise of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program.
We’ve already reported here that the Pentagon ordered a reassessment of the program, in effect delaying it until the DoD is interested – and has the money to devote to it - again. I have a problem with this because it’s well past time to replace the Humvee and there are a lot of great companies with great ideas out there chomping at the bit to build the Jeep of the future for the military.
While I was at the Modern Day Marine expo last week I spoke with Rod Millen, a renowned international rally racer and vehicle designer. His Tustin, Calif.-based company, Millenworks, has developed a series of manned and unmanned military tactical vehicles and his company is working with the Army to develop the MULE unmanned cargo carrier for FCS.
But at the show, his most impressive piece of gear was the Light Utility Vehicle, or LUV.
With both electric and diesel drive trains, and a top speed of 76 mph, the LUV cuts a clearly rally car-inspired line. Its huge ground clearance, a three-seat-across front cockpit (with center driver consol) and scalable armor packages Millenworks has definitely put forth a pretty strong candidate for the JLTV program.
Too bad there really isn’t one anymore.
-- Christian
Amazing MRAP Survival Photos
I’ve caught a lot of flak for my lack of enthusiasm with the MRAP vehicle. Some readers have maligned my intent, experience, reporting and general understanding of the issue without considering my argument carefully and reading closely to what I say.
I recognize that my stance on the MRAP debate is controversial and contrarian, but I see that as part of my job as DefenseTech editor – to seed the conversation.
One thing I have never argued is the protective capability of the MRAP. Its construction and design run circles around the Humvee if protecting the pax and crew is your sole priority. It’s an amazing vehicle that can really take a pounding.
DefenseTech ran across these pictures that attest to the MRAP’s survivability.
As you can see, the entire Marine convoy is comprised of MRAPs, and the Cougar which was hit by the IED gets truly banged up. But no one inside was killed and everyone escaped with only minor injuries. (Check out the engine blown 100 yards away)...
I don’t necessarily agree with the idea that all Humvees in Iraq should be replaced with MRAPs. But seeing these photos has me almost convinced.
The diesel-electric hybrid hype has met its match: the U.S. Army. After focusing on hydrogen fuel cells in its original version of “The Aggressor,” a high-performance, off-road Alternative Mobility Vehicle (AMV) for military ground exploration and scouting missions, the Pentagon is now going the way of Detroit -- with batteries.
The new, second-generation prototype will still utilize the same basic chassis and exterior design for light-duty capacity. But the Army’s auto research arm -- part of the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) -- has developed a battery-dominant, hybrid-electric drivetrain with a diesel engine-generator. That could make the new Aggressor the first hybrid to hit the streets of Baghdad en masse.
(Note: You may have noticed we're posting more and more stuff from Popular Mechanics these days, which is because that magazine's great staff has agreed to let us feature their best defense-related content. Look for it here and at Military.com.)
-- Ward
MRAPs Settle In - And Head to the Field
Over the last two days, the Pentagon has presented a detailed plan to the public on how it intends to equip troops in Iraq with Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. As many DT readers know, the MRAP debate is a hot topic on Capitol Hill, as lawmakers try to earn their “support the troops” stripes by thundering headlong into a massive replacement program of the Humvee with the MRAP.
Fortunately – though Pentagon chief Robert Gates claims the MRAP program is his highest priority – cooler heads have prevailed at the DoD over the fielding and use of the MRAP. The Pentagon’s top R&D official, John Young, explained that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council had finally gotten its arms around the fielding plan and decided to hold off replacing every single Humvee in the entire fleet with MRAPS – which could have questionable utility in another combat environment.
The Congress has clearly leaned forward to help us on this program. Through the end of June, the Defense Department used those funds to order 3,765 MRAPs. Approximately 2,400 of these MRAPs under contract as of the end of June are expected to deliver by 31 December of 2007. Yesterday, we asked the Congress to approve the reprogramming of an additional $1.2 billion into the program.
With all of the funds the Congress has provided and the reprogramming of an additional $1.2 billion into the MRAP program, the Defense Department, as Geoff said, can now purchase an additional 2,650 MRAPs, increasing our total on order to 6,415.
All of the 6,415 will deliver by March of 2008. Under this acceleration, DOD expects to receive an additional 1,500 MRAPs by 31 December, a 63 percent increase over that 2,400 I've told you about to a total of 3,900 MRAPs delivered from industry to the Defense Department by December, December 31st. The reprogramming is urgent because, as you all can see, the rates of production are ramping significantly. We believe 30 to 45 vehicles per day will slip into 2008 if we delay.
Under our MRAP acceleration plan, the rate of MRAP production will rise from June's production of 82 vehicles to 489 vehicles in October and roughly 1,300 per month in December that I mentioned to you earlier. So as you can see, it is important that we work with the Congress quickly to get these funds for the additional MRAPs and put these vehicles under contract. The use of available funds for the department and the reprogramming action will give the MRAP Joint Program Office $5.4 billion to immediately put on contract in 2007 for MRAPs. The level -- this level of funding makes MRAP the 3rd largest 2007 DOD acquisition program, only behind missile defense and Joint Strike Fighter.
Though Young is pushing to produce vehicles as quickly – and smartly – as he can, he and the JROC recognize that the MRAP is not the magic force field many seem to think it is. And it is not a replacement for the Humvee, says the Corps’ top money guy, Lt. Gen. John Castellaw, who’s service is only buying around 4,000 of the massive trucks...
But I've got to tell you, you know, operational requirements still trump the -- the up-armored HUMVEE will not go away. There will be operational reasons that we will want to use it in addition to the MRAP. So what this does is gives us a very important element in our operational tool bag that we'll be using along with a lot of others to ensure that our forces are protected the best they can, and also, as importantly, that they can do the job that we're asking them to do.
And Young adds…
I mean, that gets to be a tough issue about which areas really need MRAPs. I think you heard General Castellaw say up-armored HUMVEES are very effective in many areas in-theater. They're going to continue to be used. MRAPs need to go in the priority places first.
You know, this is a delicate balancing act, and I apologize. It's hard to have this discussion with you. But I'd go back to the comment I made earlier too of -- a very small fraction of attacks are underbody, underbelly IEDs, and then an even smaller fraction are EFPs right now. That may change over time. That will lead us to make adjustments.
Some of those adjustments are tactics as well as vehicles. Because a key point of this is if we're trying to protect our soldiers and Marines at the point where they IED went off, we're late. We're going to do that, because MRAP -- and MRAPs help with that significantly, and we are making that our highest priority.
But we have a number of other efforts and significant dollars going into trying to stop that IED from ever being planted, to stop it from ever being built, to stop the people that are deciding to build and plant those IEDs. And that's where a significantly greater chance of success exists to stop all those pieces of the chain. We're going to take this step because we can't afford to lose people once the detonation goes off. But we will be far more successful if we can stop the detonation from ever occurring.
And thank goodness the Pentagon is keeping its eye on the ball with regard to the development on the next-generation Humvee. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle holds great promise for increasing and tailoring protection, reducing power consumption while increasing power output, up-arming and up-armoring the military’s tactical vehicle fleet at a fraction of the weight of the MRAP.
Right now we're at -- 3,700 is our number. We got somewhere in the neighborhood of 200 plus over there now. We'll expect to have somewhere above a thousand by the end of this year, and that'll go to the units that are in the closest combat.
We are continually looking at what our future's going to be in terms of our ground mobility. We've got some assessments under way now. Surely MRAP will play a role in there. We're not exactly sure what it will be in the future. We know that such programs as JLTV will play a role. So as we continue to assist this, then we'll make resource and decisions and forward them to OSD.
And the Army’s Lt. Gen. Stephen Speakes adds…
We recognize right now that priority is protection of soldiers and Marines in combat -- that's what MRAP is designed to do. We have some important questions that we'll have to answer: How much can we pull the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle Program forward? Can we get the combination of performance, payload and protection that all of us want in a more manageable package? None of us want a vehicle that weighs between 40,000 and 60,000 pounds. So what we'd like to do is see capability provided sooner that has more flexibility and more operational capability in a variety of spectrums as you identified.
Defense Tech is keeping its eye on MRAP developments and we’ll report back the take-aways of an upcoming press conference at the Pentagon this morning. But we wanted to pass along a couple things to our readers in the interim.
First, the Pentagon asked Congress yesterday for permission to shift $1.3 billion in 2007 funds to buy MRAP vehicles more quickly. The vehicle program’s manager, John Young, and the Army and Marine Corps’ top MRAP officials, Lt. Gen. Speakes and Brig. Gen. Brogan, will address the shift and program pace at the presser today.
In other MRAP news, DT received a release from BAE Systems yesterday describing a product they’ve developed for the Army and Marine Corps MRAP fleet called the Lightweight RPG Protection Kit, or LROD. I’ll leave DT readers to draw their own conclusions on this, but it seems interesting that a vehicle that is supposed to protect troops against powerful roadside bombs needs to wear a cage around it for RPG protection. But then again, so does the Stryker, which is a highly protective vehicle in its own right.
The BAE release follows:
LROD is a lightweight, modular bar-armor system composed of an aluminium alloy that provides protection against RPGs without compromising the operational capabilities of the vehicle. Weighing less than half of comparable steel designs, LROD bolts onto the vehicle without welding or cutting, and can be repaired in the field.
The Army will procure 12 additional LROD kits for delivery this year to operational units in response to an Army Operational Need Statement. The Army has expressed interest in procuring additional kits for the entire RG31 and RG31A1 fleet. The RG31 was developed by BAE Systems in South Africa.
“The LROD system provides lightweight, low-cost RPG protection that is easily adapted to virtually any armored vehicle,” said Dr. Jim Galambos, director of business development for BAE Systems’ Advanced Technologies.
LROD was developed in response to increased threats from rocket-propelled grenades in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. It also is a candidate for use on the DoD’s mine-resistant, ambush-protected family of vehicles.
BAE Systems originally developed the system as part of a fast-response Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency program to provide RPG protection for high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. Army officials conducted more than 50 live-fire tests to validate the performance and optimize the engineering design. The modular design proved effective at preserving the integrity of the vehicle and safety of the crew in those tests.
Based on its success with Army and Marine Corps combat units, BAE Systems is designing LROD kits for other combat vehicles, including the Light Armored Vehicle BV-206 and the Amphibious Assault Vehicle both manufactured by the company. Small boats also could be protected by the LROD system.
LROD is standard equipment on the Army Buffalo explosive ordnance disposal vehicle. BAE Systems has delivered more than 100 LROD kits to the Army, with additional kits slated for the Marine Corps’ Buffalo vehicles. BAE Systems also is completing LROD designs for the company's RG33-series mine-protected vehicles.
Stay tuned for further MRAP updates...
-- Christian
MRAPs Under Scrutiny
This morning, Military.com posted a story on the findings of a Pentagon Inspector General investigation into the awarding of contracts for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles.
Defense Tech warned about this issue several weeks ago, writing that the rush to field these vehicles would pose problems for companies unaccustomed to the high-volume orders that have been mandated by Congress.
The Associated Press reports:
The Defense Department put U.S. troops in Iraq at risk by awarding contracts for badly needed armored vehicles to companies that failed to deliver them on time, according to a review by the Pentagon's inspector general.
The June 27 report, obtained Wednesday by The Associated Press, examined 15 contracts worth $2.2 billion awarded since 2000 to Force Protection Inc. and Armor Holdings Inc.
The contracts were issued without the normal competition for government work because the military determined these companies were the only ones capable of supplying the vehicles fast enough to meet the demands of deployed troops.
Yet the inspector general's report concluded otherwise.
Overall, Force Protection of Ladson, S.C., received 11 contracts from the Army and Marine Corps worth $417 million for a variety of vehicles, including its Buffalo and Cougar mine-resistant trucks.
Force Protection failed to meet all delivery schedules, according to the report, and acquisition officials knew there were other manufacturers that might have supplied some of the vehicles in a more timely fashion. The report does not provide the names of those possible alternative sources.
Mike Aldrich, a Force Protection vice president, acknowledged the delays and said the problems were caused by an inability to get essential manufacturing materials.
The company's production and delivery schedules have improved greatly in recent months, Aldrich added, noting that 100 of the Buffalo vehicles have been delivered.
"Government reports are largely written by lawyers and look intimidating when you pick them up," Aldrich said. "But our vehicles perform well in theater and have saved the lives of troops."
The inspector general's report agreed that Force Protection's vehicles have been of substantial value since they arrived.
The report, not yet publicly released, also criticizes the Army's award of a $266 million contract for crew protection kits to Simula Aerospace and Defense Group, a subsidiary of Armor Holdings of Jacksonville, Fla.
Simula lacked the internal controls necessary to ensure delivery of the kits, which were needed to make military vehicles less vulnerable to roadside bombs and small-arms fire, according to the report.
The Army received kits "with missing and unusable components, which increased installation time and required additional reinspection of kits," according to the report.
In describing the scope of the problem, the report said that some of the Simula kits delivered to the troops had two left doors, were missing side plates and contained brackets that needed re-welding.
Overall, the problems "resulted in increased risk to the lives of Soldiers," the report states.
Armor Holdings received three other contracts worth $1.5 billion for armored Humvees and armor kits to strengthen older-model vehicles.
Spokesman Michael Fox said the company had not seen the report and had no immediate comment.
In written comments to the inspector general, the Marine Corps defended its acquisition decisions for the vehicles.
The armored vehicle contracts "were executed within the law, spirit and intent of the current acquisition rules and regulations," according the comments.
In separate written comments, the Army did not object to the report's findings.
It’s cool for a July day in the nation’s capital, so I’m ready to do a few laps in a pot of boiling oil!
Inside Washington Publishers – which publishes the best-known defense newsletters dubbed colloquially “The Insides” – has been following the development of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle and the explosion of interest in this lifesaver since it erupted with the new congress in January.
For the record, as our readers will certainly remember, Defense Tech has voiced skepticism over the utility of the MRAP vehicles and the wisdom of procuring tens of thousands of these vehicles instead of using the resources to build a future Humvee with innovations in armor, power, armament, communications and crew comfort/protection that will last as long as the current one (remember the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle Program?).
Well, The Insides have been tracking each iteration of the MRAP program very closely and have published some interesting findings recently that shows the services may be backing away from the rush to procure so many of the vehicles that will have only limited utility as America’s involvement in Iraq draws down as the 2008 approaches.
From Inside Defense:
A high-level Pentagon panel avoided locking the Army into a long-term, and very expensive, commitment to acquire all of the entire 17,700 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles sought by commanders in Baghdad, opting instead to back aggressive near-term acquisition strategy coupled with periodic reviews of the situation in Iraq to curtail purchases as conditions permit.
In what participants described an unorthodox approach, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council -- headed by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the four service vice chiefs -- on June 28 endorsed in principle the Army's need for more than 2,500 MRAP vehicles acknowledging that the service may eventually need enough of the blast-resistant vehicles to equip 20 brigades.
However, participants in the meeting said the requirements panel did not formally recalibrate the MRAP requirement, which currently is 7,774, to the possible 23,044 vehicles, had the Army's entire requirement been adopted.
"They are still working toward what the right number is," said Lt. Col. Gary Tallman, a Joint Staff spokesman.
And earlier, outgoing vice chief of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, downplayed the MRAP’s ability to resist the most lethal threats in Iraq, Inside Defense reports.
One of the U.S. military's most senior officers is concerned that the intense focus on acquiring a new fleet of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles designed to protect against the blast effects of roadside bombs has created an unrealistic expectation that everyone who rides in one will be protected from a catastrophic hit.
Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was a regular passenger in MRAP-like vehicles on recent trips to Iraq, aimed in an interview to lower public expectations for the ability of the new vehicles with v-shaped chassis to protect all troops from insurgent attacks.
"No matter how much armor you put out there, all of this stuff at one point or another can be defeated," said Giambastiani, who is retiring this summer, in a June 5 interview with InsideDefense.com. "What we don't want to do is make the expectation out there that we're going to save every single individual that we put in one of these vehicles because we're putting a cocoon around them. You simply can't do it. There are weapons and techniques that can be used to defeat literally everything, including M1 tanks, Bradleys and the rest of it. So that's the bottom line."
Defense Tech as been in touch with various MRAP sources who’ve provided more information that indicate the program may need to slow down and take a more deliberate approach to finding a solution that will save lives over the long term. Stay tuned in the coming days and weeks for more gouge on MRAP development and procurement.
(Photo: Adm. Giambastiani with MRAP vehicle at Aberdeen Proving Grounds)
The AM General High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, or Humvee, has been the workhorse tactical vehicle for U.S. forces since the mid 1980s. There are no fewer than 140,000 examples in more than 15 versions in service with all military branches. The Humvee has been praised for its versatility and ruggedness, but operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed serious shortcomings, including inadequate power generation, limited seating capacity and -- most notably -- the design’s vulnerability to roadside bombs.
Building on limited deployments of specialized blastproof vehicles for engineers and bomb disposal teams, the Army and Marines are co-sponsoring programs to buy potentially thousands of so-called Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected trucks, worth as much as $1 billion, followed by 100,000 or more Joint Light Tactical Vehicles for tens of billions more. The two programs will eventually replace all Humvees with tougher, roomier designs.
But that will take decades, especially as Pentagon officials attempt to reign in costs. Acquisition czar Kenneth Krieg said in early March that he was considering moving MRAP out of the military’s fast-but-loose “rapid-fielding” process due to the anticipated scale and cost of the vehicle purchase, which he said demand careful oversight.
To keep Humvees up to speed while the military awaits replacements, BAE Systems is proposing a range of high-tech modifications, according to program manager Steve Cortese.
At the Association of the United States Army winter symposium in Fort Lauderdale on March 7-9, BAE showed off a demonstrator with the full range of upgrades, including: a new multi-band antenna that replaces a complex jumble of antennae on existing Humvees; a rear-mounted infrared camera for checking blind spots; pop-out windows for quick escape in emergencies; and a new power management system. Many of these improvements are derived from BAE’s work on the Future Combat Systems family of vehicles, slated to make their debut around 2010.
The Advanced Power Management System represents perhaps the most important change. This system, ported from FCS, provides the extra electrical power that the vehicle needs in order to support radio jammers that defeat Improvised Explosive Devices. APMS also has an export function, allowing an equipped Humvee to function as a sort of mobile generator – a capability usually seen on hybrid diesel-electric vehicles. APMS turns a standard Humvee into a “poor man’s hybrid,” Cortese says.
The mods are all based on feedback from Iraq and Afghanistan, Cortese adds. “We’re trying to be sensitive to the needs of the warfighter."
Armor is vital on the battlefield. We all remember the outcry over the shortage of up-armored Humvees in the early days of the campaign in Iraq. But when you're in a hurry to get out, all that heavy protection works against you. Here's some recent news that should give our troops another avenue of escape when things go bad: The Vehicle Emergency Escape (VEE) Window
Ninety U.S. soldiers have died and 250 have been injured in Iraq as a result of combat vehicle rollovers. Fourteen of the 90 deaths were drownings after the heavy vehicles were attacked and flipped into water where the escape doors were pinned or jammed shut.
The Army requested ideas from contractors throughout the nation last year to address the problem. The Army currently operates 30,000 armored Humvees and 40,000 unarmored Humvees.
BAE spent seven months and $500,000 developing its solution, then presented their prototype to the Army for testing earlier this month.
BAE Systems' solution, the VEE Window, looks good:
The prototype windshield, which they said can be installed in the field in one hour, is expected to give soldiers one more means of escaping quickly from a Humvee. Under the patented design, the windshield can be removed in less than five seconds...
In August, BAE engineer Michael Hafften began designing a latching mechanism that could transform the armored Humvee's bulletproof windshield into a new escape path. Hafften designed two latch pins that release the windshield with a simple quarter-turn. Soldiers then push the windshield out. The system, which doesn't compromise the security of the windshield, has been shared with Humvee maker Armor Holdings, BAE officials said.
The Humvee doesn't seem to be the right solution for most of the situations our troops are finding themselves in these days, and a better vehicle should be selected sooner rather than later. In the meantime, though, and since the Humvee will remain a mainstay for years to come regardless of any new vehicles, we need to do what we can to keep up with an evolving battlefield.
The first VEE Windows could by ready by this summer. As of now, it doesn't appear that anyone else has come forward with a design. See more pics and video at BAE's site.
The Washington Post has a fascinating report from the Anniston Army Depot, where "sprawling lots of tanks and other armored vehicles are just the start of a huge backlog" of gear broken by Iraq and Afghanistan.
"There's stuff, stuff everywhere," Joan Gustafson, a depot official, said as she wheeled her brown Chevrolet van through a landscape of rolling hills lined with armadas of mobile guns.
"There's another field of M1s," she said, motioning toward a swath of M1A1 Abrams tanks next to the winding road. "We're just waiting for someone to tell us what to do with them..."
Equipment shipped back from Iraq is stacking up at all the Army depots: More than 530 M1 tanks, 220 M88 wreckers and 160 M113 armored personnel carriers are sitting at Anniston. The Red River Army Depot in Texas has 700 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 450 heavy and medium-weight trucks, while more than 1,000 Humvees are awaiting repair at the Letterkenny Army Depot in Pennsylvania.
Despite the work piling up, the Army's depots have been operating at about half their capacity because of a lack of funding for repairs. In the spring, a funding gap caused Anniston and other depots to lose about a month's worth of work...
Responding to urgent requests from the Army and Marine Corps, Congress approved an extra $23.8 billion in October to replace worn-out equipment in fiscal 2007. With the money, the Army plans to double the workload at its depots, which will repair and upgrade 130,000 pieces in 2007, up from 63,000 last year. This will include a quadrupling of the number of tanks, Bradleys and other tracked vehicles overhauled, from 1,000 to 4,000.
At Anniston, which will handle 1,800 combat vehicles in fiscal 2007, a cavernous 250,000-square-foot repair shop is humming as damaged tanks are rolled in one by one and disassembled with the help of giant cranes. Removing an M1 tank's turret alone takes a day and a half, and the entire overhaul requires 54 days and costs about $1 million, said Ted A. Law, the depot's vehicle manager.
Earnest Linn, 58, a heavy-mobile-equipment mechanic who as of January will have worked at Anniston for 30 years, said that "it's never been like this" since the end of the Vietnam War.
Herd of Buffaloes
What started as a humble little Mom and Pop operation hand-building Cougar and Buffalo armored vehicles for the Army's Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams has expanded into a massive production push involving some of the biggest companies in the armor industry, all intended to meet skyrocketing demand for protected trucks. I go into detail over at Military.com:
Just two years ago, Force Protection had a staff of 12 hand-building one Buffalo per month, according to spokesman Wayne Phillips. Now the company employs 400 and churns out more than a vehicle per day. Force Protection is slated to build 300 Buffalos through 2010 and several hundred more Cougars. This year, Force Protection partnered with BAE Systems to build as many as 1,000 Cougar derivatives for the Iraqi Army under the U.S.-managed Iraqi Light Armored Vehicle program. In recent weeks, the company has signed a similar agreement with General Dynamics Land Systems to jointly manufacture the standard Cougar in order to meet rising demand, including 85 for the British Army.
But that will take decades, especially as Pentagon officials attempt to reign in costs. Acquisition czar Kenneth Krieg said in early March that he was considering moving MRAP out of the military’s fast-but-loose “rapid-fielding” process due to the anticipated scale and cost of the vehicle purchase, which he said demand careful oversight.
Armor is vital on the battlefield. We all remember the outcry over the shortage of up-armored Humvees in the early days of the campaign in Iraq. But when you're in a hurry to get out, all that heavy protection works against you. Here's some recent news that should give our troops another avenue of escape when things go bad: 
What started as a humble little Mom and Pop operation hand-building