In the midst of a deeply entrenched identity crisis, the U.S. Air Force is turning to technology as the potential answer to some of its problems.

Air Force Chief Scientist Werner Dahm is conducting a sweeping "Technology Horizons" study to lay out technological opportunities that could produce useful applications for the service.

"I don't think in the history of the Air Force we've been at a turning point like this. Maybe the closest was the Sputnik launch," Dahm tells Aviation Week. "What does the Air Force do when it is faced with a radically different future? Part of what it does is reach into its science and technology domain."

The study will look 20 years ahead, with an eye toward implementing near-term investment decisions aimed at producing relevant military systems. "We are not talking about pie in the sky," Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz said last month.

The Air Force spends roughly $2 billion annually on science and technology projects, as much as the rest of the Defense Dept. spends on similar research. The goal of Dahm's review is to identify those projects that could realistically change how the Air Force accomplishes its missions -- such as the advent of the GPS constellation. The results are expected in late February.

Air Force Secretary Michael Donley and Schwartz entered office last year with a slew of immediate problems, including mismanagement of the nuclear arsenal and rampant procurement missteps. The global financial recession has also tightened the Pentagon's budget amid the wars in Iraq in Afghanistan.

"We are going to have to envision and articulate things that are realistically doable in the likely budget environment that we are going to face in the next decade or two," Dahm says. There has been much criticism of the Air Force's sharp focus on air superiority, which led it to procure fifth-generation fighters at great expense. Some say this focus came at the sacrifice of other efforts, such as irregular warfare (IW) technologies.

"What we have to do is to figure out how do we augment [today's capabilities] with some carefully chosen new capabilities that allow those systems to contribute to all of the threats that we face today -- the IW threat, the cyber-threat and [operating] in the space environment," Dahm says.

The study is being executed by 36 leaders from academia, the defense research community, major commands and industry. They are broken into three working groups -- air, space and cyber. The groups began their efforts soon after in the study's June 18 launch. The second phase begins this month and is "where a lot of gold will lie," Dahm says. The participants will address "cross-domain" technologies that could enhance warfighting efforts in a number of areas and across the spectrum of major conflict operations and insurgent fights.

Read the rest of this story, see an ejection-seat view of the Parthenon, ponder why the Aussies are scared of subs down under and roll out the stars and stripes for Euro-Hawk with our friends at Aviation Week, exclusively on Military.com.

-- Christian

Well, there's more to the GAO report on Army ESAPI plate testing than meets the eye.

With only a couple references thrown in early on, it's easy to miss it. But a sharp eyed researcher at the Project on Government Oversight who called me today to ask a few questions did my job better than I and raised an issue I should have pounced on.

It turns out, the Army did its ESAPI tests at Aberdeen instead of HP White not because DOT&E requested it, but because "one manufacturer of flexible small arms protective vests, which had failed previous testing conducted for the Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier at an NIJ-certified facility, made allegations that the PEO Soldier and the facility had wrongly failed its designs."

Okay folks, who do you think that is?

So it turns out our reporting in October of '08 was spot on that the Army deemed the technology too immature to field deployable Flexible-SAP systems. The GAO fills in some blanks, saying (not sure how many) vendors sent in samples of a Flexible Small Arms Protective Vest-Enhanced and FSAPV-X and shot them at Aberdeen between February and June of '08.

In October 2008, on the basis of the Preliminary Design Model testing results, the Army awarded four 5-year indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts at a total of over $8 billion for the production of the ESAPI and the XSAPI—two categories of ceramic plates. No FSAPV-E or FSAPV-X solutions passed the testing.

Now this gets back to our boy Allan Bain's contention that flexible systems need a whole new test methodology different from the Army's current one (that failed the FSAPs in '08)...but that's a debate for another post.

(Gouge: MS)

-- Christian

My colleague Jamie McIntyre has a post over on his new blog, The Line of Departure, on the Osprey's pending deployment to Afghanistan.

He forwards some intel from the Rainman of all things Osprey, Rick Whittle, who covered the plane as a reporter for the Dallas Morning News and took the buyout a few years ago to write his upcoming book on the helo/fixed wing hybrid transport "The Dream Machine: The untold story of the notorious V-22 Osprey."

I've worked with Rick a lot on stories back in his regular journalism days and I consider him a friend and colleague. He forwarded a note to Jamie giving his take on the deployment, which is now set for November, and I invite you to read the whole post at TLOD.

“This is the first deployment to Afghanistan — and it should be the acid test, given the terrain and climate and the fact that Al Qaeda and the Taliban will surely be gunning for the aircraft if they see it. The Osprey didn’t get shot at much in Iraq because it was flying mainly in Anbar province, which was pretty peaceful at that time. It flew well in Iraq, even in searing heat, but most of that country is barely above sea level. Rotorcraft lose performance at higher altitudes and in hot temperatures, and Afghanistan is pretty high and hot.

Rick's got a point, though I would caveat it with the fact that in all likelihood the Ospreys will be operating mostly in support of RC-South where the capitol of Helmand provide sits at around 3,400 feet in elevation. I'd be interested to see the inside scoop on whether the Osprey can take off and land in a full-on hover in the altitudes of RC-East, though I suspect like with lots of helos (even the CH-47) there are some weight and landing altitude restrictions that will bracket the Osprey's operations.

But don't get all excited about helicopter assault missions and stuff either. Yes, some Marine units deployed for combat operations via CH-53s earlier this summer, but I doubt seriously those chomping for a Robert's Ridge style air assault test will get what they're asking for.

I will say this however, the Marine Corps refuses to speak on the record whether VMM-261 is taking its own aircraft or will fall in on aircraft in the area (the 22 MEU has Ospreys aboard its amphibs). If the squadron takes its own aircraft, would it self-deploy them or ship them over? We all know the answer to that one.

The excuse given is that alternatively the Marine Corps is worried about "operational security" by talking about how and when the planes will get there. Don't worry folks, I cried foul on that one, but was still denied any details. I was then told that the Corps was hoping to reduce the stress any media attention would have on the squadron so best not to say anything which would prompt more questions...

Why the paranoia? Does the Corps worry about opsec when it talks F-18, Harrier, Cobra, 53 and 46 squadron deployments...yes, to some extent, but there isn't a media blackout on it like there is here. Just what is the service worried about? Didn't Iraq prove that the plane could do what it was billed to do? Why still the first time jitters? Or is it, as my boss suspects, that there's something to hide here? Miserable mission capable rates, poor maintenance support, deteriorating parts etc.

I'm still on it, but let's energize the grid to get some answers folks.

Also, one last thing -- still checking up on the deployment of the Remote Guardian gun system. We reported that the Corps planned to arm the Afghanistan MV-22s with the underbelly gun, but now there's some doubt based on the mystery surrounding which planes will be part of the deployment. The 22 MEU birds don't have the guns, and I'm not sure if the 261 planes have it either...so can the system be retrofitted in country?

-- Christian

Now back to the M-4 COP Kahler/OP Topside debate.

I spoke with Col. Doug Tamilio, Program Manager for Soldier Weapons and Rich Audette, the Soldier Weapons deputy PM on Oct. 15 about the findings in a draft report on the so called "Battle of Wanat" that called out the M4 and the M-249 for multiple failures at "high cyclic rates" during the battle.

We've had a bit of a back and forth on this issue here at DT: was it a fundamental flaw with the M4 or was it a problem of leadership? Both sides are well represented here, but I thought I'd give the Army its say in this debate.

Tamilio said he was surprised with the findings and that he did not agree with the author's call for a systematic look at the M4's ability to keep up at high rates of fire.

"To date, I have never had a Soldier or a commander or an NCO come up to me and say 'these weapons are terrible'...Now I'm just talking about the M4. we don't get anything, no feedback, and you know if there was a serious issue out there somewhere in eight years of fighting with all the battles that we've had we would have some serious data."

Obviously Tamilio is defending his service's rifle, but he has a point. We all know that there are less maintenance-intensive options out there for troops who do their work in dusty environments (which is just about everywhere except the arctic and the jungle). But this issue of high rates of fire hasn't been brought up earlier.

The requirement for the M4 "mean time between stoppage" is 600 rounds. But Tamilio said today it demonstrates "3,600 rounds before stoppage...So that's a world-class weapon."

Tamilio said there are some "inconsistencies" between the draft history report and what he read and heard just after the battle. "We talked to the unit sergeant major a year ago and the report is not what I got first hand from him."

"I truly believe that some of these Soldiers fired so many rounds so quickly that could that happen? Yes," he added, explaining that he'd done tests with SOCOM where they fired 560 rounds in two minutes before the barrel warped.

"We knew this happened," Tamilio said. "We interviewed the unit, talked to them and then went on about our business because we didn't at that time think we had any issues with the M4 in that incident."

-- Christian

Basically, if you ignore the dorky soundtrack and the jingoistic Bush quotes injected into the audio, this video has some very impressive imagery. I'm amazed at the clarity of the IR vid. But most of all, can someone in the DT audience explain to me how these gunships can seemingly surprise these bad guys like they do? I mean, these helos aren't THAT quiet and they seem to stay there for a while.

Help me here...

(And PS -- for those of you who've patrolled the mean streets of Iraq, you'll appreciate the sense of "get some"...I know I did...)

-- Christian]]> http://www.defensetech.org/archives/005070.html http://www.defensetech.org/archives/005070.html Video Lounge lowe Tue, 20 Oct 2009 07:48:38 -0500 http://www.defensetech.org/archives/microfeed/005070.xml In another case of damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don't, the Army's getting zinged by the GAO on its armor testing procedure. We reported on the investigation that prompted this GAO look earlier this year, but the long and the short of it is that government auditors found flaws in how the Army was testing the first prototypes of its more powerful AP-round-stopping X-SAPI. The GAO recommended a host of independent audits, test procedure modifications and other "oversight" as it normally does. And the Army, in a statement, largely agreed with the idea that more oversight is better: The Department of the Army announced today that it has established additional quality control measures to further ensure that body armor testing documentation and procurement processes are rigorous, consistent, and use available best practices. To this end, the Army has added several quality control positions to include a Senior Executive Service position as the quality assurance director of personal protective equipment. This new senior-level position will report directly to the Army Acquisition Executive. These changes address issues raised in a GAO report... In the interest of full disclosure, I was invited to attend an Army press briefing on their response to the GAO report on Friday...

In another case of damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don't, the Army's getting zinged by the GAO on its armor testing procedure.

We reported on the investigation that prompted this GAO look earlier this year, but the long and the short of it is that government auditors found flaws in how the Army was testing the first prototypes of its more powerful AP-round-stopping X-SAPI.

The GAO recommended a host of independent audits, test procedure modifications and other "oversight" as it normally does. And the Army, in a statement, largely agreed with the idea that more oversight is better:

The Department of the Army announced today that it has established additional quality control measures to further ensure that body armor testing documentation and procurement processes are rigorous, consistent, and use available best practices. To this end, the Army has added several quality control positions to include a Senior Executive Service position as the quality assurance director of personal protective equipment. This new senior-level position will report directly to the Army Acquisition Executive. These changes address issues raised in a GAO report...

In the interest of full disclosure, I was invited to attend an Army press briefing on their response to the GAO report on Friday but got tied up and couldn't make it.

The bottom line remains what I indicated last year when the IG found test flaws: armor testing is as much art as it is science. The GAO wants oversight independent of the government, while others level sharp criticism over the Army's continued use of HP White Labs in Street, MD, for its armor testing -- believing doing so would make their results more unbiased since Aberdeen is essentially an Army command.

Now the GAO says Aberdeen is jacked up...ugh...

The armor testing community is a small one, I can think of only three labs in the US with testing experience for personal body armor with government contracts. With the science of armor materials and designs clashing constantly with threat modalities the ability to verify product effectiveness is constantly changing. I think the testers' heads are in the right place, but clearly there needs to be one standard and some over the shoulder checking.

As duplicitous as the Army can be with its armor claims ("The Best Body Armor in the World Bar None"), I tend to believe that since the microscope on armor and testing has swung so squarely on the service, they're loath to bob and weave to save their own skin on this one. But we'll see...

-- Christian

Over the past year cyber exploitation activity has grown more sophisticated, more targeted, and more serious. The Global Intelligence Community believes these trends to continue in the coming year. With the realization of the true threat we face from acts of cyber aggression comes a demand for highly qualified resources to protect our information assets and defend our critical infrastructure.

High end recruiting firms like SecurityRecruiter.com that focus on management and leadership are busy these days. The demand is clearly across the entire spectrum from analysts to senior level management positions. Did you know that it has been estimated that only about 30 percent of people can pass a security clearance background investigation? In that past three weeks I personally have had calls/messages from 11 different recruiters seeking candidates for some senior level positions, many of which are around the beltway. This is clearly evidence that the demand for cyber security professional is high and growing. The bullets below also provide insight into the demand growth.

• DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano plans to hire 1,000 security experts over the next three years.
• DoD is expected to recruit, train or contract for nearly 50,000 security experts within the next few years
• A search on cyber security at ClearanceJobs.Com resulted in 284 openings
• A search on cyber security at Monster.Com resulted in 234 openings

Each and every day, each and every hour, cyber attacks are waged against a wide variety of targets on millions of computers and networks around the world. Where will all these trained resources come from to defend against these acts of cyber aggression? One recruiter told me that cyber security positions now demand that candidates have current and relevant training and maintain their level of competency as the threat environment changes.

She went on to say that many candidates stop going to continuing education programs once they get certified, and that is a big mistake. The educational requirements and certifications coupled with the ability to obtain a security clearance will combine to make this a challenge for security firms, the government and military, as well as intelligence organizations around the world.

(Photo: Lockheed Martin)

-- Kevin Coleman

Why wouldn't you just sign up after watching this?

Great video posted by DoD Buzz commenter Daniel Russ at CivilianMilitaryIntelligenceGroup.com.

Have a great weekend.

-- Christian

We wrote about this back in March...that industry was skeptical that the Army would seriously pursue a subcompact rifle for Joes who can't carry an M4 but need the punch of a rifle in a pistol package (truck drivers, tankers, pilots, officers).

Well, after talking with Col. Doug Tamilio yesterday about the Wanat report, I came away with the story that the service seems as least to be pretty enthusiastic about the weapon and will move forward on its development.

You saw the teaser yesterday, so I'll give you a bit more, but I ask that you read the entire story over at Military.com.

I'll post more on my interview regarding the Wanat report and other topics later this morning.

The Army's preliminary evaluation tested a host of weapons in different scenarios and conditions, their accuracy at different ranges and how well Joes could control the small weapons with a big punch while firing.

"We tested how Soldiers worked with those weapons and what seems to work form, fit and function better than others," Tamilio explained. "We got some great data on that."

Though Tamilio wouldn't say who participated in the evaluation, an industry source said that about six manufacturers may have submitted weapons for the shoot.

The search for a weapon that delivers a Mike Tyson punch in Sugar Ray Leonard package was included in an Army solicitation last year for a possible alternative to the M-4 carbine. The solicitation left open size, weight, barrel length and caliber, but many companies had already developed so-called personal defense weapons, or PDWs, for contract security teams and other covert operators.

"We found out a lot of good things," Tamilio said of the early summer evaluation. "There are a lot of good weapons out there [and] Soldiers can hit accurately, hit very well with all of the weapons that were out there."

"So now it comes down to what are the best parts of all of these?"

Officials with the Army's soldier weapons office said the Army Infantry School is working on final requirements for the subcompact weapon, and while it may be two years before a Joe commanding a supply convoy gets to sling one of these bantam bad boys, Army officials are moving with deliberate speed to get the program in gear.

"We got a lot of great data," Tamilio added. "So, now as the Infantry School writes the requirement they'll be more informed on what they're looking for."

-- Christian

We also ran a story on this weapon about a year ago.

Allons! so they say...;-)

And oh, yeah, stay tuned to Military.com tomorrow for a story I've got posting on the Army's subcompact weapon search. Here's a teaser:

Despite initial industry suspicion that the Army would let the effort die a slow death, the service is moving forward with the development of a compact weapon that shoots like a rifle but slings like a sub gun.

According to the Army official in charge of fielding new weapons for the service, the search for a so-called "subcompact individual weapon system" is moving ahead in earnest. In May, the Army sponsored a user evaluation where Soldiers put subcompact weapons through their paces to see if the idea would stick.

And at least for the brass running the show, it did.

"I'm excited about the subcompact," said Col. Doug Tamilio, the Army program manager for Soldier weapons, during an Oct. 15 interview with Military.com. "There are a lot of Soldiers today who do not need to carry either a carbine or an M-16, but yet a pistol may just not be enough."

-- Christian

His books, Mukiwa and When a Crocodile Eats the Sun, are some of the finest narratives on southern Africa war and politics that I've read. Mukiwa, in particular, lays out simple COIN principles so effectively it should be mandatory reading prior to an Afghanistan or Iraq deployment. Head over to Small Wars Journal to read and discuss.

--John Noonan

Just yesterday I was chatting with a source and he was saying how Iraq had made Soldiers lazy or complacent because of the relative convenience of the fighting there (close, vehicle borne engagements in primarily urban settings) whereas Afghanistan stressed old school soldiering skills that were last seen in Vietnam.

One of the things he mentioned was using local foliage to camouflage your outline, and low and behold, here's a Soldier (clearly a designated marksman with his souped up M14) who's destined for Ranger school.

U.S. Army Sgt. Zachary Adkins, from Sweetland, W.Va., conducts a dismounted patrol with his platoon near Combat Outpost Herrera, Paktiya province, Afghanistan, Oct. 11. The Soldiers were searching for sites from which the Taliban has been using to fire rockets at the outpost. Adkins is deployed with Apache Troop, 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment.

-- Christian

I just want to be clear (and perhaps I should have posted the full excerpt or the link to the report) but the Soldiers at COP Kahler and OP Topside did use claymores in their defense and had built well thought out defenseive barriers and wire.

The 2nd Platoon, Chosen Company leadership made the best possible utilization of Class IV (construction materials) assets available at Wanat. All available Concertina wire was installed, and all available concertina stakes and poles were utilized. All available HESCOs were emplaced, and based upon limitations of the construction equipment available at Wanat (a single Bobcat with bulldozer blade that ran out of gas on July 11th and 12th) all available HESCOs were filled to the maximum extent possible. All available sandbags were maximized. All available weapon systems were positioned with established fields of fire and range cards. With the exception of weapons systems either suppressed or destroyed by the ACM, all weapon systems had been emplaced such that they could be successfully employed during the engagement. Available hand tools were maximized, and given the tools available the positions were excavated to the greatest depth feasible.

And on the use of claymores, it wasn't that they didn't use them, it's that they didn't use them effectively...

Insufficient numbers of Claymore mines were positioned to control the dead ground to the north, east and south of OP Topside (only four Claymores were thus employed). At OP Topside the Claymore mines were simply placed atop the ground. Claymore mines were properly tested by the soldiers, and the three Claymore mines whose wires were not damaged functioned correctly. Claymore mines were only emplaced after darkness at OP Topside, which was an effective TTP. However, the limited numbers and failure to have overlapping Claymore fields of fire is evidence that Claymores were not employed to their maximum effectiveness at OP Topside. Of the four Claymore Anti-Personnel mines emplaced at OP Topside at Wanat, one of them had its wires severed by a nearby RPG detonation, rendering it unusable. A second Claymore was either knocked over by the RPG detonations, fell over for some other reason, or was deliberately turned around by the ACM. There was no way for the defenders of OP Topside to know that this Claymore mine had either fallen over or been tampered with. The other two Claymore mines functioned as intended, and at least one killed an ACM insurgent in the act of crossing the wire.

And this is sort of along the point of what Byron, atacms and Mat are getting at in their comments on the previous post...Afghanistan is tactically more like Vietnam than Iraq ever was (at least eastern Afghanistan is) and I was talking to a source about this yesterday...time to dust off the old school firebase defense plans and agressive patrolling and search and destroy missions, maybe. If you couple that with a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy that's well resourced not incremental, then we might be able to eek one out.

And for those of you questioning the leadership and training (as I did a bit), here's another thing the official history (draft) said:

2nd Platoon leadership maintained high standards of discipline within the platoon. Numerous candid photographs taken by soldiers at COP Kahler from 9-12 July do not evince a single instance of soldiers being out of proper uniform, or not wearing their personal protective equipment. CONOP Rock Move came at the end of a 15-month deployment, but no degradation of discipline could be documented, or was reported by members of the platoon. Rigid adherence to high standards of discipline, to particularly include the “stand-to” measures that permitted the platoon to successfully withstand the determined attack, reflect great credit upon the leadership of 2nd Platoon and Chosen Company. “Stand To” at 04:00 (approx 75 minutes before BMNT) resulted in the garrison of COP Kahler being alert, awake, all defensive positions were fully manned, and all soldiers were fully equipped and armed prior to attack being launched. This standard defensive measure, first documented by Major Robert Rogers of Rogers Rangers in 1755, and meticulously implemented by 2nd Platoon leadership, prevented disaster.

I leave you with that for now...I'll have more on the weapons issue later this afternoon...

-- Christian

When's the last time you emplaced a claymore mine? When's the last time you've even seen one?

I'm sure I'll get a few of the 'you're an idiot' comments, but in several trips to Afghanistan and Iraq -- as well as multiple trips to the field for training with a variety of Marine and Army units -- I have never once seen or heard of claymores being used or trained for employment. That's not to say it doesn't happen, it's just that I've had a pretty good pass over a lot of the modern military and never once did I run into any (figuratively, of course)...

And that's a shame, because what a great piece of gear...

Well, more from the Wanat history -- seems the institutional Army needs to take a closer look at claymore training and employment.

American soldiers require additional and enhanced training in tactical employment of claymore mines. Claymore mines were integral to controlling and denying the dead ground around OP Topside, and were not optimally employed to accomplish this task. Claymore mines were not employed at COP Kahler, although they could have proven to be extremely efficient at controlling the dead ground in the ravine to the west and north of the COP’s perimeter...

However, the limited numbers and failure to have overlapping Claymore fields of fire is evidence that Claymores were not employed to their maximum effectiveness at OP Topside.

Claymore mines should always be employed in depth, with the rear Claymores employed and recovered after darkness, all firing wires buried, and all Claymores should have their rear highlighted with visible markings (chemical lights, reflective tape, IR glitter tape, white paint, etc.) so that any enemy disturbing or tampering with Claymores can be readily detected, and deterred by the employment of covering Claymores or other suppressive fire. The effective use of Claymore mines needs to be emphasized, and additional numbers of Claymore mines should be deployed for the defense of static positions. Doctrine and TTPs for Claymore mine employment need to be enhanced and strengthened. This recommendation should be addressed by the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned and by TRADOC service schools, particularly the Infantry School.

Now, I did take a look at a copy of the Small Unit Operations in Afghanistan handbook recently compiled by the Center for Army Lessons Learned in Leavenworth. It mentions the use of "mines" and claymores in the defense of COPs, JCCs and OPs but doesn't go into very much detail at all.

Like the water purification callout, maybe it's time for more training and better technology with the claymore...

-- Christian

We're still finding out more details on the report that weapons failures plagued the Soldiers defending positions in the battle of Wanat.

I wanted to pass along some thoughts from a very tapped in source of ours who warned me that A) The final report has not been released and that I am basing my take on the "draft" version and B) don't confuse jams due to recirculated gas with malfunctions resulting from high rates of fire.

My source said that he suspects the NCOs interviewed in the report are probably being "taken to task by their peers" for not enforcing fire discipline. He said this issue could be more of a training and leadership problem rather than a weapons one and added that despite its current unpopularity in the face of new Gucci guns, the M16 family of weapons has served the U.S. military very well "longer than any other rifle."

Absolutely agree 100 percent.

I'm cautious about blaming the preliminary findings on the M4s operating system and can understand how, like Cole Trickle in Days of Thunder, you can "do it deliberate" by running the gun so hard it can't take anymore. But another source who was in on the political side of the debate early on last year told me there is a problem with the M4's system that when it's operated under high rates of fire, it melts the gas tube, where as the short stroke gas-piston design can run longer on high rates of fire without degrading.

Again, this is a debate with many facets. I'm hoping to talk to an Army small arms official very soon who can help provide the service's perspective on what might be going on here.

On another note, my tapped in source said that the SCAR has been received with limited enthusiasm by special operators in the field. He says that the SCAR, to him, is a step backward. He's freaked out by the reciprocating bolt and other features that make it "just nuts, ergonomically." He did say however that his gouge says that the Mk17 7.62 is a "tack driver" in the precision gas gun role and that the Mk16 is only being used in special circumstances and not as a general patrol rifle.

...his $.02 that I thought I'd pass along.

More TK...

-- Christian