The Pentagon just released the latest Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq report. Here are some pull-outs from the Executive Summary. You can read the entire document HERE.
My question is how will the MSM portray this report and what negatives will they focus on? It will also be interesting to see if the major papers and networks ignore the update. We'll see...
...The overall security situation in Iraq has greatly improved this reporting period. Security incidents have remained at levels last seen in early 2004 for nearly three consecutive months, while civilian deaths across Iraq have declined to a level 77% lower than the same period in 2007. The surge in Coalition forces, the growth of more capable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the contributions of the Sons of Iraq (SoI), the ability of forces to secure the population, operations against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other extremist elements, and the increased willingness of the people and the Government of Iraq (GoI) to confront extremists are important factors that have contributed to the improved security environment. Periodic high-profile car and suicide vest bombings have occurred, but the number of these attacks and the resulting casualties have decreased dramatically. Moreover, these attacks have not rekindled the self-perpetuating cycle of ethno-sectarian violence that plagued Iraq in late 2006 and the first half of 2007.
...The emergence of the SoI remains one of the major developments of the past 18 months; however, the integration and employment of SoI remain a significant challenge. The SoI provide significant security benefits to their local communities by protecting September 26, 2008 neighborhoods, securing key infrastructure and roads, and identifying malign activity.
...The slow pace of transition is a concern. Continued GoI commitment is required to ensure SoI are fully transitioned to permanent employment. Recent allegations of GoI targeting SoI leaders in Diyala Province are of concern if they are indicators of GoI reluctance to integrate SoI into the ISF or, more broadly, to reconcile a diverse province. Prime Minister Maliki has recently signed an order reflecting his commitment that stipulates the GoI will assume responsibility for SoI in Baghdad and its environs (over 50,000) beginning in October 2008, but Coalition forces continue to pay the salaries of SoI personnel. Prime Minister Maliki’s order would move more than half of the SoIs to the GoI payroll.
...Malign Iranian influence continues to pose the most significant threat to long-term stability in Iraq. Despite continued Iranian promises to the contrary, it appears clear that Iran continues to fund, train, arm, and direct SG intent on destabilizing the situation in Iraq. Prime Minister Maliki has repeatedly engaged Iranian leaders on this issue. The majority of SG leaders remain in Iran where they sought sanctuary following ISF operations in Basrah, Baghdad and Maysan Province.
...In summary, political, security, economic, and diplomatic trends in Iraq this past quarter continued to be positive; however, they remain fragile, reversible, and uneven. Progress towards durable security has been made even as Coalition forces have drawn down. Normalcy is increasingly returning to formerly violent parts of Iraq. The ISF continues to improve and is in the lead in maintaining security for the Iraqi people. Improved security has allowed for dialogue among Iraq’s many groups and political entities. The reduced violence has provided time and space in which institutional development can occur. While security has improved dramatically, the fundamental character of the conflict in Iraq remains unchanged—a communal struggle for power and resources. Concerns remain in the areas of political reconciliation, rule of law, and ministerial capacity. In order to achieve enduring stability and realize its full potential, the GoI must continue to build its legitimacy by clearly serving the Iraqi people while paying continued attention to the remaining challenges discussed above to help solidify and build on the progress achieved.
-- Christian
How Small Raids Net Big Gains
The commander in charge of helping local Iraqis organize and fight al Qaeda and other anti-coalition forces said Wednesday that a raid last month netted a treasure trove of information that could spell the doom of al Qaeda terrorist smuggling operations in Iraq and, potentially, worldwide.
The description of the find exemplifies the kind of intelligence American and Iraqi forces are gaining, with the help of local tipsters, and provides a window into how commanders speak with such authority on insurgent ties to Iran and al Qaeda activity in Iraq.
The raid, conducted Sept. 11 in the town of Sinjar near the Syrian border, targeted what Maj. Gen. Kevin Bergner called “a foreign terrorist facilitation cell.”
As coalition forces busted in on the seven-man AQ team, one of them detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and one of his companions, while the U.S. team made short work of the rest.
Aside from disrupting the small smuggling team, coalition forces found “literally terabytes of electronic files,” Bergner said, including 800 names of al Qaeda terrorists – 143 of those either “en route or already delivered” to Iraq.
The intel included the terrorists’ names, passport numbers, home addresses and “their transit routes that were involved in getting them here,” Bergner said in an interview with military bloggers Oct. 10.
The computer files included documents on logistics and administrative activities, “we saw how they spend their money on everything from food, fuel and weapons … and even allocation of money to support some of their families,” Bergner added.
In one macabre find, Bergner said troops obtained copies of suicide pledges “that al Qaeda is using to help lead these individuals towards the performance of a suicide mission.”
Though the raid netted only seven dead AQ terrorists, the information gleaned from it could cripple the group’s operations in Iraq. Home addresses, phone numbers, transit routes, money information, food procurement, ammo, guns…think how many strands of the web were picked up and the down-stream effects those have to the entire AQ network.
I wonder if AQ cells are going to change their record keeping after this. And it also makes me wonder why they keep such detailed operational records. I thought we were being led to believe these groups were “loosely affiliated cells.” Only someone that was being held to strict account would keep such detailed records.
I know we covered this subject ad nauseum last week, but I just thought I'd throw one more log on the fire of the "Petraeus Report" assessment melee that's still simmering.
One of the most innovative and trusted "outside experts" in D.C. is Andrew Krepinevich and his stable of "formers" and other "think tankers" at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. It turns out, Krepinevich briefed senate staffers on the 10th, giving his read of the surge.
He's been pretty down the line on the war, critiquing where he sees fit and approving when it looks like something’s working. He’s a strong advocate of counterinsurgency strategy but tends to lean more toward the Rumsfeldian "economy of force" school of thought.
His briefing slides are offered HERE in their entirety. But here’s a look at his “conclusions.”
The Maliki Government is seemingly unable (unwilling?) to affect a national reconciliation — it lacks coercive power, legitimacy, and competence, consequently.
Iraq’s factions are increasingly making their own way, establishing their own control, protecting (or extorting) those people who live under their “rule,” and making their own alliances with foreign powers (e.g., Sunni tribes and US; Shi’a militias and Iran).
The US is slowly but surely seeing its ability to influence events in Iraq wane . . . In part because of a growing perception that the American public has one foot already out the door.
The US command in Baghdad has adapted admirably to changing circumstances, but the situation is dynamic and the path to national reconciliation may no longer lie through the Maliki Government—thus the “Surge Metrics” may be OBE . . . If so . . .
What should succeed them? What is the new way forward? And not just in Iraq, but in the theater of conflict stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush?
-- Christian
Document Alert!
Here are the testimony and accompanying slides from the appearance today of Gen. David Petraeus before the House Armed Services Committee.
Here’s an update to the Hezbollah in Iraq story, especially for those who want harder proof of the Iran nexus.
A few days ago, the new chief spokesman for multi-national forces in Iraq held a press conference on the heels of the Associated Press and CNN stories on the capture of a key Hezbollah special operations commander in Iraq who provided proof of Iran’s complicity in the deaths of American troops.
Defense Tech wanted to bring our readers’ attention to some of the documents and transcripts provided by MNF-I that bolster their claim. Any Arab speakers out there, please give the docs a once-over and see if they are indeed what U.S. commanders say they are...
Last week Defense Tech pulled out an interesting line from a June 22 briefing given to Pentagon reporters on operations in Iraq by Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno.
Odierno was asked several questions about the involvement of Iran in Iraq’s insurgency. As you’ll remember, he said specifically that Iran had been training insurgent mortar teams on how to quickly set up in cover, accurately fire and extract mortar teams before U.S forces could nab them.
He also said, in what probably passed through most reporters’ ears, this sentence in reference to evidence of Iran’s training and direction of Iraq insurgents (emphasis added):
And I think, you know, we've had some indications of that through some of the people we've detained, and I think in the future here we're going to lay some of that out for you. So I think -- we feel pretty confident about those links.
Well, now it looks like that has happened. Our sister site, Military.com, is reporting this morning an Associated Press story that indicates Lebanese Hezbollah was involved in a kidnapping attempt of U.S. troops in January. The terrorists were trained and advised by Iranian Quds force officers and instructed to carry out a high-profile hostage taking similar to the one that sparked the war with Israel last summer.
Iran is using the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah as a "proxy" to arm Shiite militants in Iraq and Tehran's Quds force had prior knowledge of a January attack in Karbala in which five Americans died, a U.S. general said Monday.
U.S. military spokesman Brig. Gen. Kevin J. Bergner said a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative, Ali Mussa Dakdouk, was captured March 20 in southern Iraq. Bergner said Dakdouk served for 24 years in Hezbollah and was "working in Iraq as a surrogate for the Iranian Quds force."
The general also said that Dakdouk was a liaison between the Iranians and a breakaway Shiite group led by Qais al-Kazaali, a former spokesman for cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Bergner said al-Kazaali's group carried out the January attack against a provincial government building in Karbala and that the Iranians assisted in preparations.
Al-Khazaali and his brother Ali al-Khazaali, both captured in March, have told U.S. interrogators that they "could not have conducted it (the Karbala attack) without support from the Quds force," Bergner said.
Documents captured with al-Khazaali showed that the Quds Force had developed detailed information on the U.S. position at the government building, including "shift changes and defense" and shared this information with the attackers, the general said.
And CNN’s top investigative reporter in Iraq, Michael Ware, never an apologist for the U.S. invasion and occupation, bolstered the AP report with his own work based on interviews with Iraqi government officials who’d seen the forensic evidence and interrogation transcripts.
U.S. sources and Iraqi militia sources have said the carefully planned operation was meant to take captives who could be traded for five Iranians held by U.S. troops since a January 10 raid in Irbil, in northern Iraq. But the Karbala attack went awry, resulting in the deaths of the five Americans.
Qais Khazali, a onetime spokesman for anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, was one of the men sought by American troops in connection with the attack. By the time of his March arrest, he had left the Mehdi Army and was leading one of the "special groups," according to U.S. intelligence.
In searching for Khazali, U.S. and allied troops found computer documents detailing the planning, training and conduct of the failed kidnapping. And they found Daqduq, whom intelligence officials said has admitted working on behalf of Iran.
And an interesting postscript to Ware’s report (watch the video here): Dakdouk pretended to be a def-mute for a while until interrogators got him to talk, then he spilled the beans. Wonder how they got him to talk?
After three years of training by coalition forces – and nonstop combat with insurgents – Iraqi army and police units are battle-hardened, highly motivated and skilled in battlefield drills. “At the tactical level ... we're doing quite well,” says Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, a senior official in the coalition training organization. “They’re fighting, dying, being wounded, being moved around country.” He says 5,300 Iraqi soldiers from outside of Baghdad have been brought in for the “surge.”
That last point – their ability to deploy – is a sure sign that Iraqi army units are improving. “Battalions disintegrated last year when we tried to move them around. Now we have them ready to move,” says Major General William Caldwell, top commander in Iraq.
“That was not even possible six months ago,” Dempsey points out.
Even the troubled Iraqi police – suspected by many of having been infiltrated by extremist militias – are apparently getting much better. Police trainer Brigadier General David Phillips says the police “are much more professional” now that systems are in place to punish corruption.
Despite these improvements, leadership remains a major failing for Iraqi forces – both at the national level and at the level of non-commissioned officers on the battlefield. Iraq’s highest military leaders, including government ministers, and police and army officers still need babysitting by U.S. and other coalition mentors. "The higher up in echelons in command you go, the more vulnerabilities in leadership become evident," Dempsey says.
"Most of the senior leaders are from the old regime – and old habits die hard," he adds. “There was a tendency to dramatically oversimplify things … not much attention to detail.”
That’s a problem Dempsey is working hard to remedy. “We've run numerous command and control exercises – the ministers [of the Interior and Defense Departments] themselves participate. Now they appreciate the details."
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Daniel Speckhard says that ongoing “surge” operations in Baghdad have forced the ministers to learn quickly. In the past, he says, ministry leaders focused solely on strictly military solutions to security problems. That’s changing: recently the government formed defense planning committees focused on using diplomacy, reconstruction and other “soft power” functions to resolve conflict.
Still, Speckhard is skeptical. “It’s too early to draw conclusions that there are encouraging signs” of long-term improvement.
Plus, the relentless demands of day-to-day combat have prevented the slow, steady training necessary to build up an experienced NCO corps, according to Dempsey. “They would like to have a U.S.-style NCO corps, but they realize it’s a long way off.”
The Iraqi army NCO corps is growing, but there is a shortage of NCOs in the training establishment because every soldier is needed at the front – and this has a detrimental effect on the security force’s ability to sustain improvements in training and development. Dempsey says the coalition’s plan for training Iraqi NCOs is evolving to ensure that enough non-coms remain in the training base.
A story cropped up today on a March 4 incident where the first-deployed Marine Special Operations Company allegedly shot and killed innocent Afghan civilians in reaction to a roadside bomb ambush.
The story, of course, is not new. What is, however, is the tacit admission by Army officers in Afghanistan that the Marine special operators committed a crime…before an official investigation has been completed!
I have been covering the formation of MarSoc since 2002, when a memorandum of understanding between the Corps and SOCom planted the seed for the new commando units. I have met some of the Force Reconnaissancemen in the new MarSoc company and can vouch for their professionalism, experience and skill.
Clearly something went wrong on that bumpy road in Nangahar province, but I know from contacts within the unit that there are definitely two sides to this story. And that’s what investigations are for, right?
Why, then, did Col. John Nicholson, commander of the 3rd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division deployed to Afghanistan, say this in a statement presented to the purported victims’ families of the March 4 incident:
I stand before you today, deeply, deeply ashamed and terribly sorry that Americans have killed and wounded innocent Afghan people…
…We are filled with grief and sadness at the death of any Afghan, but the death and wounding of innocent Afghans at the hand of Americans is a stain on our honor and on the memory of the many Americans who have died defending Afghanistan and the Afghan people…
…This was a terrible, terrible mistake, and my nation grieves with you for your loss and suffering…
We humbly and respectfully ask for your forgiveness…
Sounds to me like the Army commanders in Afghanistan have already determined the results of the ongoing investigation. In fact, after rolling out that statement to reporters at the Pentagon today, Nicholson demurred when asked to provide more details of the March 4 incident, saying, you guessed it, “it is still under investigation.”
Nicholson said the U.S. government had made compensatory payments to the families, averaging $2,000 for the 19 dead and 50 wounded.
I understand that winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan might require a little groveling at times. But in this apology there is a tacit, if not explicit, admission of fault – and the payments certainly indicate guilt.
The speed of the disclosure of the incident and the expulsion of the Marine spec ops company from Afghanistan very shortly after by Army commanders in Afghanistan seems odd as well. We surely can recall a host of incidents where the Army clammed up about the details of purported mishaps that made it look bad.
No quarter given, it seems, to the Marine Corps’ fledgling door-kicker unit on its first deployment as a spec ops unit.
I hope the Navy and Marine Corps don’t jump to conclusions like the Army commanders seem to have done, and that they instead allow investigators to do their work and determine with clarity who’s really at fault here.
On a day when the political stars seemed aligned even stronger against America’s continued involvement in Iraq, I thought it might be a good idea to get a view of events from the front line.
A story that’s making its way across the net comes from a Marine posted in Ramadi, Iraqi, who takes exception to Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid’s view that the war is lost.
WASHINGTON - A tough U.S. Marine stationed in one of the most hostile areas of Iraq has a message for Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid: “We need to stay here and help rebuild.”
In raw and emotional language from the bloody front lines, Cpl. Tyler Rock, of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, skewered Reid for being far removed from the patriotism and progress in Iraq.
“Yeah, and I got a quote for that [expletive] Harry Reid. These families need us here,” Rock vented in an e-mail to Pat Dollard, a Hollywood agent-turned-war reporter who posted the comment on his Web site, www.patdollard.com.
“Obviously [Reid] has never been in Iraq. Or at least the area worth seeing . . . the parts where insurgency is rampant and the buildings are blown to pieces,” Rock wrote.
Based in Camp Lejeune, N.C., Rock catalogued a series of grim daily traumas in Iraq, like getting covered in ash and sleeping under a dirty rug in an Iraqi family’s house, or watching “several terrorists die” on the same strip of pavement.
But he says he is optimistic about the future of a country that he says has “turned to complete s- - -” during a bloody insurgency.
He also spoke admiringly of the risks brave Iraqi citizens take every day.
“If Iraq didn’t want us here then why do we have [Iraqi police] volunteering every day to rebuild their cities?” he asked.
“It sucks that Iraqis have more patriotism for a country that has turned to complete s- - - more than the people in America who drink Starbucks every day.
“We could leave this place and say we are sorry to the terrorists. And then we could wait for 3,000 more American civilians to die before we say, ‘Hey, that’s not nice’ again.”
“And the sad thing is after we WIN this war. People like [Reid] will say he was there for us the whole time.”
Rock’s candid e-mail swept across the Internet after Dollard posted it on his site, and it was picked up by the Drudge Report and numerous other Web sites.
“What does [Reid] know about us ‘losing’ besides what he wants to believe? The truth is that we are pushing al Qaeda out and we are pushing the insurgency out. We are here to support a nation.”
Hat-tip to Pat Dollard who was there with my buddy that horrible night in Ramadi. RIP Almar and Matt.
Military.com is reporting today that Afghan security forces have surrounded a village near Kandahar that is reportedly sheltering some 200 Taliban fighters.
The rebels were found in the village of Keshay, which is in the Taliban heartland. The story says the rebels were there for a meeting when the obviously tipped-off ASF cut off their exit and demanded a surrender. The report says Taliban rebel leader Mullah Dadullah could be in the town as well, but so far has refused to surrender(photo from Counterterrorism blog).
This could be the decapitating blow allied forces were looking for in the smoldering Afghan conflict. Or, it could be a replay of Tora Bora, where payoffs and shifting alliances allowed al Qaeda and Talib fighters to escape.
Let’s hope that the lessons of the Tora Bora battle have been learned and that the ASF – as well as their NATO mentors – are up to the challenge.
I know the story has been floating around for a couple of weeks, but as media attention focuses on the security operations in and around Baghdad, I thought it would be worthwhile to remember there’s a lot of activity going on to stabilize the Sunni-majority al Anbar province in western Iraq.
I’ve spent a lot of time out there embedded with Marine and Army units over the past few years and its at least somewhat heartening for me to hear from a variety of sources that the Marines’ strategy of enlisting the local populace in the struggle against al Qaeda and the anti-government Sunni insurgency is starting to pay off.
According to Kim Kagan’s latest Iraq report, tribal chiefs and clan leaders are enlisting their members in greater numbers to join police and army units, pushing the influence of Sunni AQ out of the province.
In March 2006, al Qaeda controlled Ramadi and Anbar in the doctrinal sense. U.S. forces slowly spread through many of Ramadi’s neighborhoods through security stations and combat outposts. They cleared al Qaeda from the government center, which was its stronghold in Ramadi. In March 2007, al Qaeda no longer controlled Ramadi, and in fact, U.S. and Iraqi forces controlled many parts of the city in a doctrinal sense.
A critical mass of the civilian population in Ramadi supported counterinsurgency efforts. Ramadi’s tribal sheiks organized and led a movement, the Awakening, when they decided to expel al Qaeda from their city. They led their population not only to reject al Qaeda, but also actively to oppose the organization. They recruited thousands of Anbaris to join the Iraqi police, effectively increasing force presence in the city and throughout the Euphrates River Valley. Their efforts, combined with U.S. efforts, spread the al Qaeda opposition movement from Ramadi, the capital city, into other cities in the provinces.
And in case you want to just dismiss the report thinking Kim is simply a shill for the neocons on this, just consider her sourcing on the assessment, which includes the New York Times, LA Times and AP.
The Marine strategy was starting to work in late 2005, when operation Steel Curtain was launched in response to AQ harassment of a western tribe that controlled the smuggling routes from Syria. That sentiment gradually made its way down the Euphrates River valley, ending up in the provincial capitol of Ramadi, where Marines and their local tribal allies have wrested back control.
Now I realize that as Gen. Barry McCaffrey remarked to senators yesterday: “the American people have walked away from this war and they are not coming back,” but still, the Marines who control al Anbar deserve credit for their counterinsurgency strategy.
Counterinsurgency operations in Anbar helped reintegrate the cities of the province. Poor security, including insurgents’ control of the Euphrates River and the roads, isolated Anbar’s cities from Ramadi in 2006.
As U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces secured the river, Ramadi, and the other cities of the river valley, smaller towns and villages were able to contribute to police recruiting drives and improve security in outlying areas. Linking the cities within the province is a necessary prerequisite for ensuring that the provincial government can govern and assist the entire province. Prime Minister Maliki’s visit was a symbolic and practical first step toward establishing a working relationship between the provincial government in Anbar Province and the central government in Baghdad.
It’s been a long, painful road (as I know from very personal experience), but even if America leaves Iraq with its tail between its legs, at least the Marines stuck to their plan...and it seems to be the only one that’s really paid any dividends.
-- Christian
Chaff From Wheat 21st Century-Style
This month-old video from MNF-Iraq shows just how surgical our forces can be when the situation permits:
Ongoing “surge” operations in Baghdad are doubling as training opportunities for Iraqi soldiers, airmen and government officials. U.S. strategy entails turning over responsibility for security in Iraq to native entities as soon as they’re ready; the demands of the surge have forced Iraqis to be readier, sooner.
Iraqi army battalions “disintegrated last year when we tried to move them around,” says Major General William Caldwell, spokesman for U.S. forces in Iraq, referring to several Iraqi units that refused to deploy to trouble spots from their home bases in the north or south of the country. Many of the Iraqi soldiers involved cited a lack of preparation. “Now we have them ready to move,” Caldwell stresses. “By the middle of March, we should have three Iraqi brigades in Baghdad.”
Iraqi forces in the contested city now number more than 20,000, and Iraqi officers have taken the lead in many Baghdad missions. The tiny Iraqi air force is stepping up operations, as well, flying troop transport missions for deploying units using three U.S.-donated Lockheed Martin C-130E Hercules airlifters in addition to conducting Baghdad surveillance with CH-2000 reconnaissance planes.
“There’s been an increase in Iraqi air force operations in recent weeks,” says Brigadier General Stephen Hoog, chief U.S. trainer for the Iraqi air service. “They did their first medevac mission about seven days ago – they’re setting up channel missions to take wounded northern Iraqi troops back home. And the CH-2000s are going on one or two missions every day checking out checkpoints.” All that’s missing from operations is Iraq’s sizeable force of helicopters, which are awaiting the installation of the defensive gear they need for Baghdad missions. “By the middle of summer, we’ll see much greater participation of their helicopters.”
The surge hinges on significant diplomatic efforts by Iraqi politicians aiming to cut off the flow of weapons and insurgents into Baghdad and to keep the city’s militias peaceful. “The U.S. government got the Iraqi Prime Minister [Nouri Al Maliki] to make it clear to the militias that there’s no room for militias, and that those that ignored that warning were going to be dealt with,” reports Ambassador Daniel Speckhard, deputy chief of the U.S. mission. As a result, many of them dissolved or have ended their activity or moved out of Baghdad.” Speckhard adds that Al Maliki recently took his first official trip to western Iraq to meet with tribal leaders who are key to intercepting weapons coming in from Syria.
On another front, DT obtained a copy of an after action review of operations in Afghanistan from former 24th Infantry Division commander in Operation Desert Storm and now International Affairs professor at West Point, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who traveled to Afghanistan in mid-February.
During his visit, McCaffrey met with a wide range of military leaders, intelligence officials, diplomats and local Afghans to get a read on how things are going over there. This is something McCaffrey is exceedingly good at. His OIF post-op was outstanding and lacked the politically-charged rhetoric of many other assessments – then and now.
Overall, he’s optimistic that the U.S and NATO can “without question, achieve our US national objective of a functioning law-based state -- with a performing, non-drug economy -- which rejects sanctuary for terrorism. This is the cross-over year. The execution of our plan in the coming 24 months will decide the outcome in the country.”
But “rhetoric and political will cannot achieve our goals. Afghanistan needs strong US inter-agency and Congressional support to provide the dollars, equipment, combat soldiers, ANA and ANP mentors, and vigorous NATO and Afghan leadership to pull this mission from the fire.”
McCaffrey is calling for a $500 billion investment over the next 10 years to build the Afghan army and police force into “capable, dominant” institutions.
The Afghan economy is booming at 12% growth rate a year. $14 billion has been spent on aid since 2001. Six TV channels and a hundred free/uncensored publications are available to the people. Literacy is increasing rapidly. The ring road is now 2/3 complete. The 40,000 soldiers of the ANA are growing rapidly in numbers and capability. There are 45,000 NATO and US troops in-country. There is a functioning democracy with an elected Parliament ---and a serious, dedicated Afghan President in office.
Afghanistan can be a strategic victory in the struggle against terrorism. We are now on the right path.
There’s also good information on Pakistan’s role in the festering conflict, a NATO force hamstrung by constrained rules of engagement, the success of U.S. airpower and an innovative option for creating more “tier one” special operators…
…in my view, the Pakistanis are NOT actively supporting the Taliban -- nor do they have a strategic purpose to de-stabilize Afghanistan…
…the Pakistanis need better US support for COIN operations in South and North Waziristan. We need to sort out a set of strategic tools to help them do better. They immediately require the $395 million they have requested for their Frontier Corps. It will be a disaster for our strategic purpose if we push them to premature military action which destroys them as a unifying and stabilizing force in the region…
…as a general statement, however, the NATO forces are too weak on the ground, lack essential supporting elements (helicopters, engineers, logistics, intelligence), have severely restrictive rules-of-engagement, and may lack the national political will to fight when required. It is possible that the Taliban will try to knock one or more of these NATO nations out of the war. A major blow to the Italians, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Spanish, or the Germans might shatter their weak domestic political support…
…we need to take a revolutionary look at the methods of creating these “Tier One” forces. It will require a separately funded recruiting program similar to WWII OSS programs to identify college graduates, with superb athletic skills, who will volunteer for a 24 month training program (to include total immersion language training in Arabic or Dari) -- followed by a four year employment tour…
(Gouge: NC)
-- Christian
Changing of the Guard
Last Friday, 16 March, 2007 saw Admiral William "Fox" Fallon take over command of CENTCOM from General John Abizaid at a change of command ceremony held at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla.
These sorts of changes of command happen all the time in the military, at every level in the chain of command. What is special about this one, however, is that a Navy admiral is taking the helm over a traditionally Army or Marine-focused unified regional command.
What is really unique about this is that it is evidence that the Navy, long considered an outsider in the Joint arena, has finally "made it" - has finally "changed" (transformed?) enough from a platform-centric, open-ocean war-at-sea protect-the-sea-lanes-of-communication entity to one that is integrated with the other combat services to provide a broad spectrum of battlespace operations. This is a good thing, and Carl von Clausewitz is smiling, wherever he is.
U.S. Army photo by Spc. Patrick A Ziegler (RELEASED)
DT got a weekly Air Force update sent to us on the coalition air war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sitrep included some pretty interesting strikes from the US arsenal including a B-1B Lancer hit a Strike Eagle gun run and some British Harrier fly-bys in Afghanistan, as well as some Falcon and Warthog CAS in Iraq.
So for some fun weekend reading, take a look...
AFGHANISTAN: A B-1B Lancer dropped guided bomb unit-38s and GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munitions on enemy personnel and a building near Garmsir, in support of Operation Achilles. The on-scene JTAC and ground forces observed direct hits.
F-15E Strike Eagles provided close-air support near Garmsir, firing cannon rounds on enemy forces in the open, dropping GBU-12s and GBU-38s on buildings known to contain enemy forces and on buildings where insurgents hid after initial air strikes.
A Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet dropped a GBU-12 on an enemy mortar position and another on a cave entrance where an enemy mortar spotter was located near Now Zad. A JTAC confirmed good hits on both targets.
Other Navy F/A-18s provided a show of force over a compound for coalition forces receiving mortar fire near Sangin. A JTAC reported the show of force was successful as enemy fire had ceased. The F/A-18s also provided overwatch for a coalition convoy and reconnaissance for a roadway in the same area.
Royal Air Force GR-7 Harriers provided a show of force for a coalition convoy attacked by multiple rocket propelled grenades at the gate of a forward operating base near Garmsir. The GR-7 pilots reported individuals observing the patrol from inside a compound.
Other GR-7s released enhanced Paveway II munitions, 540-pound bombs and a rocket on enemy individuals in the open and in buildings near Garmsir. The weapons directly hit the targets, according to a JTAC.
In total, 57 close-air-support missions were flown in support of Afghan and International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, troops, reconstruction activities and route patrols.
IRAQ: Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons provided reconnaissance of suspicious individuals and provided a show of force over a large group of people near Balad. A JTAC reported the show of force was successful.
Other Air Force F-16s provided reconnaissance of a house in which anti-Iraqi insurgents involved in a previous engagement were hiding. The F-16 pilots watched the house until the arrival of coalition forces.
A-10 Thunderbolt IIs performed armed reconnaissance in support of counter-improvised explosive device mission near Iskandariyah.
In total, coalition aircraft flew 46 close-air-support missions for OIF.
Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft and C-17 Globemaster IIIs flew about 165 airlift sorties in-theater, delivering nearly 500 tons of cargo and transporting around 2,770 passengers.
Coalition C-130 crews from Canada, Japan and South Korea flew in support of OIF or OEF.
On March 6, U.S., RAF and French tankers flew 39 sorties and off-loaded more than 2.6 million pounds of fuel which is the equivalent of 65 full Air Force fuel trucks.
"News that an Iraqi Army brigade and 2,000 American troops have begun an operation in [Baghdad's] Sunni dominated neighborhood of Azamiyah has kicked off speculation the Baghdad Security Operation is now underway in full force," serial embedder Bill Roggio notes. "But the fact is the operation to stabilize the capital and the surrounding provinces is only in its infancy. Today's positioning of forces Azamiyah is but one more opening move on the chessboard."
From what I understand, Gen. David Petraeus, the new American commander in Iraq, only now just got to Iraq. So it doesn't seem like the moment for the be-all-, end-all push the papers are trumpeting.
Iraq Re-arms
Despite flat oil exports and a struggling economy, Iraq has embarked on a comprehensive program to re-arm its embattled security forces. That's focus of my latest feature for World Politics Watch:
The country is buying American patrol planes, Italian naval vessels, Russian helicopters and armored vehicles co-produced by American and British firms. The new equipment is utilitarian stuff -- optimized for patrols in and over Iraq's teeming cities and on its smuggler-infested waters rather than for attacks on external foes -- and reflects the complete inward focus of Iraq's military. But the purchases do little to solve the forces' nearly complete lack of logistics capability.
Iraq has spent around a billion dollars on new weapons in the past year, but all the new planes, vehicles and patrol boats do nothing to address Iraqi forces' fundamental flaws, including their nearly total lack of logistics ability, as I explained in a story for National Defense Magazine a few months back:
After three years of training by coalition advisors, Iraqi forces in southern Iraq are capable of planning and commanding operations. But their logistics systems remain deeply flawed, and the Iraqis rely on British and U.S. forces for supplies and spares support for all but the most basic functions.
Plus, it doesn't matter how well armed Iraqi forces are if they can't deploy within their own country, a problem I addressed last year for The Washington Times:
The 700-strong Kurdish Iraqi army battalion, originally from the northern city of Sulaimaniyah, deployed to Balad recently to bolster a single Shi'ite battalion mustered from local residents. ... The large Sunni minority living around Balad has protested the Kurdish unit's presence, said U.S. Army Lt. Col. David Coffey, a member of an ad hoc military transition team that is helping train the Kurdish battalion. He said the residents have resisted the presence of the Kurdish battalion with such force that commanders are afraid to let the soldiers leave their base, which is adjacent to a U.S. compound outside the city.
But then, Arab militaries have a bad habit of buying impressive-looking weapons that they're incapable of using to advantage. Saudi Arabia's latest spending spree, for example, includes new Apache attack choppers, Typhoon fighters and the latest Abrams tanks. But that country remains incapable of defending itself, according to the Federation of American Scientists.
President Bush and his new military chiefs have been saying for nearly a month that they would "surge" an additional 21,500 troops to Iraq, in a last, grand push to quell the violence in Baghdad and in Anbar Province. But a new study by the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office says the real troop increase could be as high as 48,000 -- more than double the number the President initially said.
That's because the combat units that President Bush wants to send into hostile areas need to be backed up by support troops, "including personnel to staff headquarters, serve as military police, and provide communications, contracting, engineering, intelligence, medical, and other services," the CBO notes.
Over the past few years , DoD’s practice has been to deploy a total of about 9,500 personnel per combat brigade to the Iraq theater, including about 4,000 combat troops and about 5,500 supporting troops.
DoD has not yet indicated which support units will be deployed along with the added combat forces, or how many additional troops will be involved. Army and DoD officials have indicated that it will be both possible and desirable to deploy fewer additional support units than historical practice would indicate. CBO expects that, even if the additional brigades required fewer support units than historical practice suggests, those units would still represent a significant additional number of military personnel.
To reflect some of the uncertainty about the number of support troops, CBO developed its estimates on the basis of two alternative assumptions. In one scenario, CBO assumed that additional support troops would be deployed in the same proportion to combat troops that currently exists in Iraq. That approach would require about 28,000 support troops in addition to the 20,000 combat troops—a total of 48,000. CBO also presents an alternative scenario that would include a smaller number of support personnel—about 3,000 per combat brigade—totaling about 15,000 support personnel and bringing the total additional forces to about 35,000.
According to the study, the costs for the "surge" would also be dramatically different than the President has said. The White House estimated a troop escalation would require about $5.6 billion in additional funding for the rest of fiscal year 2007. Of that, about $3.2 billion was supposed to go to the Army and Marines for their escalated activity.
But that figure appears to have been grossly underestimated. The CBO now believes "that costs would range from $9 billion to $13 billion for a four-month deployment and from $20 billion to $27 billion for a 12-month deployment." There's a more detailed analysis of the numbers on pages 3 and 4 of the study, which was sent to House Budget Chairman John Spratt today.
UPDATE 1:43 PM: Here's Spratt's reaction, in a statement just released:
“An average of 170,000 military personnel has been maintained in the Iraq theater of operations, and this high deployment level has taken a toll. Last year, CBO reported that the Department of Defense had reduced the amount of ‘dwell’ time for many troops from two years to one year in order to sustain troop levels. ‘Dwell’ time is the time troops spend in training at bases in the United States while living with their families. CBO questioned whether such a high pace of operations was sustainable over the long term. The President’s proposal will increase this level to above 200,000 troops, and to reach this level, the Pentagon will probably have to relax ‘dwell’ time standards even more.
“CBO’s report concludes that the cost of the President’s plan to ‘surge’ troops will be higher than previously indicated, both in dollar terms and in the burdens it places on our military.”
Asked by Sen. John Warner, R-Va., why he had not requested the full five extra brigades that Bush is sending, Casey said, "I did not want to bring one more American soldier into Iraq than was necessary to accomplish the mission."
With many in Congress opposing or skeptical of Bush's troop buildup, Casey did not say he opposed the president's decision. He said the full complement of five brigades would give U.S. commanders in Iraq additional, useful flexibility.
"In my mind, the other three brigades should be called forward after an assessment has been made on the ground" about whether they are needed to ensure success in Baghdad, Casey said. later.
The tens of thousands of foreign mercenaries fighting alongside coalition soldiers in Iraq aren't just tooling around in up-armored SUVs sporting submachine guns. These guys have got helicopters too that they use to escort convoys -- and one of them has just been shot down over Baghdad, according to the Associated Press:
Five civilians died in the Baghdad crash of a helicopter owned by the private security company Blackwater USA, according to a U.S. military official. The helicopter was shot down Tuesday over a predominantly Sunni neighborhood, a senior Iraqi defense official said. The crash came three days after a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter crashed northeast of Baghdad, killing all 12 soldiers aboard.
Blackwater should have seen this coming. Unlike U.S. military helicopters, which are armored and equipped with countermeasures to defeat shoulder-fired missiles, Blackwater's McDonnell Douglas MD-369FF Loaches are essentially defenseless, unless you count the two mercs hanging out the cabin doors with their rifles.
Note that Blackwater's choppers -- which fly from the same Green Zone helipad used by the U.S. Army and Marines -- are just civil versions of the Hughes OH-6 Cayuse that the Army began phasing out after the Vietnam War due to their vulnerability. U.S. Special Forces fly updated H-6s, but only at night, when it's safer. It's not clear what time of the day the Blackwater bird was shot down, but I've witnessed these choppers buzzing around in broad daylight.
It's too early to tell what this shoot-down means for Blackwater and for merc ops in Iraq. But one thing's for sure: with the military struggling to scare up another 20,000 troops for its so-called "surge," the demand for private soldiers isn't going away.
UPDATE 1/24/07: Four of the dead Blackwater men were apparently killed execution-style, perhaps after surviving the chopper crash, while the fifth was a member of a second chopper crew also at the site of the crash. All this according to the Associated Press:
In Washington, a U.S. defense official said four of the five killed were shot in the back of the head but did not know whether they were still alive when they were shot. The U.S. official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the record. ...
Another American official in Baghdad, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said three Blackwater helicopters were involved. One had landed for an unknown reason and one of the Blackwater employees was shot at that point, he said. That helicopter apparently was able to take off but a second one then crashed in the same area, he added without explaining the involvement of the third helicopter.
The New York Times, citing unnamed American officials, reported that the helicopter's four-man crew was killed along with a gunner on a second Blackwater helicopter.
Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association, an industry group that includes security contractors, said the type of helicopter downed, known as a "little bird," is among the safest modes of transportation in war zones.
"Their crews are the best -- they really know their stuff," he said in an e-mail. "They are very good at avoiding fire, flying low and fast -- and the tiny helicopters are very hard to hit."
Doug is a nice guy. But I'll put my money on Axe as the more objective observer.
UPDATE 01/24/07 11:07 AM: Robert Young Pelton has details on the incident -- and recent footage of Blackwater choppers in action.
Behind the Ethiopian Blitz
Today marks the launch of two blogs from two Defense Tech's most awesomest contributors. Site regulars Sharon Weinberger and David Axe have debuted Ares, a spinoff of Defense Technology International. Meanwhile, the Axe-man has begun his own blog, called War Is Boring. Expect frequent cross-posting. The launch post for both is Axe's analysis of Ethiopia's mechanized blitz through Somalia:
Ethiopia's tiny air force, which just four years ago was in danger of implosion, spearheaded last month's assault into southern Somalia to drive out Islamic Courts and their militia forces. Beginning on December 24, Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker fighter-bombers hit strategic targets and even struck ground troops while at least 3,000 Ethiopian soldiers – 8,000 according to the United Nations – supported by T-55 tanks, Mil Mi-24/35 Hind gunship helicopters and artillery darted more than 150 miles to surround Mogadishu in just seven days. By the first week of January, Islamic forces had fled to the southern tip of Somalia and a jungle enclave and were being tracked by U.S. aerial drones flying out of Djibouti. On Jan. 8, the last Islamic holdouts came under assault by U.S. and Ethiopian forces, signaling the imminent end of large-scale Islamic military resistance.
This is only the latest victory for a storied air service. The Ethiopian air force, then backed by Russia, defeated the powerful Ukrainian-supported Eritrean air force during the two nations' 1998-2000 border conflict. But the service suffered in post-war political crackdowns. Two senior officers, Major Daniel Beyene and Captain Teshome Tenkolu, were abducted by government security forces and reportedly held for years on suspicion of disloyalty. Beyene died last year, apparently assassinated, while Tenkolu and more than a dozen other pilots and technicians defected several years ago, Tenkolu while at the controls of an Aero L-39 jet trainer. Meanwhile, Ethiopia's MiG-21 Fishbed and MiG-23 Flogger fighters were becoming obsolescent.
But an improved Ethiopian political climate and a concerted effort to re-equip the air force and its sister services preceded the Somali fighting. Between 1998 and 2004, Ethiopia received around 16 Flankers plus a handful of Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes from Russia as well as several dozen Hinds and other helicopters. The army, for its part, bought around 100 pristine T-55 tanks from Bulgaria in addition to Russian- and U.S.-built self-propelled howitzers; these would arm the invasion force and likely inflict the majority of Islamic casualties. But it was Ethiopia's new fighter jets that elicited hysterical comments from Islamic Courts leaders in the days before the Ethiopian invasion. "I hope God will help us shoot down their planes," Sheik Mohamoud Ibrahim Suley told the Associated Press in December.
The Sukhois are the backbone of operations in Somalia and are the only jet types mentioned in press reports from the fighting. Jeffrey Gettleman of The New York Times claimed a jet even strafed the Mogadishu airport on Dec. 25. Hinds, too, have featured prominently in journalists' dispatches. One Hind was reportedly shot down on Dec. 25. Professor Abdiweli Ali from Niagara University, who claims to have contacts with pro-Ethiopian Somali commanders, told Pajama Media that the Islamic Courts were armed with Russian should-fired surface-to-air missiles but had failed to hit the mostly high-flying Ethiopian aircraft. It's not clear what brought down the Hind.
The effectiveness of the Ethiopian air campaign came as a surprise to at least one observer. "There's nothing significant to bomb ... that would really affect the Islamic Courts," Professor Terrence Lyons from George Mason University said at a Dec. 15 Council on Foreign Relations event. Lyons perhaps neglected the disproportionate effects of combined air-ground operations, as demonstrated by U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan in 2001. The Ethiopian air force apparently worked in close coordination with ground forces. If doctrine applied during the 1998-2000 border war is still current, the majority of Ethiopian air strikes within sight of friendly ground forces in Somalia were guided by ground-based forward air controllers. (During international mediation of damage claims following the war with Eritrea, the Ethiopian government insisted that of hundreds of attack sorties launched by its air force, only 20 were executed without ground controllers.)
In Somalia, Flankers hit airports, roads, ammo dumps, Islamic militia camps and convoys – disrupting transport, communications and emergency re-supply – while T-55s sporting external fuel tanks crawled south ahead of self-propelled howitzers. Hinds flew top cover and even dropped 250-kilogram gravity bombs. Mil Mi-17 medevac choppers evacuated wounded troops. Helicopters kept pace with the ground advance by way of forward operating bases.
These heavy forces faced just a few thousand Islamic troops boasting nothing heavier than "technicals" – pickup trucks hauling heavy machine guns. There were reports of Eritrean forces aiding the Islamists and even swapping artillery barrages with the invaders; if true, this resistance hardly slowed the Ethiopian advance. The Ethiopian government claims 1,000 Islamist fighters killed while declining to cite its own, surely lighter, losses.
What role the United States has played in Ethiopia's initial success is unclear. For years, the Pentagon has reported only around $200 million annually in military aid to Ethiopia, mostly in the form of technical assistance for aircraft. This assistance might be related to the 1995 U.S. donation of four used Lockheed Martin C-130B Hercules transports.
Training support is another matter. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. soldiers headquartered in Djibouti have instructed Ethiopian troops in infantry tactics. "This goes from troop-leading procedures to react to contact, break contact, reconnaissance, patrolling, vehicle searches and so on," Army 1st Lt. Christopher Anderson told a military journalist in April.
"They love it and eat it up," Sgt. Ryan Castro said in the same article. "A part of this class is short-range marksmanship. The Ethiopian army shoots maybe ten rounds a year. Here, they went through 400 to 500 rounds in a week."
This murky relationship is getting clearer. On Jan. 8, CBS news reported attacks by a U.S. Air Force Boeing AC-130 Spectre gunship on Islamic forces in southern Somalia. CBS also mentioned supporting operations by unspecified U.S. aerial drones, most likely General Atomics RQ-1 Predators based alongside the Spectres in Djibouti. Meanwhile, the U.S.S. Eisenhower aircraft carrier and her battlegroup departed their station in the Arabian Sea and headed towards the Somali coast, apparently to support further operations against "terrorist" forces in Somalia.
What happens next in Somalia is anyone's guess. In weeks of furious fighting, Ethiopian forces proved effective at conducting fast-moving, conventional air-ground operations leveraging one of the world's most advanced fighter jets. Whether the same forces will succeed or even attempt to provide post-conflict security remains to be seen.
Twelve days ago, Peter Singer broke the story here, that private military contractors were going to be subject to the same laws as soldiers. Since then, big media outlets from the Boston Globe to the Financial Times have picked up on Singer's scoop. Today, it's the Washington Post'sturn. The paper puts the story on the front page.
"Right now, you have two different standards for people doing the same job," said Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), who pushed the provision. "This will bring uniformity to the commander's ability to control the behavior of people representing our country."
Graham, an Air Force Reserve lawyer, said the change will help morale in the field. "If the troops see someone getting away with something that hurts the overall mission, that is a morale buster," he said.
Under military law, known as the Uniform Code of Military Justice, commanders have wide latitude in deciding who should be prosecuted. Crimes include many that have parallels in civilian courts -- murder and rape, for instance -- as well as many that don't, such as disobeying an order, fraternization and adultery.
Legal experts say that latitude is one reason why attempting to hold civilians to the same standards as U.S. troops could be a messy process. It is also likely to raise constitutional challenges: Civilians prosecuted in military court don't receive a grand jury hearing and are ultimately tried by members of the military, rather than by a jury of their peers...
To try to solve the problem, Rep. David E. Price (D-N.C.) introduced legislation last week that he said would strengthen MEJA [the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which supposedly expand federal prosecutors' authority to foreign battlefields], an option he considers superior to using military law. "Military law is not appropriate for civilians," Price said. "The constitutional questions just confuse the issue."
The New York Times also gives our lil' site a shout-out over the scoop, in the "What's Online" column.
Bush Authorized Anti-Iran Raids
I was a little skeptical, when some blog-buddies started worrying that the President had "declare[d] 'secret war' against Syria and Iran" in his speech this week. But events may be proving them right, after all.
“There has been a decision to go after these networks,” Ms. Rice said...
Ms. Rice said Mr. Bush had acted “after a period of time in which we saw increasing activity” among Iranians in Iraq, “and increasing lethality in what they were producing.” She was referring to what American military officials say is evidence that many of the most sophisticated improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.’s, being used against American troops were made in Iran.
"Surge": Some Good News (Updated Again)
I just spent a couple of minutes on a White House conference call on the troop increase. There wasn't a ton of new information, unsurprisingly. But there was one, teeny-tiny encouraging tidbit: at least some U.S. soldiers are going to be redeployed from their massive bases, and spend 24/7 in Baghdad itself.
The city will be divided into 9 sections. Each will get a brigade of 2500 Iraq troops. And joined to that brigade will be an American combat battalion of 650 men. These people will live, full-time, "in the neighborhoods themselves," White House chief flack Tony Snow says. Unlike before, when U.S. troops would often take a 'hood -- and then head right back to their bases.
Those were smaller cities, however. Baghdad is a city of six million. An extra 5,000 U.S. troops there full-time is nice. Is it really enough?
UPDATE 4:41 PM: "President Bush tonight is expected to announce plans to increase the permanent size of U.S. ground forces by as many as 90,000 uniformed personnel," Inside Defense is reporting.
UPDATE 6:28 PM: OK, this is potentially interesting, too. "The rules of engagement governing where troops could and couldn't go were severely restricted by politics in Baghdad during previous operations," says a White
After three years of training by coalition forces – and nonstop combat with insurgents – Iraqi army and police units are battle-hardened, highly motivated and skilled in battlefield drills. “At the tactical level ... we're doing quite well,” says Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, a senior official in the coalition training organization. “They’re fighting, 
Ongoing “surge” operations in Baghdad are doubling as training opportunities for Iraqi soldiers, 
"
That's because the combat units that President Bush wants to send into hostile areas need to be backed up by support troops, "including personnel to staff headquarters, serve as military police, and provide communications, contracting, engineering, intelligence, medical, and other services," the CBO notes.
Ethiopia's tiny air force, which just four years ago was in danger of implosion, spearheaded last month's assault into southern Somalia to drive out Islamic Courts and their militia forces. Beginning on December 24, 
In Somalia, Flankers hit airports, roads, ammo dumps, Islamic militia camps and convoys – disrupting transport, communications and emergency re-supply – while T-55s sporting external fuel tanks crawled south ahead of self-propelled howitzers. Hinds flew top cover and even dropped 250-kilogram gravity bombs. 
Twelve days ago, Peter Singer 
I just spent a couple of minutes on a White House conference call on the troop increase. There wasn't a ton of new information, unsurprisingly. But there was one, teeny-tiny encouraging tidbit: at least some U.S. soldiers are going to be redeployed from their massive bases, and spend 24/7 in Baghdad itself.