A New 'Submarine' Threat?

The increased use of semi-submersibles to bring drugs into the United States has raised the specter of similar craft being employed to transport terrorists, explosives, and elicit funds into the country. But the likelihood of terrorists going that route is extremely unlikely.

Writing in The Washington Post (6 June), William Booth and Juan Forero said, "U.S. law enforcement officials say that more than a third of the cocaine smuggled into the United States from Colombia travels in submersibles." These craft, manned by a crew of four or five, and carrying up to ten tons of cocaine, are being produced in the jungles of Colombia. They transit with their decks awash or just below the surface, employing snorkel-like tubes for air for the crew and the diesel engines.  Habitability is spartan, with simple bunks and stocks of food being provided. There are no sanitary facilities.

Employing GPS for navigation, the craft sail northward-up to 3,000 miles-to rendezvous points off of the Central American coast to transfer their cargo to fishing craft or pleasure boats, which will bring the drugs into the United States. Radios are provided, but are used infrequently and then for brief, coded transmissions. There are reports that unmanned, radio-controlled craft of this type are under development for use in cocaine smuggling.

Up to 100 of these craft may have departed Colombian waters in 2008; about ten percent of the known or suspected semi-submersibles were intercepted that year. Some of their successes may have been due to being escorted by counter-surveillance vessels-fishing boats that sail with them to provide warning of the approach of U.S. or other search ships or aircraft. Upon warning the semi-submersible will stop its engine and drift noiselessly until the danger is past.

The construction of the semi-submersibles -- which are built in ones or twos at specific sites -- are changed after use to avoid detection and are relatively expensive to build. Estimates are about one to two million dollars for construction of a semi-submersible and to pay the crew.

Writing in the Naval Institute Proceedings (October 2008), Navy Captain Wade F. Wilkenson observed:

Experts conservatively estimate that each [semi-submersible] costs roughly $1 to $2 million to build, equip, and crew, so a ten-metric ton [craft],   fully loaded, is a $20 million investment. Deploy five vessels at a combined total lay out of $100 million, successfully deliver one, and you double your investment. Having all five successfully reach their destination nets a nine-fold return on investment.     

Yet, despite the success of these craft in smuggling drugs into the United States, there is little likelihood that they will be used for terrorist activities. Terrorist organizations do not appear to have the funds to construct such craft. Faced with the increasing probability of detection or even accidental loss in rough seas, would such organizations be willing to risk carrying funds or operatives in semi-submersibles?

And, people or explosives that are sent by semi-submersible must first be transported to Colombia or another starting point in South America. Also, arrangements must be made to procure the semi-submersible and man it, and then to arrange transfer to another craft for the run into the United States, and possibly arranging for an escort vessel for the semi-submersible. All of these actions would involve contacts with non-terrorist individuals, increasing the likelihood of a "leak" and possibly even blackmail in an effort to obtain more money from the terrorists for the arrangements even after a “contract” was made.

Rather, the availability of explosives in the United States, the porous U.S. maritime borders and the lengthy border with Canada, and the potential for terrorist sympathizers within the United States all argue against the use of semi-submersibles. Meanwhile, the extensive cocaine traffic using semi-submersibles argues for stronger efforts by the U.S. and allied governments to detect and stop such craft.

-- Norman Polmar

John Lehman's Solution

John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy from 1981 to 1987, has addressed "What the Navy Should Look Like" in response to the service's current array of problems. Under Lehman's guidance in the 1980s, the Navy almost reached his goal of 600 active ships, including 15 aircraft carriers and four battleships. He rejuvenated Marine aviation with both the F/A-18 Hornet and AV-8B Harrier, and provided modern aircraft and ships for the Naval Reserve.

Speaking at a Hudson Institute conference in Washington, D.C. that addressed Navy shipbuilding problems, Secretary Lehman called for a three-phase program to rebuild the Navy, maximize its capabilities, and boost its image.

First, the Navy "should look the same to everyone," according to Lehman. He explained that everyone should realize that the U.S. Navy "can visit unacceptable violence from the seas." That image should comfort actual and potential friends, and should intimidate and restrain actual and potential enemies.

As Lehman has indicated in the past, naval forces provide persistent presence, for sustained periods, without the need for overflight rights or foreign bases. This is in sharp contrast to those who propose "virtual presence" by long-range aircraft or missiles based in the United States.

Rating the Navy's capabilities, Lehman gives the service high marks for strategic deterrence (i.e., Trident missile submarines). But at lower levels of warfighting, there are "lots of holes," and "this is inviting potential enemies to move into the vacuum."

Second, the former Secretary of the Navy called for "competence" in U.S. military and naval, strategy, and in developing and building ships, aircraft, and weapons. Problems in Navy hardware programs, he contends, are due to a lack of competence among program managers and engineers. "The Navy looks incompetent managing (its) resources," he said. Lehman, however, is quick to point out that the other military services are worse.

The Navy should return to "simple line management and accountability," cutting out layers of bureaucracy. And, he said, the service should concentrate on cost analysis and engineering, not sexual harassment counseling.

Third, Secretary Lehman believes that the Navy must (again) become an "elite organization." It must be viewed as a glamorous service -- "a calling," and not simply a trade. The Navy must attract interesting and creative people. 

In discussing the reasons this is not now being done, he cited the many uniform issues that have brought criticism from Navy enlisted personnel.  Lehman was stronger in his criticism of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation that forces officers to have "joint" duty before they can screen for command. This takes them away from important assignments and experience, and it adds to "the constant bureaucratic growth" by increasing shore staffs.

In addressing fleet size -- the principal subject of the Hudson conference -- Lehman said, "Numbers do count," and called for a fleet of 350 ships. This, he said, is the minimum needed to carry out the current and predicted Navy missions. But he believes that there will be continuing fleet reductions unless the Navy can develop a realistic shipbuilding strategy as a starting point.

-- Norman Polmar

Shipbuilding Program is a Mess

The Navy's shipbuilding program is a mess. That was the consensus of several highly qualified speakers at a recent Washington seminar sponsored by the Hudson Institute. And, it was agreed, the current Navy and congressional efforts will not rectify the situation.

The fiscal year 2010 program recently presented to Congress calls for $14.9 billion in shipbuilding funds for eight ships:

1 SSN attack submarine1 DDG Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (a restart of that program)3 LCS littoral combat ships2 T-AKE replenishment ships1 HSV high-speed vessel

With a planned average ship service life of 30 years, this building rate would sustain a fleet of 240 ships. This is less than the Navy's current 283 ships and far short of the long-standing Navy "requirement" for 313 ships.

The distinguished speakers at the Hudson conference on 22 May made it clear that without a massive increase in shipbuilding funds a larger fleet was not achievable. Dr. Eric Labs, senior naval analyst at the Congressional Budget Office said that about $25 billion per year for new ships is needed to reach the Navy's goal.

Now is the time for "hard choices," Labs said. We "cannot fix problems with simple measures."  He observed that the ship procurement dollars being discussed do not include a new class of ballistic missile defense cruisers, and "it is not unreasonable" for those ships -- now designated CG(X) or, if nuclear propelled, CG(X)N, to cost $6 to $7 billion per ship.

Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, under whose direction the U.S. fleet had reached almost 600 ships in the 1980s, outlined a "new look" for the Navy (which will be discussed in a future commentary). With respect to shipbuilding problems, Lehman blamed the constant bureaucratic growth of the Defense Department, including the Naval Sea Systems Command, and the lack of "line decision makers" -- people who have the authority and responsibility to make key decisions. Only then can the continual flow of changes be made in ship requirements and construction be halted.

Lehman called for "freezing" designs and making only "block" changes in new construction programs.

Congressman Joe Sestak, a retired vice admiral, believes that the Navy could carry out its missions with a 240- to 260-ship fleet if "we bought cyberspace." Calling for the development of methods for tracking every surface ship -- both military and commercial, an expansion of the Automated Identification System (AIS) now used for large merchant ships -- and for the continuous location of submarines, he said that such information could reduce the U.S. Navy's ship requirements. 

Still, "owning" cyberspace would be expensive. And, the only way to undertake such an achievement would be to remove "cyber war" operations from the service budgets and consolidate the effort under a Department of Defense executive, according to Sestak. 

A consensus of the presentations and the questions and comments from the audience included the following points:

· The Navy's flip-flops on the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) and Burke (DDG 51) programs have hurt the Navy's image and credibility of its shipbuilding program.· The Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan, required by Congress, is unrealistic and of little value.· Poor management of the Navy's shipbuilding efforts have resulted in ship delays and cost overruns· The Navy has failed to effectively "sell" itself as a key factor in America's political-military effectiveness, in part because of the above factors · Ship numbers do count and the controversial littoral combat ship (LCS) is the Navy's only hope for increasing fleet size.· The Navy's leadership can fix the procurement mess, but must take bold and innovative action, including demanding firm fixed-price contracts and the use of second-tier shipyards and contractors to spark competition.

-- Norman Polmar

China's 'Increasing Naval Threat' Overstated

China's Navy -- officially the Peoples Liberation Army's Navy -- held an impressive naval review in the historic port city of Qingdao on 23 April, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA Navy. By any criteria, the event was a great success. Beyond a Chinese contingent of 2 nuclear and 2 diesel-electric submarines, 5 missile destroyers, and 6 frigates, there were 21 ships representing 14 other nations at the review. The U.S. Navy's contribution to the anniversary celebration was the Aegis missile destroyer Fitzgerald (DDG 62).

By the criteria of many American newspapers and, of course, bloggers, the event revealed the increasing "threat" to Western interests from China's Navy. Indeed, a Time magazine blog showed an Associated Press (AP) photo of a Chinese warship with the caption, "A Chinese navy soldier guards on a battleship at Quingdao port..." The photo, however, shows what is probably a frigate. China does not have any battleships; nor does any other nation.

Other articles -- some citing official Chinese statements indicating that aircraft carriers will be constructed "in the future" -- tell how the Chinese Navy is about to overtake the U.S. Navy, although by which measures is usually ignored. Indeed, one AP article declares that Chinese nuclear-propelled submarines "are considered just a notch below cutting-edge U.S. and Russian craft."

Reality is quite different. First, simplistic numerical comparisons are too often misleading. But quantity does provide a quality. For example:

• Nuclear aircraft carriers (CVN)
  U.S. = 11 China = 0

• VSTOL/helicopter carriers (LHA/LHD)
  U.S. = 11 China = 0

• Guided missile cruisers (CG)
  U.S. = 22 China = 0

• Destroyers (DDG/DD)
  U.S. = 60 China = 27

• Frigates (FF/FFG)
  U.S. = 30 China = 48

• Ballistic missile submarines (nuclear)(SSBN)
  U.S. = 14 China = 3

• Attack/cruiser missile submarines (nuclear)
  (SSN/SSGN)
  U.S. = 57 China = 6

• Attack submarine (non-nuclear) (SS/SSK)
  U.S. = 0 China = 55

Second, numbers alone to not convey an adequate comparison. For example, each U.S. CVN-type carrier can operate 60 or more high-performance aircraft. All U.S. cruisers and destroyers have the Aegis advanced radar/fire control system; only a few Chinese ships have the equivalent. Similarly, all U.S. cruisers and destroyers have vertical-launch systems for firing long-range Tomahawk strike (land-attack) missiles as well as surface-to-air missiles. The Chinese have no ship-launched strike weapons and their surface-to-air missiles are inferior.

Further, there is no public evidence that the Chinese SSBNs have an operational missile, and none is known to have undertaken a long-range patrol. No long-range patrols have been reported of nuclear torpedo-attack submarines (SSN), and relatively few are made by diesel-electric undersea craft.

The one category in which the Chinese Navy does pose a potential threat to the U.S. Navy -- in this writer's opinion -- is in non-nuclear submarines. The Chinese Navy has modern, Russian-built Kilo (Project 877EKM) submarines as well indigenous-built diesel-electric submarines. An Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarine program is underway.

The U.S. Navy's ability to detect these craft, especially in littoral areas is limited. This was demonstrated for two years when the U.S. Navy operated against a Swedish AIP submarine, the Gotland, "loaned" for anti-submarine exercises. According to the Swedish officers, the U.S. carrier battle groups operating against the Gotland off the southern California coast invariably failed to locate the craft.

Less is publicly known about the results/lessons of several South American diesel-electric submarines that periodically exercise with the U.S. Navy.

The Chinese Navy, supported by a large, land-based air arm and land-based anti-ship missiles, could most likely deny U.S. surface and air operations off of the lengthy Chinese coast, and in the Taiwan Strait. At this time U.S. (nuclear) submarine operations in those areas appear to be feasible. Those submarines, armed with torpedoes, mobile mines, and Tomahawk missiles provide a considerable war-fighting capability.

But the most likely scenarios for a U.S.-Chinese conflict appear to be in Third World, resource-rich areas, such as Africa and South America. And today, and for the foreseeable future, the Chinese Navy cannot project meaningful political or military power to those distances. To develop such a capability would take at least a decade, and most likely longer.

-- Norman Polmar

Gates Opaque on EFV Call

One of the decisions not yet made by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is the future of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), the new "amtrac" being developed for the Marine Corps. The EFV program was initiated in 1996 as a "high-speed" combat vehicle to carry Marines from amphibious ships offshore to the beach and, once ashore, operate as an armored personnel carrier.

But speaking at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, on 17 April, Secretary Gates said, "[W]e have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious action again. In the 21st century, how much amphibious capability do we need?" The U.S. Marine Corps has not made an opposed amphibious assault in more than half a century -- since the landing at Inchon, Korea, in the fall of 1950.

The Marine Corps has operated "amtracs" -- amphibious tractors -- since 1942. Production and the introduction of new types of LVTs for landing vehicles, tracked (with those mounting heavy guns called LVT(A) for "armored") continued, with the last model being the LVTP-7 (the "P" for personnel), introduced in 1967. The designation was changed to Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV-7) and when its successor was initiated it was designated as the Advanced AAV. On 10 September 2003, the planned AAAV was changed to EFV, according to the official Marine Corps web site, "in keeping with the U.S. Marine Corps cultural shift from a 20th century force defined by amphibious operations to a 21st Century force focusing on a broadened range of employment concepts and possibilities across a spectrum of conflict."

While the gobbledygook explains little, the Marine leadership continues to give the EFV a high priority, saying that it is vital to provide an amphibious capability into the 21st Century. As recently as 12 March of this year, Lieutenant General George J. Flynn, the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, wrote that, "This nation requires the ability to rapidly project combat power ashore from U.S. Navy ships to ensure our security against international threats. The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle remains a vital capability to accomplish that amphibious mission and is the commandant's top ground combat priority."

But after more than a decade of development and the expenditure of many millions of dollars, the prime contractor, General Dynamics, has not yet produced an operational vehicle. The principal difficulty is in making the EFV a high-speed water vehicle, that is capable of traveling from ship to shore at just under 30 m.p.h., and upon climbing onto the beach become an armored fighting vehicle, capable of 45 m.p.h. speeds on good roads.

It has a complex configuration to achieve those speeds in water and to then "transform" into a land vehicle. The vehicle's diesel engine produces 850 horsepower through a complex transmission in land mode and an impressive 2,700 horsepower through twin pump-jets in the water mode.

The EFV is intended to carry 17 combat-laden Marines and is operated by a crew of three. It would be armed with a 30-mm Bushmaster II M242 cannon and a 7.62-mm M240 machine gun.

The question must be asked, however, is how does the EFV fit into modern "amphibious" operations? The Marine Corps speaks of over-the-horizon assaults as the key component of its Operational Maneuver From the Sea. Several Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, and Naval Research Advisory Committee studies indicate that amphibious forces must stand off some 50 miles from hostile beaches because of the increasing threats from land-launched missiles, low-flying aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Thus, Marines could be afloat in EFVs for almost two hours in reaching the beach. And the word beach is significant -- EFVs come across a beach, they do not "land" at the objective, which could be an inland airfield, government building, or crossroads. Even a port that is critical for capture may not be suitable for EFV landings.

In contrast, at the same time as the EFVs are moving through the water toward the beach at about 25 m.p.h., other Marines will be landed at the objective by helicopters and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, which have much greater speeds. Further, once ashore, the EFV may not be an effective combat vehicle because of (1) its high noise level, (2) height of the vehicle, (3) treads that are vulnerable to heavy land use, (4) slow speed over certain terrain, and (5) relatively light armor.

These factors, coupled with the low probability of the need for across-the-beach landings -- which should not be confused with the potential viability of air-landed amphibious operations -- demand that the EFV program be carefully scrutinized.

The fate of the EFV will most likely be decided by the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review, a major assessment of military programs and policies, that will shape the Pentagon's fiscal year 2011 budget.  Indications are that if the review takes an objective look at the requirements for future amphibious operations and the relative costs of retaining over-the-beach assault capabilities, the EFV will receive its long-delayed scuttling.

-- Norman Polmar

Secretary Gates and the F-22 Raptor

The decision by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to halt the further production of the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor aircraft may be the most controversial of his new defense strategy. In the past Gates himself as well as other Department of Defense executives had sought to curtail F-22 production, noting that the aircraft contributes little to -- in his words -- "fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead. . . ."

But those efforts ran afoul of the F-22's large number of congressional and aerospace industry supporters, as well as Air Force's leadership. Now, however, Secretary Gates has the direction and backing of the new administration to "reshape the priorities of America's defense establishment." 

With that underpinning, Gates has stated that F-22 production will end with 187 aircraft -- the 183 planes now built and under contract plus the four aircraft in the Fiscal Year 2009 supplemental appropriation. This is less than one-half of the Air Force's stated requirement for 381 aircraft. This is based on the need to provide ten rotational Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs), each with at least one squadron of 24 Raptors.

Under Air Force planning, those 240 F-22s assigned to the AEFs would be supported by 60 training aircraft, 15 test and evaluation aircraft, 32 for backup, and 34 for attrition during the aircraft's service life (i.e., ten percent of the above).  The total: 381 aircraft.

However, in February 2009, Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz said that a new F-22 target would be "less than 381" jets, which Air Force leadership had clung to in recent years. Air Force officials recently told Congress that they would like an additional 60 or more F-22s, for a total of between 240 and 250 aircraft.

"I think it's a sign of a healthy institution that we're willing to revisit long-held beliefs, no matter how central to our ethos they may be," said Schwartz.

Conceived as the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) in the 1980s, the F-22 Raptor won a competitive development with the Northrop-McDonnell Douglas F-23 design. The ATF program was initiated to (1) insure U.S. air superiority, (2)counter the growth of advanced air defenses, and (3)allow the timely retirement of F-15 Eagle aircraft. When Lockheed was selected in 1991 to build the ATF the Air Force procurement goal was 648 aircraft.

Now, almost two decades later, the F-22 arrives on the scene as foreign air threats are far more limited.  Instead of having to counter hundreds of advanced Russian Sukhoi or MiG fighters over Europe or Asia, U.S. air forces will face only tens of advanced fighters in the likely crises and conflicts of the foreseeable future. And, beyond the ten AEFs of the Air Force, the Navy can put into forward areas up to ten carrier air wings -- with  as many as 60 F/A-18 Hornets of various models--while the Marine Corps has three aircraft wings with an aggregate of more than a dozen F/A-18 squadrons.

Secretary Gates, while announcing the end of F-22 production, has also said that he is accelerating procurement of F/A-18E and F models for the Navy, and recommending an acceleration of the F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The F-35 -- also having low-observable (stealth) features -- will come in three principal models: The F-35A for Air Force land-basing, the F-35B Short Takeoff/vertical Landing (STOVL) for the Marine Corps, and the F-35C carrier-capable model for the Navy. The ultimate procurement goal for the three services is now 2,443 aircraft.

Thus, Secretary Gates is predicting that the Navy-Marine Corps F/A-18 force, eventually supplemented and the replaced by the JSF, as well as the Air Force F-35A program will complement the reduced F-22 force to provide an adequate if not superior air capability for the country. 

Editor's note: This is the first of several commentaries by Mr. Polmar on the new defense strategy and procurement plans being put forth by Secretary Gates.

-- Norman Polmar

MV-22 Osprey Going To Sea [Gun Question...]

Discussions are underway with regard to the Marines also operating them in Afghanistan as U.S. military forces in that conflict area are increased.

For her coming forward deployment to the Middle East-Indian Ocean area the Bataan will embark the ten Ospreys of (again) VMM-263. The tilt-rotor aircraft will provide increased flexibility over the CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters that are normally deployed in LHA/LHD amphibious ships. The Osprey provides greater range, lift capacity, and speed compared to the helicopters. And, the Osprey can be refueled in flight.

The Bataan will also embark CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-lift helicopters as well as SeaCobra gunships and Huey utility helicopters. Normally these ships also have a detachment of AV-8B Harrier STOVL attack aircraft on board. It is not clear if the Bataan will carry those aircraft.

The Bataan's deployment follows a highly successful deployment of four Air Force CV-22 model Ospreys to North Africa in November 2008 for a multi-national exercise. Based at Hurlburt Field, Florida, those aircraft -- configured for special operations -- were flown overseas with in-flight refuelings. Dubbed Operation Flintlock, the 15-nation exercise in the trans-Sahara region was conducted without any significant problems with the Osprey.

The CV-22s -- from the Air Force's 8th Special Operations Squadron -- flew the 6,000-plus statute miles from Florida to Mali with several stops and with in-flight refuelings from Air Force MC-130 Hercules aircraft.

(Ironically, in 2007 several Air Force CV-22s conducted operations from the Bataan.)

Meanwhile, procurement of the Ospreys is continuing. The current Marine procurement goal is 458 MV-22 aircraft and the Air Force is acquiring 50 CV-22s for special operations (replacing the MH-53J Pave Low helicopter). Interestingly, the V-22 prefixes are erroneous as, according to Department of Defense guidance, the "M" should indicate multipurpose -- and is suitable for the Air Force special operations mission -- while the "C" prefix indicates cargo/transport, more suitable for the Marine's Osprey missions.

Read the rest of Norman's story at Military.com's Warfighters Forum...

[EDITOR'S NOTE: I spoke with a Marine Lt. Col. yesterday at a conference on Afghanistan in Washington who brought up an interesting point I hadn't thought of regarding the Osprey's gun. He's a 53 pilot and mentioned that the BAE Systems "Remote Guardian" gun that's to be retrofitted to the Osprey doesn't have the ability to engage targets while on the ground. I discussed with him the Corps' contention that landing in hot LZs is an anachronism and he argued back that while Corps planners always try to avoid that situation, sometimes you've gotta go in with guns blazing.

That brings up the whole escort problem. Cobras can't keep up with the Osprey if it's truly taking advantage of its speed capabilities, so that injects a whole nother complexity into combat planners' task. I suppose you could use another Remote Guardian-equipped Osprey orbiting the LZ to cover the one dropping off or picking up pax. I'll be interested to see how SOCOM develops TTPs for the Osprey gun.]

-- Christian

Navy Surface Force in Deep Trouble

The Obama administration, looking for potential budget cuts, may take aim at the trouble-plagued Navy surface ship programs. As well documented, the San Antonio (LPD 17) amphibious ships and littoral combat ships (LCS) are far behind schedule and over cost. Indeed, the San Antonio herself took almost three years from when the Navy placed her in commission until she was ready to undertake her first overseas deployment -- probably a record for Navy surface ships.

Meanwhile, after some ten years and many millions of dollars in development, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead has truncated the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) advanced destroyer program -- and undoubtedly wishes to cancel even the three ships already funded by Congress. Rather, Roughead wants to restart construction of the  Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class destroyers -- a design that dates to 1979. Significantly, the two previous CNOs both strongly supported the DDG 1000 while saying that the Navy did not need any DDG 51s beyond the 62 ships built and under construction.

Similarly, the Navy has periodically announced plans to cease further construction of LPD 17 amphibious ships, knowing that Congress would still fund the ships because of Marine Corps support for them.

These machinations have led Missouri Representative Ike Skelton, the Democratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, earlier this month to say that the Navy must make a final decision this year about how many and what kind of surface ships it wants to build. Skelton told the American Shipbuilding Association that he did not know yet what the administration's Fiscal Year 2010 shipbuilding request would include, but that the Navy could not afford to wait longer before settling on a course for what warships it wants to build.

"The debate about the future surface Navy needs to end this year. A decision needs to be made. After a decision is made that both the Department [of the Navy] and the Congress can support, we need to fund the surface construction program at the level necessary to restore our fleet," Skelton said. "Whether that number is 313 ships or 340 ships, we need to get there."

Meanwhile, the carrier and submarine shipbuilding programs are relatively settled -- and eating up large chunks of the relatively finite shipbuilding budget. With an estimated FY 2010 budget of $10 to $12 billion -- at most -- the Navy is now building two attack submarines (SSN) per year for a total cost of almost $5 billion in today's dollars. The next nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford (CVN 78), is expected by non-Navy sources to cost some $10 to $12 billion. Although the "flattop" is being funded over several years, such high-cost programs will leave minimal funding for surface combatants -- cruisers, destroyers, and the littoral combat ships plus amphibious ships and fleet auxiliaries.

Today the Navy has some 280 ships in service against an oft-stated requirement of a minimum of 313 ships. To build up to 313 ships the Navy should be building some 10 to 12 ships per year -- at an annual cost of more than $20 billion, clearly a "cost too far."

Addressing the problem, Representative Skelton said, "We would like the Navy to do what the Navy keeps saying makes the most sense: build affordable ships which leverage on commonality with other ship programs, and build them in numbers that allow for economies of purchase and investment in infrastructure."

U.S. sea power today is "on a bad glide slope," he added.

The Obama administration is looking at a military establishment that is fighting difficult and, in realty, open-ended conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Although the president has said that he plans to withdraw all U.S. "combat troops" from Iraq in a little over a year, that will leave some 40,000 or (more likely) more "support and security" troops in country.  Add in the U.S. training, advisory, and counter-insurgency operations in Africa and other areas, and the perceived "strategic" threats from China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia, conventional naval forces appear to have a very limited role in the future. (The more significant exception would be the planned ballistic missile defense ships -- now designated CG(X) or, with nuclear propulsion, CG(X)N.)

But looking into the future, with the continued loss of overseas bases, naval ships take on increased significance. This was evident when, without nearby bases, aircraft carriers and amphibious ships were the means of providing tactical support for the initial operations in Afghanistan. Similarly, the inability to fly most combat sorties from Saudi bases in the spring of 2003 again saw the need for naval forces for the invasion of Iraq.

If the United States does have a future confrontation -- not conflict -- with China it will most likely be over resources in Africa and South America.  Similarly, Russian support for Venezuela's regime and interests in other areas for political and economic reasons add to the probability of crises in remote areas.  And, it will be ships, carrying aircraft and embarking Marines and other troops, which will provide the U.S. president with political and military options in those areas. 

The Navy's leadership -- military and civilian -- must develop a reasonable and affordable program that will be saleable to Congress. As important, the program must be articulated properly so that all "players" understand the future importance of naval forces in this uncertain era.

-- Norman Polmar

Polmar on the C-130

There should be an expression, "Build a better airplane, and people will fly it." Today the "better" airplane in the medium-range/lift category is the same airplane that has held that spot for a half century-the Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules. In continuous production since 1954, the "Herc" has enjoyed the longest production run of any airplane in history with almost 60 nations currently flying the aircraft.

The C-130J production line at Marietta, Georgia, currently has a backlog of 86 airframes -- the largest in that variant's history -- and Lockheed Martin anticipates that the annual rate of production will increase significantly in the next several years as more customers-military and civilian-sign up for the aircraft. During the past few years the production line has produced about 12 airframes a year.

The production rate is planned to increase to 16 this year -- and to 27 by 2010 -- with further increases anticipated. Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and U.S. military services operate or have C-130J aircraft on order.

The C-130J has four Rolls Royce-Allison AE2100D3 turboprop engines of 4,591 shp each. The "J" model, which entered production in 1997, also provides a "glass cockpit" and digital avionics that make the aircraft easier and safer to operate in low-altitude maneuvers and introduces an all-weather airdrop capability. The new engines, with a six-blade propellers, enhance aircraft performance in terms of range, cruise altitude, rate of climb, speed, and short airfield requirements, while halving the number of maintenance man-hours required for each flight hour.

Beyond expected production of this model, Lockheed Martin engineers are looking at improved models, including the recently unveiled "wide-body" version. Now designated C-130XL by the firm, the aircraft is being proposed to the U.S. Air Force to meet an emerging requirement for a larger version of an intratheater airlifter after 2015. Boeing is already proposing the C-17B for this role, that aircraft to have higher-thrust engines, larger flaps, and a third main landing gear; EADS North America wants to offer the Airbus A400M to meet the same requirement.

And, of course, Hercules also fly in many specialized roles-U.S. military forces currently fly the aircraft as gunship (AC-130), electronic attack and countermeasures (EC-130), search-and-rescue (HC-130), special operations (MC-130), tanker (KC-130), research (NC-130), and weather reconnaissance (WC-130) aircraft, as well as in the straight cargo/troop C-130 (and with skis as the LC-130) configuration. There have also been drone-launch/control, strategic communications relay, and Airborne Early Warning (AEW) configurations of the Hercules. Including sub-types, there have been more than 70 military and commercial variations of the aircraft.

To demonstrate the flexibility of the Hercules, the Navy conducted a series of landing and takeoff trials with a KC-130F aboard the aircraft carrier Forrestal (CV 59) in October-November 1963. The Hercules made 26 touch-and-go landings and 21 full-stop landings. No carrier arresting gear was employed and the aircraft rollout was as little as 270 feet. After each of the full-stop landings the KC-130F took off with deck runs as short as 330 feet. In these trials, with Lieutenant James H. Flatley III, the primary pilot, the aircraft reached a maximum of 120,000 pounds, making it the largest aircraft to ever operate from a carrier.

Today, with the world economic situation, there will be still more impetus for other nations to procure a proven aircraft design like the Hercules, which can be supported with existing capabilities. This will also be true for the U.S. military establishment.
The current U.S. Hercules order of battle consists of:
Air Force (including Air National Guard and AF Reserve)
450 C-130/LC-130
25 AC-130
21 EC-130
33 HC-130
50 MC-130
20 WC-130
Navy (including Naval Reserve)
20 C-130
6 KC-130
3 NC-130
Marine Corps (including Marine Corps Reserve)
60 KC-130
Coast Guard
26 HC-130

-- Norman Polmar

The Russians are 'Pushing' Again

Russian manipulation has led to the government of the central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan telling the United States that it must cease using its Manas air base. The base is of major importance to U.S. operations and support of the conflict in Afghanistan.

Until 1991, Kyrgyzstan had been a part of the Soviet Union. And, like Afghanistan, it is a land-locked state.

Large-scale U.S. military operations in Afghanistan began shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Because no countries in the region -- including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which the United States had defended in 1991 -- would permit U.S. forces to fly combat missions from their airfields, initial U.S. air support came from aircraft carriers operating in the Persian Gulf. These included the carrier Kitty Hawk (CV 63) serving as an afloat base for special forces and their helicopters. Other flights to Afghanistan had to fly lengthy routes, with overflight permission need from several countries.

Thus the Kyrgyzstan base of Manas has been of great importance. About 500 tons of material and 15,000 U.S. troops move through the base every month. The United States has been paying the country just over $17 million per year for use of the facility.

Talks between the U.S. and Kyrgyzstan governments are continuing as this is written, but the point has been made: The president of Kyrgyzstan announced the end of American use of the base at a joint press conference with Russian President Dmitri A. Medvedev. This was another demonstration of the "new" Russia being a major player in world events.

Other recent examples of this attitude include the Russian invasion of Georgia last year, the difficult negotiations over energy pipelines to Europe through the Ukraine, the recent visit of a naval task force -- including a nuclear-propelled cruiser -- to Venezuela to boost the prestige of U.S. antagonist Hugo Chavez, the operation of a Soviet carrier task force in the Mediterranean, planted rumors that Russia is seeking to reestablish a naval base in Syria, and the periodic long-range flights toward NATO countries by Russian bombers.

These activities are not meant to provoke a conflict -- but perhaps crises. The "new" Russia is in no condition for a conflict beyond border incursions into neighboring countries (as the Georgia episode). But while the slow and expensive attempts to rebuild the country to be a significant military force, the political-military activities enumerated above will, in Russian eyes, contribute to the country again having a major role in world affairs.

Another factor, in the words of Baktybek Abdrisaev, who served as Kyrgyzstan's ambassador to the United States from 1996 to 2005, "all has not proceeded as we had hoped." Writing in The Washington Post on 20 February, he continued: "For one thing, economic arrangements relating to the base have always been obscure, and the employment and support relationships that many expected have not been realized. A couple of very troubling incidents, including the shooting death of a Kyrgyz man in 2006, have left many in Kyrgyzstan concerned about the candor of American officials and the attitude with which they approached their Central Asian partners."

But the bottom line: Russia will benefit, that government at the same time having said that it will assist in U.S.-NATO efforts in Afghanistan, including the logistics transit issues.

-- Norman Polmar

Indian-Russian Ties Are Chilling

For most of the Cold War and beyond Russia has been the prime arms supplier to India, especially with respect to naval ships, aircraft, and weapon systems. That relationship now appears to be cooling down with India even buying maritime patrol aircraft -- the new Boeing P-8 Poseidon -- from the United States. (They will replace Tupolev Tu-20 Bear aircraft.)

The two major ship acquisition projects of the Indian Navy have now been substantially delayed: The first is the "indefinite" delay in the delivery of the first Project 971M nuclear-propelled attack submarine (SSN) -- known in the West as the Akula II. A Russian newspaper has reported, "The pre-delivery trials have been postponed by the Amur Shipyard as it has no trial crew and is running short of cash."

This follows the 8 November 2008, accident in which 20 members of the shipyard’s trials crew were killed during an accident while underway in the Sea of Japan. Other crewmen were injured when fire-fighting chemicals were accidentally released into the craft. Some accounts say that other crewmen have refused to sail in the submarine. Apparently a new trials crew will not be ready before March of this year and will have to undergo a lengthy training process before it is ready for submarine trials and to train the Indian crew.

The Indian Navy was to have received the first of two SSNs on lease from Russia last year, but prior to the accident the schedule for the lead submarine was changed to an August 2009 delivery. That schedule has now been set back perhaps a year or more.

These SSNs are being acquired to train the Indian crews for the indigenous nuclear submarines being constructed under Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project. This project, undertaken with Russian technical assistance, will make India the sixth nation to have constructed nuclear submarines after the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China. However, India earlier leased a Project 670–known in the West as Charlie -- nuclear-propelled cruise missile submarine (sans missiles), from January 1988 to January 1991.

The reactor plant for the ATV project is being developed at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research at Kalpakkam. The development of a submarine reactor plant began in the 1970s. According to some sources, the shipyard at Vishakapatnam will launch the ATV submarine later this year, but the Akula II accident will undoubtedly delay completion beyond the previously estimated 2010 to 2012. There are reports that India is planning to produce five such SSNs, which could be armed with nuclear land-attack cruise missiles.

The delay in the Indian submarine is accompanied by further delays in the Indian acquisition of the Soviet-built aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. Delivery of the carrier, now being modified and modernized at the Russian shipyard Sevmash at the northern city of Severodvinsk, will be delayed several years.

The original US $1.5-billion contract signed in 2004 called for delivery of the carrier -- renamed Vikramaditya -- about 2008. The Russians have advised the Indian government that the carrier’s delivery will be delayed four or five years beyond that date, with Russian officials claiming that they underestimated the amount of work required. They are demanding another US $1.2 billion to finish the ship -- almost the same amount as the original contract cost.

In addition to rebuilding the 45,000-ton ship, originally completed in December 1987, the Russian government is to provide MiG-29K Fulcrum fighter-attack aircraft and Ka-27 Helix-A and Ka-31 Helix-B helicopters as part of the agreement.

In Indian service the Vikramaditya will replace the ex-British carrier Hermes, a VSTOL carrier that had a key role in the 1982 conflict in the Falklands, and is some 50 years old. While India is building a carrier in its own shipyards, having already paid Russia $500 million of the original contract price, and needing the Gorshkov before its indigenous ship could be delivered, the Indians are stuck with the Russian deal. . . which certainly marks a cooling in Russian-Indian relations.

-- Norman Polmar

More BMD Capabilities

The U.S. Navy's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) force -- based on Aegis-equipped missile cruisers and destroyers -- is being increased. The Navy currently has 3 cruisers of the Ticonderoga (CG 47) class and 15 destroyers of the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class configured for ballistic missile intercept. One of the former, the USS Lake Erie (CG 70), gained world-wide headlines when the ship fired a missile to intercept an errant U.S. intelligence satellite on 20 February 2008, hitting the target at an altitude of approximately 150 miles.

Writing in Defense News, Christopher P. Cavas said that the Pentagon and industry sources confirmed to him on January 7th that three additional Aegis ships will be provided with the BMD capability. Of the existing 18 Aegis-BMD ships, all but two are in the Pacific. Reportedly, the three additional ships will also be based in the Atlantic area. The Atlantic-based ships are intended primarily to provide defense in the eastern Mediterranean area against Iranian-launched ballistic missile.

Navy leaders and officials of the Missile Defense Agency -- the Department of Defense organization that directs the nation's missile-defense efforts -- have at times indicated that all 22 Aegis cruisers and 62 Aegis destroyers may eventually be upgraded to the BMD configuration. Indeed, the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, plans to ask Congress to fund an estimated eight additional Aegis destroyers primarily for their potential BMD capability.

The Aegis BMD capability has been demonstrated in 14 successful missile tests (five other tests failed); one success and one failure were in tests by Japanese destroyers. These are in addition to the Lake Erie intercept of the errant U.S. spy satellite.

The modification of Aegis ships for the BMD role consists primarily of a series of software upgrades and the arming of the ships with modified Standard Missile-2 and the special-purpose Standard Missile-3 missiles. While configured for the BMD role the Aegis cruisers and destroyers retain their full conventional warship capabilities for anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and (Tomahawk) strike operations.

In addition to the Aegis BMD force, the United States currently has 30 ground-based BMD interceptors in Alaska and California, and more than 600 ground-based PAC-3 missile interceptors. The ship -- based Aegis and Army PAC-3 systems have the advantage of forward deployment, where they can be used for early (boost-phase) intercept of enemy missiles, or can provide terminal defense for allies and overseas U.S. forces. The PAC-3 units, while mobile, cannot be deployed in overseas/forward areas without the commitment of a large number of transport aircraft and the political implications that accompany such a movement and deployment on foreign territory.

While the Navy is continuing to improve the quality as well as quantity of the Aegis-BMD force, the Army is also seeking to improve its ground-based capability, while the Air Force has a research and development program to develop an Airborne Laser (ABL) intercept system. Employing a modified Boeing 747-400F aircraft (designated YAL-1), the ABL had its first airborne firing test in November 2008. The ABL uses a chemical oxygen-iodine laser in the megawatt range. 

It is expected that the ABL will be tested against a target representating a missile in the boost phase in the fall of 2009. However, the operational feasibility of the ABL intercept system makes it highly unlikely that it could be deployed as a weapon system in the foreseeable future.

-- Norman Polmar

China Seriously Considering Carriers

The most controversial naval issue of the post-Cold War era has been whether or not China is planning to procure aircraft carriers. In late December the senior national defense spokesman, Huang Xueping, declared that China is "seriously" considering adding an aircraft carrier to its navy.

While this may be the most definitive statement to date by a Chinese official, more significant was the Chinese Navy's decision this past fall when 50 naval officers began a pilot training program at the Dalian Naval Academy to provide a cadre of carrier-based aviators.

Thus, speculation about a future Chinese carrier force continues albeit still without any public indications of whether such ships would be constructed in China or possibly purchased from a foreign source, in particular Ukraine, which contains the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolayev. That yard produced all Soviet-era aircraft carriers. Also, no definitive time table has been put forward by any Chinese officials.

And, much more significant from a viewpoint of the future of China's Navy, on 26 December a three-ship task force departed Sanya in Hainan Province for operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to help deter pirate attacks on international merchant shipping. Although Chinese warships have carried out long-range visits to other countries, those could not be considered operational missions. 

(The last time that China sent a naval expedition to East Africa was during the Ming Dynasty when the emperor's envoy Zheng He led a large armada in the early 15th Century to the region for goodwill port calls.)

The modern Chinese task force consists of two missile destroyers and a replenishment oiler. The destroyers are the Haikou and Wuhan. These are two of China's newest warships. The Haikou, completed in 2005, is an advanced air-defense ship, the Chinese equivalent of a Western Aegis-type warship. With a full load displacement of about 6,500 tons, the Haikouhas a heavy anti-air and anti-ship missile armament as well as anti-submarine weapons. Two helicopters are embarked.

The Wuhan, completed in 2004, is the same size, also with a multi-mission capability, although without the advanced 30N6E multi-function radar (Western code name Tombstone). One helicopter is carried.

The replenishment oiler Weishanhu, a 22,000-ton ship, completes the anti-pirate force. 

About 800 officers and sailors man the three ships, commanded by Rear Admiral Du Jingchen. Upon sailing, Admiral Du stated that, "China definitely has neither the intention of threatening interests of any sovereign parties nor the interest in breaking up power equilibrium in the region."

A Defense Ministry spokesman said in an earlier statement that Chinese naval forces would observe United Nations Security Council resolutions and relative international laws in fulfilling its obligations. Almost 1,300 Chinese merchant ships have passed through the Gulf of Aden in 2008, with seven being attacked. One fishing ship and her 18 crew members are still being held by pirates. Negotiations for their rescue are underway.

China's increasing world-wide political and economic interests have rarely been supported by military forces. Thus, the anti-pirate operation will provide excellent training for Chinese naval forces in such operations while at the same time giving their officers experience in tactical operations with other navies. And, for Western navies operating in the area, it will provide an excellent opportunity for intelligence collection against modern Chinese warships their procedures.

-- Norman Polmar

Keeping Marines Off the Beach

As the new administration takes office, the defense budget will come under extensive scrutiny. A recent editorial in The New York Times entitled "How to Pay for a 21st-Century Military" calls for a halt to the F-22 Raptor fighter, the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer, SSN 688 Virginia-class submarines, and MV-22 Osprey programs, among others.

Some "big dollar" programs could be cut, in part to demonstrate the seriousness of the Obama administration to reform the U.S. military establishment. But there will be many programs at risk that have less visibility. One of the leading candidates for cancellation is the long-gestating Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), the advanced "amtrac" that has been under development for almost two decades.

The Marine Corps now has ten of the EFVs -- that designation being assigned in 2003 to replace the more prosaic but useful AAAV -- Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, which in turn replaced the LVT -- Landing vehicle Tracked -- designation in 1982.

The EFV can carry 17 Marines on land or sea, at a speed up to 45 mph on land and about 25 knots at sea.  The EFV’s range is 325 miles on land and 65 nautical miles at sea.

But those specifications are the "rub." How does the EFV fit into the Marines Corps concept of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)? That concept calls for launching an assault from 25 to 100 nautical miles from the objective -- which may be an inland location, such as an airfield, capital, or military base. Recent studies by the Defense Science Board (DSB) and Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) call for amphibious ships to stand offshore at least 50 miles because of the threat of land-launched cruise missiles (as struck the Israeli frigate Hanit operating off the Lebanese coast in 2006).

Thus, launching an assault from 25 or more nautical miles offshore would see the assault troops flown in by MV-22 tilt-rotor STOVL aircraft and CH-46E and CH-53E helicopters, the former at more than 300 mph and the helicopters at more than 100 mph. And, of course, they could land troops on an inland objective.

Follow-up equipment that was not air landed would be brought ashore by Air Cushion Landing Craft (ACLC), with a new design being developed, and the few remaining LCU landing craft.

Where does the EFV fit in? It cannot be launched from more than about 30 miles offshore because of its limited waterborne range if it is to return to the launching ship; it could be launched farther out if it is to then climb ashore and operate as a personnel carrier. And, even at 30 miles the transit time would be more than an hour, or longer if the seas are rough. If too rough, of course, the EFVs could not be employed.

After the EFVs "hit the beach" they must then travel to the objective. At that point the troops will have been "in the box" for at least an hour. Once ashore, an EFV operating as a personnel carrier has the benefit of a relatively heavy gun armament -- a 30-mm cannon and 7.62-mm machine gun. But it will lack support from armored vehicles -- tanks or even the Marines’ valued LAV (Light Armored Vehicle) -- making the EFV particularly vulnerable to the widely proliferated anti-tank weapons found in the Third World.

The official cost of the EFV is $10 million per vehicle, with several hundred planned to replace the existing AAV-7 series. The total EFV force will not be fielded until at least 2020.

With some "bugs" still to be worked out after two decades of development and the high cost per vehicle, coupled with the operational limitations or at least questions about how the EFV fits into the OMFTS concept, the EFV must be considered a highly visible target for administration budget cutters.

-- Norman Polmar

Problems Persist for SEAL Mini-sub

The nations' problem-plagued effort to develop an effective means of landing special forces from submarines has suffered still another setback. The Navy's lone Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) suffered a six-hour fire in November that probably marks the end of that program.

The single ASDS vehicle originally was to have been the first of at least six such vehicles, intended to be clandestinely carry swimmers into forward areas by submarines. The swimmers would ride the ASDS vehicles to go ashore or to enter harbors to carry out secret missions such as sabotage, intelligence collection, and planting sensors.

Each ASDS vehicle, manned by a two- or three-man crew, would accommodate eight SEALs or other special forces and their gear in a dry, pressurized environment.  Other than the single ASDS -- which has now been left a smoldering wreck -- troops can only come ashore from submarines in rigid-hull rubber craft or in the Navy's few Mk VIII "wet" swimmer delivery vehicles. Further limiting operations, the Mk VIII is carried in a Dry Deck Shelter (DDS) that is mated to the submarine's deck aft of the sail structure. The Navy has only seven DDS structures.

The program suffered several setbacks even before the fire that ravaged the ASDS vehicle. As is happening to most U.S. Navy ship programs, the ASDS "vehicle" was behind schedule and far over cost projections. The vehicle was completed in 2001 by Northrop Grumman's Ocean Systems in Annapolis, Maryland, and was "conditionally" accepted by the Navy. In 2003 it was assigned to SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 at Pearl Harbor. The craft suffered major problems with its propulsor, electrical system, and batteries. (Its original zinc batteries were replaced with lithium-ion batteries.) Because of these and other problems, plus cost increases, in 2006 the U.S. Special Operations Command -- sponsor of the program -- and the Navy cancelled the procurement of the five planned additional vehicles.

Read the rest of this story and other Polmar's Perspective entries at Military.com's Warfighter's Forum.

-- Norman Polmar

Flying Submarine or Submerging Seaplane?

The answer is simple: Submarines cannot fly, but seaplanes can submerge -- if you build them properly.

That's what the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is seeking to develop. A recent Request for Proposal (RFP) from DARPA calls for a submersible aircraft [that] would combine the key capabilities of three different platforms: (1) the speed and range of an aircraft; (2) the loiter capabilities of a boat; and (3) the stealth of a submarine. "By combining the beneficial characteristics the and operating modes of each platform, DARPA hopes to develop a craft that will significantly enhance the United States tactical advantage in coastal insertion missions," according to the RFP.
The irony of the RFP is that the U.S. Navy was developing such a craft some 45 years ago.

The objectives issued by DARPA are for a vehicle that would have an airborne tactical radius of 1,000 nautical miles, a low-level flight radius of 100 nautical miles (which may leverage surface effects), and a submerged tactical radius of 12 nautical miles. The sum of these must be achieved within eight hours. Endurance on the surface has to be 72 hours in sea states up to five between inserting and extracting personnel. The craft's payload objective is eight men and their equipment with a total cargo weight of 2,000 pounds.
DARPA has identified the major challenges to the project as (1) weight, (2) fluid flow regime, (3) structure, (4) lifting surface geometry, and (5) power and energy storage. These factors force the consideration of a seaplane that can submerge as opposed to a "submarine that can fly." The relatively light construction of an aircraft can be submerged to shallow depths, and to even great depths with internal pressurization. But submarine-like vehicles, built to withstand greater depths, are too heavy for consideration.

The U.S. Navy had begun contemplating the merger of aviation and submarine technologies into a single vehicle as early as 1946. By that time several Navy laboratories were looking into the required technologies. When asked by the press in 1946 whether such a vehicle could be produced, Vice Admiral Arthur W. Radford, at the time the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, replied: "Nothing is impossible."

A decade later, in 1955, studies were being conducted under contract from the Department of Defense by the All American Engineering Company while aviation pioneer John K. (Jack) Northrop was designing such craft. The All American vehicle was to alight on and takeoff from the water on "hydro-skis"; once on the water the craft could be "sealed" and submerge.

Although nothing resulted from these studies, by the early 1960s the U.S. Navy was ready to invest in such a vehicle. A Navy engineer working on the project, Eugene H. Handler, explained, in a 1964 article in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, "there is... a tremendous amount of [Soviet] shipping in the Soviet-dominated Baltic Sea, the essentially land-locked Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the truly inland Caspian Sea. These waters are safe from the depredations of conventional surface ships and submarines."

The Navy's Bureau of Naval Weapons -- at the time responsible for aircraft development -- awarding a contract to Convair in 1964 to examine the feasibility of a "submersible flying boat," which was being called the "sub-plane" by those involved with the project. The Convair study determined that such a craft was "feasible, practical and well within the state of the art."

The Bureau of Naval Weapons specified a set of design goals:

air cruise speed 150 -- 225 mph air cruise altitude 1,500 -- 2,500 feetair cruise radius 300 -- 500 n.miles maximum gross takeoff < 30,000 lb submerged speed 5 -- 10 knotssubmerged depth 25 -- 75 feet submerged range 40 -- 50 n.miles submerged endurance 4 -- 10 hourspayload 500 -- 1,500 lb takeoff and land in State 2 seasSeveral firms responded to a Navy request and a contract was awarded to Convair to develop the craft. The flying boat, which would alight and takeoff using retractable hydro-skis, would be propelled by three engines -- two turbojets and one turbofan, the former for use in takeoff and the latter for long-endurance cruise flight. Among the more difficult challenges of the design was the necessity of removing air from the engines and the partially full fuel tank to reduce buoyancy for submerging. Convair engineers proposed opening the bottom of the fuel tank to the sea, using a rubber diaphragm to separate the fluids and using the engines to hold the displaced fuel.

To submerge, the pilot would cut off fuel to the engines, spin them with their starter motors for a moment or two to cool the metal, close butterfly valves at each end of the nacelles, and open the sea valve at the bottom of the fuel tank. As the seaplane submerged, water would rise up into the fuel tank beneath the rubber membrane, pushing the fuel up into the engine nacelles. Upon surfacing, the fuel would flow back down into the tank. The only impact on the engines would be a cloud of soot when the engines were started.

When the engines were started their thrust would raise the plane up onto its skis, enabling the hull, wings, and tail surfaces to drain. The transition time from surfacing to takeoff was estimated to be two or three minutes, including extending the wings, which would fold or retract for submergence. Only the cockpit and avionics systems were to be enclosed in pressure-resistant structures. The rest of the aircraft would be "free-flooding." In an emergency the crew capsule would be ejected from the aircraft to descend by parachute when in flight, or released and float to the surface when underwater. In either situation the buoyant, enclosed capsule would serve as a life raft.

The craft would have a two-man crew and could carry mines, torpedoes or, under certain conditions, agents to be landed or taken off enemy territory.

The Navy Department approved development of the craft, with models subsequently being tested in towing tanks and wind tunnels. The results were most promising. But in 1966 Senator Allen Ellender, of the Senate's Committee on Armed Services, savagely attacked the project. His ridicule and sarcasm forced the Navy to cancel a project that held promise for a highly interesting "submarine." Although the utility of the craft was questioned, from a design viewpoint it was both challenging and highly innovative.

DARPA would do well to check the Navy's historical records as it embarks on the development of a flying submarine -- -oops, I mean submerging seaplane.

-- Norman Polmar

New Rescue System Replaces Submersibles

The Navy has officially placed in service a new submarine rescue capability, replacing its long-serving and highly versatile rescue submersibles. The Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System (SRDRS)replaces the submersible Mystic, the Navy's last Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV).

The SRDRS, according to Navy statements, "is a rapidly deployable rescue asset that can be delivered by air or ground, installed on pre-screened military or commercial vessels of opportunity. . . and mated to a distressed submarine within a 72-hour time to first rescue period."

Unfortunately, only two of the three major components of the SRDRS are now available, and the system in some ways lacks the flexibility of the now-discarded DSRVs. The SRDRS is a three-phased acquisition program:

The first phase was the Atmospheric Dive System 2000 (ADS2000), which was delivered to the Navy in 2006. This is a manned, one-atmosphere dive suit that enables a diver to inspect a disabled submarine on the ocean floor to a depth of 2,000 feet, i.e., approximately the "crush depth" of the U.S. Navy's deepest-diving submarines. The diver would also have a limited ability to clear debris from escape hatches.

The second phase is the Rescue Capable System (RCS), delivered to the Navy in October 2008. This system is based on the "Falcon," a tethered, remotely-operated, pressurized rescue module that is lowered from the surface ship to "mate" with the escape hatches on a disabled submarine. The survivors climb into the module, which is then brought back up to the surface ship. The RCS also includes the ship-based launch and recovery system, and controls. The Falcon can conduct rescue operations to a depth of 2,000 feet, can mate to a disabled submarine at a list and trim of up to 45 degrees, and can transfer up to 16 personnel at a time.

But the third phase of the SRDRS -- that will not be delivered until late 2012 -- is the submarine decompression system. This will enable rescued submariners to remain under pressure during the transfer from the rescue module to hyperbaric treatment chambers aboard the surface ship to prevent their being affect by the "bends" as they reach surface pressure after being in a disable submarine that might have increased internal pressure.

The Navy touts the SRDRS as being air transportable and then able to be taken to sea in a variety of pre-designated U.S. and foreign naval and merchant ships.  However, being a surface-based system, the SRDRS is vulnerable to bad weather and rough seas and, of course, could not affect a rescue under Arctic ice.

The SRDRS underwent a test and operational evaluation during the international submarine rescue exercise Bold Monarch in May-June 2008. The rescue module transferred personnel from three participating submarines -- from Norway, the Netherlands, and Poland. More recently, the SRDRS conducted an exercise with the Chilean submarine Simpson on 17-18 September 2008.

The SRDRS replaces the rescue submersibles Avalon (DSRV 2), which was deactivated on 1 September 2000, and the Mystic (DSRV 1), deactivated on 1 October 2008. Both DSRVs became fully operational in late 1977, although they were completed several years earlier. The DSRVs, also air-transportable, could be carried and supported by specially designed surface ships -- that have since been discarded -- and submarines (SSN and SSBN) that have special fittings provided. Several U.S. and foreign submarines were modified to carry a DSRV. The rescue submersible could then be carried to sea and both launched and recovered from the submerged "mother" submarine.

The DSRV could mate with all U.S. submarines except for the new discarded NR-1 and Dolphin (AGSS 555) as well as most foreign submarines. A DSRV could carry 24 survivors (plus 3 or 4 crewmen), and could transport them under pressure to the mother submarine, which could also have a pressurized compartment to receive the survivors. And, with the DSRV there was no need to place a diver on the disabled submarine, in part because the DSRV had a capability of both examining the submarine and clearing debris from a hatch. However, while the DSRVs had a capacity of 24 crewmen compared to 16 for the Falcon rescue chamber, the latter received power through its tether while the DSRVs required a two-hour battery charge between rescue cycles.
The two DSRVs were built as part of the comprehensive Deep Submergence Systems Project (DSSP), established following the loss of the nuclear-propelled submarine Thresher (SSN 593) in 1963. Two DSRVs were built, each weighing 37 tons and just under 50 feet in length. They had an operating depth of 5,000 feet -- far beyond the collapse depth of U.S. submarines -- and, because they could be clandestinely employed from submarines, they provided a very use capability for special missions.

The DSSP also sponsored the development of advanced emergency submarine location devices, submarine escape gear, the ability to locate and recover small objects on the ocean floor, and a large object salvage capability. It was also responsible for developing systems for the nuclear-propelled research/recovery submersible NR-1.

-- Norman Polmar

Is China Moving Toward a Carrier?

After more than a decade of speculation about China obtaining an aircraft carrier, there appears to be some movement in that direction -- although not related to procurement of a ship. Rather, there are reports that 50 Chinese naval officers have begun a pilot training program at the Dalian Naval Academy to provide a cadre of carrier-based aviators.

The Chinese Navy already has a large, shore-based air force, which includes more than 400 aircraft, mostly fighter/attack types, but also a score of Chinese-produced Tu-16 Badger strike aircraft as well as training and transport aircraft. There are some 26,000 personnel assigned to the naval air arm, according to the web site "Periscope."

The training program for the 50 students is reported by some sources to cover a four-year period. The training will largely be conducted at the Faculty of Automation Engineering at the Dalian school, which in one of several Chinese naval education institutions. The students will also learn seamanship alongside their colleagues who will become surface ship and submarine specialists.

The program will include flight training. The major questions are (1) will their flight training include carrier operations and (2) how and when will China acquire a carrier. With respect to the first, while simulated carrier-deck training can be conducted ashore, at some stage the student pilots must go aboard ship. This could be done through agreements to train aboard a foreign carrier -- possibly Russian or Indian. The U.S. Navy periodically permits carrier ops from its carriers for the carrier-less Argentine naval air arm.

The second issue -- of Chinese carrier procurement -- is far more perplexing. Press reports continue to declare that the Chinese Navy is rehabilitating the never-finish Soviet carrier Varyag, moored at Darlian since 2002, to constructing a nuclear-propelled "super carrier" of almost 100,000 tons, i.e., the size of the U.S. Nimitz (CVN 68)-class carriers. Both of those options are highly unlikely. Other than a new coat of paint, the Varyag has had no work done on her since arriving at Dalian; she lacks electronic gear, radars, and other vital equipment, and her engines are inoperable. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that many of the equipment producers for the Soviet carrier program are no longer making the appropriate equipment or are no longer in business. The cost of making the Varyag operational would be similar to that of constructing a new ship. (The Varyag design dates to the 1970s.)

Similarly, the cost and effort to design and construct a 100,000-ton ship as China's first carrier could instead produce two ships of perhaps half that size, a much more efficient approach to the problem. And, of course, having two ships available would provide more at-sea time for the carriers.

New construction ships could certainly be built in China, which has produced very large merchant ships, although destroyers are the largest warships that have been built in the country. A class of LPD amphibious ships of about 17,000 tons full load is now under construction. Another option would be to have a carrier built in the Ukraine, where the Black Sea Shipyard No. 444 constructed all previous Soviet aircraft carriers. Those ships were the largest warships to be constructed outside of the United States since the end of World War II. The Ukrainian government would certainly welcome a contract from China to construct a major warship in the yard.

Of significance, in the late 1980s the Chinese Navy had another naval training program in which nine pilots were graduated from a three-year training course. They were then assigned to shipboard duties and, reportedly, all have become destroyer commanding officers. Some observers believe that these men could become the commanding officers of a future Chinese carrier force. The program was interesting because Chinese naval aviators -- like their Soviet counterparts -- are not "line" officers in the Western sense and normally do not serve as ship's company, and cannot succeed to command of a ship.

Another complication is the issue of carrier-based aircraft. In the past, Chinese Navy pilots have reportedly undertaken short-run takeoffs and landings using the indigenous J-8 fighter on a simulated carrier deck, but the aircraft's poor aerodynamic performance makes it impossible for real shipboard operations. The indigenous, third-generation J-10 and J-11 fighters are potential candidate, but both would require substantial structural modifications before they could take off and land on a carrier deck.

The Russian press has reported the Chinese purchase of up to 50 Sukhoi Su-33 Flanker-D fighter-attack aircraft. These fighters, manufactured by the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Production Association, were to be delivered to China 2007-2008. But none are known to have entered Chinese service -- assuming that the reports of their sale are correct. The Su-33 (formerly Su-27K series) are flown aboard the Russian Navy's only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. (The Chinese Navy has experience with Sukhoi aircraft, currently having 24 land-based Su-30MKK2 fighter-bombers since 2004. Thirteen countries fly variants of the Su-27 Flanker series, including the Chinese Air Force.)

There is no question: The Chinese Navy is seeking to develop a carrier capability; but there are many, many questions about how that goal will be achieved.

-- Norman Polmar

Bye-Bye Pave Low, Hello Osprey

The deployment of the CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft to North Africa this month for Operation Flintlock 09 overshadows the retirement of the long-serving MH-53 Pave Low helicopter. The final Pave Low mission was flow in Iraq in September by the Air Force’s 20th Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron.

Once numbering 39 helicopters, the Pave Low fleet was employed around the world for low-level missions to insert and take out special forces as well as for Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) operations. The Sikorsky H-53 series is the largest helicopter flown in the West, with the largest (three-turboshaft) H-53E variants also flown by the U.S. Navy (MH-53E) and Marine Corps (CH-53E).

The Air Force retired the last MH-53M Pave Low IV variants -- all upgraded from earlier models -- in September. The Air Force is acquiring 50 Bell-Boeing CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft for the special operations role. The CV-22 and MH-53 are roughly the same size (but with very different configurations); however, the Osprey is much faster and has a greater range, and is provided with an in-flight refueling capability. (In July 2006 two MV-22s flew across the Atlantic in the first trans-ocean flight of the aircraft.)

The Marine Corps has already forward deployed its Osprey variant, the MV-22. In October 2007 the Marines sent ten MV-22s to Iraq, where they continue to operate. The Marines have a requirement for 360 MV-22s for the assault and combat support missions, replacing the long-serving CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter. (The original Marine requirement -- developed during the Cold War era -- was for 552 MV-22 aircraft.) The Marines currently have four MV-22 deployable squadrons plus a transition squadron, with a schedule to activate two additional squadrons per year.

At a press conference last May, Marine officials cited the excellent record of the MV-22 in Iraq. During a seven-month period the unit -- with ten aircraft -- flew 2,500 sorties, with each averaging 62 hours per month. Pre-deployment forecasts were that the MV-22s would fly about 50 hours per month. Maintenance time was 9.5 hours per flight hour (compared to 24 hours for the CH-46E).

The U.S. Navy has a requirement for 48 HV-22 aircraft for the CSAR role. But the Navy has yet to fund procurement of those aircraft. Thus, the probable near-term U.S. buy of V-22 Ospreys is on the order of 400 to 450 aircraft.

At times the U.S. Army has also expressed interest in the V-22, with some official statements having cited about 230 aircraft for the medical evacuation role as well as for Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA). Again, there are no near-term procurement plans. And, several other countries have expressed interest in eventual procurement of the tilt-rotor aircraft.

Perhaps further into the future, various Bell Boeing studies have indicated the feasibility of anti-submarine (SV-22) and airborne early warning (EV-22) variants. Such aircraft could operate from the Navy’s large aircraft carriers as well as from LHA/LHD-type VSTOL carriers.

-- Norman Polmar

Potential Russian Launch Base in Cuba

Even as a Russian naval task force enters the Caribbean for joint exercises with Venezuelan forces, and a pair of Russian Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bombers fly from a base in the Kola Peninsula to Venezuela, the Russian government is discussing the possibility of a satellite launch facility in Cuba.

Revelation of the interest in Cuba came from Anatoly Perminov, the head of the Russian space agency Roscosmos, in a September statement. This may be the latest move by Russian prime minister (and former president) Vladimir Putin to reestablish Russia as a key "player" on the world political-military scene.

The Russian interest in the Caribbean-South America region is reflected in the high-level Russian delegation visiting the area, led by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. Perminov is part of the Sechin delegation.

(Sechin had visited Cuba on 30-31 July of this year for talks with Raul Castro and, possibly, the ailing Fidel Castro.Putin followed up Sechin's visit with a 5 August announcement that Russia should "restore [its] position in Cuba and other countries.")

The Soviet Union-Russia was the principal political and economic supporter of Cuba from the early 1960s through the demise of the USSR in December 1991. Indeed, Soviet attempts to establish Cuba as a strategic missile and military base led to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 when the United States and Soviet union came closer to a nuclear exchange than at any other time during the 45-year Cold War. After the demise of the USSR support for Cuba ended, causing considerable economic hardship in Cuba.

A major satellite launch facility in Cuba would permit placing satellites in certain orbits that cannot be done from Russian launch sites: Easterly launches close to the equator are the most efficient because of the earth's rotation, maximizing the payload that a launch vehicle can boost into orbit. Such a launch facility and its support infrastructure would be a major source of employment and foreign investment for the Cuban economy.

From the Russian perspective, beyond the political impact of having a major technical facility less than 100 miles from the U.S. coast, it easily enables the reestablishment of a major intelligence collection capability in Cuba. (From the mid-1960s until 2002 the Soviet military intelligence agency -- the GRU -- operated a massive collection facility at Lourdes, Cuba. At its peak operation it was manned by more than 2,000 technicians, both military and civilian.)

Russia's interest in the Western Hemisphere far exceeds Cuba and Venezuela, as the Moscow regime seeks to sell arms to other South American countries, gain access to South American resources (which is now subject to major Chinese efforts), and to develop improved commercial ties to an area that many feel has long been ignored by the United States.

While some Americans will see a satellite launch facility in Cuba as a "cover" for the possible use of such launch stands for military missiles, that concern is a non-starter. U.S. satellite surveillance and the presence of numerous American technicians and businessmen in Cuba, as well as visiting educational groups, would make such a clandestine effort impossible.

Further, because of the non-military nature of such a facility -- which would take several years to establish -- the U.S. government would be hard pressed to claim that it violated the 1962 agreements between Moscow and Washington that prohibited strategic weapons -- missiles and bombers -- from being installed in Cuba.

As the Russian government reacts to American anger over Russian intervention in Georgia, the continuing expansion of NATO, and U.S. plans to install ballistic missile defense systems in Eastern Europe, a non-military satellite launch installation in Cuba could be considered a valid action by the Moscow regime. Of more concern to American leaders should be the arms sales to Venezuela, especially the expected sale of up to five advanced diesel-electric submarines of the Project 877EKM or Varshavyanka series, known in the West as the improved Kilo class.

These submarines and other arms sales -- and joint Russian-indigenous weapon programs -- will enhance Russia's influence and access to resources in South America. And that situation could greatly harm U.S. interests.

-- Norman Polmar

Ships that Won't Sail

"No more amphib excuses" reads the headline of a recent editorial in Navy Times newspaper. The editorial went on to enumerate some of the problems being encountered by the Navy's new amphibious ships of the San Antonio (LPD 17) class.

After a construction period that lasted twice as long as planned, and cost twice as much as originally budgeted, the San Antonio was belatedly placed in commission on 14 January 2006.

But the ship was not ready for service and, after two and a half years of being "fixed," the San Antonio was to deploy with an amphibious group. But on the eve of her August sailing it was discovered that there were problems with the stern gate to her docking well, where LCU landing craft and AAV amphibian assault vehicles are carried and discharged.

After additional work was performed the ship was able to deploy two days later.

Still, the San Antonio probably goes down in Navy history as having taken the longest time on record from being placed in commission to first deployment. This is amazing when one considers that the LPDs are basically "transport ships" with docking wells and helicopter decks. The Navy has been building docking well ships since the early 1940s, with the first, the USS Ashland (LSD 1), completed in 1943.

The new LPDs have relatively simple and basic systems -- no high-tech radars, no sonar, no advanced missiles, no nuclear propulsion, no advanced electronic warfare systems. Okay. As the Navy Times editorial of 8 September pointed out, the Navy and industry spokesmen "repeatedly have given the same excuse: You will always have issues with the first ship of a class."

That is not a true statement -- look at the intervals between being placed in commission and the first deployment of the first U.S. nuclear-propelled submarine, the Nautilus (SSN 571); the first Polaris submarine, the George Washington (SSBN 598); the first nuclear surface warship, the Long Beach (CGN 9); the first Aegis warship, the Ticonderoga (CG 47); and many other high-tech lead ships.

Now the second ship of the San Antonio class, the USS New Orleans (LPD 18), has been found to suffer from a long list of problems. That ship, also behind schedule and far over cost, was commissioned on 5 March 2007 -- a year and a half ago. The recent report of a Navy inspection team concludes that the ship "cannot support embarked troops, cargo or landing craft," and was deemed "degraded in her ability to conduct sustained combat operations."

These ships were built by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems at Avondale, Louisiana. An additional ship, the Mesa Verde (LPD 19), was commissioned on 15 December 2007, and several more are under construction at the yard.

By accepting these ships the Navy has taken responsibility away from the shipbuilder to pay for fixing these massive problems. Beyond these issues, the basic design of the LPD 17 must also be questioned. Compared to the Navy's previous LPD class of 12 ships completed from 1965 to 1971, the San Antonio class is one-third larger (24,900 tons compared to 16,585 tons), but has minimal improvements in troop, vehicle, and landing craft capacities, with a slight increase in speed.

Coupled with the delays and major cost increases in the Navy's littoral combat ship (LCS) program, and the Navy's continued confusion and changes in the DDG 1000 advanced destroyer program, the credibility of the Navy's shipbuilding efforts must be questioned. When addressed in the broad context of the shrinking size of the fleet and the expected reductions in shipbuilding budgets, the situation should be considered critical

-- Norman Polmar

Russian Force to the Caribbean

The Russian government is sending one of the world's largest warships into the Caribbean for a joint naval exercise with Venezuela. This will mark the first time since the end of the Cold War in December 1991 that a Russian naval force will sail that "American sea." The ships will operate in the Caribbean during November, showing support for Venezuela's government, which is strongly anti-United States.

Leading the Russian force will be the Petr Velikiy, a 26,000-ton, nuclear-propelled "battle cruiser." The ship, completed in 1998, is the world's largest warship other than aircraft carriers, and displaces more than twice as much as the largest U.S. surface combatants, the Aegis missile cruisers of the Ticonderoga (CG 47) class.

While Russian officials have denied that the deployment is linked to the United States sending naval ships into the Black Sea to visit a Georgian port, the Petr Velikiy cruise certainly reflects Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's efforts to demonstrate that Russia is again a major political-military "player" on the world scene. The single Russian aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, led a task force into the Mediterranean in late 2007, and there have been periodic long-range flights by Russian Bear bombers as the Putin regime seeks to impress other nations that Russia is still a great power. Admiral Eduard Baltin, former commander of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, said that the Caribbean maneuvers mean that "Russia is returning to the stage in its power and international relations which it, regrettably, lost at the end of last century".

"No one loves the weak," Baltin was quoted as saying by Russia's Interfax news agency.

Baltin, in January 2007, had declared that there was a buildup of U.S. nuclear-propelled submarines in the Persian Gulf area for the purpose of a Tomahawk missile strike against Iran.

"The presence of U.S. nuclear submarines in the Persian Gulf region means that the Pentagon has not abandoned plans for surprise strikes against nuclear targets in Iran. With this aim a group of multi-purpose submarines ready to accomplish the task is located in the area," he said.

There has been intense Russian interest in the Caribbean area since 1959, when Fidel Castro took control of Cuba and began negotiations with the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. As the Soviets built up an arsenal of defensive and offensive weapons in Cuba in 1962, there were plans to dispatch cruisers and destroyers as well as submarines to the area to be based in Cuban ports. In the event, at the time of the crisis only a few Soviet diesel-electric submarines were in the area. Following the crisis additional conventional submarines visited the island's ports, with the first nuclear submarine arriving in 1969. Almost simultaneously a missile cruiser and two other surface combatants visited Cuba. Additional Soviet warships made periodic deployments into the Caribbean, including the helicopter carrier-missile cruiser Leningrad in 1984.

At the same time as these ship visit to Cuba, naval Bear reconnaissance/targeting aircraft made periodic flights from their Northern fleet bases, down the Atlantic, and landed in Cuba for short-term operations. They subsequently returned to their Soviet bases.

Such flights and warship visits came to an end with the demise of the Soviet Union.

The relatively modern destroyer Admiral Chabanenko (completed in 1999), probably another surface combatant, and an oiler will accompany the Petr Velikiy to the Caribbean. The nuclear-propelled warship is one of two remaining ships of a class of four "battle cruisers" at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. The two other ships are no longer operational. These giant cruisers have combination oil-burning and nuclear propulsion plants that can drive them at 32 knots. They are armed with a massive array of anti-ship, anti-submarine, and air/missile defense weapons.

-- Norman Polmar

Signal Changes

The U.S. Navy's leadership has shown unprecedented ineptitude in the handling of surface ship programs. The previous (and ongoing) mass of problems with the amphibious ships of the LPD 17 class and the littoral combat ships (LCS) seem to pale in comparison to the handling of the DDG 1000 "destroyer" program.

For eight years the Congress and public have heard the Navy's leadership -- civilian and uniformed -- declare that they wanted no more ships of the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class. Sixty-two of these destroyers are in service or under construction.

Chiefs of Naval Operations Vern Clark (July 2000 -- July 2005), Michael Mullen (July 2005 -- September 2007), and Gary Roughead (since September 2007) had been adamant that the DDG 1000 was the surface combatant of the future. All three admirals are surface warfare specialists, giving credibility to their statements.

Furthermore, the 30-year shipbuilding plan, which the Navy Department presented to Congress in February 2008 (covering the period fiscal years 2009-2038) still indicated a total of 32 DDG 1000s.

The DDG 1000 program -- assigned the class name Zumwalt -- dates to the early 1990s and a Mission Needs Statement that evolved from the Navy's post-Cold War strategy paper …from the Sea (1992). The strategy postulated that future Navy emphasis should be oriented toward supporting joint/coalition operations against the shore. The "land-attack destroyer" and DD-21 concepts followed, evolving into the DDG 1000.

But this spring the Navy's leadership essentially stopped supporting the DDG 1000 within weeks of contracts being awarded to construct the first two ships. At the same time, the Navy's leaders began advocating for eight or nine additional Burke-class destroyers. Now, at congressional instigation, the third DDG 1000, which is in the president's fiscal year 2009 budget, is also being supported by the Navy leadership.

Another turn-around? Not really, as the Burkes are still being asked for in addition to the three DDG 1000s. As indicated in an earlier blog, the DDG 1000 offers improved capabilities in most warfare areas compared to the earlier destroyer as well as greatly enhanced survivability features. Indeed, the Burke-class destroyer design, which dates back to 1979, will be extensively modified compared to the earlier ships, in part because of basic upgrades to that design, and in part because newer features must be provided to make the ships viable for the next three decades. These changes and other factors will increase the cost of the new Burkes to at least $2 billion per ship compared to just over $1 billion for those units now being completed. (By comparison, in production the DDG 1000s are estimated to cost about $2.5 billion after the first two ships, which are estimated at $3 billion each.)

The situation is confusing, in large part because of the actions of the Navy's leadership. This state of affairs will lead to the new Congress and the new Secretary of Defense undoubtedly taking more control of the Navy's shipbuilding program next January.

-- Norman Polmar

War and Peace -- Russian Style

The massive Russian air, ground, and naval assault against the country of Georgia is certainly reminiscent of the earlier Soviet assaults against East Germany and Hungry, and, to some degree, the Russian campaign in Chechnya. But there are major differences in the cause of the current conflict and in the world political-military situation from those earlier military operations.

At this writing there were strong indications that the odd situation in the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia could have only led to conflict. The border provinces appear to have had Russian “peacekeepers” in them to “protect” the interests of the local populations that include many Russian citizens and sympathizers. According to Russian sources, Georgian troops attacked those Russian troops, although the exact circumstances of the initial exchange are unknown.

In response, after a brief delay, Russian forces invaded the two provinces, taking control after inflicting heavy civilian casualties -- some press reports cited approximately 2,000 deaths. But the Russian troops, carried in armored personnel carriers and supported by aircraft and helicopters, continued into Georgia, reportedly coming within 12 miles of the Georgian capital of Tbilisi.

In addition to civilian (and military casualties), Georgia has suffered perhaps 100,000 people being uprooted, and severe damage to towns and cities.

Georgian troops -- trained and partially equipped by the United States -- were unable to withstand the Russian onslaught. As this blog was written it appears that the Russian government has accepted the truce, brokered in part by the French government.

Why did the Kremlin order the land-air-sea assault on its weaker neighbor? Obviously, the Russian regime is concerned about South Ossetia and Abkhazia and their large Russian populations. There were certainly other factors. American influence in Georgia has been increasing over the past few years; when the Russian assault began there were 35 U.S. civilian contractors and almost 100 military personnel in Georgia to help train the army. More than 1,000 U.S. troops -- including reservists and national guardsmen -- were recently in Georgia for a joint exercise.

Further, Georgia has been seeking full membership in NATO. The continued expansion of NATO since the end of the Cold War, especially including Eastern European states, has particularly been a concern of the Russian government. This situation has been exacerbated by recent U.S. proposals to build advanced X-band ballistic missile detection radar in the Czech Republic and base ten interceptor missiles in Poland. The stated rationale for these installations is to protect Western European countries from long-range missiles launched by rogue states, including Iran. The perspective from the Kremlin, however, is that these defenses -- and other U.S.-sponsored military activities -- as well as the missile defenses are part of an American campaign to encircle the Russian state.

Thus, some Western officials and analysts see the Russian action in Georgia, beyond the obvious intent of protecting Russian citizens and sympathizers in the border provinces, as a clear message to the United States that further expansion American political-military influence in Eastern Europe will not be tolerated.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government is attempting to gain support for political actions by Western European countries and the United Nations, hopefully to censor Russia. There is no possibility that the United States will take military action against Russia, or immediately rush to the support of the shattered Georgian army.

-- Norman Polmar

LCS No. 1 Underway at Last

The Navy's first littoral combat ship, the Freedom (LCS 1), got underway for the first time on 28 July. The first ship of a program that seeks some 55 advanced-technology ships for operations in coastal/littoral waters, the Freedom is being constructed on Lake Michigan by a team led by the Lockheed Martin Corp.

The Freedom and the competitive design, led by the Independence (LCS 2) built by a General Dynamics-led team, are noteworthy in being more than a year behind schedule and costing more than twice as much as originally estimated. The contract cost of these ships was to be on the order of $220 million -- plus the innovative "mission packages" that would be installed when they were ready for operations. The LCS 1 cost is now estimated at $550 million. And, it may be more before the ship is ready for delivery to the Navy later this year.

The delays and cost increases of the LCS program led to Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter cancelling the construction of LCS 3 and 4, to have been built by the Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics teams, respectively. The "mess" of the LCS program also led to the firing, reassignment, or resignation of several naval officers, including the Program Executive Officer for Ships, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition).

Subsequently the LCS 5 and LCS 6 were also cancelled in 2007 as the Navy sought to restructure the overall program. Under current plans, the Navy will procure:

FY 2008   1 LCSFY 2009   2 LCSFY 2010   3 LCSFY 2011   3 LCSFY 2012   4 LCSFY 2013   6 LCS

The Navy's program goal still calls for some 55 of these ships. Each ship will have a set of container-like modules and an MH-60 series helicopter plus unmanned vehicles (air, surface, and underwater), as well as associated surface craft in some configurations, that will comprise a mission package. In theory, these packages could be swapped between LCS hulls. Each LCS will have a core crew and a team of specialists will embark in each ship with the mission package.

At this time the Navy plans to procure 24 mine warfare packages (approximately $68 million each), 16 anti-submarine warfare packages ($42.3 million), and 24 surface warfare packages ($16.7 million). Thus, if all are procured, the Navy would have flexibility in swapping modules at U.S. ports or, if the packages are flown overseas, at forward ports.

After the Freedom and Independence complete their builder and sea trials, the Navy will decide wither to procure one or the other design, or a force mix of both designs.

The Freedom is now running builder trials, to be followed by Navy acceptance trails. The ship will displace 2,862 tons full load and is 378-feet long -- the size of a corvette or small frigate. The Navy, of course, could not accept such mundane designations for an innovative ship concept, and invented the LCS designation.  Since the early 1940s "L" ships were landing ships (LSD, LSM, LST, etc.). Subsequently, from 1968-1969 all of the Navy's larger amphibious ships -- command ships, transports, cargo ships, and helicopter carriersc were also given "L" designations (LCC, LPA, LKA, LPH, LHA, etc.).

Thus, the LCS marks still another break with Navy designation procedures as well as with naval tradition. But then again, on several counts -- both good and bad -- the LCS concept itself is a break with tradition.

-- Norman Polmar

Polmar on Sinking the Zumwalt

While no "final" decision has been revealed, the indications "inside the Beltway" are that the Navy's long-gestating DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer program will end with only two ships.  Indeed, there are also rumors that even those two ships will not be constructed.

Contracts have already been awarded for the first two destroyers -- authorized in the fiscal year 2007 budget -- to General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (Maine) and to Northrop Grumman (Pascagoula, Mississippi). Originally the Navy planned a class of 32 of these DDGs, but, as previously reported here, last year the Navy cut the program to seven ships, although the 32-ship requirement was still "on the books." 

The Navy's leadership, both uniformed and civilian, has been lackluster in its support of the DDG 1000 class. Indeed, the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, when recently asked by Congress what he believed the new ships' most important feature would be, he told of the reduced manning for the ships.

The new "destroyers" are to have a full-load displacement of almost 15,000 tons and an overall length of 600 feet -- the dimensions of a cruiser by most standards. Armed with two 155-mm rapid-fire guns (with a range of more than 75 miles firing guided projectiles) and 80 Standard and Tomahawk missiles or their equivalent, and fitted with a large manned- and unmanned helicopter facility, the ships would be highly capable, multipurpose units.

The price has become a "deal breaker" for some involved in the shipbuilding process. The Navy estimates that the first two ships will cost $3.3 billion each, with follow-on ships to cost $2.5 billion.  This compares to the last of the 62 Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) destroyers having a cost some $1.2 billion each.

The most likely, near-term alternative to the DDG 1000 is to resume construction of the Burkes. The Navy now has 62 in the fleet and under construction. The former CNO, and now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, has declared repeatedly that the Navy does not need additional Burke-class ships.  And, restarting that line and updating the ships would give them a pricetag of about $2 billion each. (The Burke original design dates from 1979.)

Further, according to Navy data, even building two Burkes per year, and dividing the buy between the two shipyards, would probably not enable keeping the Bath Iron Works yard in business.

The lack of Navy support for the DDG 1000 is seen by some observers as a rationale for accelerating the Navy's next surface combatant, the CG(X) missile cruiser, which would be optimized for the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) role. This seems ironic because there was no Navy requirement for the DDG 1000 to have that role, although her new-design radars could certainly have been developed with that capability. Of course, even after the ships are completed their radars/fire control systems could be upgraded for the BMD role. That is exactly what is being done now for the Aegis cruisers of the improved Ticonderoga (CG 47) class and for the Burke-class destroyers.

Further, the CG(X) is getting significant support in Congress, especially from Representatives Gene Taylor (D-MISS) and Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD), who want that ship to be nuclear propelled. They have even proposed a new generation of Burke-class ships with nuclear propulsion!  Both proposals are ludicrous when one looks at the percentage of U.S. oil consumption by the Department of Defense (less than 2 percent) and the percentage of that which is used to drive U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships (about 8 percent). Considering the additional cost to design and construct nuclear-propelled ships; adding the cost of recruiting, training, and retaining nuclear-qualified personnel; and including disposal costs of those ships, and the idea does not hold water.

Further, the basic DDG 1000 design could become the CG(X) -- obviously not CG(X)N -- with only modifications to the ships' radar/fire control systems. The ships have a significant growth margin and deleting the two 155-mm guns could provide space for additional missiles or other advanced features.

The DDG 1000 is not, in this writer's opinion, the best surface combatant that could have been produced at this time. But considering the time and dollars that have been invested in developing the DDG 1000 design and the ship systems, and the Navy's need for additional surface combatants, the DDG 1000 is far, most superior to the alternatives available. 

-- Norman Polmar

Gliding Across the Atlantic

An unmanned submersible operated by Rutgers University's Coastal Ocean Observation Laboratory (COOL) is "flying" -- underwater -- from New Jersey to Spain. The remote-controlled undersea glider will travel more than 3,800 miles, and will collect key scientific information on the temperature and salinity of the Atlantic Ocean.

"The big advantage is, it's totally unmanned," according to Conrad Lautenbacher, head of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which sponsors the submersible. "It's very efficient and can be used to obtain the same kind of data we gather from ships."

In general, sea gliders are Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) that use small changes in buoyancy in conjunction with wings to convert vertical motion to horizontal, and thereby propel themselves forward with very low power consumption. While not as fast as conventional AUVs with propulsion systems, gliders using buoyancy-based propulsion represent a significant increase in range and endurance compared to vehicles propelled by electric motor-driven propellers. The sea glider has a battery-powered data collection and satellite communication system. The U.S. Navy as well as NOAA have been developing such sea gliders for several years.

During its trans-Atlantic cruise the glider will periodically rise to the surface of the ocean to transmit data up to a satellite. But most of the time the COOL glider will travel at depths between 15 feet to 300 feet below the surface. The COOL researchers will share all collected oceanographic data with the Navy and other interested agencies. The lack of a propulsion system will aid in data collection, alleviating self-noise interference.

The Navy is also looking into glider-type AUVs -- which it calls UUVs for Unmanned Underwater Vehicles -- for several missions, primarily to undertake environmental measurements in areas where surface ships or aircraft (dropping sensors) cannot easily operate. And, of course, flotillas of such unmanned gliders would be much cheaper than manned research ships and craft.

The COOL-developed submersible is yellow, less than 8 feet long, and weighs about 130 pounds. Developed by Rutgers University, the craft will also provide the university with other important information, such as how long the craft’s batteries will last and systems reliability. Larger and more capable AUV/UUVs are being developed by the Navy under the auspices of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command’s systems center in San Diego and the Office of Naval Research.

According to the 2000 Program Guide to the U.S. Navy, the highest priority missions for Navy UUVs, presumably including gliders, are intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; mine countermeasures (i.e., locating and mapping mines); and anti-submarine warfare. Sea gliders could be very useful in collecting environmental information for ASW operations.

-- Norman Polmar

The Next Generation of UAVs

The U.S. Air Force is initiating a program to develop the Next Generation Unmanned Aerial System (NG-UAS) or unmanned aerial vehicle while Washington is still in an uproar over the last major Air Force contract competition -- the KC-X advanced tanker aircraft. And, the Air Force action takes place while the UAV picture is clouded by a protest filed in May against the Navy's contract award to Northrop Grumman for the Global Hawk-derived RQ-4N aerial vehicle for the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) system.

The notice to industry for the NG-UAV sent out by the Air Force in May seeks a follow-on UAV to the highly successful MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper aircraft, the latter a much improved variant of the Q-1 series. Those UAVs -- with the prefix letter "M" -- indicating multimission -- have proved invaluable in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

The Air Force lists seven potential key missions for the NG-UAV:

These missions are to be carried out in all low- and some medium-threat environments. 

The NG-UAS platform is planned to have capabilities beyond existing UAVs. Compared to the MQ-1 Predator and the derivative MQ-9 Reaper, the new vehicle would have improved maneuverability and time on station among other features.  The planned initial operational capability of the NG-UAS would be 2015. The MQ-1 Predator, developed by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, first flew in July 1994; the improved Predator-B, which was redesignated MQ-9 Reaper, first flew in February 2001. Both have been produced in the hundreds. They have suffered significant losses in the combat area, albeit several losses being due to collisions with smaller, low-flying UAVs. Still, their efficacy cannot be questioned.

General Atomics has already developed a candidate for the NG-UAS role now known as Predator-C. That UAV is believed to have swept-back wings and stealth characteristics. The firm has not "pushed" the Predator-C because of the continuing demand for its Predator and Reaper UAVs.

Other firms, notably Northrop Grumman, which produces the also highly successful RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV and is said to have a scaled down version in the works, as well as several foreign firms are expected to enter the competition for the NG-UAVs. Still, as both U.S. and foreign aerospace firms consider the Air Force's interest in the next generation UAV, the dark cloud of the controversial KC-X program and now the protesting of the Navy's BAMS competition award hang over the NG-UAS landscape.  

-- Norman Polmar

'Ma Deuce' Days May be Numbered

Probably the longest serving weapon in the U.S. military arsenal is the Browning .50-caliber M2 machine gun. Often referred to as "ma deuce" for its M2 designation, the weapon entered U.S. service at the end of World War I, being scaled up from the Browning .30-caliber M1917 machine gun. The .50-caliber weapon was initially designated M1921.

Using a round designed by Winchester, the .50-caliber machine gun was originally intended for ground troops to use against enemy troops. Subsequently, it was employed as an anti-aircraft weapon and then became the standard armament of U.S. warplanes. In 1932, the design was updated and redesignated M2.

Ground and naval machine guns could be air- or water-cooled, the latter having large "jackets" around the barrel. The weapons had rates of fire from 500 to 650 rounds per minute. Mounts for vehicle and shipboard use soon had twin barrels, while a fixed quad-barrel mount was developed for ground and vehicle use. Its light weight permitted up to eight guns to be carried in fighters and it fit into single-, twin-, and quad-barrel turrets on U.S. bombers. The weapon was used in every theater of World War II by U.S. and allied troops--by 1945 the U.S. Army authorized 237 .50-caliber guns in each infantry division, 385 in each armored division, and 165 in each airborne division.

The "ma deuce" was used in large numbers in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, in other crises and conflicts, and, of course, in the Gulf War of 1991 and the later invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Now, after almost 90 years of service, the U.S. Army has moved to replace Browning's remarkable machine gun. The Army recently ordered three prototypes of a lightweight .50-caliber machine gun. Produced by General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products, the weapon weighs about one-half of the current .50-caliber M2HB (Heavy Barrel) machine gun, fires with less recoil and is equipped with technology to improve accuracy, according to the company.

The Army and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) will test the new guns and then apply the lessons learned to a potential production design. Low-rate initial production could begin as soon as 2011.

It would take several years for the new weapon to replace the "ma deuce" in U.S. service. But even if it does so, the M1921/M2 would have been in service for a century.

Its inventor -- John Moses Browning (1855-1926) -- was one of America's most prolific gun inventors. After making his first gun from scrap metal at age 13, he went on to design pistols, rifles, and machine guns. The U.S. Army began using his machine guns in 1890. Browning's innovative weapons also included the .30-caliber M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), used in U.S. Army and Marine Corps squads from World War I through the Korean War.

-- Norman Polmar

India's Navy Expanding Rapidly

While Chinese naval modernization efforts are capturing the attention of Western naval officials and analysts as well as journalists and even bloggers, little attention is being given to the Indian Navy's massive expansion effort. Mohammed Ahmedullah, a leading defense writer, wrote in Military Technology (2/2008):

"With the second biggest Army in the world and a rapidly expanding Navy, India knows that it needs to modernize fast, leapfrog in technology and accumulate military assets rapidly over the next decade if it has to safeguard it growing economic might with military teeth. . . ."

Within a decade the naval forces of India will include two large aircraft carriers, a large force of missile-armed surface warships, and a significant submarine flotilla, probably including three nuclear-propelled attack submarines. The rationale for the expansion of the Indian fleet is to protect the flow of oil to India's rapidly growing economy.

However, the Indian subcontinent sits astride the tanker sailing routes from the Middle East to Chin and Japan. And, Indian naval forces could come into play with respect to the continuing turmoil and quest for resources in Africa.

The current Indian Navy expansion program provides for the rehabilitation of the Soviet-built, 44,570-ton carrier Admiral Gorshkov in a Russian shipyard. That project is far behind schedule and over cost; the ship should be fully operational about 2015. India has also begun construction of an "air defense ship" -- a 40,000-ton carrier to be completed about 2018. (India now operates the 28,700-ton, ex-British VSTOL carrier Hermes; she was originally launched in 1953 and completed in 1969, and has been extensively rebuilt.)

Now being procured are advanced missile-armed destroyers and frigates. Some are being fitted with the highly-touted Israel Barak-8 air-defense system.

With respect to submarines, the Navy currently operates 14 relatively modern submarines: four German Type 209/1500 (built in Germany and India) and ten Russian-built Kilo/Project 877EM. Some of the latter are being fitted to fire the Russian-developed Klub-S submerged-launch, anti-ship missile. However, there have been some problems encountered with that modification to the submarines.

Six French-built Scorpene torpedo-attack submarines are under construction in at the Mazagon Dockyard in Mumbai. These will replace the last of the Foxtrot/Project 641 submarines operated by India.

Most significant, India will again operate nuclear-propelled submarines in the near future. Three Akula/Project 971 torpedo-attack submarines are on order, being constructed in Russia. These are 33-knot, relatively quiet submarines, capable of operating to 1,970 feet feet, armed with four 21-inch and four 25.5-inch torpedo tubes and carrying 40 tube-launched missiles and torpedoes. (India previously operated a nuclear submarine from 1988 to 1991, when a Soviet Charlie I/Project 670 cruise missile submarine was leased to India. Soviet personnel operated the submarine's reactor-propulsion plant.)

For the past two decades India has also been working on the development of an indigenous nuclear-propelled submarine, officially labeled the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). The project has encountered numerous difficulties, but there are reports that the first ATV submarine is now under construction at the Mazagon Dock Yard. The first of several such craft may be completed as early as 2010. She will have a submerged displacement of some 7,000 tons and will carry cruise missiles as well as torpedoes.

The Indian Navy is also procuring advanced aircraft to support fleet operations: These include MiG-29K multi-role aircraft and Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters for the carriers, and land-based Il-38D maritime patrol aircraft.

Whereas in the past few decades the Indian Navy has relied upon Soviet and -- to a lesser degree -- British naval technology, Indian leaders are shopping world-wide. Israeli, French, and South African as well as Russian weapons are being sought. And, the former U.S. amphibious ship Trenton (LPD 14) was transferred to India in 2007 and it is likely that six Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules aircraft will be acquired. Obviously, there are other U.S. naval platforms and systems of interest to India.

Thus, the Indian Navy is undergoing a massive expansion. By some criteria the naval expansion is greater than that of the other services. And, unlike the Chinese naval modernization, India's efforts are taking advantage of essentially all of the world's naval technologies and are being undertaken with relatively little publicity.

-- Norman Polmar

New Allies from Old Enemies

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were unforgiving "enemies" from the mid-1950s through the end of the Cold War. True, the two communist giants did - with great caution - collaborate to arm and train the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War. But politically and even ideologically they were enemies.

Indeed, after President Richard M. Nixon's visit to China in 1972 the United States and China entered a period of limited cooperation aimed against the Soviet Union. Over the past 35 years this relationship has had up and downs - in the 1980s the Reagan administration began a military relationship, which included the establishment of a U.S. "listening post" in China to intercept Soviet communications; during the Clinton administration there was considerable technology transfer to China, while U.S.-China economic ties grew precipitously.

Following the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 Russia and China entered a new relationship, which soon included massive sales of Russian military equipment to China including high-performance aircraft, destroyers, submarines, and other advanced weapons. Now Russia and China have reached a new level of cooperation - some might label it collaboration.

Russia's new president, Dmitri Medvedev, has just completed a visit to Beijing. With China's President Hu Jintao, Medvedev has signed a joint statement declaring that Russia and China are ready to push forward a new level of economic cooperation between their nations. Medvedev said that his country's relationship with China is now a driving force on the world stage and can no longer be ignored - that the international community can no longer make major decisions without the participation of the two countries. He added that Russia will continue to pursue close ties with China, even if it makes other countries uneasy. "Our activity is not directed against any other country but serves to maintain an international balance," Medvedev said of Russia's new level of cooperation with China.

Among the other declarations of the two leaders during the May visit by Medvedev, they joined in criticizing plans of the United States to build a missile defense system in central Europe. From the start of that effort the Russian government believed that its purpose was to neutralize Russia's IBCM force.

Both China and Russia are veto-wielding permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, where they have coordinated positions on controversial issues such as independence for Kosovo, which both countries oppose, as well as the Iranian nuclear issue. And, unlike most Western nations, Russia has not voiced concerns about China's human rights record or its assault on the protest movement that erupted against Chinese rule in Tibet last March.

This was Medvedev's first official foreign trip since becoming Russia's president earlier in May. That action in itself is of major international significance. During their May meeting President Hu accepted an invitation from Medvedev to visit Russia in 2009.

The two leaders also signed a $1 billion agreement for Russia to build a uranium enrichment facility in China. Not publicized, their staffs also discussed an increase in military cooperation between the two countries.

Meanwhile, Russian air and ground forces are dispatching planeloads of humanitarian aid to China to help with earthquake relief efforts.

Not yet clear are the long-term implications for the United States and other Western states of the new Russia-China relationship. Prior to the recent meeting in Beijing, alarmists in the United States called attention to Russian military sales to China. These are expected to increase. Less attention has been given to the more important implications of Chinese efforts to increase influence and to obtain critical resources in Africa and the Middle East. Russian-Chinese collaboration could certainly exacerbate this situation.

-- Norman Polmar

Is China Building Aircraft Carriers?

The recent flurry of articles and revelations about the submarine-hiding tunnels on Hainan Island in the South China Sea has again raised questions about China’s aircraft carrier program. Indeed, some articles have suggested that the tunnels may be large enough to "hide" an aircraft carrier -- a clear impossibility.

[Photo of 'concrete' carrier: Marc van der Chijs blog]

Articles regularly cite Chinese plans to rehabilitate the ex-Soviet carrier Varyag, now moored at the port of Dalian, or even the carrier Minsk, moored as a "theme park" at Shenzhen. Other articles cite alleged Chinese plans to build up to six aircraft carriers in the near term. A South Korean newspaper has stated that "A source close to Chinese military affairs said . . . that China has been promoting the construction of a 93,000-ton atomic-powered carrier under a plan titled 085 Project. The nation also has a plan to build a 48,000-ton non-nuclear-powered carrier under the so-called 089 Project."

The Chinese Navy is certainly interested in aircraft carriers. At the end of the Cold War a Chinese naval delegation visited the Black Sea shipyard at Nikolayev in the newly established Ukraine nation to examine the unfinished Soviet carrier Varyag. Subsequently, shortly before his retirement in 1997, Admiral Liu Huaqing wrote that it was "extremely necessary" for China to possess aircraft carriers. Liu was Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Navy from 1982 to 1988, and the vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission from 1989 to 1997.

According to Liu, aircraft carriers are needed to protect China’s sovereignty and maritime resources, especially with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea; guard China’s sea lines of communications as the country industrializes and becomes a major trading power; enable China to keep up with regional powers such as India and Japan; and give China’s Navy a decisive edge in future naval warfare.

In the early 1990s the Chinese Navy began a large-scale modernization program, acquiring advanced submarines, destroyers, anti-ship missiles, and aircraft, primarily from Russia.  Rumors surrounded those acquisitions that a carrier program was begun when China acquired the unfinished Russian Varyag and the retired carrier Minsk in the late 1990s. But both ships had been stripped of all useful aviation and electronic equipment, and their propulsion plants are inert; at best they could provide Chinese naval architects with hands-on design information.

Upon arrival in China the Minsk spent 18 months at the Guangzhou Wenchong Shipyard for repairs and rehabilitation. She was then towed to Shenzen, arriving on 9 May 2000, configured as the center piece for a military a museum-theme park.  She is certainly not capable of being returned to service as an operational carrier.

The Varyag is equally problematical. Since being towed to Dalian she has been painted but no other work has been observed, with the ship being readily visible from public locations.

Returning the Varyag -- designed in the 1960s -- to operational service would require new propulsion and auxiliary machinery, new electronics with the attendant wiring of the ship, structural repairs, and other work. Looking at the continued delays and increasing costs of a Russian shipyard rehabilitating and upgrading the Soviet-built carrier Admiral Gorshkov for the Indian Navy, objective analyses shows that the Varyag is highly unlikely to be returned to service. She has lain idle with no work on the ship having been observed since her arrival at Dalian on 3 March 2002.

Rather, it can be expected that in the next few years the Chinese Navy will initiate the construction of small carriers -- possibly modeled on the recent Japanese-built dock landing ships and aegis destroyers that have large flight decks.  Such ships would be a reasonable step toward the eventual construction of large carriers -- to be started a decade or more from now.

-- Norman Polmar

A Super Secret Sub Base?

Has China "secretly built a major underground nuclear submarine base that could threaten Asian countries and challenge American power in the region"? Thomas Harding, writing in the London Daily Telegraph early this month, has declared that it is.

According to Hardy, "Satellite imagery, passed to The Daily Telegraph, shows that a substantial harbour has been built which could house a score of nuclear ballistic missile submarines and a host of aircraft carriers."

The threat from Chinese submarines, long touted by "hard liners" in the West, now includes the ballistic missile submarine base and protective tunnels for the craft being constructed at Sanya on the southern tip of Hainan Island in the South China Sea.

The report comes almost simultaneously with word that a Chinese Type 094 (NATO Jin-class) ballistic missile submarine was sighted at the base in satellite images. Also visible was a newly constructed pier that appears to be a demagnetization facility for submarines. Demagnetization is conducted before a submarine deploys to remove residual magnetic fields to reduce the craft's vulnerability to magnetic mines.

The satellite image was taken by the QuickBird commercial satellite on 27 February 2008, and purchased by the Federation of American Scientists from DigitalGlobe.

China is believed to have completed two Jin-class SSBNs with at least one more unit under construction. (An older SSBN is also in service; see below.) The U.S. Intelligence Community estimates that China would probably build five SSBNs if it wants to have a near-continuous deterrent at sea. Each Jin-class SSSBN will carry 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. A "score" of such submarines -- as reported in some newspaper accounts -- seems highly unlikely.

While some Western defense analysts as well as journalists are touting this new Chinese capability, it should be noted that there have been submarine tunnels in southern Hainan for probably two decades or more and that similar (albeit smaller) tunnels are also found at the Northern Fleet's Jianggezhuang naval base. Indeed, China has long constructed tunnels for military (and civilian) purposes in the even of a nuclear conflict. This writer visited some of those near the base complex of Dairen, near the Soviet-Russian border.

Further, while submarines could be "hidden" in the tunnels, they could be observed by U.S. reconnaissance satellites as they enter and leave the tunnels. This possibility, coupled with the likely noise level of the Jin-class SSBNs would increase their vulnerability to U.S. detection and surveillance methods.

Also, in wartime, any submarines in the tunnels at the outbreak of hostilities would be vulnerable to the tunnels being easily blocked by U.S. conventional or nuclear weapons.

Certainly the Chinese Navy is being modernized, although it is significantly smaller than it was during the Cold War era. The slow development pace of China's SSBN force, the failure of the first Chinese SSBN, the Type 092 (NATO Xia) completed in 1988, to have ever made a deployment, and persistent reports that a ballistic missile for the SSBNs is not yet available, raise major questions about this aspect of the "Chinese threat."

-- Norman Polmar

The F-117 Nighthawk is Gone. . . We Think!

The F-117 Nighthawk -- the U.S. Air Force's greatly touted stealth attack aircraft -- is gone. At least, we think it's gone -- can one really be certain with a stealth airplane? The aircraft, which won combat honors during operations over Panama, Serbia, and Iraq, was officially retired in late April after a 27-year service life.

"It was a mistake to retire them," said Dr. Richard Hallion, former historian of the Air Force and special assistant to that service's secretary. Hallion explained to this writer that the large number of F-16 and F-15 fighter-type aircraft flown by the Air Force are not stealthy and the number of F-22 Raptors, which do have stealth characteristics, are too few in number to meet the U.S. need for low-observable strike aircraft.

Cited by the Air Force as the world's first operational aircraft designed to exploit low observable -- stealth -- technology, the F-117A entered service in 1982. Through 1990 Lockheed built 59 aircraft at a Burbank facility.

The F-117 first flew in combat during the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 that led to the capture of dictator Manuel Noriega. F-117s were also flown in the air campaign over Serbia in 1999, and were among the first aircraft to strike targets in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

One F-117 was shot down by Serbian anti-aircraft fire on 27 March 1999. Serbian forces launched Soviet-provided "Neva-M" missiles (NATO designation SA-3 Goa) to down the F-117A serial number 82-806. The pilot ejected after the aircraft was struck and was subsequently rescued by Allied forces.

According to then-NATO commander General Wesley Clark and other NATO officials, Serbian air defenses found that they could detect F-117s with their radars operating on unusually long wavelengths. This made the aircraft visible by radars for short times.

The wreckage of the F-117 was not immediately bombed due to possible media fallout from news footage showing civilians around the wreckage. The Serbs were believed to have invited Russian personnel to inspect the remains, inevitably compromising the U.S. stealth technology.

Some of the wreckage is reportedly on display at the Museum of Yugoslav Aviation close to Belgrade's Nikola Tesla Airport.

During the 1991 air campaign against Iraq, the F-117 was the only coalition aircraft to fly over Baghdad. (The Navy's ship-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles also "flew" over Saddam's capital city.)

F-117s flew combat missions only at night, hence their name Nighthawk.

The F-117 was born at the Lockheed "Skunk Works" in Burbank, California, the same design facility that produced the ultra-secret U-2 and SR-71 spyplanes. A production decision was made in 1978 and the first flight was made on 18 June 1981. The single-seat F-117's low-observable characteristics were derived from both its bat-like shape, with twin turbofan engines "buried" in the "boxy" fuselage. Capable of in-flight refueling, in 1992 F-117s flew non-stop from Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico, to Kuwait, a flight of approximately 18-1/2 hours -- a record for single-seat fighters that still stands.

Although designated as a "fighter," the F-117 had no air-to-air capabilities. It was an attack aircraft that could carry some 4,000 pounds of bombs or missiles in an internal weapons bay.

The first F-117s were retired in December 2006. The surviving aircraft will be stored in hangars at a secret location in Nevada. Their special storage is based on retaining the secrecy of their special features rather than any consideration of someday reactivating the planes.

-- Norman Polmar

Fighting Fighter Issues

The most difficult weapons decision by the new administration that enters the White House next January will likely be the fighter issue -- how many and what kinds of fighters should be procured for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

The George W. Bush administration--with Secretaries of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Robert M. Gates -- has mapped out a fighter procurement strategy. Particularly controversial was the decision to produce only 183 to 187 F-22 Raptor advanced fighters for the Air Force. But many Air Force leaders believe that the service needs as many as 381 F-22s to bridge a "fighter gap" until the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) becomes available in numbers. The recent problems with the F-15 Eagle have provided ammunition for the advocacy of more F-22s in the near term.

Meanwhile, some Navy officials are becoming concerned about a "fighter gap" in that service. Their solution would be to increase the current procurement of F/A-18E and F Super Hornet aircraft. These strike-fighters would be for Navy service as the Marine Corps has kept with older F/A-18s and does not fly the E/F models.

All three services plan to acquire specific variants of the F-35 JSF -- officially named Lightning II, a moniker that is rarely used. But what impact would additional buys of F-22s or F/A-18s have on the F-35 program? Air Force Major General Charles R. Davis, the F-35 program executive officer, was recently quoted in Defense News (7 April 2008) stating, "Any time there is a discussion of a service or country pulling out airplanes from the program, the other service leaderships get very concerned. But we have told the Navy that buying them [F-35C aircraft] sooner at greater rates gives you a lower cost and more capability on your [carrier] decks than any other buying profile."

In realty, the Air Force has the least interest in near-term procurement of the F-35 JSF as it would take several years to buy up to an F-22 force of 381 aircraft.  Similarly, the Navy is pleased with the F/A-18 Super Hornet for the next decade or more. That aircraft has both a fighter and attack capability, and the nature of expected air threats -- both in terms of quantity and quality -- should be effectively countered by the Super Hornets. Also, an "all F/A-18 Super Hornet force" -- including the new A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft -- simplifies maintenance and training.

More critical is the U.S. Marine Corps situation. The Marines now fly the F/A-18C and D variants and, of course, the AV-8B Harrier STOVL aircraft. Both will be in need of replacement within a decade and the F-35B STOVL is the planned -- and needed -- replacement. STOVL aircraft can operate from the Navy's large carriers as well as the so-called amphibious assault ships (LHA/LHD), which are "flattops" as large as World War II-era fleet carriers but lack catapults, arresting gear, and angled flight decks.

Similarly, the Britain is planning procurement of the F-35B to succeed the less-capable Harriers flown from their carrier decks (by Royal Navy and Royal Marine pilots).

In the long-term, the U.S. Air Force has discussed buying about a thousand F-35A and possibly other JSF variants to replace all of its F-15/F-16/A-10 aircraft.

Thus, there are major fighter issues to be addressed when the new administration is sworn in next January. Because of aircraft production line and component concerns, some decisions will have to be made quickly. Still, an objective, all-service study of U.S. fighter requirements and options should be conducted as soon as possible by the new administration -- preferably during the November -- January transition period.

-- Norman Polmar

Cyber Defense -- and Attack

With U.S. civil and military officials increasingly concerned about cyber attacks against American networks, the U.S. Air Force is planning to establish what will probably be the largest and most comprehensive military organization to defend against cyber attack. And, unlike the apparent efforts of the other U.S. military services in this field, the Air Force will conduct offensive cyber warfare.

The massive Air Force effort will pull together existing cyber-related units and establish new ones, all under the Air Force Cyber Command -- AFCYBER in milspeak -- and its operating arm, the 24th Air Force. According to Major General William T. Lord, the provisional commander of AFCYBER, the command and 24th Air Force will achieve "initial operational capability" on 1 October 2008. However, many components of the command are already operational.

Two new wings are being established to work with two existing wings. The total strength of the new commands have not been established, but they will be "large," with active, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard personnel assigned. The AFCYBER/24th Air Force headquarters are at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, on an interim basis; the permanent base for those headquarters will be decided shortly.

Operating directly under AFCYBER will be the Network Operations unit, which will develop the standards and integration architecture for the command. All other major components are line units under the 24th Air Force; these will be:

67th Network Warfare Wing (Lackland AFB, Texas) -- This is the core of Air Force cyber operations. Its official functions are to organize, train, and equipment "cyberspace" forces to conduct network defense, attack, and exploitation. It is believe that this is the only U.S. military organization that carries out extensive offensivecyber operations.

Under Colonel Joseph J. Pridotkas, the 67th is the largest "wing" in the Air Force, consisting of five intelligence groups with 35 squadrons and detachments comprising more than 8,000 men and women. They serve at about 100 locations on every continent except Antarctica.

450th Electronic Warfare Wing (Lackland AFB, Texas) -- Consisting of electronic attack as well as protection components, this wing will provide operational input for Air Force EC-130J Commando Solo (Hercules) as well as EA-6B Prowler electronic aircraft. The latter are flown by Navy and Marine Corps squadrons, but with some Air Force personnel assigned. Those electronic warfare aircraft will soon be replaced by Navy EA-18G Growler variants of the F/A-18 Hornet.

688th Information Operations Wing (Lackland AFB, Texas) -- Formerly known as the Air Force Information Operations Center, this wing integrates information warfare tactics, training, and technology.

689th Cyberspace Wing (Scott AFB, Illinois) -- Responsible for communications and information functions as well as deployable communications capabilities, the wing is assuming the functions now performed by the Air Force Communications Agency and the Global Cyberspace Innovation Center. (Those commands will be deactivated when AFCYBER becomes operational).

The Air Force leadership believes that the AFCYBER command and its components will provide the necessary capabilities and expertise for "cyber warfare" in the 21st Century. The command is being established at a time that thousands of efforts are being made every day to break into Department of Defense databanks and links, and when there will be increasing efforts by potential military enemies as well as terrorist to wage cyber warfare against the United States.

-- Norman Polmar

Army Embarks on Ambitious UAV Plan

Of the five U.S. military services, the Army is embarked on the most ambitious plan to integrate Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) into all levels of the force. Based in large part on the Army's five years of experience in fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, UAVs are being integrated into operations from the division down to the platoon level.

This wholesale adoption of UAVs is exacerbating the Army-Air Force controversy over single-service control over UAV procurement and operational control. For the past several years the Army (and to some extent the Marine Corps) has complained about the allocation of Air Force-controlled UAVs, while the Air Force has pointed to the operational and procurement problems that could be solved by single-service control -- under the Air Force.

For example, the Army has great affinity for the MQ-1 Predator, a long-endurance, medium-altitude reconnaissance UAV. The MQ-1 variant can be armed with Hellfire anti-tank missiles, and has been used effectively by the CIA as well as the Air Force. Predator wore Army green until 1996, when the Air Force (and CIA) took over that UAV effort. Reportedly, the Army now obtains less than one-half of the Predator time requested.

There are major "cultural" differences between Army and Air Force operation of UAVs. The Army devolves operational control of UAVs to field commanders at various levels, while the Air force operates UAVs through regional air component commanders. And, in general, the Army relies more on software and uses enlisted men as UAV controllers while the Air Force uses rated pilots.

In this environment, the Army is seeking -- and Congress is funding -- the MQ-1C Sky Warrior, a modified Predator variant tailored for Army requirements with the 3,000-pound aircraft carrying 300 pounds of sensors internally and 500 pounds of external sensors and weapons. The Army wants 45 squadrons of Sky Warriors, each with 12 UAVs. Combat divisions will have a Sky Warrior squadron and combat brigades will get detachments of two to four of these UAVs. The Army program is seeking more than 500 Sky Warriors that will carry Hellfire missiles and Viper Strike smart bombs as well as sensors and target designators.

On an interim basis Army divisions now have the RQ-5A Hunter UAV. The General Atomics Predator/Sky Warrior beat out an improved version of the Hunter for Army service.

At the brigade level the RQ-7A Shadow UAV will also be provided, later to be supplemented by an improved RQ-8A Fire Scout. The Fire Scout UAV is a rotary-wing aircraft developed by the Navy for shipboard use. It was originally rejected by the Navy because of shortcomings, but is now in production for the Navy. The Fire Scout, developed by Northrop Grumman/Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical, weighs some 2,600-pounds with an array of internal sensors. While it has the advantage of VSTOL operations, its weapons payload will be limited.

Next on the Army's UAV list is the small, four-plus pound RQ-11A Raven. This micro-UAV is being provided at the battalion, company, and platoon level to provide a picture of "what's on the other side of the hill." The Army's Raven requirement is in excess of 3,000 vehicles, with about half that number now in the inventory.

The Air Force has little interest in the short-range, low-flying UAVs being procured by the Army. Rather, it is the Predator/Sky Warrior and Fire scout programs that divide the services. They have agreed to cooperate on supporting Predator and Sky Warrior UAVs, which will save money for both services. But beyond that agreement their respective UAV programs have created contention over the future procurement and operational control of unmanned systems between the Army and Air Force

In discussing the Army's ambitious UAV program, the Association of the U.S. Army in its January 2008 report "U.S. Army Aviation: Balancing Current and Future Demands," explains that UAVs "combine the capabilities of persistent view of an area, precise target designation, instant assessment of attack results, and rapid destruction of fleeting targets. . . . [UAVs] have now become an integral part of the land component commander's ability to conduct reconnaissance, attack and many other critical missions."

The report might have added that those were missions previously carried out primarily by the Air Force.

-- Norman Polmar

An Awakening Bear?

The recent deployment of a the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier task force to the Mediterranean and extensive long-range Russian military aircraft operations since last July indicate an attempt by President Vladimir Putin to demonstrate that the Soviet Union must again be considered a world power. While these activities have taken place in the Eastern Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Western Pacific, they reveal the lack of "depth" of the Russian armed forces.

For example, the Admiral Kuznetsov -- actually the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov -- is Russia's only aircraft carrier. The 59,100-ton ship, completed in 1991, had not deployed to the Mediterranean in four years. While the Russian Navy and government officials consider that the task force's deployment from the Northern (Arctic) Fleet, where the Admiral Kuznetsov is based, plus two ships from the Black Sea Fleet, the Navy has only some 18 Su-33 Flanker-D shipboard fighters to operate from the carrier.  The "flattop" also embarks one or more Su-25 Frogfoot trainers and helicopters. Such an air group pales in comparison to the approximately 70 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters embarked in each of the U.S. Navy's 11 carriers.

Similarly, long-range flights by Russian aircraft have been "dramatic" -- especially when overflying U.S. carriers -- but have not demonstrated much military capability. The large four-turboprop Tu-95 Bear -- flown by the Russian Air Force as a missile-armed strategic strike aircraft -- have made periodic long-range flights since 1999 after a hiatus of such flights for several years. But such flights pose little threat to Western warships, especially if Western carrier- or land-based radar warning aircraft are available. These Bears are updated variants of the Tu-20/95, which first flew in 1955.

The Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-22M Backfire missile-armed strike aircraft have also made these flights. These are newer, turbojet aircraft, which first flew in 1987 and 1974, respectively, and are more of a potential threat although they have less range than the Bear and there are very few Blackjacks in service. The Air Force is estimated by the magazine Aviation Week & Space Technology to have only 16 to 18 operational Tu-160s, and less than a dozen Tu-22Ms. However, the Russian Navy has more than 100 Backfires, and those have been making some of the recent long-range flights.

While those flights have been made primarily for political purposes and, probably, to train air crews in long-range navigation and search, the Western press has been quick to label them provocative. UPI on 12 February declared, "Russia ratcheted up tensions with the United States over the weekend by reportedly having one of its bombers overfly the USS Nimitz off the coast of Japan."

Both Putin and his hand-picked successor, Dimitri Medvedev, plan to allocate more of the money flowing into Russia from oil and gas sales to military programs, especially to combat aircraft.  However, it will be many years -- some analysts estimate decades -- until the Russian Air Force and Navy will again pose a major threat to U.S. forces -- assuming that future administrations continue at least the current level of investment in the U.S. armed forces.

-- Norman Polmar

Air Force at a Crossroads

The U.S. Air Force -- plagued by a recent series of F-15 fighter crashes and the loss of a B-2 stealth bomber -- is fighting to maintain its approved force levels and to move forward with several aircraft programs. And, the Air Force has initiated a controversial move into Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

In the fiscal year 2009 budget request the Air Force is asking for $117 billion to sustain the existing force, modernize the force, and provide for increasing personnel costs. The request is up $8.6 billion, or roughly eight percent, compared to the $108.4 billion that Congress provided for the Air Force in the current fiscal year. That amount may not be enough to maintain and modernize the 86 combat wings that Air Force officials refer to as the "required force."

The increasing costs of fuel and the invariably higher-than-predicted costs of new aircraft threaten the force level unless Congress provides additional funds. But the Army and Marine Corps, both being expanded and both suffering major material problems after several years of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Navy’s massive ship cost problems make a substantial increase for Air Force programs unlikely.

Of the several aircraft programs being discussed the most critical in the view of senior Air Force commanders is the F-22 Raptor, the "next generation" stealth fighter aircraft. The Department of Defense has approved only four more F-22s after the fiscal 2009 budget which would provide a total of 187 aircraft. Previously the Pentagon has stonewalled buying more F-22s when Air Force studies indicated that at least 250 are needed with a goal of 381 aircraft. Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England has written that "in depth" reviews by the Pentagon show that buying F-35 Lightning II multi-role aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps "provides more effective capability to the joint force commander than concentrating investments in a single service by buying more F-22s."

There are 20 F-22 aircraft in the fiscal 2009 budget, which reaches the 183 number (the 20 being part of a three-year, 60-aircraft multiyear contract). The four aircraft provided under Mr. England’s plan enable the Lockheed Martin production line to remain (barely) open until a key decision point in early 2009, when the new administration could make the decision about continuing F-22 production.

Beyond the F-22 issue, the Air Force is seeking more C-17 Globemaster III cargo aircraft (although none are provided in the basic fiscal 2009 budget request) while the forthcoming tanker aircraft procurement and the initiation of a new bomber aircraft will also demand more funding. And, there is the UAV issue. Of the 93 aircraft requested in the Air Force’s fiscal 2009 budget, more than half are unmanned aerial vehicles:

20 F-22 Raptor
8 F-35 Lightning II
6 CV-22 Osprey
4 MC-130 Combat Talon (Hercules)
2 HC-130 Hercules
1 C-29A
52 UAV

The unmanned aircraft are: 38 MQ-1B armed Predators, 9 MQ-9 Reapers (Predator B), and 4 RQ-4 Global Hawks.

Meanwhile, the Air Force and Army have agreed to cooperate on procuring and supporting Predator and Sky Warrior UAVs, which is expected to save money for both services. But the Air Force is concerned that the Army is using "software" to fly its UAVs as opposed to trained aircraft pilots, as does the Air Force. The Air Force does use non-pilots for controlling micro-UAVs (similar to the Army's five-pound Raven, which are used for base security functions). The Air Force uses rated pilots for the larger UAVs, being concerned about mission flexibility and the potential for collisions with other UAVs or manned aircraft.

The Air Force is expanding its UAV qualification and training programs, with a major effort underway to increase the number of pilots being transferred to UAV programs. The Army -- which uses mainly warrant officers as pilots for its thousands of helicopters -- cannot provide rated pilots to man the planned force of several hundred UAVs.

Thus, the Air Force is facing major challenges in several important areas.

-- Norman Polmar

Spy Satellite Not the First to Fall

As reported in the press, a Navy Aegis missile cruiser in the Pacific Ocean will try an unprecedented shoot-down of the out-of-control, school-bus-size U.S. spy satellite loaded with a toxic fuel as it begins its plunge to Earth. Marine General James E. Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the Navy missile will be fired as the satellite re-enters the atmosphere and "has a reasonably high opportunity for success."  The Navy has been developing -- and has successfully tested -- a ballistic missile intercept capability aboard several of its Aegis cruisers and destroyers. 
Aegis is an advanced radar/fire-control system that was originally developed to destroy incoming anti-ship cruise missiles. The Navy has 22 cruisers and some 60 destroyers with the Aegis system and between 90 and 122 vertical-launch cells for surface-to-air and Tomahawk land-attack missiles. The Navy is upgrading several of these ships for the ballistic missile defense role.
The three previous spy satellites that fell to earth with nuclear reactors on board were Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites (RORSAT). The RORSAT was part of the world's first satellite system orbited for ocean surveillance to detect warships on the high seas. The Soviet Union began tests of the system in 1967 and the first operational RORSATs went into orbit in 1974. 
Two types of satellites were used in tandem: Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) satellites that were "passive" and sought to "lock on" to electronic signals emanating from ships, especially radar transmissions. The 18,400-pound EINT satellites became operational about 1970. Pairs of ELINT satellites were coordinated with a single RORSAT, guiding the latter to a suspected target ship. The 10,000-pound RORSAT could then use active radar to precisely locate and target Western warships. Later RORSAT satellites could send targeting data directly to missile-armed ships, surface ships, and submarines as well as to ground stations (as did the early RORSATs).
The power requirements for the RORSAT's radar was provided by a small nuclear reactor that carried some 110 pounds of enriched uranium (U235) to produce up to ten kilowatts of power for some 90 to 120 days in space.  When the service life of these Kosmos-series RORSATs was complete the reactor section carrying the radioactive fuel and weighing about one ton was designed to be boosted into higher orbits -- more than 550 miles -- where they would circle the earth for more than 500 years and then cause no danger when they did come down and burn in the atmosphere. (They normally orbited at an altitude of about 130 miles.)
But three reactor sections malfunctioned and plunged into the atmosphere: Kosmos 954 in January 1978, with portions of the craft landing in Canada; Kosmos 1402 in February 1983, which fell into the Indian Ocean; and Kosmos 1990 in February 1989. Apparently no significant pieces of the last survived reentering the atmosphere.
No attempt was made to intercept those SPYSAT reactor sections when they plunged to earth.

-- Norman Polmar

Russia and China Propose Space Weapons Ban

Russia and China -- enemies for most of the Cold War -- have joined together to propose a new treaty to ban space weapons. The proposal comes a little more than one year after China demonstrated that it possessed an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability.

Russia (at the time the Soviet Union) and the United States had earlier demonstrated the ability to destroy satellites in orbit. In January 2007, the Chinese employed an SC-19 ballistic missile to fire directly at and destroy an outdated Feng-Yun-1C weather satellite at an altitude of 527 miles above the earth. Two previous ASAT attempts by China may have been intentional "misses" for test purposes. Reportedly, at the time of those earlier missile launches the U.S. intelligence community believed that China was close to proving the ability to hit an orbiting satellite, but some officials were taken by surprise when the ASAT capability was demonstrated, creating a massive field of space debris.

Now China has joined Russia in proposing a ban on all weapons in space. The proposal was voiced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 12 February at an international disarmament conference in Geneva. "Without preventing an arms race in space, international security will be wanting," he told the conference. "The task of preventing an arms race in space is on the conference's agenda. It's time ... to start serious practical work in this field," he said.

The existing Outer Space Treaty of 1967 -- formally known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies -- bans the build-up or stockpile of weapons, including nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction in orbit, and their installation on the moon. But the treaty does not address the shooting down of satellites. (To date 98 countries are states-parties to the treaty, while another 28 have signed the treaty but have not yet completed ratification.)

In calling for a ban of all types of weapons in space including ASAT systems, Lavrov explained, "Weapons deployment in space by one state will inevitably result in a chain reaction. And this, in turn, is fraught with a new spiral in the arms race both in space and on the earth."

He also criticized the U.S. government's plan to expand the ballistic missile defense system into Europe: "We cannot but feel concerned over the situation where ... there are increasing efforts by the United States to deploy its global ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] system," Lavrov said. "The desire to acquire an anti-missile 'shield' while dismantling the 'sheath', where the nuclear 'sword' is kept is extremely dangerous," he added.

The U.S. government has ongoing talks at this time with the leaders in Warsaw and Prague that are address a proposal to install ten ABM interceptor missiles in Poland and associated ABM radars in the Czech Republic. The Eastern European-based ABM components are being put forward by the United States to deter rogue states -- presumably Iran -- from attacking Europe with ballistic missiles.

While many individuals and groups in the United States as well as Europe question the need for and effectiveness of an ABM system, the anti-satellite issue is of general interest to all virtually all parties. The massive and all-encompassing use of satellites for intelligence collection, missile launch warning, navigation (especially GPS), communications, and weather forecasting make them invaluable to civil and military activities on a continuous basis.

-- Norman Polmar

Chinese Space Leader Honored

Qian Xuesen -- the head of China's space program -- has been named Person of the Year by the international aerospace journal Aviation Week & Space Technology. The AvWeek citation notes, "Not well known in the West, he is the father of China's space efforts. And it was in 2007 that China demonstrated it was the third force in space."

Educated in the United States, Qian served in the U.S. Army and was a leading aerospace scientist before being expelled from the United States for being suspected of having Communist sympathies.

Qian -- now age 96 -- was the force behind the last year's anti-satellite test demonstration conducted by China. That test was based on advanced sensor, tracking, and trajectory control procedures that had previously been demonstrated only by the United States and Russia. China has undertaken a long line of space achievements that have included manned space flight and lunar probes. In China, as in the United States and Russia, the development of space technology has been in lock-step with military technology related to strategic missiles and satellites.

Born in Zhejiang Province in 1911, Qian came to the United States at age 23 to study aeronautical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. But preferring theory to practice, he soon moved to Caltech, "and began to follow a path that would lead to his becoming one of the most eminent rocket scientists in the U.S.," according to Bradley Perrett's account in the January 7, 2008 issue of AvWeek.

During World War II he served as an officer in the U.S. Army. After the war he was appointed to the prestigious Scientific Advisory Board of the Air Force. Physicist Theodore Van Karman, chief scientific advisor to the Air Force at the time, wrote. "At the age of 36, he was an undisputed genius whose work was providing an enormous impetus to advances in high-speed aerodynamics and jet propulsion." In 1949, Qian detailed his concept of a "spaceplane," a winged rocket that is credited with being the inspiration for the Dyna-Soar project of the 1950s.

Qian's career in the United States came to a sudden and dramatic end in 1950 as a result of the communist-hunt of Senator Joseph McCarthy. With China now controlled by the communists, the U.S. government revoked Qian's security clearances.

While Qian claimed that there was absolutely no evidence that he had communist sympathies, he sought to return to China. He did not have American citizenship. The government tried to keep him in the United States because of his technical knowledge. Then both parties changed their minds due to the outbreak of the Korean War. In the event, Qian was finally able to return to China in 1955.

Although -- in a period of rapid technology development -- his knowledge was soon outdated by Western standards, Qian quickly became director of the Fifth Academy under the Ministry of National Defense and began work on ICBMs. China's first long-range missiles and military satellites were developed under his direction.

In the early 1990s the Chinese government publicly acknowledged Qian's contributions to China's technological growth. AvWeek's tribute to Qian concludes:

"But if China is now a strategic rival to the U.S., then his achievements are now more important than ever -- especially as the Chinese economy moves relentlessly forward toward front and center on the world stage. Hence the continuing relevance of this very old man."

-- Norman Polmar

Mine Countermeasures Face Setbacks

The U.S. Navy's first destroyer fitted for modern mine countermeasure operations has begun searching for mines in the Mediterranean Sea. The USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) is forward deployed and has begun using the AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS).

Mines are a major concern for U.S. warships operating in forward littoral waters, such as the Persian Gulf. Beginning with Operation Desert Storm in 1961, three U.S. Navy ships have been severely damaged by mines in the Gulf-a helicopter carrier, an Aegis missile cruiser, and a guided missile frigates. Mine are cheap, readily available, and can be clandestinely emplaced.

The RMS is a self-propelled, remote-controlled, torpedo-like object that seeks out bottom and bottom-moored mines. The vehicle has a small, 370-horsepower diesel engine for propulsion, The vehicle's sensors forward-looking sonar and obstacle-avoiding video camera. The images from these sensors is sent by data link to the destroyer's combat center. The craft can be programmed to perform autonomously or can be controlled via data link, even when beyond the horizon from the mothership, which recovers the RMS after the "mission." The RMS can detect and map the location of mines, but neither it nor the destroyer can sweep or destroy the mines.

The Navy plans to outfit six Aegis missile destroyers with the RMS. But, the RMS is intended to support naval forces operating in relatively shallow, littoral areas where the threats include mines as well as small submarines and small surface craft. The Aegis destroyers are primarily anti-air warfare ships, intended for deep-water operation, primarily in support of carrier battle groups. Indeed, the Navy's trouble-plagued Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program was developed in part to provide a littoral mine countermeasures capability. The RMS is a key component of the LCS mine countermeasures suite, which will include the means of destroying as well as detecting mines.

Further, aboard the Aegis destroyers the RMS will be rarely employed, thus the specially trained crewmen will have little "stick" time. And, of course, they will be employed in other duties much or most of the time, duties for which they may or may not be properly rated.

One must then ask that with the LCS program underway and the Navy operating 14 mine countermeasures ship of the Avenger (MCM 1) class, why the six missile destroyers are being fitted with the RMS.

Meanwhile, the Navy has recently taken out of service the last of its relatively new Osprey (MHC 51)-class coastal minehunters. These 12 ships-ideal for littoral operations-were commissioned between 1993 and 1999. The Navy began decommissioning them in June 2006. Some have been transferred to Greece and Egypt, with the remainder being kept in storage at Beaumont, Texas, until they can be disposed of.

Lee Hunt, vice president for academic affairs for the Mine Warfare Association, said that the departure of the last coastal minehunters robs the service of the ability to survey domestic harbors for mines. The threat of mines or Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in U.S. harbors is of growing concern of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense.

Still another sign of the confusion and lack of interest with respect to mine countermeasures is the current Navy move to replace the large MH-53E Sea Dragon mine countermeasures helicopters with the smaller MH-60S Sea Hawk. The latter has considerably less endurance and equipment lift capacity than the MH-53E, and also lacks the big bird's night-flying capability.

The U.S. Navy has long employed minesweeping helicopters, which can be rapidly flown to forward areas with their support gear and put to sea in a variety of ships, especially amphibious helicopter carriers (LPH/LHA/LHD). They have bene used in several areas over the years, including North Vietnam waters at the end of the Vietnam War.

While the U.S. Navy has long shown a lack of interest in mine warfare, the situation was recently exacerbated by the merger of what had been a separate Mine Warfare Command with the recently established anti-submarine training command to form the Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command with headquarters in San Diego. Despite official Navy statements to the contrary, the merger in reality subordinates mine warfare interests to the larger, broader, and more-visible ASW community. This is particularly true as the Navy sounds the alarm about the increasing Chinese submarine capabilities with hardly a mention of that nation's mine warfare activities.

-- Norman Polmar

Russia Completes Hybrid Submarine

Russia's Sevmash shipyard at the Arctic city of Severodvinsk has completed a hybrid submarine powered by a diesel-electric plant and a small nuclear reactor. Designated B-90 and named Sarov, the submarine was completed on 17 December.

The submarine is known as Project 20120 in Russian design terminology. She apparently employs the small nuclear reactor -- known to some engineers as a "teakettle" -- to keep a charge on the battery, providing essentially unlimited underwater endurance on relatively quiet electric propulsion. In effect, this is an Air-Indpendent Propulsion (AIP) system.

The "teakettle" concept is not new. The Soviet Navy deployed a Project 651 (NATO Juliett) cruise missile submarine (SSG) in 1986-1991 with a similar diesel-electric/nuclear plant. That craft had a pressurized-water reactor with a single-loop configuration coupled with a turbogenerator. The Soviet report stated that the sea trials "demonstrated the workability of the system, but revealed quite a few deficiencies. Those were later corrected."

However, no follow-on efforts were undertaken at that time. (The Soviets built 16 diesel-electric Juliett SSGs from 1963 to 1968.)

The B-90 was designed by the Rubin design bureau in St. Petersburg. Construction was begun at the Krasnoe Sormovo shipyard in Nizhnii Novgorod (formerly Gor'kiy), and the submarine was then transported through the inland waterways to the Sevmash yard for completion.

There is no available information on the size of the B-90 program. In the past the Soviet Union was an early leader in AIP-type submarines. As early as 1938 the Soviets began development on a "single-drive" submarine that could operate diesel engines while submerged and surfaced. After World War II the Soviets built the Project 617 (Whale), an AIP submarine based on German technology. She was followed by 23 coastal submarines of Project A615 (Quebec), which were torpedo and gun-armed combat craft. Other AIP experiments followed.

Today several navies are operating AIP submarines, with the U.S. Navy having "borrowed" the Swedish AIP submarine Gotland in 2005-2007 to serve as an anti-submarine target for U.S. carrier task forces. The Gotland, according to Swedish officers, could not be located by U.S. naval forces in exercises until the submarine "wanted to be found."

The Soviet B-90 may be a follow-on submarine to the Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines that have been transferred in large numbers to other navies, including China and India. The B-90, especially when operating in coastal or littoral waters, could pose a significant threat to Western maritime interests.

-- Norman Polmar

Navy-Coast Guard Ship Merger Proposed

The massive cost overruns and some technical problems with the U.S. Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the Coast Guard's new cutters of the Deepwater Project led a key member of Congress to propose a merger of the two programs. Representative Gene Taylor (Democrat-Mississippi) has told Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead and Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thad Allen that the two services should look to pursue a "common hull" for LCS and the Coast Guard's National Security Cutter program.

Representative Taylor said "We can't afford to keep repeating mistakes," referring to the massive ship acquisition and development problems that both services have had with key shipbuilding initiatives. He made his proposal to the service chiefs at a congressional hearing on 13 December.

Admiral Allen subsequently said that he plans to meet with Admiral Roughead in January to discuss a number of issues, and a common hull could be on the agenda. However, both service chiefs said that their ships use different concepts of operations, and developing a single hull could present requirement challenges. Ironically, early in the development of the LCS the Navy spoke of possible collaboration with the Coast Guard, but the Navy's requirement for an LCS speed in excess of 40 knots quickly ended Coast Guard interest in a joint program.

There is also irony in the situation as the Department of Defense pays for national security features in Coast Guard ships -- guns, fire control, some radars, and, in the past, missiles and sonars.

The Navy has already cancelled two LCS hulls earlier this year because of costs, while the problems have led to the "firing" of the LCS project manager and the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Ships. The Coast Guard's first 418-foot-long national security cutter, the Bertholf, recently completed the first set of builder's trials, and the second ship is scheduled to be launched early next year. This program has been plagued by cost and technical problems.

Representative Taylor's comments came during hearings of the House Armed Services Committee. The solons pressed the two admirals and Marine Corps Commandant General James Conway on why the new maritime strategy does not include a direct force structure outline and does not focus on the potential threat posed by the modernization of China's navy.

The maritime strategy outlines a broad future plan that includes increased maritime partnerships, a focus on the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific regions, and an emphasis on humanitarian and disaster relief missions. However, it does not provide specific ship or other force requirements for the services, leaving in effect the almost meaningless 30-year shipbuilding plan that the Navy proposed to Congress last year.

Representative Duncan Hunter (Republican-California), the committee's senior Republican member, asked Admiral Roughead why the rise of China and its naval force were not mentioned specifically in the new strategy. Roughead replied the document "looked at changes in navies around the world," including China. He was hesitant to list China as a direct peer rival, but did note China's overall shipbuilding capabilities, civilian and military, could surpass Korea's as the best in the region someday.

Mr. Hunter also asked why the new maritime strategy does not detail how the force structure of the three services should adjust to a changing global environment. Hunter specifically called attention to the problems in LCS acquisition as preventing the Navy from having the force levels it will need to meet global challengers. He said, "I am pleased that you have cooperated to develop this strategy, but you're not going to be able to deliver if you cannot afford the force that will make this strategy a reality. What are you planning to do to get control of requirements and to enable the acquisition community to more effectively manage their programs?"

Similarly, Representative Taylor called the new strategy a "nice brochure," but said the document should have given greater prominence to the Marine Corps and its need for more amphibious ships. Admiral Roughead explained that he has talked to General Conway about the number of amphibious ships the Navy should acquire and there is "not much daylight" between them on the issue.

General Conway said that he "can live with" at least 30 operational amphibious ships and that 33 - the current number - would be the right number to ensure the proper level of readiness at all times.

The Navy's number of 33 ships is not a realistic count of the amphibious force. The two fleet command ships, the Blue Ridge (LCC 19) and Mount Whitney (LCC 20), are included in the count; neither is a "lift" ships and both are configured and employed as fleet flagships. Also included is the long-delayed San Antonio (LPD 17), which has been in commission almost two years but has not yet deployed, and the Mesa Verde (LPD 19), commissioned earlier this month and unable to deploy for several months.

Neither the new maritime strategy nor the 30-year shipbuilding plan nor the Navy's method of counting ships is realistic for the issues that will face the United States in the coming years.

-- Norman Polmar

Russian Fleet Sails Into Med

In his latest move to demonstrate that Russia is again a world power, President Vladimir Putin has sent an 11-ship carrier task force to the Mediterranean Sea. Speaking at a Kremlin conference also attended by Putin, Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov said that the sole Russian aircraft carrier, two large anti-submarine ships, and a guided missile cruiser, along with replenishment ships from Russia's Northern and Black Sea Fleets as well as 47 naval aircraft would be part of the task force that will operate in the "Med" beginning in mid-December. It is not clear if submarines are included in the force.

Earlier this year, Admiral Vladimir Masorin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, called for restoring a permanent Russian presence in the Mediterranean. He declared that the Mediterranean was a strategically important zone for the Black Sea Fleet. The Soviet Navy had maintained an almost continuous naval presence in the Mediterranean from the mid-1960s until the demise of the Soviet Union in late 1991. Since then Russian naval operations there have been intermittent and brief.

The current deployment of the nation's only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov, has been delayed for two or three years because of the poor condition of the ship and the lack of qualified carrier pilots. Reportedly, there are only about a dozen Su-33 shipboard multi-role aircraft available for the Kuznetsov. The Su-33 -- with the NATO code-name Flanker-D -- is a carrier-based version of the highly capable, Mach 2-plus Su-27 land-based aircraft.

The remainder of the ship's air group probably consists of a few Su-25 (NATO Frogfoot) attack-trainer aircraft and helicopters. The latter include Ka-27 Helix anti-submarine and rescue variants, and Ka-31 Helix helicopters configured for the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) role. The Ka-31 has large air-search radar suspended under its fuselage which folds upward for landing and takeoff. (This is a variation of the British Sea King AEW-configured helicopter concept.)

A Russian spokesman has said that the Kuznetsov task group would conduct three tactical exercises with real and simulated launches of sea- and air-launched missiles, and would make nearly a dozen port calls. The ports will include Syria's Tartus, once a major port-of-call of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron. There is still a Russian technical facility there.

The Kuznetsov deployment, believed to be only the second such sortie into the Mediterranean since the end of the USSR, is important for Russia as President Putin attempts to demonstrate that the country is again a major military power. At this time his only other means of demonstrating the prowess of the Russian armed forces is by the long-range flights of bomber aircraft over international waters, which periodically approach Western countries.

-- Norman Polmar

A New Russian Frigate at Last

[New photo added per reader's comments and tip. Thanks guys.]
While the U.S. Navy has suffered from warship delays and massive cost overruns, especially with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the San Antonio (LPD 17) amphibious ships, and the planned Zumwalt (DDG 100) destroyers, the Russian Navy is suffering similar problems. The long-delayed frigate Steregushchiy was placed in commission in late November.

The ship had been laid down six years ago -- in December 2001 -- at the Severnaya shipyard in St. Petersburg. Not only has the ship taken about two years longer to construct than planned, but the cost per unit has more than doubled.

The Steregushchiy was to have been the lead ship of up to 50 of these 2,100-ton warships, intended for coastal patrol, anti-submarine warfare, and escort duties. The original order given to the Severnaya shipyard in 2001 was for ten ships, but that number was almost immediately reduced to four ships. The three additional ships are believed to be on the building ways in St. Petersburg.

Although often touted as having a low-observable or “stealth” design, in fact the Steregushchiy has a conventional configuration with a 100-mm gun forward, surface-to-air missiles, a close-in gun system, and ASW weapons. The ship can arm and fuel a helicopter on its flight deck, but does not have a helicopter hangar.

Also being constructed by the Russians are the slightly smaller (2,090-ton) frigates of the Tatarstan class. The lead ship was laid down in 1992, but not completed until mid-2002. The second ship of the class, laid down in 1994, is not yet operational. These ships, also intended for coastal patrol and ASW operations, do have a small helicopter hangar.

The delays with these ships is highly significant as Russia is not currently constructing destroyers or cruisers except for one or two of the Neustrashimyy-class ASW destroyers. These destroyers are taking more than a decade to build.

Thus, these frigates are the “future” of the Russian surface fleet. While President Vladimir Putin continues to tout the growing military capabilities of the Russia, it is clear that for the foreseeable future the Russian Navy will not be part of the new Russian power base.

Indeed, in September 2005, Putin fired Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov, who had commanded the Russian Navy since 1997. Kuroedov had complained bitterly about the Navy’s funding shortfalls, at one point claiming that he was receiving only 12 percent of the funds needed to maintain and modernize the fleet. While he was also blamed for the disastrous Russian Navy response to the sinking of the nuclear-propelled submarine Kursk in 2000, in reality he survived that tragedy and, more likely, was fired because of the poor state of the fleet in general and his constant advocating more emphasis on regaining Russia’s status as a major naval power.

-- Norman Polmar

The Downside of End-Strength Increases

The Bush administration's plan to add 92,000 troops to the ranks of the Army and Marine Corps is coming under increasing scrutiny from defense analysts and congressional staffers. When President George W. Bush proposed the increase -- 65,000 men and women for the Army and 27,000 for the Marine Corps -- in his State of the Union message last January, he garnered support from both sides of the aisle in Congress. While most Republicans offered support for the buildup out of party loyalty or belief in the president's goals in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Democrats applauded for fear of being labeled soft on terrorism, especially the dozen who had presidential aspirations.

The proposed increases would bring the Army to almost 550,000 troops and the Marine Corps to 202,000. Senior officers of both services have strongly supported the increases. Officials say that the additions would permit a slowdown of the hectic pace of troop rotations in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. When Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates unveiled the planned increase, he assured troops in the war zones -- some of whom have served two or more combat tours since the wars began -- that "help is on the way."

The Army would like to keep active-duty soldiers at their home base for at least two years for every one year they deploy, easing the home-front problems with families and loved ones. Today many troops are forced to undertake another tour of duty after only a year at home. This situation has also prevented many Army and Marine Corps units from maintaining their training schedules for different missions. An increase in active-duty strength could also ease the burden on reserve units, the 346,000 members of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the 196,000 Army reservists (USAR).

But increasingly critics of the buildup point out that in the next few years, possibly before the additional troops are added by 2010-2012, the United States will have withdrawn combat troops and possible all military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Even today, they note, the U.S. commitment of ground troops in the two wars is just over ten percent of the total active Army-ARNG-USAR and Marine Corps strength.

Frank Hoffman, a retired Marine officer and leading defense analyst, has observed that the global war on terrorism and the Iraq conflict are being used as "lame rationales" for enlarging the military. Hoffman, a senior researcher at the Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities in Quantico, Virginia, continued, "Unless you think we will have more than six brigades in Iraq in 2012, I don't see how this is relevant." Other analysts and some congressional staffers have privately echoed Hoffman's views, as have a few military officers in off-the-record conversations.

The troop buildup has an estimated initial cost of nearly $100 billion with a subsequent cost of $15 billion per year to maintain the additional forces. These costs are being incurred at a time that several new aircraft and ship programs are far above predicted costs, virtually all U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground vehicles except for M1 tanks are in need of replacement, military health costs are skyrocketing, and the increased costs of fuel are playing havoc with operating budgets.

While some troop increases transcend the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially increases in special operations forces and, to some extent, in Marine units. After withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq -- as after the Vietnam War -- U.S. national leaders will be very reluctant to commit ground forces to sustained combat situations. Rather, special operations and forward-deployed Marine units afloat will be the more likely to be used in future crises and conflicts. Along with forward-deployed Navy ships, they will be the "forces of preference" for the foreseeable future.

The current crises in Africa that have led to the recent establishment of the U.S. Africa Command, the confrontations with the leaders of Venezuela and Iran, competition with China and India for resources in several parts of the world, and other problem areas will demand that the United States maintain flexible and rapidly deployable presence and combat forces. It is unlikely that those will be large Army or Marine Corps ground combat formations.

-- Norman Polmar

Russia's 5th Gen Fighter Delayed

Russia's fifth-generation fighter aircraft -- being developed in collaboration with India -- has again been delayed. In late October a senior Russian air force officer said that the fifth-generation fighter is expected to fly by 2012, the RIA Novosti news service reported. "The deadlines have been set—[the fighter] must take to the skies in 2012 and enter service [with the Air Force] in 2015," said Lieutenant General Igor Sadofyev, the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force. "International cooperation and joint development efforts will certainly expedite the process," Sadofyev said.

(EDITOR: Photo is of an S-37 Berkut, once thought of as Russia's 5th generation fighter. There are no pictures available of the current one.)

Less than two years ago, on 17 January 2006, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, General Vladimir Mikhailov, said that Russia's fifth-generation fighter plane would be ready to fly in 2007. "Work to build the fifth-generation plane is going according to schedule," Mikhailov declared.

However, the project has encountered some financial problems with civilian aircraft being produced using money allocated in the budget for fighter planes. "Clearly, the development of aviation technology will depend on specific military and economic conditions, determining the progress of reform in the Russian armed forces and the country's aircraft construction industry,” explained Mikhailov.

(At the time the general also said that "We are actively working on the modernization of MiG-29 and MiG-31 planes. New equipment could be installed in their cockpits that will increase their efficiency two and a half to three times.")

Russia and India have agreed to jointly develop the fifth-generation fighter aircraft. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who is co-chairman of the Russian-Indian commission on military-technical cooperation, said that the new multi-role fighter is being designed by the Sukhoi Bureau, which has developed a long line of Soviet-Russian fighter and strike aircraft. India has agreed to cooperate with Russia on research and testing of the aircraft, and to future joint production by India's HAL corporation.

While the categorization of fighter-type aircraft by generation is somewhat arbitrary, the technologies that best characterize fifth-generation fighters are advanced integrated avionics systems, which provide the pilot with a complete picture of the aerial battlespace, and the use of low observable or "stealth" features in the design and construction of the aircraft. Most experts agree that the U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor and the multi-service F-35 Joint Strike Fighter/Lightning II, now in flight test, are the world's only fifth-generation fighters currently flying. Both the F-22 and F-35 series are produced by Lockheed Martin.

Beyond the Sukhoi Su-47, the Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG) design now known as the MFI is the only other fifth-generation fighter on the horizon.

India has been a customer for Soviet-Russian military equipment for a half century. Soviet-Russian warships dominate the Indian Navy, with the ex-Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, now being rebuilt in a Russian shipyard for future service in the Indian Navy. The Indian Army uses a large amount of Russian ground combat equipment while the overwhelming majority of the Indian Air Force's aircraft inventory was built in Russia or in India to Russian designs.

The buildup of the Indian armed forces overshadows the advances being made by other Asian military forces, including the massive modernization of the Chinese armed forces.

-- Norman Polmar

Israel Looks East for Navy Commander

The Israeli Navy, still recovering from the image of one of its missile ships struck by a land-launched missile during the summer 2006 Israeli assault on the Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, has received a new commander -- of Chinese descent.

The Israeli minister of defense and other senior military officials had earlier stepped down following recriminations and investigations of the ill-fought conflict. Rear Admiral Eli Marom -- with the nickname "Chiney" -- took command of the navy in October after his predecessor, David Ben-Bassat, retired amidst the continuing criticism of his conduct during the Lebanon war.

Marom's mother was a member of the Chinese Jewish community, born to an Israeli and a Russian émigré woman. She married Marom's father after he had fled his native Germany for China during World War II. In 1955, the couple moved to Israel, where Marom was born.

Because he looked different, it "forced him constantly to show that he was better. He became one of the very best very quickly," one former comrade told the weekend newspaper Yediot Acharonot, which published a profile of the new admiral.

Marom, age 52, trained as an engineer and ascended through the ranks, overseeing major naval operations such as the 2002 capture of an Iranian-supplied weapons ship en route to Gaza.

The Israeli Navy is currently undergoing a major expansion, with additional German-built Dolphin-class submarines and American-built Sa'ar V-class missile corvettes as well as lesser craft under construction. These new ships will lead to an expansion of the active Israeli Navy, which currently has some 5,500 active duty personnel and about 3,500 reservists.

One of three earlier Sa'ar V corvettes delivered in 1994-1995 was struck by the cruise missile on 21 July 2006. The Hanit was part of the force blockading the Lebanese coast to prevent additional weapons from reaching the terrorists by sea from nearby Syria. At 8:45 P.M. a C-802 cruise missile struck the ship some ten miles offshore. Indications are that one missile was fired "high" to distract the ship's defensive systems and the second was aimed at the Hanit (spear).

The first missile struck a small merchant ship, reported to be a Cambodian-flag cargo ship with an Egyptian crew, steaming about 35 miles offshore. The second missile struck the stern of the 1,275-ton Hanit. The Israeli ship, fitted with a massive array of anti-missile systems, was apparently taken by complete surprise by the missile attack.

-- Norman Polmar

The Future of Carriers Threatened?

Comments made in the halls of the Pentagon and the halls of Congress indicate that there is a new threat to future U.S. Navy aircraft carriers. The "threat" to carriers is not enemy weapons or even the U.S. Air Force, but the increasing cost of the nuclear-propelled carriers now being constructed and planned.

The Navy currently operates 11 large-deck carriers -- ten nuclear-propelled ships and the oil-burning USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63). The latter ship, which is forward based in Japan, will be decommissioned next year, when another nuclear ship, the George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), will be placed in commission. The next carrier to be decommissioned will be the USS Enterprise (CVN 65), which was completed in 1961. She will go out of service in 2013 at which time carrier levels will drop to ten ships.

The next carrier will be the Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), which is now being started. But that ship will not be ready for service until 2015 -- if the ship is completed on schedule. The Navy officially estimates that the Ford -- the first of a new design -- will cost about $8 billion plus about $6 billion for research, development, test and evaluation for the new design. But unofficial estimates have placed the eventual cost of the ship at some $12 billion plus another $12 billion for one-time RDT&E. (In comparison, the last ship of the previous Nimitz [CVN 68] class -- the Bush -- will cost almost $7 billion.)

The higher costs are also predicted in a recent study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), released in late September that says three key systems face problems that could greatly affect the cost of the Ford: the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (catapults), the dual-band radar, and the advanced arresting gear. While current radars and arresting gear could be fitted in the ship, the ship's new reactor plant will not produce sufficient steam nor will the design permit the use of existing steam catapults. Without the launch system the ship would not be able to launch conventional fix-wing aircraft.

While aircraft carriers have proved to be invaluable for U.S. military operations, from the Korean War through the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, today many of their traditional missions can be carried out as effectively and possibly more so in some scenarios by other "systems." These mission areas include strike, reconnaissance, and anti-submarine warfare.

At the same time that the cost of carriers is increasing and the carrier force is below the authorized level of 12 ships, Navy shipbuilding programs are coming under increased congressional and executive branch scrutiny as the littoral combat ship (LCS), new amphibious ships (LPD), and some other ships are suffering massive cost overruns. It is unlikely that -- with an average shipbuilding budget of $11 billion planned for the foreseeable future -- the Navy will be able to afford building to the current goal of 313 ships. The Navy now operates about 279 ships.

The world situation for the foreseeable future will see a need for additional "carriers" to support U.S. political-military interests.

An alternative to constructing "the next" large CVN-type ship is to procure additional LHA/LHD-type amphibious ships. These VSTOL/helicopter carriers, which can operate the new F-35B Joint Strike Fighter, could carry out some mission that traditionally required a large-deck ship. The LHA/LHD-type ships, of some 40,000 tons full-load displacement, can carry some 1,700 troops for sustained periods as well as operating about 40 VSTOLs and helicopters. These "amphibs" -- currently in production -- cost about $2.5 billion per ship.

Large-deck carriers are important, but it is unlikely that the U.S. Navy will be able to afford the planned 12 ships or even maintain the current 11 carriers. Alternatives must be considered.

-- Norman Polmar

MarDets Back in the Mix?

The Navy’s newly published maritime strategy -- officially A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower -- calls for the return of Marine Corps detachments on a “wider variety” of Navy ships and Coast Guard cutters. When the strategy was unveiled at the Naval War College in mid-October it was announced that “Marines will continue to be employed as air-ground task forces operating from amphibious ships to conduct variety of missions, such as power projection... But they will also be employed as detachments aboard a wider variety of ships and cutters for maritime security missions.”

Marines are not normally embarked in U.S. Navy warships or Coast Guard cutters. Of course, amphibious ships, some of which have small Marine detachments as part of their ship’s company, normally embark Marines for assault operations.

It has not been announced which ships will carry Marine detachments or what will be their mission. “Maritime security” can cover a variety of activities, from inspection of merchant ships to raids on suspected pirate bases.

Since the colonial era Marines have been embarked in U.S. warships, primarily to form landing parties. In the era of steel ships Marines were assigned to cruisers, battleships, and aircraft carriers. On those ships they often were also employed to man secondary or anti-aircraft gun batteries as well as being used for landing operations. With the deployment of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. aircraft carriers in the early 1950s, Marines were given the principal duty of security for those weapons.

During the 1990s the last Marine detachments were withdrawn from warships. The last nuclear weapons were removed from U.S. surface ships in the early 1990s, and the last Marine detachment -- embarked in the nuclear-propelled carrier George Washington (CVN 73) -- went ashore on 3 April 1998. That detachment consisted of one officer and 25 enlisted Marines; previously Marine carrier detachments numbered two officers and 64 enlisted men.

In 1992 the Navy experimented with placing large Marine detachments aboard aircraft carriers. In January 1992 the carrier Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) embarked 538 Marines for a month of at-sea training and workup. This force consisted of a rifle company, command staff, and various detachments including a composite helicopter squadron. Subsequently, in March 1993 the Roosevelt battle group steamed for the Mediterranean for a six-month deployment with some 600 Marines and their helicopters. (Part of the carrier air wing was left ashore to make space for the Marines.)

The “TR” operation was considered successful by the Navy and Marine Corps. However, the costs and disadvantages outweighed the benefits and the Marines-on-warship concept was not continued.

The recent decision to place Marines aboard Navy ships and Coast Guard cutters occurs as the Marine Corps is fully committed -- to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and forward deployments aboard amphibious ships in several areas, while at the same time, being required to provide a major Marine troop contingent to the U.S. Special Operations Command. The recent decision to increase the size of the Marine Corps and Army by 92,000 troops reflects the critical situation in U.S. ground troop strength. Thus, the decision to place Marines abroad ship should be addressed with caution.

-- Norman Polmar

Exercise Delay Shows India-China Rift

The first ever land military exercise between India and China, originally scheduled for October 2007 and then delayed for a month, has again been delayed because the two long-time antagonists cannot decide on the details of dates and venue. The two nations had conducted minor joint naval exercise in the East China Sea in 2003.

The planned ground exercise was to be an anti-terrorism drill involving about 150 troops from each country. The principal purpose is to increase the “confidence levels” between the two countries, which fought a brief but bitter border war in 1962 and have been long-time rivals for power in southern Asia as well as having had continuing border disputes. As originally agreed, India was to send an Army unit to China for the exercise, but new negotiations will now be held to determine the details of the exercise.

The original agreement came after the Indian Army’s chief of staff, General J.J. Singh, visited China at the end of May 2007. Those discussions, according to the Indian Defense Ministry, led to a decision on "engagement and mutual confidence building" including joint training exercises.

During the lengthy China-Soviet rivalry that began in the late 1950s, the Soviet Union became a prime arms supplier to India. Subsequently, China became a close ally and arms supplier of Pakistan, India’s long-time rival and opponent in several major conflicts and confrontations.

Those long-time alliances and rivalries involving the Soviet Union began to unravel with the demise of the Soviet regime at the end of 1991. Subsequently, the Russian Federation has become a major arms supplier and, in some respects, economic partner of China as well as of India. In August 2007 small Chinese and Russian military units held a joint exercise called Peace Mission 2007.

Significant political and territorial issues continue to divide China and India. At this time India contends that China occupies 14,670 square miles of its territory, while China claims the whole of the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Still, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao have held recent meetings, with Singh promising "to do everything possible to cement our relationship." And, he declared, "Our government and people, regardless of their political affiliations, want the strongest relationship with China."

-- Norman Polmar

Good News - Bad News on UAVs (Depending on Who You Are)

The good news is that the Air Force’s plan to obtain control of all U.S. military medium- and high-altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) has been rejected by the Department of Defense. The bad news is that the Air Force’s plan has been rejected.

Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England announced his UAV decision in a recent memo to senior civilian and military officials in the Department of Defense. According to the memo, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition is to create a task force to coordinate UAV issues and develop ways to "enhance operations, enable interdependencies, and streamline acquisition of [UAVs]." The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) will be responsible for coordinating the development of training and tactics, added England.

Many defense officials and military officers -- Air Force and from the other services -- believe that the solution will not bring the volatile UAV situation under “control.”

The JROC was established to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his statutory responsibility to advise the Secretary of Defense on military requirements, programs, and budgets. Headed by the chairman, the JROC’s membership consists of four-star officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley had proposed on 5 March 2007 that the Air Force take over the management of all Pentagon UAV programs. It was met with strong opposition from Army and Navy officials, who feared that Air Force “control” would subjugate their UAV requirements for direct support and other roles -- as well as control of funds -- to Air Force roles, missions, and schedules.

Thus, in lieu of forming an executive agency within the Air Force, Mr. England -- a former Secretary of the Navy -- has directed that an interagency task force will address how to promote interoperability and efficient operations among the services unmanned aerial vehicles. (There are more than 100 different types of UAVs now in operation or development.)

Mr. England’s memo did direct that the Air Force's Predator and Army's Sky Warrior UAV programs be merged by October 2008, “to include a common data link, in order to achieve common development, procurement, sustainment and training activities." He did direct which service should lead this effort.

The decision especially relieves the Navy of concerns that the Air Force could subsume oversight of its high-dollar UAV contracts, especially the Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAV) demonstrator, which was recently awarded to Northrop Grumman, and a soon-to-be-decided Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BMAS) contract. Some Navy officials believe those programs as well as other UAV efforts to be critical to future naval operations, both in “blue water” and coastal/littoral areas.

-- Norman Polmar

Opening Up the PLA

Major progress is being made in increasing the "transparency" of China's armed forces - known collectively as the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). "Transparency" is a Washington term as senior U.S. military officers, defense officials, and analysts seek to know more about the strength and intentions of China's defense establishment.

The outgoing chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace, visited China in March 2007 and gave the PLA high marks for the access that he was given. Pace was allowed to see China's newest fighter aircraft and was given a ride in the PLA's most advanced tank. "They took me to places no other U.S. officer had been," Pace said. "They took me to their private offices. They took me to their command centers and showed me their maps and their plans."

More recently, Admiral Mike Mullen, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations who will relieve General Pace as JCS chairman this fall, returned from a China visit. Mullen declared that he now had a better grasp of the PLA modernization efforts and "There's a long way to go, but I'm reassured...I'm very encouraged about their commitment to continuing to improve this relationship."

Reportedly, other Pentagon officials are less impressed, noting that U.S. military officers are routinely denied access to Chinese sites during trips there, even as the Americans allowed visiting Chinese officers into some of the United States' most sophisticated and advanced facilities.

"What we expect the Chinese to do is give us the same level of access that we give them here in the United States," explained Richard P. Lawless, who recently stepped down as the Pentagon's senior expert on Asia. "We make a great effort to give them access - reasonable access - and we make a great effort to let them understand how our military really works, and if that cannot be reciprocated, then we have a very serious disconnect," Lawless added.

Still, Chinese military officers in the United States tend to have more restrictions placed on them than many other foreign representatives, including officers from the Russian Federation. And, considering the long-closed society of China and the high degree of secrecy that shrouded all PLA activities and programs until a few years ago, China is becoming increasingly transparent from a military viewpoint.

Although some observers view U.S. and Chinese naval ship visit exchanges as superficial, as well as the recent U.S.-China naval search-and-rescue exercise, such steps are truly landmark changes in the relationship of the two nations.

-- Norman Polmar

More on Osprey Ops

Although the Osprey bird nests ashore, there are several at sea as this item is written. The U.S. Air force has just conducted carrier operations aboard the large helicopter/VSTOL carrier Bataan(LHD 5) with their CV-22 variant of the Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. Belonging to the 8th Special Operations Squadron at Hurlbert Field, Florida, the Air Force CV-22s are configured to support Navy SEALs, Army Green Berets, and other special forces.

The carrier ops went off without a hitch. According to Lieutenant Colonel Ted Carallo, the commanding officer of the squadron, the “real thing” was easier than the simulator training. According to Air Force Magazine on-line, a greater challenge than the actual flying was getting the squadron and ship schedules to mesh.

Earlier this year the Air Force CV-22s conducted operations with Navy SEALs. The Air Force is procuring 50 CV-22 aircraft for the special operations role.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Marine Corps has dispatched ten MV-22 Ospreys to Iraq for combat operations. Those aircraft are also at sea, being transported aboard the helicopter/VSTOL carrier Wasp (LHD 1). Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 has sailed aboard the Wasp with ten MV-22s and 171 personnel. A Marine spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Hill, explained that moving the aircraft by ship rather than flying them to Iraq with stopovers and in-flight refuelings will “save wear and tear on the airplane… [and] will also allow time to do shipboard integration operations. That will help us down the road as we look to integrate them with the [Marine expeditionary units].”

The method of returning squadron VMM-263 to the United States after its seven-month deployment has not been decided. The squadron is based at the Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina.

The Marine Corps currently has more than 40 MV-22s in service with several hundred being procured to replace the CH-46E Sea Knight, a helicopter whose service dates from the Vietnam era, and the CH-53D Sea Stallion, of the same period. The Marine aircraft can carry up to 24 troops or can carry a large cargo load by external sling. It can fly twice as fast and twice as high as the CH-46, and has three to five times the range, depending upon payload. A single 7.62-mm machine gun is fitted to the rear door/ramp of the aircraft in the MV-22 configuration.

A Navy plan to procure the V-22 as a combat search-and-rescue aircraft has been dropped. Early studies also looked at an SV-22 anti-submarine variant and an EV-22 airborne early warning aircraft.

-- Norman Polmar

New Nuke Sub for India?

Sources are reporting that India, with one Russian nuclear-propelled attack submarine (SSN) already on order, is seeking a second Project 971 submarine, given the Western code name Akula. India is the only country to have operated nuclear submarines built by another nation.

India’s first Akula SSN is under construction at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur shipyard near the city of Khabarovsk in the Far East. That submarine -- which will be leased to India -- is expected to be completed in 2009. The Akula is a torpedo-attack submarine fitted with four 533-mmm and four 650-mm torpedo tubes that can launch a variety of weapons, including anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. The first Akula entered Soviet service in 1984, introducing a new level of quieting, a 1,950-foot test depth, and other advanced SSN capabilities to the Soviet Navy.

India has publicly denied interest in nuclear submarines. However, writing in New Delhi’s Sunday Express, Mr. Shishir Gupta reported that leasing a second submarine was included in talks held in late August that included India’s National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan and senior Russian officials visiting New Delhi, including First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov and recently appointed Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov.

The Indian government had signed an agreement in 2004-2005 for the leasing of the first Akula SSN. The quest for a second SSN may be motivated by the highly publicized modernization of Chinese naval forces. The Chinese government’s improved ties with Pakistan and Myanmar (formerly Burma) and growing Chinese importation of Middle East oil, as well as increasing Chinese involvement in East African issues, are of concern to India’s government. The SSN procurement as well as the purchase of a former Soviet aircraft carrier (the ex-Admiral Gorshkov), the start of construction of an indigenous carrier in India, and other military modernization efforts are undoubtedly influenced by China’s activities.

India had previously leased a Soviet nuclear submarine, a Project 670/Charlie cruise missile submarine (SSGN). After 20 years in the Soviet fleet, the K-43 served in the Indian Navy from 1988 to 1991. She was employed primarily to train Indian personnel in nuclear propulsion and submarine operations.

-- Norman Polmar

Japan Launches Carrier...Sorta

The Japanese Navy -- officially the Maritime Self-Defense Force -- has launched an “aircraft carrier.” At least the Hyuga, launched at Yokohama on August 23, looks like an aircraft carrier -- she has a flush flight deck and a large, starboard-side island structure. But the Hyuga is a relatively small ship as carriers go, with a standard displacement of 13,500 (metric) tonnes and will displace 18,000 tonnes full load. That is about the size of the planned U.S. destroyers of the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) class.

The Hyuga is classified as a helicopter-carrying destroyer (DDH 181) by the Japanese. She will carry an Aegis-type air defense system, with the U.S.-developed AN/SPY-1 multi-function radar; her principal “weapons” armament will be 64 advanced ESSM-type Sparrow missiles. She will also be fitted with two 20-mm Phalanx “Gatling” guns for close-in defense against anti-ship missiles, and she will have six tubes for anti-submarine torpedoes.

(EDITOR: Thanks to DT reader "Camp" for links to Hyuga pics...)

More significant from an aviation viewpoint, the Hyuga will normally operate three SH-60J Blackhawk-type anti-submarine helicopters and one MH-53E Super Stallion multi-purpose helicopter. Reportedly, the ship’s hangar can accommodate 11 of the smaller aircraft.

Ironically, the U.S. Navy briefly, and mostly at congressional insistence, looked at similar aircraft-carrying destroyer designs in the 1970s. Based on the U.S. Spruance (DD 963) design, such ships could have operated Harrier VSTOL aircraft as well as helicopters on a modified destroyer hull. (Congress voted funding for two such ships, but instead the Navy simply built another conventional destroyer.)

The Hyuga, the largest warship constructed in Japan since World War II, is considered by some observers to be the first step toward the development of a large aircraft carrier. Japan’s constitution, imposed by the United States after World War II, permits Japanese to have only “self-defense” forces. Many Japanese, recalling the effectiveness of Japanese aircraft carriers in China in the 1930s and against U.S. forces in the Pacific in the early stages of World War II, consider carriers to be offensive weapons.

Japan was a leader in carrier development in the 1930s and early 1940 with their short-lived carrier Shinano, which was converted during construction from a battleship. It was the world’s largest carrier to be built prior to the USS Forrestal (CVA 59), completed in 1955.

The overwhelming dependence of Japan on oil from the Middle East, with tankers having to transit long ocean distances, and the increasing Japanese political-economic involvement in the Middle East and Africa, has led many Japanese leaders to look at the utility of naval forces in a new light.

In this context, the innovative design of the Hyuga raises the question: What’s next?

-- Norman Polmar